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This thesis seeks to answer the question how should the criminal law of England 
and Wales respond to the relationship between culture and legal responsibility? 
It undertakes a socio-legal and interdisciplinary analysis of the  relationship 
between culture and legal responsibility within the parameters of (i) the 
foundations, practice and policy of the criminal law of and criminal justice system 
in England and Wales; and (ii) understandings of multiculturalism as social reality, 
policy and philosophy within the socio-political system of the United Kingdom in 
the twenty first century. The analysis therefore draws on theory, practice and 
policy to develop a renewed and specifically nuanced ‘culture-responsibility 
relationship’, distinguishable from the ‘cultural defence’, and its importance for 
contemporary justice is established. Evidence  is presented to confirm that the 
criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales manifest an 
absence of consistent and coherent engagement with culture and with the 
culture-responsibility relationship. Multicultural policy in turn manifests an 
absence of engagement with the criminal law. These omissions need to be 
addressed. A practical and policy-facing framework for the place of the culture-
responsibility relationship in the criminal law and criminal justice system of 
England and Wales is therefore suggested. This reflects the current limits of the 
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CHAPTER 1  
CONTEXT AND OVERVIEW  
 
‘Culture - like religion and nation and race - provides a source of identity for 
contemporary human beings. And like all three it can become a form of 
confinement, conceptual mistakes underwriting moral ones.’1 
1.1 Introduction 
The research question at the heart of the thesis asks ‘how should the criminal law 
of England and Wales respond to the relationship between culture and individual 
legal responsibility?’ The question arises from the hypothesis that there is an 
absence of consistent and coherent engagement between the concepts of culture 
and legal responsibility in the practice of our criminal law and at policy level. There 
is, arguably, a relationship or at least the perception of a relationship between 
culture and responsibility and throughout the thesis this will be called the ‘culture-
responsibility relationship’. The existence of this relationship needs to be firmly 
recognised, its essence understood and its importance for contemporary criminal 
justice established.  The thesis can be seen as a case study that problematises 
the culture-responsibility relationship within the wider socio-legal context of the 
failure of the criminal law to embrace the presence of cultural diversity both 
historically and in the early years of the twenty first century and within the still 
                                                        
1 Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘There is no Such Thing as Western Civilisation’ The Guardian  
(London, 9 Nov 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-
appiah-reith-lecture> accessed 28th September 2018. 
Appiah Writing in The Guardian on 9th November 2016 following the 2016 Reith Lectures on 




wider political realm of addressing the tension that cultural diversity brings to a 
liberal democracy under the Rule of Law.  
With a view to achieving the fullest possible understanding of the culture-
responsibility relationship within this wider domain, this thesis looks to a number 
of sources.  As well as law, political theory on multiculturalism, social, political 
and legal theory concerned with justice and the disciplines of anthropology, 
sociology, philosophy and criminology are all drawn upon. This is not a new 
approach and there is a small body of academic literature that addresses the 
difficult intersection of criminal law and cultural diversity in this way.  This thesis 
takes existing work a step further, developing a nuanced and specific 
understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship and undertaking a 
systematic review of the practice and policy of the criminal law and criminal justice 
system in England and Wales and of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom with 
a view to suggesting a framework for the ongoing development of that newly 
refined relationship. The thesis therefore adopts a socio-legal and truly 
interdisciplinary approach to the research question and means that the practice 
based and policy-facing framework suggested in Chapter 5 is theoretically 
grounded and roundly considered.2 
Law and culture are inseparable but a cultural hegemony has been presumed 
and, as Cotterrell points out, in the past culture seemed ‘irrelevant’ or 
                                                        
2 There has been a movement in recent years towards interdisciplinary academic research. This 
stems in law from the ‘Law and Society’ movement ‘…a scholarly enterprise that explains legal 
or social phenomena in social terms.’ Lawrence M. Friedman, ‘The Law and Society Movement’ 
(1986) 38(3) Stanford Law Review 763,763. Feminist methodology is also drawn upon because 
of the gendered implications of the culture-responsibility relationship, discussed in section 2.4. 
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‘unproblematic’ in legal thinking.3  Multiculturalism has certainly made culture 
relevant and arguably problematic and this difficulty has manifested itself most 
controversially in the concept of the ‘cultural defence’.  Foblets and Renteln 
assert that courts worldwide have entertained arguments based on cultural 
factors for centuries, but it is generally accepted that there is no recognized 
defence based on ‘culture’ in the criminal law of England and Wales.4  Consider 
then these three cases across place and time. Firstly, Mr Purefoy, ‘a man of 
perfect honour and humanity’, tried for causing the death of an opponent during 
a duel in 1794. Baron Hotham directed the jury, gathered from the duelling class, 
to reconcile the facts to their conscience and acquit ‘…though the verdict may 
trench upon rules of rigid law, yet the verdict will be lovely in the sight of God and 
Man.’5 Why? Duels were seen in society as a matter of ‘honour’ and thus outside 
the law of murder.6 This was so despite the clear statement of law by Judge 
Foster in 1762 that ‘…deliberate duelling, if death ensueth, is in the eye of the 
law murder, for duels are normally founded in deep revenge.’7 Despite over 400 
deaths in duelling from 1785-1845 Banks reports that between 1815 and 1845 
there were only 11 duelling trials resulting in 7 acquittals, 2 manslaughter 
convictions (based on provocation) and 2 murder convictions (but with the capital 
penalty reduced to 12 months in prison in each case). Colonel Campbell was the 
only British duellist convicted of murder and given the death penalty in the 
                                                        
3 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality’ (2009) 40 (4) 
Journal of Law and Society 373, 407. 
4 Marie-Claire Foblets and Alison Renteln Dundes (eds), Multicultural Jurisprudence: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009). 
In Baronet v Allain two French men were accused of duelling and refused bail in the way that 
English men would have been refused bail. Their culture was not relevant in any way to the bail 
decision or to questions of guilt.  Baronet v Allain [1852] 169 ER 633. 
5 Baron Hotham as quoted in Stephen Banks, ‘Very Little Law in the Case: Contests of Honour 
and the Subversion of the English Criminal Courts, 1780-1845’ (2008) 19 (3) King's Law Journal 
575, 586. 
6 Adrian Gray, Crime and Criminals of Victorian England (Stroud, History Press 2011). 
7 Sir Michael Foster, Crown Court Cases and Crown Law (London 1762) 296 as quoted in 
Banks (n 5) 577. 
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nineteenth century but that is because he behaved with ‘dishonour’ in breaking 
the rules of the duel.8 It seems that the duel had its own laws and its own ‘culture’ 
and that acting according to that ‘culture’ provided a sort of ‘cultural defence’ even 
to the crime of murder. This could be construed as an early example of the ‘sub-
culture’.9 
Secondly, the Pinto Case.10 Three defendants, Angolan immigrants who were 
members of a protestant evangelical church and who held a belief in African 
cosmology, were convicted of child cruelty (or of aiding and abetting child cruelty)  
when a ‘malevolent spirit’ was exorcised from a child at their request. At trial, the 
defence called a ‘cultural profiling expert’ from Kings College London but her 
evidence was not accepted, the judge saying it looked like a ‘cultural horoscope’. 
On appeal against sentence the appellants argued that because the child was 
possessed by spirits they were not ‘…as culpable as somebody who perpetrates 
cruelty deliberately and out of malice, inflicting violence gratuitously.’ The Court 
of Appeal accepted that two of the appellants did hold the ‘deluded belief’ that the 
child was possessed but said that it was ‘…necessary to make it clear that such 
belief provides no mitigation and …does little to  reduce the culpability of the 
offenders’.11  However, each of the defendants had their sentences reduced 
because this was not the ‘worst case scenario’ of child cruelty. 
                                                        
8 Banks 594. 
9 Sub-cultures are considered in criminology as ‘exaggerations, accentuations or editings of 
cultural themes prevalent in the wider society’ and the criminologist is concerned with subcultures 
that condone delinquent acts . P Rock, in Mike Maguire, Rod Morgan and Robert Reiner (eds), 
The Oxford Handbook of Criminology (4th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) 31 and are 
discussed further in Chapter 2. 
10 R v Sebastian Pinto and others [2006] EWCA Crim 749. 
11 ibid 753. 
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Thirdly the ‘Pitcairn Case’ where 55 charges of rape, indecent assault and incest 
involving girls as young as 12 were brought against 7 men living on the island of 
Pitcairn.12 Following the conviction of 6 of the defendants in the Pitcairn Supreme 
Court and appeal to the Pitcairn Court of Appeal against conviction, the Privy 
Council were asked to make a decision on sovereignty  (and found that the laws 
of England did extend to Pitcairn). 13  It was also asked to comment on the 
suggestion that Pitcairn ‘may in some way be an anarchic or lawless society’ but 
found that the 1956 Sexual Offences Act had been promulgated, that Pitcairn was 
a developed society where ‘…there was never any contention that the 
appellants…did not or could not have reasonably known that the allegations 
against them constituted serious criminal offending.’ 14  This was so despite 
suggestions identified by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office that ‘… the line 
of offending that had been revealed was a cultural trait’ and despite the question 
throughout each stage of the trial  ‘…as to whether Pitcairn’s cultural particularity 
and unique isolation were sufficiently recognized.’ 15  In the Pitcairn Supreme 
Court the pre-trial hearing noted ‘…what makes this pre-trial hearing so distinctive 
is not only the constitutional importance of the issues…but the context in which 
the potential parties live. Pitcairn hosts a tightly-knit community of inhabitants 
who, due to population size and the Island’s remoteness, rely heavily on each 
other in all of the ways that matter.’16 In other words, the cultural dimension of the 
                                                        
12 The men were convicted in the Pitcairn Islands Supreme Court (Queen v 7 Named Accused 
PNSC 1:SC 04-04-19(19 April 2004)) and The Public Defender challenged the jurisdiction of the 
UK in the Pitcairn Court of Appeal (Queen v 7 Named Accused [2004] PNCA 1-7 2004 (5 
August 2004)) who referred the matter to the Privy Council. 
13 Christian and Ors v The Queen [2006] UKPC 47. 
14 ibid 118. 
15 The Foreign and Commonwealth Office correspondence is referred to by Lord Hope of 
Craighead in the Privy Council judgment. Christian and Ors v The Queen [2006] UKPC 47 [50]. 
The cases are anaylsed in detail by  
C O’Cinneide, ‘A Million Mutinies Now: Why Claims of Cultural Uniqueness Cannot be used to 
Justify Violations of Basic Human Rights’ in Dawn Oliver (ed),Justice, Legality and the Rule of 
Law: Lessons from the Pitcairn Prosecutions (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2009) 137. 
 
16 Queen v 7 Named Accused PNSC 1:SC 04-04-19(19 April 2004) Introduction [5]. 
 13 
trial divided opinion with some attacking the prosecutions as cultural imperialism 
and others seeing a need for the sovereign authority to intervene to ‘…redress 
barbaric behaviour in the name of human rights, the protection of children and 
gender inequality.’ 17  In 2014 similar allegations were made (and dismissed) 
against residents of St Helena.18  
Although centuries or worlds apart (and of course the outcomes in each of  these 
cases are a product of their historical situation and may have been decided 
differently in different times) culture is intrinsically present in each of these 
judgments. The disparate outcomes reveal not only an inconsistent approach 
towards culture but a more understanding approach where that culture resonates 
with or is part of the culture of the majority so that explicit  engagement with the 
ideas of the ‘minority’ is only identifiable in the cultural division between ‘us’ and 
‘the other’. Nineteenth century British aristocratic duelling is constructed as an 
‘honourable’ practice worlds away from the ‘honour’ based violence we condemn 
today perhaps because it is much more difficult to understand the honour of ‘the 
other’ and the culture of the alien has no place in our own social and legal 
understandings.  This raises huge questions for fairness and in turn for justice. In 
each decision we see a failure to acknowledge a link between culture and 
responsibility, but it is there, beneath the surface in the duelling case where it is 
recognized as a justification for killing, in the courtroom in the malevolent spirit 
case where it is acknowledged but  dismissed as irrelevant and in the public 
domain in the sexual abuse case where it is disregarded as abhorrent. Lacey 
                                                        
17 O’Cinneide, (n15) 134. 
18 These allegations were raised late 2012 and initially investigated by the Lucy Faithful 
Foundation and then reviewed by Northumbria Police and an Independent Inquiry headed by 
Sasha Wass QC was established on 20 November 2014 by the Foreign Secretary and reported 
in December 2015. https://www.gov.uk/.../the-wass-inquiry-report-into-allegations-surrounding-
child-safe accessed 6th June 2018. 
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acknowledges this latent existence of culture in the courtroom in, for example, 
rape trials where ‘…the defendants beliefs about women’s sexuality, and about 
appropriate inference from behaviour, surely count as deriving from his ‘way of 
life’.’19 Thus sometimes without even being aware of it, courts have to contend 
not only with their own cultural standpoint but with the culturally embedded beliefs 
of defendants, even where they do not manifest as ‘other’. The disparate 
approaches to culture identified in these decisions is troubling. But the failure of 
the courts to outwardly acknowledge culture and its possible relationship with 
responsibility is more worrying. And the relationship between law and culture can 
be confusing. In March 2013 the Law Society published a Practice Note aimed at 
high street solicitors on producing wills under Sharia law. This led to the headline 
‘Sharia Law is adopted by Legal Chiefs’, an outrage about the relentless march 
of Islamic law and culture into British society and calls for a Select Committee to 
look at the extent of Sharia law in Britain.20 Yet there has always been clarity 
around the place of Islamic law, with An-Nacim stating that Islamic law cannot be 
the state law of any state and that ‘…the religious authority of Islamic law for 
Muslims exists outside the framework of state’ and that ‘…compliance with 
                                                        
19 Nicola Lacey, ‘Community, Culture, and Criminalization’ in Will Kymlicka, Claes Lernestedt 
and Matt Matravers (eds) Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2014) 49. 
20 The Telegraph 22nd March 2014 ran this headline. 
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/religion/10716844/Islamic-law-is-adopted-by-British-legal-
chiefs.html 
Accessed 1st October 2018. 
The call for a Select Committee was led by the National Secular Society and the One Law For 
All campaign. In May 2016 the Home Office did announce an independent review of the 
application of Sharia law. This was led by Mona Siddiqui and the committee reported in 
February 2018. The review found that there are between 30 and 85 Sharia Councils in England 
and Wales that rule on matters of family law. Their decisions can be discriminatory to women. 
The committee recommended that religious marriages need to be undertaken alongside civil 
marriages and that over time the use of Sharia councils be reduced. This ties into concerns over 
legal pluralism. See  
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/applying-sharia-law-in-england-and-wales-
independent-review 
accessed 1st October 2018. 
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Islamic law cannot be legal justification for violating state law.’21 These concerns 
alone go some way towards justifying this analysis of the culture-responsibility 
relationship. They begin to highlight some of the challenges inherent within this 
complex relationship. Most of all they begin to demonstrate a fear of the concept 
of culture, something that we will return to throughout the thesis. 
This Chapter continues in section 1.2  by setting out the broad context within 
which the research question is situated and clearly setting out the aims and 
objectives of the thesis. Section 1.3 introduces  the literature associated with the 
culture-responsibility relationship and explains why a formal literature review is 
not the best approach to scoping the field. Section 1.4 sets out the methodology 
and research methods used and section 1.5 sets out a summary of the arguments 
and themes running through the thesis. 
  
                                                        
21 Abdullahi Ahmed An-Nacim, ‘The Compatibility Dialect: Mediating the Co-Existence of Islamic 
Law and State’ (2010) Modern Law Review 73 1. 
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1.2 Aims and Objectives of Thesis 
 
Successive United Kingdom governments have not formally adopted or declared 
a policy of ‘multiculturalism’ yet the term ‘multicultural’ can be used to describe 
our contemporary society which comprises an ‘…ethnically diverse population 
brought together by post-colonial migration’ and of course by a variety of other 
population movements over a long period of time including most recently 
migration from the European Union and by those seeking refugee status or 
political asylum from across the world.22 A diverse population brings with it a 
diverse array of cultural beliefs and practices. The intersection between these 
divergent cultural values is not straightforward and where values and ideas clash, 
as they often do, how should a western liberal democracy navigate its way 
through the demands of a multicultural population on the one hand and the 
preservation of an existing social order under the rule of law on the other? Political 
theorists have been considering the tensions inherent in balancing these 
competing interests for a long time and this pressing question is attracting 
attention at the highest levels of policy making. UNESCO has included the study 
of multicultural societies in its MOST Programme because ‘…multiculturalism 
embodies the idea of reconciling respect for diversity with concern for societal 
cohesion and the promotion of universally shared values and norms.’23 However, 
the question is pertinent too in the field of criminal law and criminal justice where 
new approaches to notions such as rights and equality challenge our settled 
understandings of the concepts of fairness and justice. Yet, as Kymlicka, 
                                                        
22 Anne Phillips, Multiculturalism Without Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2007) 4. 
Chapter 4, section 4.2 of this thesis gives a summary of the history of immigration to the UK 
since around 1800. 
23 MOST is the ‘Management of Social Transformation’ Programme, a UNESCO programme 
that promotes social research and focuses on building bridges between research policy and 
practice http://www.unesco.org/new/en/social-and-human-sciences/themes/most-programme/ 
accessed 11th July 2018. 
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Lernestedt and Matravers point out, ‘…there is one particularly important domain 
of public life where the challenge of cultural diversity has been underexplored, 
namely the criminal law.’24  
 
To date there have been a few examples of endeavours within the criminal law 
and criminal justice system to respond to or at least to recognise these tensions. 
These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. Specific ‘cultural offences’ have been 
created and administrative adjustments have been made in the shape of 
allowances for largely uncontroversial cultural practices.25  In the field of law 
reform passing reference has been made to multiculturalism, for example when 
the Law Commission considered mixed motives such as honour killing in 
excluding ‘a considered desire for revenge’ as a qualifying trigger in the reform of 
the law on provocation.26 The criminal courts too have not shied away entirely 
from the influence of multiculturalism as evidenced by a limited judicial 
exploration of the interaction between law and culture. As early as 1973 the 
House of Lords (in a case involving conspiracy to corrupt morals) stated that 
‘…the jury should be invited, where appropriate, to remember that they live in a 
plural society with a tradition of toleration towards minorities and that this 
                                                        
24 Will Kymlicka, Claes Lernestedt and Matt Matravers (eds) Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity 
(Oxford, Oxford University Press 2014) 1. 
25 There has been legislation aimed at prohibiting female genital mutilation (The Female Genital 
Mutilation Act 2003) and forced marriage (Antisocial Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014). 
These are discussed in detail in Chapter 3 below. Exceptions and exemptions are discussed in 
depth in Will Kymlicka, The Rights of Minority Cultures (Oxford, Oxford University Press 1995). 
An example of such an administrative adjustment is the relaxation of the requirement that 
helmets should be worn by construction workers on site for Sikhs (S11 Employment Act 1989). 
However, liability for accidents on site will be limited to that which would have applied had the 
individual been wearing a helmet. Obviously the decision about what to criminalise is relevant to 
the limits of criminal responsibility and this is discussed in section 3.2 in the context of the 
purpose of the criminal law. The focus of specific cultural offences is forward looking 
responsibility whereas the focus of this thesis is on the backwards looking attribution of 
responsibility at trial or in sentencing. 
26 Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder (Final Report 6th August 2004)  
<http://lawcommission.justice,gov.uk/docs/lc290_Partial_Defences_to_Murder.pdf> 
accessed 10th July 2018. 
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atmosphere of toleration is itself part of public decency.’27 It could be argued that 
these measures represent a satisfactory response to the demands of a 
multicultural society and that the role of the criminal law is indeed to be reflective 
and responsive to individual situations as they arise.28 If these endeavours are 
adequate then why look further? 
An alternative viewpoint, and one offered here, is that these measures amount to 
no more than ad hoc, temporary and reactive solutions to discrete and distinct 
problems, addressing only the narrowly defined pressing issues of the day. 
Perhaps this is because, following a Critical Legal Studies rationale, there is a 
fundamental problem with the law which, in addition to serving the interests of the 
powerful, is blinkered to wider contextual issues and merely glosses over 
complexity in an attempt to provide a ‘quick fix solution.’29 In a Marxist critique of 
the legal system Miliband identifies legal conflicts as ‘problems’ that have to be 
‘solved’ on the basis ‘…that conflict does not or need not run very deep.’30 Of 
course, Miliband is referring to the deeper conflict of domination and subjection 
underlying these seemingly superficial legal conflicts and the laws failure to 
address it. This failure can be likened to the shortcomings evidenced today in the 
approach to the deeper conflict generated by cultural diversity in the twenty first 
century. Whilst the measures taken at the interface of law and cultural diversity 
may appear to ‘do the job’ in the short term such piecemeal approaches merely 
scratch the surface, providing solutions that do not adequately reflect the 
                                                        
27 Knuller v DPP [1973] AC 435 at 439. 
28 For example, the law criminalising forced marriage (S104 Antisocial Behaviour Crime and 
Policing Act 2014) represented a dramatic change in the Government’s previous position 
following a high profile media campaign focusing on the social issues of forced marriage. 
29 This critique is offered by Kelman. Mark Kelman, (1987) A Guide to Critical Legal Studies 
(Harvard University Press 1987) 242. 
30 Ralph Miliband, Marxism and Politics (Delhi, Aakar Books 2011). 
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complexities of the meaning of ‘multiculturalism’ and its implications and indeed 
the meaning of ‘culture’ itself and here once again we can hypothesise that the 
criminal law and criminal justice system harbour a fear of culture. What we need 
is ‘…a law appropriate for a society of permanent cultural diversity.’31 We need a 
new approach.  
At its most complete this approach would encompass a whole scale review of the 
competing issues identifiable at the intersection between the criminal law of 
England and Wales and cultural diversity and subject them to a thorough scrutiny 
that looks beyond the law itself with a view to achieving what Norrie refers to as 
a ‘depth ontology.’32  From this understanding we could seek to formulate a 
thoroughly considered framework grounded in theory and informed by empirically 
gathered evidence from the voices of all across society. We are in what political 
philosophers call a ‘post-recognition era’ where we need to move on from the 
politics of recognition to acknowledge the difficulties of balancing the dual 
demands of accommodation and stability and to call on our resources including 
‘the pacifying power of the law’ to seek and find justice in a culturally diverse 
world.33  This analysis of the culture-responsibility relationship, in searching for 
an answer to the research question and in suggesting the ensuing framework for 
a way forward, is perhaps a step in bringing this ambitious project to fruition, the 
beginning of an answer to Shabani’s widely framed question ‘…how can the 
                                                        
31 Cotterrell (n3) 374. 
32 Alan Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul (London, Glasshouse Press 2005) 11, at 12 Norrie 
argues that ‘…legal forms appear as the surface phenomena which are explained by underlying 
social relations’ and it is only through understanding these relations that we can truly 
understand law. 
33 This is referred to in Kant’s 1795 essay Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Essay 
in James Bohman, Matthias Lutz-Bachmann (eds), Perpetual Peace: Essays on Kant’s 
Cosmopolitan Ideal (Cambridge MA, MIT Press 1997).  
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practices of law making help us to confront the challenges of stability and 
solidarity in a post recognition era?’34 
It is also a ‘new approach’ to the development of the criminal law in a multicultural 
age in the following ways. As seen above, it moves the culture-responsibility 
relationship beyond the black letter of the law and into the socio-legal and draws 
together relevant ideas from a number of complementary disciplines but, more 
importantly, it calls for a tightly bound analysis and policy facing development of 
the culture-responsibility relationship in the following two ways: 
• It places at its heart the relationship between culture and responsibility and  
the potential application of that relationship in individual cases (Chapter 
2). 
• It seeks to understand and develop that relationship within two distinct and 
defined parameters, namely the theory, practice and policy of the  criminal 
law and criminal justice system of England and Wales (Chapter 3), the 
social reality and policy  of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom in the 
early years of the twenty first century (Chapter 4). 
• It makes practical recommendations for the place of the culture-
responsibility relationship in the criminal justice system, a forward looking 
framework to be seen as a starting point for dialogue about the ongoing 
development of that relationship (Chapter 5). 
This specifically nuanced culture-responsibility relationship thus becomes a 
strong and academically plausible concept, insulated as far as it possibly can be 
from the challenges from the theoretical field which seem to come to light when 
culture and responsibility are mentioned in the same breath (addressed in section 
2.4) and bolstered by ideas of justice. It is particularly important that the culture-
responsibility relationship be analysed and moved forward under an umbrella of 
legal and political theory which seeks to deepen our understanding of how justice 
                                                        
34 The reference to a ‘post-recognition era’ is identified and described by Shabani. Omid A 
Payrow Shabani (ed), Multiculturalism and Law: A Critical Debate (Cardiff, University of Wales 
Press 2007) 1. 
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may be best achieved in this multicultural era. Cotterrell asks ‘…what general 
challenges are posed for legal theory…by multiculturalism in complex western 
societies today?’35 His question can be turned on its head to ask ‘how can legal 
(and political) theory help complex western societies in facing the challenges of 
multiculturalism?’ Either way, the thesis provides the opportunity for theory to 
interact more closely with ideas of culture and responsibility and the relationship 
between them. As Cotterrell points out, culture influences regulation in many legal 
fields but legal theory has not caught up with social reality because ‘…modern 
juristic legal theories have usually conceptualised laws regulated population as 
an undifferentiated social field made up of citizens or subjects assumed to be 
treated equally by law.’36 But ‘justice’ needs to look further than to the demands 
of multiculturalism and in particular we need to be mindful of feminist concerns.  
A first step towards justice is to establish an essential distinction between the 
culture-responsibility relationship and the concept of the ‘cultural defence’. The 
‘cultural defence’ emerged in academic literature in the late 1980’s, allegedly from 
a Harvard law student’s essay.37 By the mid 1990’s a body of largely feminist 
work had emerged highlighting the potential for injustice where accommodation 
is made on the basis of culture. The concept of the ‘cultural defence’ still has 
supporters but it has detractors  too and arguments against it (discussed in 
section 2.4) remain in the ether influencing attitudes and perhaps helping to 
                                                        
35 Roger Cotterrell, ‘The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality’ (2009) 40 (4) 
Journal of Law and Society 373, 374. 
36 ibid 378. 
37 ‘Cultural Defense in the Criminal Law’ (1986) 99 (6) Harvard Law Review 1293. These notes 
are said to be written by an unnamed Harvard undergraduate who is thought to be the first to 
have used the term the ‘cultural defence’. The source of the origin of the ‘cultural-defence’ in 
academic literature is identified by Levine. Kay L Levine, ‘Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime 
and Culture: A Socio-Legal Perspective on Cultural Defense Strategies’ (2003) 28 (1) Law & 
Social Inquiry 39. 
. 
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reinforce a negativity towards the culture-responsibility relationship. Part of the 
problem with the ‘cultural defence’ is that of time. It emerged when 
understandings of multiculturalism looked very different to the way they do today. 
The social reality of twenty first century multiculturalism in the United Kingdom is 
examined in section 4.2. Throughout the literature on the ‘cultural defence’ we 
see references to defendants as ‘members’ of groups and to ‘cultural practices’ 
and degrees of acculturation. But for our purposes whilst culture is, for the sake 
of argument ‘…a shared vocabulary of tradition and convention’, it is only, as we 
will see in Chapter 2, the contribution of that shared meaning to personal identity 
in individual cases that can be considered in relation to ‘defence’. Another part is 
place. In legal discourse the ‘cultural defence’ relies on a handful of largely US 
sensationalist and well documented cases that undermine the subtleties of the 
culture-responsibility relationship and is grounded largely in the idea of cultural 
rights and even cultural protection without really considering the individual 
defendant and the potential effect of culture upon him.38 In other words, the 
‘cultural defence’ does not enhance the quest for what Lernestedt calls ‘true 
blameworthiness’.39   
The main difficulty, however, with the ‘cultural defence’ is that of definition. What 
is meant by ‘defence’? The terms ‘defence’ and ‘evidence’ are used 
                                                        
38 These are, for example 
• People v Dong Lu Chen (1989) No. 87-7774(N.Y. Supreme Court) where Chen killed 
his wife after learning of her adultery, his defence being that he was driven by culture to 
behave in this way. 
• People v Kong Moua (1985) No. 315972 (Fresno County Superior Court) where Moua 
pleaded culture as an excuse for the kidnap and rape of his bride in the form of the 
Laotian practice of zij poj niam or ‘marriage by capture’. 
• People v Tou Moua (1985) No. 328106 (Fresno County Superior Court).  
• People v Fumiko Kimura (1985) No. A-091133 (Santa Monica Superior Court ) a case 
involving parent-child suicide where a Japanese mother attempted to drown herself and 
her two daughters because of the shame of adultery in Japanese culture. 
39 Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 24) 26. 
. 
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interchangeably within the literature with the former including anything on a 
spectrum from complete acquittal to mitigation in sentencing. Definition has 
become confused with purpose too, with, for example, Renteln claiming that ‘…a 
cultural defence is necessary to ensure that cultural evidence is considered by 
the courts.’ 40  Even where commentators take a more legalistic approach in 
suggesting definition this may not always bear the scrutiny of clear legal 
thinking.41 And so the culture-responsibility relationship must be divorced from 
the ‘cultural defence’.42 Despite the lack of definition and disagreement around 
purpose, those addressing this issue of culture in the criminal law call for all actors 
within the legal system to consider cultural information with greater sophistication 
and to recognise ‘…the need to set standards for incorporating cultural 
information in judicial proceedings.’43 This, of course, is absolutely endorsed 
here. 
Returning to the first of the three ways in which this thesis represents a new 
approach, we need to explore further the idea of relationship. 
Relationship in Individual Cases: The most important word in the thesis is 
relationship because it is argued from the outset that culture can only have a 
bearing on legal responsibility where a relationship between that responsibility 
and culture is established. Whilst legal theorists have offered general theories of 
responsibility in abundance none seem to have picked up on the possibility of a 
                                                        
40 Alison Dundes Renteln, The Culture Defense (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) 102. 
41 Woodman, for example, defines ‘defence’ as including grounds of mitigation. 
Gordon R Woodman ‘The Culture Defence in English Common Law: The Potential for 
Development’ in Foblets and Renteln (n 4) 9. 
42 At this stage of course a definition (or more realistically a clear explanation) of the culture-
responsibility relationship has not been offered either but this will be addressed in section 2.4. 
43 Jamie Rowen, ‘Reviewed Work(s): Multicultural Jurisprudence: Comparative Perspectives on 
the Cultural Defense by Marie-Claire Foblets and Alison Dundes Renteln’ (2010) 44 (2) Law & 
Society Review 411.  
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relationship between culture and responsibility. 44  Tadros, writing in 2013, 
obliquely recognises this omission and comes close to engaging with 
multiculturalism in stating: 
‘One noteworthy feature of much of the recent work done in the philosophy 
of criminal justice is that relatively little special attention has been given to 
the idea that citizens in a liberal political regime will have divergent moral 
conceptions many of which it will be reasonable to believe…one important 
question for political theorists is how those with divergent views can be 
expected to live together in a way that is stable and respectful of each 
other.’45 
And yet, Tadros himself does not pursue such ‘divergent moral conceptions’ in 
the context of culture or indeed go on to engage with culture in any guise. Political 
philosophers, on the other hand,  have considered the relationship between 
culture and responsibility but generally at a more abstracted group level leading 
Kymlicka to demand that they ‘…should contemplate the individual more 
carefully.’46 And individual too is an extremely important word in the thesis. There 
is an argument that the endeavours of the criminal law to respond to or recognise 
the tensions in our multicultural world have traditionally revolved around ‘groups’ 
(although in England and Wales this has been perhaps more of a theoretically 
driven aspiration than a reality because as we will see in Chapter 3 there has 
been minimal engagement between the criminal law in this jurisdiction and 
                                                        
44 The following textbooks, all broadly on the topic of legal responsibility and all written within 
the last 11 years, were chosen randomly and checked for references to culture and 
multiculturalism and not one of them addressed these issues: 
Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2016).  
Antony Duff, (2007) Answering for Crime: Responsibility in the Criminal Law (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing 2007). 
Michael Moore, Placing Blame: A Theory of the Criminal Law (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2010). 
Victor Tadros, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007). 
45 Tadros, V. (2013) ‘Introduction: Political Philosophy and Criminal Justice’ Criminal Law and 
Philosophy 7(2) 179-184 179. 
46 Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 24) 6. 
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culture). Kymlicka, in earlier work, argues that there is an obligation on states to 
provide ‘cultural freedom’ for groups because toleration alone is ‘benign neglect’ 
and this freedom comes through states providing special compensation for 
‘minority cultural groups’.47 Kymlicka has refined his work to accept that at times 
cultural rights may infringe upon individual autonomy and concedes that as ideas 
about what culture is have developed the earlier body of thought on 
multiculturalism, embedded in the idea of the group, can be challenged.48 This 
thesis is therefore clear from the outset that the culture-responsibility relationship 
is merely a possibility, a paradigm to be considered and applied if and where 
appropriate in each unique and individual case. It is not a right; it is not of 
universal application although it is universally available. And it is very much 
something that needs to work inside the criminal law of England and Wales, an 
important factor that should allay fears of legal pluralism, something that we will 
return to in  section 2.4.49 In this way it is a challenge but arguably, as Lacey 
says, it is ‘…analytically indistinguishable from that of how the criminal law should 
respond to the problem of any situational differences’ and therefore not 
something to be feared but a tool for justice in a multicultural world in deserving 
cases.50 
                                                        
47 Will Kymlicka, Liberalism, Community and Culture (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
1989)187.  
48 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, 
Clarendon 1995) 95.  
As well as the emphasis on groups there is an emphasis on rights and in Chapter 4 we will see 
the emphasis in both multicultural policy and philosophy on the concept of rights. But rights 
have a corollary and that is responsibility.    
49 The term legal pluralism here is used in the context of national state laws. However, in a way 
our legal system is pluralistic in accommodating international law, EU Law, devolved 
government and its laws. Pluralism can be widely construed too outside of the legal domain and 
we will return to the ideas of cultural pluralism and moral pluralism in Chapter 4. 
50 Lacey, N. ‘Community, Culture and Criminalization’ Chapter 3 in  Kymlicka, Lernestedt, and 
Matravers, (n24)  52. 
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Two Distinct and Defined Parameters: Secondly, the new approach situates 
the culture-responsibility relationship within two distinct and defined parameters 
and the selection of these needs explanation. Much of the literature surrounding 
the ‘cultural defence’ is generic rather than jurisdiction specific. However, if a 
system of law is to respond adequately to the demands of a multicultural 
population and engage meaningfully with the concept of culture then any 
suggested framework for a way forward needs to be offered within the constraints 
of that specific legal system. The criminal law of England and Wales has features 
that are deeply entrenched and, being (arguably) naturally averse to change and 
reform  we need to consider how far these standards can be expected to shift. 
How far, for example can the standard of ‘reasonableness’ move? Norrie writes 
of The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Glue Sniffer advancing the idea that 
moral contextualism (which could encompass culture) is a more meaningful place 
from which to asses ‘reasonableness’ than orthodox subjectivism, yet it is 
perhaps difficult to imagine a wholescale re-evaluation of one of the standards 
that has underpinned our criminal law for centuries.51  We therefore need to 
consider the culture-responsibility relationship within the confines of the 
foundations of the criminal law of England and Wales (remaining aware of the 
restrictions that such principles, values and systemic factors impose yet being 
open minded to challenging them, to pushing the boundaries) and the living 
practice and policy of the criminal law and criminal justice system.  
As regards the specificities of multiculturalism and cultural diversity within the 
United Kingdom’s socio-political system, this is ever changing but is a result of 
                                                        
51 The Reasonable Glue Sniffer is based on R v Morhall [1995] 4 All ER 658 and found in Norrie 
(n 32) 111. 
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twentieth and twenty first century migration and an ensuing immigrant and now 
migrant population. Our response must reflect this. Things look very different in 
jurisdictions with an indigenous minority population or in a post-colonial state 
where redress is sought or offered for the injustices of the past. Our response 
must be socially and politically specific, taking account too of the difficulties 
identified in section 2.4 as being inherent within the culture-responsibility 
relationship, in particular the dangers of essentialising and its implications for 
agency and free will, competing claims of universalism and cultural or moral 
relativism and claims of the prioritisation of one cultural group over women or 
over another cultural group. 
A Forward Looking Framework: Thirdly, it seeks to provide a forward looking 
framework for a new approach to the culture-responsibility relationship grounded 
in practice, policy and theory. A normative schema is being sought but the 
framework is not constructed as a formal and rigid solution to the problem of 
culture and criminal responsibility. Instead, having defined the objectives of the 
law in seeking a just way forward and identified and examined the issues at stake, 
the framework is conceived as a working document and a starting point for 
dialogue between interested parties. Looking to Dworkin’s ideas of law as 
communitas and the search for the ‘best meaning’ of law, Cotterrell advocates 
we search for the ‘best mutual understandings’ of how society should be 
governed and argues that such understandings can be derived from ‘cross 
cultural dialogue’ because ‘...law’s essential purpose in addressing the conditions 
of multiculturalism is to facilitate communication.’52 This is a departure from the 
more generally understood and accepted purpose of the criminal law (discussed 
                                                        
52 Cotterrell (n3) 374. 
Here Cotterrell draws too on Fuller’s ideas of law as communication. 
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in section 3.2) but certainly communication should be a  first step in formulating 
the law’s approach to multiculturalism. Such discussion ties law into political 
theory, introducing law to the idea of a ‘dialogical approach’ in a post recognition 
era perhaps best described by Tully: 
‘The first step in transforming the way we think about law-making and 
difference has been from the presumption that there can be monological 
solutions, handed down from a theorist, court or policy community, to the 
approach that any resolution has to be worked out as far as possible by 
means of dialogues among those in the field who are subject to the 
contested norm of mutual recognition.’53 
Travers argues that socio-legal research is ‘…a subfield of social policy mainly 
concerned with influencing or serving government policy in the provision of legal 
services.’54 Whilst this narrow definition of the socio-legal is not adopted here it 
is important to remember that the proposed new framework, grounded in the 
domain of the socio-legal, may in time become a useful working document and 
may alleviate criticisms made for example by Herring who recognises that 
scholars are brilliant ‘deconstructors’ but asks ‘…what is to replace the rubble 
they have created?’55 The framework aims to be both practical in suggesting a 
workable approach to the culture-responsibility relationship and theoretical in 
symbiotically drawing on and contributing to the development of a legal theory 
that always places the demands of justice at its very centre. It makes a distinct 
contribution to the field. 
                                                        
53 Tully, J.(2007) in Shabani (n34) 27.  
54 Max Travers, Qualitative Research Through Case Studies (London, Sage Publications 2001) 
26. 
55 Jonathan Herring, Criminal Law: Text, Cases and Material (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
6th edn 2014) 53‘. 
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Much of the thought surrounding this difficult relationship between individual legal 
responsibility and culture is constrained by binary paradigms which call for 
simplistic choices to be made in framing answers to this most difficult of questions 
how should the criminal law of England and Wales respond to the relationship 
between culture and individual legal responsibility? For example, if we allow 
culture into the courtroom then how does that affect gender equality? If we 
concede that  culture has a deterministic effect on behaviour then what does that 
say about individual agency? In a broader sense these paradigms call for two 
dimensional choices to be made, between for example multiculturalism and social 
and national cohesion or between essentialism and the recognition of difference 
or between multiculturalism and feminism. It is an overriding objective of this 
thesis that, having stripped away the layers to arrive at the pared down question 
of how an individual accused of a crime in England and Wales can expect culture 
to be allowed to impact on the disposition of his case, the answer should unfold 
in a reflexive and multidimensional way so that suggestions for a new approach 
to the question are rounded and all embracing. This approach should avoid 
Norrie’s criticism that legal discourse is ‘…essentially contradictory… or 
antinomial in its form’ so that ‘…neither side of the argument really or fully 
captures what is at stake.’ 56  Furthermore, the objective complies with Von 
Jhering’s interpretation of law as a ‘struggle’, a  struggle for a law that is living 
and vibrant and that links people emotionally and morally to culture. 57  The 
arguments presented fill a gap in academic discourse and the conclusions 
reached can offer a practical and policy facing way forward because the work can 
                                                        
56 Norrie (n 32) 1.  
57 Cotterrell bases his 2008 article ‘The Struggle for Law: Some Dilemmas of Cultural Legality’ 
on Von Jhering’s 1915 work Der Kampf Ums Recht (The Struggle for Law) in which the author 
argues that the struggle for law is not to control it but to invigorate it. However, Von Jhering was 
writing at a time of cultural unity and law’s struggle is more challenging in multicultural times. 
Cotterrell (n 3). 
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‘…create clearings, openings, new possibilities for communication, connection 
and creative invention where opposition or studied indifference prevailed.’58 
To summarise, the aim of this thesis is to undertake a socio-legal and 
interdisciplinary analysis of the relationship between culture and legal 
responsibility focusing on the individual (not the group) and responsibility (not 
rights)  within the parameters of (i) the foundations, practice and policy of the 
criminal law of and criminal justice system in England and Wales; and  (ii) 
understandings of multiculturalism within the socio-political system of the United 
Kingdom in the twenty first century. The analysis remains mindful at all times of 
the concept of justice and is intended to provide us with a renewed specifically 
nuanced understanding of the relationship between culture and responsibility and 
to establish the importance of that relationship for contemporary justice. It will 
advance the hypothesis that the criminal law and criminal justice system of 
England and Wales manifest an absence of consistent and coherent engagement 
with culture and with the culture-responsibility relationship, based on an innate 
reluctance to embrace, or even a fear of, the concept of culture. This 
inconsistency, incoherence and fear needs to be addressed through the 
construction of a framework which, although just a starting point for on-going 
dialogue, recommends a way for the criminal law of England and Wales to 
engage meaningfully with the culture- responsibility relationship. 
 
 
                                                        
58 W Connolly, ‘Europe: A Minor Tradition’ Chapter 5 in David Scott and Charles Hirschkind 
(eds), Powers of the Secular Modern: Talal Asad and his Interlocutors (Stanford, Stanford 
University Press 2006) 75. 
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1.3 Methodology and Research Methods59 
The thesis adopts an essentially doctrinal approach in analysing legal concepts 
and principles.  This is partly in accordance with what Kuhn identifies as ‘research 
paradigms’, shared worldviews within a discipline that determine suitable 
methodologies. 60  Yet here there is a necessity for a doctrinal methodology 
because the analysis of legislation, traditional defences, decided cases and 
sentencing decisions undertaken in section 3.3 not only serves to support part of 
the hypothesis (that there is an absence of consistent and coherent engagement 
between the concepts of culture and responsibility in the practice of the criminal 
law) but the conclusions from that analysis form the backbone to the thesis (and 
an original contribution to the field) in providing a strong evidentially informed 
basis from which to justify further exploration of the culture-responsibility 
relationship with a view to understanding its essence.61  As Sanchez-Graells 
states, a doctrinal approach makes an analysis ‘…technically sound from a legal 
perspective.’62  
                                                        
59 Two books on legal research methods were published ten years apart in 2007 and 2017. 
Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui (eds), Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University 
Press 2007); Dawn Watkins and Mandy Burton (eds) Research Methods in Law (London, 2nd 
edn, Routledge 2017). Both are collections of essays on different approaches to legal research. 
Both state in their introductions that legal researchers are generally unclear about what is a 
research method and what is a methodology and that throughout the books these terms are 
used in different ways by the different researchers. Here the term ‘methodology’ is understood 
as a broad conceptual framework within which the research question is situated and answered. 
Clearly more than one methodology can be employed and in this thesis these are, broadly, 
doctrinal, socio-legal, interdisciplinary and feminist. By contrast the term ‘research methods’ is 
understood here as meaning the way in which specific parts of the research have been carried 
out. 
60 Thomas S Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago, University of Chicago Press 
1970). 
61 Matravers asserts that ‘…any serious reflection on the cultural defence must be embedded in 
a more general account of criminal justice’ and this is the aim here (although obviously 
replacing the term ‘cultural defence’ with the culture-responsibility relationship). (Matravers, M. 
‘Responsibility, Morality and Culture’ Chapter 5 in Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 24) 
89.) 
62 Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Economic Analysis of Law or Economically Informed Legal 
Research’ Chapter 8 in Watkins and Burton (n 59) 73. 
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In recent years doctrinal legal scholarship has expanded its horizons to include 
both problem based and reform orientated approaches. It can also be said to 
encompass content analysis (and this research method is adopted in reviewing 
both the approach of the criminal law and the criminal justice system to culture 
(sections 3.3 and 3.4) and multicultural policy (section 4.3)). Generally content 
analysis can range from ‘impressionistic interpretations’ to highly systematic 
analyses of text based data. Here, where a determined search for the interaction 
between culture and the practices/policies referred to is pursued, the analysis is 
closer to the impressionistic end of spectrum. A deductive approach is taken in 
attempting to prove the hypothesis. One final thought on the doctrinal 
methodology used is that it may amount to what Minow identifies as ‘doctrinal 
restatement’ because the culture-responsibility relationship, initially understood 
here as a problem in need of reform, will become in a sense a creation of this 
thesis, newly understood or restated as a result of its scrutiny in the light of  
theory, practice and policy.63  
Non-doctrinal socio-legal, interdisciplinary and feminist methodologies are also 
natural partners for the subject matter of the thesis. It may be tautological to 
emphasize the socio-legal nature of the thesis for despite the myriad definitions 
of ‘culture’ it is always conceptualised within the ‘social’. However, it is useful to 
point out that the analysis, comprising more than a black letter scrutiny of the 
current approach of the criminal law to issues involving cultural diversity, revolves 
around ‘…an interface with a context within which law exists.’64 As well as the 
culture-responsibility relationship being de facto socio-legal, the work itself is 
                                                        
63 Martha Minow, ‘Archetypal Legal Scholarship: A Field Guide’ (2013) 63 J Legal Educ 65, 65. 
64 Sally Wheeler and Phil Thomas, ‘Socio-Legal Studies’ in David Hayton, Law's Future (Oxford, 
Hart Publishing 2000) 271. 
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socio-legal in looking at how practice and policy interact with that relationship.  
Multiculturalism is a social phenomenon and it is the reality of the functioning of 
the criminal law in a multicultural society that must be considered. As Norrie 
argues ’…in understanding a phenomenon such as law we need to move beyond 
it, to the social structures and relations which underpin it and which it mediates.’65 
The term socio-legal is to be interpreted as being a field of research in its own 
right, situated within the broader area of social research and being given a wide 
meaning to reflect the emphasis on the relationship between law and society and 
to represent a balance to a narrow doctrinal approach. More specifically the thesis 
involves research into the social, justifiable according to Bryman because 
‘…there is an aspect of our understanding of what goes on that is to some extent 
unresolved.’66 
The thesis also takes advantage of the opportunity to explore the development of 
the criminal law of England and Wales within the political realm drawing on 
political theory and other disciplines. In this way the thesis is interdisciplinary for 
how can the criminal law consider the culture-responsibility relationship without 
looking outside its own boundaries? Sanchez-Graells argues that it is wrong to 
ignore the economic implications of legal research but agrees that ‘…it is equally 
faulty not to incorporate the insights derived from political science and other social 
sciences such as sociology or anthropology or even beyond, from evolutionary 
theory and psychology.’ 67  Hutchinson recognises the limitations of purely 
doctrinal research and the increased impact of an interdisciplinary methodology 
in reforming the law stating that ‘…while the doctrinal core of legal scholarship 
                                                        
65 Norrie (n 32) 11. 
66 Alan Bryman Social Research Methods (5th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 2016) 5. 
67 Albert Sanchez-Graells, ‘Economic Analysis of Law or Economically Informed Legal 
Research’ Chapter 8 in Watkins and Burton (n 59) 73. 
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survives intact, legal scholars are, to some extent, endeavouring to 
accommodate…social science evidence and methods and theoretical analysis 
within the research framework in order to provide additional ballast to the 
recommendations for reform.’68  Here, the foray into disciplines other than law is 
not prescriptive but is reflexively driven, with one path of enquiry leading to 
another. Exploration in the disciplines of anthropology, sociology, religion, 
philosophy and criminology enhance understanding but it is within political 
philosophy that progress in this area is traditionally most evident and Kymlicka, 
Lernestedt and Matravers argue that further progress requires ‘…political 
philosophers to better understand the specificities of criminal law and for criminal 
law scholars to better understand philosophical debates on culture and agency.’69 
Recourse to these subject areas makes the project truly interdisciplinary and the 
body of relevant literature potentially huge.70  
As seen in section 1.2, the 1990’s saw the emergence of a body of feminist work 
that warned against multicultural accommodation in the interests of gender 
justice. The multiculturalism/feminist paradigm is explored further in section 2.4 
but it is clear that research in this area should be informed by feminist theory and 
methodology. Braidotti emphasises that feminist theory is constantly changing 
but that men’s interests are disproportionately represented in social research and 
therefore a feminist methodology is necessary in seeking to redress the 
                                                        
68 Methods in Reforming the Law’ (2015) 3 Erasmus Law Review 130 
<http://www.erasmuslawreview.nl/tijdschrift/ELR/2015/3/ELR-D-15-003_006> 
accessed 23rd September 2018. 
69 Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 24) 13. 
70 ‘Interdisciplinary’ here is construed widely and in a common sense way. Perhaps the purpose 
of interdisciplinary research is best described by Roberts in that ‘…it broadens the terms of its 
theoretical and conceptual framework which guides the direction of the studies.’ Roberts, P. 
(2017) ‘Interdisciplinarity’ Chapter 4 in McConville and Chui (n 59) 103. 
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balance.71 As Bartlett says, feminist enquiry uses three main techniques, feminist 
practical reasoning, consciousness raising and ‘asking the woman question.’72 
Although Munro states that ‘…there is no such thing as a united feminist 
jurisprudence, nor a universally shared feminist legal method’ she recognises that 
the law in context movement is a prominent theme in feminist legal scholarship 
and as part of the social context of this research the ‘woman question’ is present 
throughout the thesis.73  
At the outset a broad qualitatively based research strategy was envisaged as a 
good fit for the research question in this thesis, an inductively based research 
methodology based on Weber’s notion of verstehen which seeks to understand 
rather than to explain social phenomena within the social sciences. 74  In 
attempting to marry theory and practice it was hoped that ‘dialogue’ could be used 
through the media of qualitative interviews and focus groups with participants 
drawn from those working in the administration of justice in a multicultural world 
and those representing diverse cultural beliefs and traditions across society, to 
gain understanding of the attitude of ‘interested parties’ to the concept of the 
culture-responsibility relationship. It soon became apparent that this was an 
unworkable aspiration. The depth and breadth of the field and the complexity of 
the culture-responsibility relationship itself meant that dialogue would be 
                                                        
71R Braidotti, ‘Feminist Philosophies’ in Mary Eagleton (ed), A Concise Companion to Feminist 
Theory (Oxford, Blackwell 2003) 211. 
72 Katherine Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ (1990) 103(4) Harvard Law Review 830, 830. 
73 Vanessa E Munro, The Master’s Tools? Chapter 9 in Watkins and Burton (n 57) 194.   
  ‘Law in Context’ is, broadly, a movement to broaden the study of law emerging from the 
University of Cambridge in the 1907’s  and thus has much in common with the Socio-Legal 
studies movement that originated at the University of Oxford at the around that time and their 
earlier American counterpart the Law in Society Movement. 
<https://www.cambridge.org/core/series/law-in-
context/387EA14AA111E65AB0120DA893AFAFCBA>  
accessed 28th September 2018. 
74 M Weber (1947) The Theory of Social and Economic Organization (New York, Free Press 
1947) 88 referred to in Bryman (n 66) 29.   
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meaningless without a specific point of reference from which to begin a 
discussion. The framework suggested in Chapter 5 now provides that specific 
point of reference, a starting point from which it is hoped in a later project to 
undertake an empirically based exploration of the recommendations made in this 
thesis. However, the research strategy still remains broadly ontologically 
constructivist in that it recognises that ‘…social phenomena and their meanings 
are continually being accomplished by social actors’ so that we see  ‘…the active 
role of individuals in the construction of social reality.’ 75 The fluidity of culture is 
recognised in section 2.2 below but the constructivist emphasis on culture and 
the culture-responsibility relationship in turn is balanced by objectivism for culture 
can never be new, it ‘…persists and antedates the participation of particular 
people.’76 
The use of content analysis is employed in sections 3.3 and 3.4 and more 
particularly in section 4.3 and this is described in detail in the relevant sections. 
Moreover the thesis has made opportunistic use of quantitative research 
methods, in a limited way, in presenting some of the data gathered for the review 
of decided cases in section 3.3 in statistical form. This is a useful way of 
effectively summarising a number of facts and of making comparisons with 
general statistics but it must be remembered that the statistics are based on a 
relatively small number of cases. Therefore we need to be cautious about making 
theoretical generalisations based on these statistics.  
                                                        
75 Bryman (n 66) 33. 






1.4 Literature  
As described in section 1.3 above, the thesis adopts doctrinal, socio-legal, 
interdisciplinary and feminist methodologies. The bibliography reflects the 
enormous amount of material consulted to fully understand the culture-
responsibility relationship, to situate it most effectively within this boundless field 
and to develop it to be able to make the recommendations set out in the 
suggested framework in Chapter 5. The challenge is finding a balance between 
covering the academic field and selecting the most relevant work for analysis.  As 
with methodology (other than the doctrinal approach) the search for relevant 
literature is reflexively driven in a bid to get to the very essence of the culture-
responsibility relationship. Bryman describes two main types of literature review, 
narrative and systematic. The latter involves ‘…exhaustive literature searches of 
published and unpublished studies’ and seeks an evidence based solution or 
definitive answer to a research question.77 Such an approach does not easily lend 
itself to answering a research question that spans many fields and so the review 
of literature undertaken here is critically narrative and again interpretivist, a bid to 
understand in the sense of the ‘thick description’ identified by Geertz. However, 
Geertz says that ‘…the besetting sin of interpretive approaches to anything - 
literature, dreams, symptoms, culture - is that they tend to resist, or be permitted 
                                                        
77 Bryman (n 66) 102 quoting  D Tranfied, ‘Towards a Methodology for Developing Evidence-
Informed Management Knowledge by Means of Systematic Review’ (2003) 14 British Journal of 
Management 207, 209. 
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to resist, conceptual articulation and thus to escape systematic modes of 
assessment.’78 It is argued that the review of literature undertaken here is, in its 
way, ‘systematic’ because the attitude of the law, practice and policy to culture is 
always central to our interpretation of the materials. This is especially so in 
relation to the decided cases and sentencing decisions and law (section 3.3) and 
policy statements about multiculturalism (section 4.3) although these important 
sources are perhaps more rightly defined as data. In fact the conclusions reached 
from the data on decided cases and sentencing decisions offer an original  
account of the approach of the practice of the criminal law to the culture-
responsibility relationship. A formal literature review seems inappropriate 
because of the large body of work drawn upon and because there is not yet 
literature that directly addresses the culture-responsibility relationship, at least 
not in the specifically nuanced way that this thesis argues that we need to 
understand it, and so critical commentary is passed on relevant academic 
sources throughout the thesis and in section 1.5 the work that has particularly 
informed each Chapter is identified. 
However, we have already seen that the concept of the ‘cultural defence’ is the 
starting point for academic discourse about the place of culture in the criminal law 
and Renteln’s work, relentless in its support of  the ‘cultural defence’, is significant 
in informing this thesis and relevant throughout. Renteln claims that her 2004 
book The Cultural Defense is the first book length specific study of the topic and 
despite taking issue with some of her ideas this thesis shares her broadly stated 
aim of questioning the ‘…proper role of cultural evidence in legal systems’ and 
                                                        
78 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, Basic Books 
1973) 24. 
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agrees that ‘…justice requires us to look at the context of individuals’ actions.’79 
Renteln’s later book, co-edited with Foblets, is a useful collection of essays that 
is also drawn on throughout the thesis.80 The third stated aim of this volume is to 
‘…inspire practitioners to consider raising the possibility of a cultural defence in 
appropriate cases.’ 81  The answer to the research question here will allow 
practitioners in England and Wales to know when such ‘appropriate cases’ arise. 
Another edited collection of essays, Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity is 
relevant throughout the thesis. The aim of the book is to ‘…encourage criminal 
law scholars to reflect upon where and how information that could be called 
cultural should be deemed relevant, especially in the application of the rules 
regarding personal responsibility and blameworthiness.’82 This book contributes 
to understandings of the difficulties apparent at this problematic intersection but 
stops short of offering a conclusion to the ideas or a discernible agreed 
consensus on the way forward.  
  
                                                        
79 Renteln (n 40) 102. 
There are many places in which this thesis takes a different viewpoint from Renteln. We have 
already identified the lack of clear definition of the ‘cultural defence’ in her work and a divergence 
of opinion about the purpose of culture in the courtroom.  
80 Foblets and Renteln (n 4).  
81 ibid (introduction). The other aims of this volume are stated to be to document the 
experiences of litigants and  to encourage scholarship in ‘other’ jurisdictions (presumably ‘other’ 
refers to other than US). 
82 Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 24) 5. 
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1.5 Overview of Thesis 
This introductory Chapter has identified and contextualised the research 
question, defined the boundaries of the enquiry and outlined the aims and 
objectives of the thesis (sections 1.1 and 1.2). It has gone on to explain the 
methodology and research methods adopted (section 1.3) and to situate the 
research question within the existing academic literature (section 1.4). The 
purpose of this section (1.5) is to provide an overview of the thesis, to show how 
the answer to the research question, ‘how should the criminal law of England and 
Wales respond to the relationship between culture and individual legal 
responsibility?’ will unfold. 
Chapter 2 
Broadly, the purpose here is firstly to define our own understanding of the culture-
responsibility relationship, to explore more fully its meaning so that its essence 
can be understood and to emphasise its distinction from the ‘cultural defence’. 
The Chapter begins in section 2.1 with a reflection on the ways in which culture 
might be said to affect legal responsibility and makes it clear that of these 
possibilities we are concerned to explore cultural determination or predisposition 
and moral outlook. Referring particularly to the work of Rosen and Cotterrell, the 
inevitable interaction between law and culture in the widest sense is then 
established.83 In sections 2.2 and 2.3 the concepts of culture and responsibility 
                                                        
83 Lawrence Rosen is both a lawyer and anthropologist and relates law to everyday social life. 
Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press 1989). Rosen looks at the way in which judicial discretion is 
informed by cultural beliefs. Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton, 
Princeton University Press 2006).   
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are, in turn, subjected to thorough analysis to enhance understanding. Culture, it 
is concluded in section 2.2, is perhaps indefinable, but it is understandable and it 
is from this understanding, this recognition of the attribute that makes us uniquely 
human, that questions about its relationship with responsibility emerge. 
Contemporary understandings of culture also firmly reject the notion of static and 
bounded groups and this interpretation is very much in keeping with the objective 
here of refocusing the interplay between criminal law and culture to concentrate 
on the individual.  
If section 2.2 gives us an understanding of culture, section 2.3 enhances our 
understanding of responsibility. Tadros identifies a number of elements to 
responsibility and it is broadly the attribution of responsibility that we are 
concerned with, ‘…the conditions under which an action or event can be 
attributed to an agent who has appropriate status’ where ‘…that action reflects in 
the appropriate way on the agent qua agent.’ 84  Here those conditions are 
considered in the widest possible sense, looking beyond the realm of orthodox 
subjectivism to a morally contextual understanding of responsibility. Drawing 
primarily on the work of Norrie and Lacey the section takes forward to section 2.4 
the idea that responsibility can be both a matter of agency and of the moral values 
that different cultures engender.85  Following Fletcher’s analysis of the general 
                                                        
Roger Cotterrell takes a socio-legal approach to the understanding of legal ideas and takes 
socio-legal to mean ‘a perspective informed by social theory’. Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and 
Society: Legal Ideas in the Mirror of Social Theory (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing 2006). 
84 Tadros (n 44) 23.  
The other three elements to criminal responsibility identified by Tadros are (i) who counts as a 
responsible agent? (ii) defining the ambit of responsibility; and (iii) the defendant’s part in the 
crime. The second refers to criminalisation and although the thesis is concerned with the 
backward looking attribution of responsibility in criminal cases ‘cultural offences’ are considered 
in section 3.2 in connection with the purpose of the criminal law and in section 3.3 in looking at 
legislation which could be said to have created ‘cultural offences’ in the wider context of 
assessing the engagement of the criminal law with culture. 
85 Lacey (n 44). 
Alan Norrie, Crime, Reason and History: A Critical Introduction to Criminal Law (Cambridge 
University Press 2014).  
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part of the criminal law, understandings of responsibility are construed widely in 
a second sense, that is to include the degree of responsibility (perhaps more 
accurately culpability), the deemed degree of responsibility being reflected at the 
sentencing stage. 
In section 2.4, recognising that the culture-responsibility relationship is more likely 
to gain credibility where it is conceptualised as a pre-disposition rather than within 
the determinism/free-will paradigm, tentative arguments that culture may affect 
responsibility in terms of agency and that it can certainly affect responsibility in 
terms of moral values are put forward. Here a review of ideas from a number of 
disciplines is undertaken but it is Ortner’s continuum of positions on culture as a 
hard or soft determinant of behaviour that is most useful in establishing the 
credibility of the culture-responsibility relationship. 86  Ortner explains that we 
begin by acting as individuals but when we recognize that our actions fit within a 
pre-organised schema, we are likely to choose to follow the schema. When acting 
in the cultural schema the path dictated by the schema becomes intuitive for the 
actor. A link between the concepts of culture and responsibility is thus established 
allowing us to conclude that legal responsibility in the criminal law needs to be 
revisited in our multicultural world. This section is then proactive in identifying 
inherent difficulties within the culture-responsibility relationship and in attempting 
to dispel concerns around them. These are both practical (evidential difficulties 
in court, the apparent prioritisation of one group over another) and theoretical 
(strict notions of equality may be undermined by perceptions of individualised 
                                                        
Alan Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice: A Relational Critique (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2000). 
Norrie, Law and the Beautiful Soul  (n 32).  
86 Ortner, S. 1990) ‘Patterns of Shared History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of Sherpa 
Religious Institutions’ in Culture Through Time: Anthropological Approaches (ed) Ohnuki-
Tierney, E. (Stanford, Stanford University Press) 43. 
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justice, cultural determinism has implications for agency and free will, the culture-
responsibility relationship raises concerns of cultural and/or moral relativism). 
This renewed and self-critical understanding of the culture-responsibility 
relationship, summarised in section 2.5 is carried forward to be applied to and 
tested in the context of the foundations of the criminal law and the practice and 
policy of the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales in 
Chapter 3. 
Chapter 3  
Chapter 3 focuses on the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and 
Wales, the first of the two distinct parameters for the exploration of the culture-
responsibility relationship set out in section 1.2. The foundations of the criminal 
law are explored in section 3.2 to assess the extent to which they may or may not 
be able to accommodate the culture-responsibility relationship and Ashworth and 
Horder (on the general principles of the criminal law) complemented by the more 
critical approach of Wells and Quick provide useful guidance here.87 Sections 3.3 
and 3.4 can be thought of as ‘fact finding’ but they sit at the heart of the thesis in 
engaging in turn with the black letter of the criminal law and policy within the 
criminal justice system to prove the hypothesis that there is an absence of 
engagement between the practice and policy of the criminal law and culture. 
Section 3.3 involves an analysis of legislation aimed at outlawing ‘cultural 
practices’, traditional defences and decisions on substantive law and sentencing  
in 32 case with a cultural element is undertaken. As well as supporting the 
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hypothesis the section concludes therefore that the criminal law cannot support 
a standalone ‘cultural defence’ or even the recognition of culture within the 
traditional defences because its boundaries are not currently receptive to that 
idea. However, there is a place for culture at the sentencing stage in personal 
mitigation, where a pre-disposition or altered moral outlook may be construed as 
a motive in influencing behaviour. Sentencing laws need to reflect clearly the 
admissibility of culture as a factor in personal mitigation in individual cases where 
it is established that culture has had an influence on behaviour. There need to be 
clear procedural rules within the law of evidence on how evidence of the effect of 
culture on behaviour should be introduced and considered in the courtroom.  
Following the analysis of the Police, Crown Prosecution Service and Judiciary in 
the context of the culture-responsibility relationship in section 3.4 the section 
concludes that the Judiciary (and prosecution and defence lawyers) need specific 
training that goes beyond the stated aim in the Equal Treatment Bench Book of 
‘increasing awareness and understanding of the different circumstances of 
people appearing in courts and tribunals’ on how to deal with cultural evidence in 
court. Other areas explored in this Chapter include ‘honour’ and the gendered 
implications of allowing culture into the courtroom in criminal cases. A perception 
of mistrust between the concept of culture and the criminal justice system also 




Chapter 4  
The Chapter focuses on the second of the two distinct parameters within which 
the culture-responsibility relationship is situated, multiculturalism in the United 
Kingdom. This is explored through three perspectives, social reality (section 4.2), 
policy (section 4.3) and philosophy (section 4.4). Section 4.2 involves a historical 
analysis of migration to and from the United Kingdom from 1800 to the present 
day in order to arrive at a thorough understanding of the make-up of our 
multicultural population. We discover that the particular trajectory of the 
development of multiculturalism in the United Kingdom has led to a focus on 
immigration control rather than on the settlement of migrants after arriving in the 
country, largely evidenced within a race relations framework. We see also a focus 
on the delegation of settlement to local government and communities rather than 
central government taking a strong and pro-active lead. We see a focus in 
academic and political discourse on the immigrant, in particular immigrant groups 
which does not necessarily reflect the contemporary social reality of a more fluid 
migrant population.  
The approach to multicultural policy in section 4.3 involves a thematic content  
analysis of policy statements or, where these do not exist, of implied policy 
throughout time. After considering understandings of integration the section is 
divided into different time periods and the overriding theme emerging from the 
analysis is the lack of coherent and clear policy from the different political parties 
in office across time coupled with a failure to follow through on stated policy 
objectives. Sections 4.2 and 4.3 together provide a comprehensive picture of 
multiculturalism in the United Kingdom but they also provide evidence of a lack 
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of engagement between multiculturalism and law in general and the culture-
responsibility relationship in particular. They also allow the emergence of the 
argument that the culture-responsibility relationship has the ability to sit 
comfortably within the policy objectives of integration. 
Section 4.4 situates the culture-responsibility relationship within understandings 
of multicultural philosophy and the discourse on multicultural justice. The analysis 
here centers firstly on the politics of recognition and considers how the 
relationship can best do justice to recognition and how it can avoid 
misrecognition. Secondly it centers on dialogical theory and the search for 
operative public values (Parekh) or norms of mutual recognition (Shabani) and 
considers whether the culture-responsibility relationship could become such a 
norm or value. In section 1.1 we emphasised the importance of the individual as 
being at the centre of the culture-responsibility relationship but multicultural 
philosophy focuses, broadly on the group. This section reconciles inherent 
conflicts between group and individual (and in some cases state)  and whilst it 
goes without saying that the attribution of responsibility in the criminal law of 
England and Wales rests with the individual we can see the importance of the 
group in informing identity. 
Chapter 5  
Section 5.1. summarises the findings of the thesis before going on in section 5.2 
to outline reflections on culture and multiculturalism in the context of justice. The 
main purpose of the Chapter (and of course of the thesis) is to offer a forward 
looking framework for the ongoing development of the culture-responsibility 
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relationship. This framework, set out in section 5.3 draws together the findings 
made throughout the thesis in the realm of theory, policy and practice and offers 
a practically based and roundly considered and just way in which the criminal law 
and criminal justice system of England and Wales can respond to relationship 
between culture and responsibility in a multicultural society. Section 5.4 takes 
advantage of the opportunity to set out a number of questions that emerge during 
the course of the thesis about the ongoing just development of the criminal law 











CHAPTER 2  
THE CULTURE- RESPONSIBILITY RELATIONSHIP  
‘…the degree of moral responsibility for wrongful conduct is something which is 
beyond human power to allocate…’1 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As seen in Chapter 1, this thesis seeks to answer the question how should the 
criminal law of England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility 
relationship? What exactly are we asking here and how do we go about 
answering the question in a multicultural society requiring both equality and strict 
standards through criminal norms? To answer the question we must firstly 
attempt to understand, in turn, the concepts of culture and responsibility. Only 
then can we begin to focus on what we have already identified as the paramount 
concern of this thesis, the relationship between them in individual cases. There 
are a number of possible ways in which it might be said that culture might be 
relevant to legal responsibility. For the sake of absolute clarity a list of these 
possibilities and their place in the criminal justice system (at guilt or at sentence) 
is given here, together with an indication of the dilemmas, legal and philosophical, 
that each might give rise to: 
I. D should not be responsible because he does not that know that 
his actions contravene the criminal law of England and Wales. 
 
This could be relevant to guilt. 
Difficulties:  
• Conflict with the principle of criminal law in England and Wales that 
ignorance of the law is no excuse (discussed in section 3.2).  
• Concerns of legal pluralism. 
                                                        
1 Dennis Lloyd, The Idea of Law (London, Penguin Books 1964) 64. 
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• Challenges notions of strict equality. 
 
II. D should not be responsible because he is culturally determined or 
pre-disposed  to act in a certain way and therefore his agency is 
compromised.  
 
This could be relevant to guilt and/or sentence. 
Difficulties: 
• Evidential difficulties at both the guilt stage and the sentencing 
stage. 
• Challenges to the limits of excusatory defences (examined in 
section 3.3). 
• Undermining of agency and free will. 
• Claims of essentialising ‘the other’. 
• Apparent prioritization of one group (the cultural group) over 
another (another cultural group or, as discussed in section 2.4, 
women). 
• Balancing claims of individualised justice against equality. 
 
III. D should not be responsible because his moral outlook is 
influenced by his culture. 
 
This could be relevant to guilt and/or sentence. 
Difficulties: 
• Evidential difficulties at both the guilt stage and the sentencing 
stage. 
• Cultural relativism/moral relativism 
• Challenges to the limits of justificatory defences (examined in 
section 3.3). 
• Apparent prioritization of one group (the cultural group) over 
another (another cultural group or, as discussed in section 2.4, 
women). 
• Balancing claims of individualised justice against equality. 
 
 
IV. D should not be responsible simply because he is a ‘member’ of or 
belongs to a particular ‘cultural group’ (ie. his apparent identity is 
disconnected from his legal responsibility) . 
 
This could be relevant to guilt.  
Difficulties: 
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• ‘Membership’ of a group alone is no longer sufficient  to establish a 
relationship between culture and responsibility in individual cases 
which must now be seen in terms of (II) or (III) above.  
• ‘Membership’ relies on outmoded views of culture as static and 
bounded (discussed in section 2.2). 
• Claims of essentialising the other. 
• Concerns of legal pluralism. 
• Challenges to strict notions of equality. 
• Apparent prioritization of one group (the cultural group) over 
another (another cultural group or, as discussed in section 2.4, 
women). 
• Adducing evidence of ‘membership’ in court. 
 
 
V. D cannot be responsible because he has a ‘right to culture’ or his 
culture needs protecting. 
 
This could be relevant to guilt. 
Difficulties: 
• Cultural rights and the protection of culture, whilst of huge 
importance, do not lie in the domain of the attribution of 
responsibility in criminal law.  
 
Setting out the possibilities in this way overcomes the criticism of  lack of definition 
levelled at the ‘cultural defence’. We can dismiss number I fairly quickly by 
reference to the principles of criminal law in England and Wales (see section 3.2) 
and number V, included because it is consistently raised in connection with the  
‘cultural defence’, can never be said to be truly relevant to the culture-
responsibility relationship. Number IV is more difficult because it stems, once 
again, from ‘cultural defence’ discourse and the wider domain of multicultural 
theory with its emphasis on the group and group rights and it moves beyond law 
and into the realm of identity politics.  But as will be seen in section 2.2, this thesis 
aims to move forward under an understanding of culture that rejects the static 
and bounded group and that focuses on the way in which culture is acquired, 
adopted and adapted and therefore uniquely processed in each and every 
individual case. We are therefore limiting the culture-responsibility relationship to 
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instances where it might be said that culture might affect responsibility either 
because a defendant is culturally determined or pre-disposed to act in a certain 
way and therefore his agency is compromised (number II) or because his moral 
outlook is influenced by his culture (number III), and in either case that 
determination or pre-disposition or altered moral outlook needs to be considered 
in connection with a breach of the criminal law. The question of how the criminal 
law should respond to such breaches is asked both in the context of the attribution 
of legal responsibility through the application of the criminal law to arrive at 
decisions on guilt or innocence and in the application of sentencing laws to arrive 
at a just punishment in cases of guilt. ‘Responsibility’, as understood in section 
2.3, is therefore widely construed to include too the degree of responsibility 
deemed to be  just and reflected  in sentencing decisions.  
The above list of possibilities identifies a number of problems that are inherent 
within the culture-responsibility relationship and even if we confine this list to 
those pertinent to the understandings set out in numbers II and III above these 
are not insignificant. These difficulties, along with attempts to diffuse them, are 
discussed in detail in the context of establishing the existence and importance of 
the culture-responsibility relationship in section 2.4. They are largely theoretical 
and fall under two headings, firstly what we can broadly identify as ‘equality, 
inequality and relativist concerns’ which encompasses notions of  individualised 
justice, pluralism, legal, moral and cultural relativism and essentializing and 
secondly ‘feminist concerns’. Raising them does not contribute directly to 
answering the question how should the criminal law of England and Wales 
respond to the culture-responsibility relationship? However, attempting to 
rationalise these difficulties enhances the commitment within this thesis to the 
development of a holistic understanding of this problematic relationship and the 
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paradoxes within it so that the suggested answer to the research question framed 
in Chapter 5 is as well considered as it can possibly be. 
An initial practical problem, however, is the treatment of cultural evidence in court 
and this needs to be considered to fully answer the question how should the 
criminal law of England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility 
relationship? The culture-responsibility relationship is therefore relevant both to 
the rules of procedure within the criminal justice system and to the substantive 
criminal law. The issue of culture in the courtroom is addressed in section 2.4, 
evidence of the approach of the courts and of the Judiciary to the rules of 
procedure is extracted during the analysis in Chapter 3, and more detailed 
practical suggestions for a way forward in this dimension are included in Chapter 
5.  A further problem that does not arise directly from the culture-responsibility 
relationship but nonetheless affects the issue of culture in court is the perception 
within ‘cultural defence’ discourse of an endemic cultural bias within the legal 
system of England and Wales, something that is linked in turn to the wider issue 
of discrimination. These issues too will be addressed in section 2.4. Bias, the 
‘…inclination or prejudice for or against one person or group, especially in a way 
considered to be unfair’ is an emotional issue and although it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to consider where the line between a unique legal culture and bias 
lies this impression of bias needs to be acknowledged in the context of the 
culture-responsibility relationship. 2  A perception of bias can arise from the 
interaction between law and culture in all jurisdictions and it is useful at this stage 
to consider the interaction between law and culture more widely, to reconsider 
why and how the domains of culture and law are of interest to each other at all. 
                                                        
2 Definition of bias from Oxford English Dictionary 
<https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/bias> accessed 1st October 2018. 
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Cotterrell and Rosen both write about the symbiotic relationship between law and 
society with the former taking a sociological approach and the latter an 
anthropological approach. Cotterrell bases his work on, among others, the theory 
of Ehrlich who developed the idea of a sociology of law in the early twentieth 
century and who asserts that ‘…law lives in all human association.’ 3  Law 
therefore has no ‘truth’ of its own but its understandings come from participants 
in the legal system and in this way law and the social are mutually constitutive as 
’…law gains its meaning and ultimate authority from the social at the same time 
as it shapes the social through regulatory force.’4 Therefore, argues Cotterrell, 
legal scholarship requires a sociological understanding of law. For Cotterrell this 
sociological understanding of law is rooted not in the concept of culture but in the 
idea of community because although culture is useful to uncover community 
‘…the term culture embraces a too indefinite and disparate range of phenomena’ 
to be useful to legal theory.5 We therefore need to break culture down into its 
component parts and see it as expressed in different types of social relations of 
community. Our own understanding of culture, arrived at in section 2.2, is, as 
Cotterrell suggests, indefinite but community along with culture is in every way a 
group endeavor. At times it is difficult to see the difference between Cotterrell’s 
‘community’ and the understanding of culture developed in section 2.2.6 Cotterrell 
does challenge the concept of the group asking if the Rule of Law can recognise 
groups as ‘cultural persons assuming rights and subject to duties’.7 This is a 
                                                        
3 Ehrlich, E. (1936) Fundamental Principles of the Sociology of Law (Transaction Reprint, New 
Brunswick) (2002), Summarised in Roger Cotterrell, Law, Culture and Society: Legal Ideas in 
the Mirror of Social Theory (Farnham, Ashgate Publishing 2006) 4 
4 Cotterrell  (n 3) 25. 
5 ibid 97. 
6 For example, Cotterrell relies on the work of Cohen to describe community as a web of 
understandings about the nature of social relations. This is very close to Geertz’s definition of 
culture discussed in section 2.2. 
Cotterrell (n 3) 67. The work by Cohen is Cohen, A. (1985) The Symbolic Construction of 
Community (London, Routledge) p19. 
7 ibid 98. 
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theme we return to in section 2.2 when we question the ability of the group to 
‘own’ a culture. Despite an emphasis on community, Cotterrell argues that juristic 
scholarship is not addressing issues of culture even though there is interaction 
between law and culture in many different ways and asks ‘…how can culture be 
appropriately dealt with juristically?’8 This suggests that even though culture may 
not be useful to legal theory it has to be addressed in the practical realm. 
Rosen argues that law is a ‘cultural domain’ that does not exist in isolation but 
emerges when ‘…we create our experience, knit together disparate ideas and 
actions and in the process fabricate a world of meaning that appears to us as 
real.’9 Law cannot be divorced from the culture within which it exists. In this way 
legal decision makers are bound to draw upon the wider domains alongside 
which the law exists. So if culture influences law, then equally law influences 
culture in ‘…contributing to the formation of an entire cosmology, a way of 
envisioning and creating an orderly sense of the universe, one that arranges 
humanity, society, and ultimate beliefs into a scheme perceived as palpably 
real.’10 Rosen illustrates this hypothesis through a number of historical examples 
within our legal system including juries who are an ‘important sign of the culture 
of law.’11 
                                                        
8 Cotterrell (n 3) 97. 
Cotterrell lists six examples of where this interaction occurs and the list includes cultural 
defences  
1. References to legal culture in comparative law 
2. Liberalism and Multiculturalism 
3. Legal definitions of culture 
4. Cultural defences 
5. Law and popular culture 
6. Law and cultural heritage 
Ibid 98-101. 
9 Lawrence Rosen, Law as Culture: An Invitation (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2006) 
4. 
10 ibid 11. 
11 ibid 146. 
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In The Anthropology of Justice , ‘…a study of law as culture and culture as integral 
to law’, Rosen takes these ideas and tests them in an ethnographic study of the 
Islamic law courts of Morocco which focuses on judicial discretion and how that 
is tied to culture. 12  He finds that inevitably cultural concepts shape judicial 
reasoning and decisions. In section 2.4 we refer to this symbiosis less benignly 
as the ‘endemic cultural bias’ in the legal system of England and Wales and 
although we cannot justify a ‘cultural defence’ to counteract that bias we can 
endorse Rosen’s argument that ‘…the analysis of legal systems…requires at its 
base an understanding of the categories of meaning by which participants 
themselves comprehend their experience and orient themselves toward one 
another in their everyday lives.’13 This is a call for us to be self-reflective about 
the culture that informs the practice of our criminal law, particularly our judicial 
reasoning and decision making, and to be able to reflect in turn upon the cultural 
perspective of others. It is, in its way, a reason for the importance of the culture-
responsibility relationship. 
In fact, Cotterrelll and Rosen (writing at different times) both appear to give us a 
licence to consider the culture-responsibility relationship. We will see in Chapter 
3 how culture is making its way into the judicial realm and how it is met with 
uncertainty and reluctance. Rosen seems to recognise a space within the criminal 
law for the culture-responsibility relationship stating that  ‘…at moments of 
contested social change the propulsion to tie various cultural domains together 
may be intense: it may also appear most strongly when the results or norms of a 
given statutory structure no longer seem to satisfy existing sensibilities.’14 It is 
                                                        
12  Lawrence Rosen, The Anthropology of Justice: Law as Culture in Islamic Society 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 1989) xv. 
13 ibid xiv. 
14 Rosen, Law as Culture (n 9) 200. 
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argued throughout this thesis that those ‘existing sensibilities’ are not satisfied by 
the current ad hoc approach of the criminal law and criminal justice system to 
culture and the need for a roundly considered and consistently applied culture-
responsibility relationship is asserted. We appear to be in a liminal space when it 
comes to what to do about culture in the courtroom and the time is right to move 
the discourse forward and into the practical realm. Cotterrell too issues a call to 
‘…introduce a new paradigm that reunite(s) concepts that have been fractionated 
by instances that prior ideas have been increasingly unable to contain.’15 That 
new paradigm, in the context of criminal law and culture, is the culture-
responsibility relationship.  
The aim of this Chapter is to explore understandings of culture and responsibility 
(section 2.2 and 2.3 respectively). It takes these nuanced understandings forward 
to section 2.4 where the existence, scope and importance of the culture-
responsibility relationship is established and the problems inherent within it, both 
practical and theoretical, are explored and rationalised. In a somewhat circular 
argument these problems in themselves are reconstructed to provide a 
justification for the place of a roundly considered culture-responsibility 
relationship in the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales.  
  
                                                        
15 ibid 173. 
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2.2 Understanding Culture 
We all have some idea of what we mean and understand by culture but defining 
or describing it, pinning it down in words, is another matter. Although Rosen 
states that the key concepts of culture began before we became human, when 
early hominids began to organise work groups, the first written references to 
culture are thought to come from Cicero, who explored human culture 
metaphorically in writing of the cultivation of the soil in his Tusculanae 
Disputationes in 45 BC.16 More recently the concept of culture gained visibility in 
the fifteenth century, an age of exploration, when Western adventurers 
encountered the ‘primitive savages’ of other worlds, tribes who were perceived to 
be ‘different’ and in need of ‘civilization’. By the nineteenth century these diverse 
cultures were providing fascinating grounds for study and so the discipline of 
anthropology, ‘the science of the nature of man’, emerged with early 
understandings of culture emanating from the findings of cultural anthropologists 
who travelled to far flung corners of the earth to undertake ethnographic studies 
of isolated tribes.17 This means that for centuries culture is something that has 
been perceived both as belonging to ‘others’, to non-western people and groups 
and to which ‘others’ belong. A deemed group, membership of which is based on 
racial or ethnic similarities, is ascribed a culture and that culture becomes a strong 
aspect of identity, something which individuals in that group feel that they belong 
                                                        
16 ibid 3. 
17 This definition came from Theodor Waitz, Introduction to Anthropology (London, Longman 
and Roberts 1863)  
There seems to be some confusion over the classification of different branches of anthropology 
and their areas of study, perhaps as a result of different terminology in the UK and the US. Early 
anthropology was based on animism, the idea that natural beings possess a spiritual element. 
‘Cultural anthropology’ refers to the study of cultural variation and is attributed to the work of Franz 
Boas in the US and Edward Tylor in the UK. It is to be distinguished from ‘social anthropology’ 
which is a more sociologically based discipline emerging in the UK in the early twentieth century 
and based on the ideas of Durkheim and on Malinowski’s methodology of ‘participant 
observation’. 
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to. In contrast, the west has been perceived as a-cultural, an idea that we will 
return to in section 2.4.  
It is not intended to provide a definition of ‘culture’ in this section but simply to set 
out the parameters within which culture must be understood. Jahoda, in his 
critical reflection of recent definitions of culture, reiterates Lang’s conclusion that 
‘…attempts at defining culture in a definite way are futile’. However, he 
simultaneously recognises that the concept of culture is indispensable and 
advocates clarification of the specific use of the term when used for empirical or 
theoretical reasons. We do therefore need to establish our own understanding of 
culture in the context of the culture-responsibility relationship.18  Calling on a 
handful of influential definitions from the last 150 years and tracing the 
development of the concept provides a good starting point in achieving that 
understanding. 
The Oxford English Dictionary gives two meanings of culture in addition to those 
related to the arts or biology: 
The ideas customs and social behaviour of a particular people or society. 
The attitudes and behaviour characteristics of a particular human group.19 
These are drawn from the field of anthropology and from the start  anthropologists 
have attempted to define culture. In 1952 Kroeber and Kluckhorn put together a 
list of 164 definitions of culture having identified the emergence of 6 new 
definitions between 1871 and 1920 and 100 more between 1940 and 1950.20 
                                                        
18 Gustav Jahoda, ‘Critical Reflections on Some Recent Definitions of Culture’ (2012) 18 (3) 
Culture and Psychology 289 quoting A Lang, ‘Thinking Rich as Well as Simple: Boesch’s 
Cultural Psychology in Semiotic Perspective’ (1997) 3 Culture and Psychology 383, 389.. 
19 Oxford English Dictionary definition 
 <https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/culture> accessed 3rd August 2018. 
20 Alfred L Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn, ‘Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and 
Definitions’ (1952)  47 (1) Papers Peabody Museum of Archaeology and Ethnology. 
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More recently Varene has compiled a collection of definitions of culture that he 
claims ‘…could someday lead to a new version of Kroeber and Kluckhorn’s 
Culture: A Critical Review of Concepts and Definitions.’21 In 2004 Woodman 
claimed that there are over 3000 definitions of culture, an assertion that may 
indeed be credible, and argued, in analyzing the ‘cultural defence’ that there is 
no need to define culture.22 On the other hand, Van Broeck, who advocates the 
use of ‘cultural offences’ to regulate undesirable practices, argues that we do 
need a definition of ‘cultural’.23 Clearly any attempt to analyse these definitions in 
depth is beyond the scope of this work.  
The most widely accepted early definition came from Tylor in 1871: 
‘Culture, or civilization, taken in its broad ethnographic sense, is that 
complex whole which includes knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, 
customs, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a 
member of society’.24   
                                                        
21 Herve Varene, ‘Snippets from Overhearing a Conversation about "Culture"’ (19th October 
2007) 
 <http://varenne.tc.columbia.edu/hv/clt/and/culture_def.html> accessed 19th October 2018.  
Varene writes on ‘the culture of culture’.  
There seems to be a recent interest in compiling definitions of culture with Spencer-Oatley 
working on a similar set of definitions. Helen Spencer-Oatley, ‘What is Culture? A Compilation 
of Definitions’ (2012) Global PAD Core Concepts 1 
<https://warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/al/globalpad/openhouse/interculturalskills/global_pad_-
_what_is_culture.pdf> accessed 10th October 2018. 
22 G Woodman, ‘The Culture Defence in English Common Law: The Potential for Development’ 
Chapter 1 in Marie-Claire Foblets and Alison Renteln Dundes (eds), Multicultural Jurisprudence: 
Comparative Perspectives on the Cultural Defense (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 2009) 8. 
However, Woodman randomly chooses a definition from the Canadian Commission for  UNESCO 
without offering explanation for his choice. 
23 Jeroen Van Broeck, (2001) ‘Cultural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural 
Offences)’ (2001) 9 (1) European Journal of Crime, Criminal Law and Criminal Justice 1. 
24 Encyclopedia Britannica (28 September 2018)  
Edward B. Tylor, (1871) Primitive Culture as reproduced in Popular Science Monthly 26 (1884): 
145. Public Domain and cited by <https://www.britannica.com/biography/Edward-Burnett-Tylor> 
accessed 15th May 2018. 
Tylor is considered to be the founder of British cultural anthropology. Early anthropology is based 
on animism, the idea that animals in nature possess a spiritual essence. 
Appiah has recently been critical of the concept of ‘western civilisation’ and of Tylor’s approach 
to culture for its assumption that the west is ‘civilised’, and the rest of the world in not. His 
criticisms were made in the 2016 Reith Lectures and reported in the Guardian 9th November 
2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-appiah-reith-
lecture> accessed 20th September 2018. 
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This was based on the Herderian idea of Volksgeist or the spirit of the people and 
on Bildung, which referred to the ‘totality of experiences that provide a coherent 
identity’.25  Tylor’s definition is criticized for being vague around the edges and 
already by 1940 Blumenthal was critical of social scientists in general for using 
common sense definitions and called for a ‘scientific’ one.26 In a bid to overcome 
these inconsistencies, White tried to impose a scientific order to the concept of 
culture defining it as ‘…the extra-somatic means of adaptation for the human 
organism.’ 27   That is a good and simple definition but it does not enhance 
understanding from a social perspective and in any event by 1949 Haring had 
already concluded, in an article whose title asked the very question ‘Is Culture 
Definable?’, that culture is not definable.28 However, in 1950 Kroeber claimed 
that the most significant contribution of anthropology in the first half of the 
twentieth century was ‘the extension and clarification of the concept of culture’.29   
By the 1970’s Geertz had formed the idea that culture is: 
‘…an historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a 
system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of 
which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about 
and attitudes to life.’30 
Geertz argues that cultural anthropologists traditionally attempt to describe 
different cultures without acknowledging the limits that their own cultural 
standpoint places on their ability to interpret the cultures of others and so we need 
                                                        
25 Herder belied that everyone belonged to the Volk which was not the rabble but the spirit of a 
nation and included everyone from the king down (as discussed in Dictionary of Anthropology 
Anthrobase). <http://www.anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/pers/herder_johann_g_von.htm> accessed 
28th September 2018. 
26 Albert Blumenthal, ‘A New Definition of Culture’ (1940) 42 (4) American Anthropologist 42 (4) 
571. 
27 Leslie White, The Evolution of Culture: The Development of Civilization to the Fall of Rome 
(New York, McGraw Hill  1959). 
28 Douglas Haring, ‘Is “Culture” Definable?’ (1949) 14 (1) American Sociological Review 14(1) 
26. 
29  Kroeber and Kluckhohn (n 20). 
30 Clifford Geertz, The Interpretation of Cultures: Selected Essays (New York, Basic Books 
1973) 89. 
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a ‘symbolic anthropology’ grounded in interpretive social sciences (which goes 
back to Weber’s notion of verstehen and the idea that ‘man is an animal 
suspended in webs of significance’) 31 so that the ‘…analysis of culture is not an 
experimental science in search of law but an interpretive one in search of 
meaning.’32 In this way we achieve a ‘thick description’ of culture. Geertz is critical 
of cultural anthropologists too for searching for universal understandings of 
culture and following a stratigraphic conceptualisation of man through layers from 
the organic through to the psychological, social and cultural in turn when  these 
factors should be treated as ‘…variables within unified systems of analyses.’33 
This is a step towards seeking the individual, or perhaps the particular in the 
universal, and brings the understanding of culture closer to one that is a better fit 
with the culture-responsibility relationship. 
In 1989 Roosens moved towards a more cognitive definition, relevant for our 
purposes, because it refers to the effect of culture on an individual’s behaviour. 
Culture is: 
 ‘…an encompassing system of thinking, doing, evaluation. It touches 
different domains of human life and has some overall logic without being 
completely deterministic.’34 
 
A final definition to consider is that of Spencer-Oatley. Culture is: 
‘… a fuzzy set of basic assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, 
policies, procedures and behavioural conventions that are shared by a 
group of people and that influence (but do not determine) each members’ 
                                                        
31 n74 Chapter 1. 
32 Geertz (n 30) 5. 
33 ibid 44. 
34 Eugeen Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenics (California, Sage 
Publications 1989).  
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behaviour and his/her interpretation of the ‘meaning’ of other peoples’ 
behaviour.’35 
 
And so we can draw from these definitions for our own clarification and to inform 
our own understanding. The common theme in these definitions is the idea of a 
‘complex whole’ (Tylor), something that is ‘fuzzy around the edges’ (Spencer-
Oatley). This ‘fuzzy complex whole’ is a good starting point. The question is 
whether or not we need to compile a list of what constitutes that ‘complex whole’. 
We have ‘knowledge, beliefs, arts, morals, law, customs’ (Tylor) and 
‘assumptions and values, orientations to life, beliefs, policies, procedures and 
behavioural conventions’ (Spencer-Oatley). We have ‘thinking, doing, evaluation’ 
(Roosens) and more recently Matravers has added ‘experience of migration’ but 
could we add to this, for example, folklore, religion, tradition, and identity?36 Tylor 
suggests that his list is not definitive in adding ‘…any other habits and capabilities 
acquired by man’ and it is probably best not to be prescriptive but rather to allow 
for the evolution of what, in different times and places, may be included in this 
‘complex whole’ because there will always be disagreement about what should  
and should not be on the list.  
Pagel, for example, argues that religion is not part of culture but a way of 
advertising commitment to a particular culture so that religion, along with music 
and arts, is a ‘cultural enhancer’.37 Tradition, described by Glenn as a belief or 
behaviour passed down with its origins in the past, is a more comprehensible 
idea than culture because although it is historically grounded ‘…it is recognized 
                                                        
35 Spencer-Oatley (n 21) 3. 
36 Nicola Lacey, ‘Community, Culture and Criminalisation’ Chapter 3 in Will Kymlicka, Claes 
Lernestedt and Matt Matravers (eds) Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press 2014) 50. 
37 Mark Pagel, Wired for Culture: The Natural History of Human Cooperation (London, Allen 
Lane 2012) 132. 
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that traditions are not internally stable’ and all societies can have traditions 
whereas the dominant culture, as stated above, can be seem at times to be a-
cultural.38 Somehow, tradition seems a weak concept in comparison with culture 
and it is hard to imagine ‘tradition’ alone being considered in relation to legal 
responsibility but there is absolute merit in its inclusion as a component of culture. 
Giddens encourages us to look to tradition because it has the capacity to 
circumnavigate the postmodern critique of culture (which claims that culture leads 
us to think of societies as static and internally coherent with the danger of the 
‘…reified exotification of the lifeways of people’ who are different from us).39 This 
postmodern attack raises awareness of concerns about understandings of culture 
in the context of the culture-responsibility relationship - the myth of the bounded 
culture, the hierarchy of cultures, the emphasis on the group and conceptions of 
‘the other’ and we will return too to these. 
Whilst culture is an important factor in shaping identity and cultural identity is 
therefore a characteristic of the individual, Benhabib bemoans our failure to 
interrogate the meaning of cultural identity and argues that ‘…culture has become 
a ubiquitous synonym for identity’ (and she is critical of this because, she argues, 
groups form around such identity markers and demand legal recognition and 
resource allocation and identity politics draws the state into ‘cultural wars’).40 But 
this cannot be wholly right as individual identity is influenced too by other markers 
                                                        
38 Patrick H Glenn, Legal Traditions of the World (5th edn, Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2014) 30. 
39 A Giddens, ‘Living in a Post Traditional Society’ in Ulrich Beck, Anthony Giddens and Scott 
Lash (eds) Reflexive Modernization: Politics, Tradition and Action in the Modern Social Order 
(Cambridge, Cambridge Polity Press 1994). Quote from anthrobase 
<http://www.anthrobase.com/Dic/eng/def/culture.htm> 
accessed 10th October 2018. 
On the other hand Renteln criticises the ‘postmodern tendency to deconstruct culture so that it 
is no more than a social construction.’ Alison Dundes Renteln, The Culture Defense (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2005) 11. 
40 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2002) 1. 
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such as race, gender, history, sexuality and religion and so identity, in the 
individual, is greater than culture and culture, being as indeterminate as we are 
understanding it to be, arguably only exists in the mind of the individual.  Appiah 
too sees culture as a source of identity (along with religion and nation and race) 
but warns that all these things ‘…can become a form of confinement, conceptual 
mistakes underwriting moral ones.’41 Bhatt challenges us to refuse the origin 
stories and identity myths that claim to be part of our culture on the basis that 
they are recent constructions (or reconstructions) of the past and to develop a 
deeper sense of personhood, responsible to humanity as a whole because 
culture is a creative and dynamic process, and using it as an excuse to follow 
certain behaviour is dangerous.42 Both Appiah and Bhatt therefore see culture as 
something that may not be benign.  
We can see in this exploration of the understandings of culture that the focus is 
on the individual but we can further the construction of understandings of culture 
for the purposes of the culture-responsibility relationship by finding in the 
definitions studied here insight into the relationship between the individual and 
the group. Culture is conceptualized as originating in the group and so it 
comprises ‘…capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society’ 
(Tylor) or ‘…inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms’ (Geertz) or 
‘…assumptions [etc]…that are shared by a group’ (Spencer-Oatley) or it is the 
means by which ’… men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge 
about and attitudes to life’ (Geertz). This is understood, but what we are 
concerned with in the culture-responsibility relationship is a conscious or 
                                                        
41  Kwame Anthony Appiah, ‘There is no Such Thing as Western Civilization’ The Guardian  
(London, 9 Nov 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/nov/09/western-civilisation-
appiah-reith-lecture> accessed 28th September 2018. 
42 Chetan Bhatt, TED Talk on Identity <https://www.ted.com/speakers/chetan_bhatt> accessed 
30th September 2018. 
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subconscious acceptance by the individual of the conceptions of the group. What 
we are effectively questioning is the extent to which the individual has taken this 
joint construction of meaning on board, the extent to which the individual has 
internalized the group cultural identity. Both Roosens and Spencer-Oatley include 
reference to the cognitive domain in their definitions of culture but both fall short 
of claiming that culture is deterministic. Barry argues that cultural beliefs are freely 
affirmed and so consciously adopted but Parekh says that cultural beliefs are 
more a product of circumstance than deliberately chosen because ‘… in some 
cases a cultural inability can be overcome with relative ease by suitably 
reinterpreting the relevant cultural norm or practice; in others its constitutive of 
the individual’s sense of identity and even of self-respect and cannot be 
overcome without a deep sense of moral loss.’43 Kymlicka takes a middle ground 
believing that people are capable of personal autonomy (in deciding whether or 
not to take cultural beliefs on board) but the culture in which they are brought up 
is usually the given context within which that autonomy is achieved.44 Relating 
this to law and to the culture-responsibility relationship, it seems there is some 
recognition of agency in decisions to accept culture or part of a culture or not and 
as will be seen in section 2.4 Levine takes Ortner’s work on this and applies it to 
the ‘cultural defence’. A final point of importance about the individual and the 
group is that whilst culture is a product of the group it remains a ‘concept’, 
nebulous and evolving, created over time through the interaction of people. It 
therefore exists only in minds and it is understood in different ways in different 
                                                        
43 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan 2000) 241.  
Brian Barry, ‘Second Thoughts- and Some First Thoughts Revived’ in Paul Kelly (ed), 
Multiculturalism Reconsidered: ‘Culture and Equality’ and its Critics (Cambridge, Polity Press 
2002) 216. 
44 Will Kymlicka, Multicultural Citizenship: A Liberal Theory of Minority Rights (Oxford, Clarendon 
1995) 95.  
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minds according to different experiences. It cannot therefore be said that culture 
‘belongs’ to the group although the individual may feel a sense of ‘belonging’ to 
a particular cultural group and may internalize a group cultural identity. It is the 
‘membership’ of a particular cultural group that has been at the heart of  ‘cultural 
defence’ discourse and a significant factor in its failure to bear strict legal scrutiny 
but as stated in section 1.2 the culture-responsibility relationship moves away 
from this idea of belonging because belonging alone may not be relevant to the 
mind of the defendant. Multiculturalism implies that the basis of all groups is 
cultural but Barry says that this is simply ‘bad anthropology’ and, like Benhabib, 
argues against the politicisation of groups based on culture.45  
We are therefore working towards a subjective understanding of culture, 
grounded in the individual, despite the legacy of historical anthropological 
studies, where cultures were grounded in the group which was seen as being 
‘internally integrated and externally bounded’ and culture a singular and universal 
driving factor in the lives of those studied, making for a more objective definition 
of the group as a whole.46 Geertz is critical of both Levi Strauss for his structuralist 
approach, his search for objective data to place anthropology in the realm of 
positive science with a focus on the similarity of human structures everywhere, 
and of Malinowski for his functionalist and absolute explanation of cultures.47 The 
                                                        
45 Brian Barry, Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism (Cambridge, 
Polity Press) 21. 
46 This objectivity was seen for example in Ruth Benedict’s 1935 work. ‘…culture, like an 
individual, is a more or less consistent pattern of thought or action’ with ‘characteristic purposes 
not necessarily shared by other types of society.’ Ruth Benedict, Patterns of Culture (London, 
Routledge and Kegan Paul 1935) 33. 
47 Malinowski published Argonauts of the Western Pacific in 1922 following a number of years 
spent living among the people of the Trobriand Islands. (Bronislaw Malinowski, Argonauts of the 
Western Pacific: An Account of Native Enterprise and Adventure in the Archipelagoes of 
Melanesian New Guinea (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul Ltd 1922)). Radcliffe Brown is said 
to have combined functionalism with structuralism in looking at the purpose and meaning of myths 
in the Andaman islands (The Andaman Islanders: A Study in Social Anthropology) although this 
was published in 1922 forty years before the seminal structuralist work of Levi Strauss La Pensee 
Sauvage (1962). For the sake of completeness the work of Boas, grounded in historical accounts 
of culture, should be mentioned. All three approaches are based on extensive fieldwork and all 
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tendency to see cultures as bounded and static encourages the perception of a 
hierarchy of cultures with ethnocentric views meaning that non-western cultures 
are seen as inferior. Moreover, as Kukathas asserts, groups are fluid and 
constantly changing and although early ideas refer to the ‘culture of the group’ 
and the emergence of ‘group rights’ Kukathas argues that there cannot be group 
rights, only individual rights and the authority that upholds them.48 This is returned 
to in section 2.4 and fits in with what is at stake here because for the most part 
the criminal law is concerned with individual responsibility, not group 
responsibility. Dick argues for example that our understanding of culture comes 
from historical, colonialist and imperialist discourse so that minorities are seen as 
socially primitive and culturally determined and Volpp objects to the idea that 
culture is conceptualized and linked with race so that ‘…culture is a pseudo-
biological property of communal life’ and the exclusion of some groups from ‘us’ 
a form of epistemic violence. 49 But is culture so bounded and isolated? 50  
As we will see in Chapter 4 liberal multiculturalism is founded on the idea of ‘group 
rights’ but we can see ideas that move away from this framework and emphasis. 
Benhabib, for example, argues that participants within a culture experience it 
‘..through shared, albeit contested and contestable, narrative accounts…from 
within a culture need not appear as a whole; rather it forms a horizon that recedes 
each time one approaches it.’51 In 1995 Waldron recognized the period in which 
                                                        
share the same ideology, that culture is the essence of human nature but Geertz is critical of all 
three because they do not permit the entry of the individual anywhere in their accounts.   
48 Chandran Kukathas, ‘Are there any Cultural Rights?’ (1992) 20 (1) Political Theory 105, 116. 
49 Caroline Dick, ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Intimate Femicide, Cultural Defences, and the Law of 
Provocation’ (2011) 23 (2) Canadian Journal of Women and the Law 519, 547. 
Leti Volpp, ‘Blaming Culture for Bad Behaviour’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law and the 
Humanities 89. 
50 The question of the incommensurability of cultures and cultural hierarchies will be considered 
in section 4.4. The question of whether ‘others’ are culturally driven to some extent informs the 
research question in this thesis. 
51 Benhabib (n 40) 5. 
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he was writing as an era of ‘cultural hybridity’ where cultures have become 
cosmopolitan, because ‘…we live in a world formed by technology and trade; by 
economic, religious and political imperialism and their offspring; by mass 
migration and the dispersion of cultural influences. In this context to immerse 
oneself [in a culture] involves an artificial dislocation from what is actually going 
on in the world’.52 And modern cultural anthropologists are keen to break down 
old habits of unreflective ethnocentric judgments. Contemporary ethnographer 
Whitehouse rejects claims of universal dispositions and claims that 
‘…anthropologists have now developed theories of culture that support varying 
levels of individual idiosyncrasy’.53 In fact he refers to Ortner’s continuum of 
cultural determinism as evidence of the recognition of individualism in cultural 
theory.54 Deckha points out that we need a postcolonial approach where culture 
is considered in a nuanced way and certainly some feminist writers see cultures 
as hybrid, contested and overlapping, so that perhaps there is de facto 
cosmopolitanism, whereby individuals code-switch from one group to another.55 
Challenging this individualism, Renteln criticizes ‘the postmodern tendency to 
deconstruct culture so that it is no more than a social construction.’56 But isn’t that 
exactly what it is? Indeed, Benhabib defends ‘…social constructionism as a 
comprehensive explanation of cultural differences’ not least because it avoids 
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cultural essentialism (something that we will return to in section 2.4).57 But Bush 
too is critical of postmodern culturalism which ‘simultaneously promotes 
cosmopolitanism and a universal hybridization of cultures.’58 The issue is that, to 
some extent and depending on where we sit on the Barry-Kymlicka-Parekh scale 
of autonomy, in a multicultural world there is a choice and the ability to exercise 
that choice will vary from individual to individual in the same way that conceptions 
of culture vary from individual to individual. Because the degree of choice is part 
of the culture(s) in question. As Uberoi and Modood state ‘…cultures are linked 
to individual autonomy… but people need something to choose with, which is the 
beliefs and norms of their culture’.59 
To reinforce this recognition of cultural hybridity and the idea of autonomy (and 
whilst respecting feminist concerns) we have to argue that culture is wider than 
Rimonte’s description of  ‘…a body of beliefs, ideas and ideals held by an ethnic 
group about the nature of women and men and about their roles and 
relationships’ and we can no longer say that the beliefs, ideas and ideals 
identified by Rimonte are held by an ‘ethnic group’ partly because culture and 
ethnicity are distinct and partly because we are of course concerned with the 
beliefs, ideas and ideals held by the individual though informed by the group.60  
Definition aside, do we all have a ‘culture’? Environmental biologists can provide 
us with an answer to this question.  In this field there seems to be little dispute 
that culture exists and that it is what makes us ‘human’ as recent work claims to 
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prove that we are ‘wired for culture.’61 Yet there is a tendency to assume that 
white culture is nonexistent or invisible and to see ‘other’ cultures as sites of 
oppression where individuals have struggled as slaves, colonised or conquered, 
so that culture belongs to the oppressed. Bhabha encourages us to think about 
our own cultures because we assume ‘monolithic characterisations of minority 
migrant cultures’ and assume ‘the western democratic scene is egalitarian and 
empowering’ and that minorities are ‘huddled in the gazebo of group rights, 
preserving the orthodoxy of their distinctive cultures in the midst of the great storm 
of western progress.’62 
And so what we have arrived at here is an understanding of culture as a fuzzy 
complex whole, derived from the historical interpretation and adaptation by a 
group of a number of possible influential factors that an individual may adopt, 
consciously or subconsciously, freely or not, in whole or in part, and that 
contributes to both collective and individual identity. Culture is therefore fluid not 
certain, ephemeral not concrete and we can leave aside  for now the  question of 
the ‘influential factors’ that should be included to make up this ‘whole’ The 
interpretations of culture are therefore multiple. Is it an intellectual cop out to 
decline to define culture? No, because fluid ideas are valuable and save us from 
accusations of imposing our white western cultural biases in interpreting what we 
think culture is and perhaps our understanding here can be considered another 
of what Geertz calls ‘sites of interpretation.’63 This ties in with the need to see 
cultural practices through a lens ’…for which there is never a fully exclusive inside 
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and outside.’64 Cotterrell argues that law has an inherent constitutive power, a 
capacity to create the meaning by which people understand the social 
environment in which they live and their place in it and so law can confer ‘cultural 
meanings’ on many things and perhaps in time it will bring its own meaning to 
‘culture’.65 
For now we can carry forward from this section a conceptual understanding of 
culture and an agreement that we all possess a culture. Although anthropologists 
cannot agree on a definition of culture they recognize that for the purposes of the 
law what is important is the effect that culture has or does not have on behaviour 
and that will be explored in depth in section 2.4. Before exploring the idea of 
responsibility in section 2.3 we can consider this one last definition from Honig. 
Culture is ‘…a way of life, a rich time worn grammar of human activity, a set of 
diverse and often conflicting narratives whereby communal (mis)understandings, 
roles and responsibilities are negotiated.’66 This reinforces the malleable nature 
of culture and in the next section the commutative  understanding of responsibility 
over time will be seen. 
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2.3 Understanding Responsibility 
Matravers states that ‘…different conceptions of the criminal law will not only have  
different accounts of responsibility…but may have different places for the very 
idea of responsibility.’67 Responsibility is often seen as forward looking through 
the creation of offences, something that is addressed in this thesis in section 3.2 
in the context of the purpose of the criminal law, and backward looking through 
findings within the criminal justice system that an individual has committed such 
an offence. For the purpose of establishing the existence and importance of the  
culture-responsibility relationship we are concerned here with understanding a 
backward looking responsibility in the context of the individual. The theory of the 
Criminal Law is largely concerned with something called the ‘general part of the 
criminal law’, that is, the structure of criminal liability and within that we need to 
consider when an actor can or cannot be held ‘responsible’. Broadly, and 
adopting a traditional dual structural analysis of the criminal law, most crimes 
consist of an Actus Reus and a Mens Rea. The Actus Reus revolves around an 
individual voluntarily carrying out an act (or in rare cases allowing an omission to 
occur) that causes a certain outcome and the Mens Rea makes that act a crime 
if the individual possesses the required mental state and if there is no recognised 
defence. Together, therefore the Actus Reus and the Mens Rea make the 
individual ‘responsible’ or liable for the commission of a crime in the absence of 
a defence. The emphasis on responsibility is, however, a modern idea because 
in earlier times there was simply ‘blame’. In his Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle 
asked ‘what exculpates us from blame and when is blame appropriate?’68 In pre-
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Medieval times it was the harm that counted in English law and it is not until the 
thirteenth century that Bracton first refers to ‘the will’.69 There has been, over 
time, a shift from simple act to the will to choose defining action in attracting 
criminal responsibility. There has also been a shift from a law that simply defined 
specific offences (for example Blackstone (1760) and James Fitzjames Stephens 
(1880) both focus on individual crimes)70 to the development of the general part 
of the criminal law, an ongoing development that began at the beginning of the 
twentieth century. The idea of legal responsibility is complex in a number of ways. 
Two broad questions relating to responsibility arise in the context of this thesis. 
Firstly, where does responsibility sit within the criminal justice process? Secondly, 
what makes an individual legally responsible? 
In section 3.2 we identify the maintenance of social order as the purpose of the 
criminal law, achieved in three ways through criminalisation to prevent harm, the 
application of the criminal law to attribute responsibility through findings of guilt, 
and sentencing decisions to enforce punishment. The first question raised here, 
‘where does responsibility sit?’ calls on differing structural paradigms of the 
criminal law and looks a little more closely at where we find the attribution of 
responsibility in the criminal justice process. We said in section 2.1 that we need 
a wide understanding of responsibility to include not just findings of guilt but the 
degree of responsibility deemed to be just and reflected in sentencing decisions. 
In Rethinking Criminal Law, Fletcher recognizes the traditional dual account of 
manifest criminality (the act) and subjective criminality (the mind) set out above 
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but is critical of Anglo-American legal theory for focusing on the actor’s 
responsibility generally rather than focusing on the actor and his accountability 
for the particular act in question. For Fletcher therefore ‘accountability’ consists 
of wrongdoing (the categorical violation of a prohibitory norm without justification), 
the finding of culpability (where excuses may challenge the degree of culpability) 
and punishment (which is retributively related to desert to reflect the degree of 
culpability).71  It is clear from his work that these three components all work 
together to determine not only guilt but the level of culpability and there is a link 
that runs between all three strands because the criminal law is making a judgment 
about ‘…whether a wrongful act is attributable to character or to circumstances 
that overwhelmed [the actors] capacity for choice.’72 Fletcher sees in the second 
strand, the attribution of responsibility (or in his words, the finding of culpability), 
the potential for an individualised account of responsibility that acknowledges the 
fact that it is easier for some actors to avoid wrongdoing than others but if one 
falls below the minimum threshold of being able to avoid wrongdoing then he 
should be excused.73  However, there are inherent limits on how many people we 
can excuse in the interests of social control and safety and Fletcher suggests that 
excuse should be confined to a ‘…limited temporal distortion of the actor’s 
character’ because excuses do not change the norm of law but entail a judgment 
in a particular case. 74  The recognition of excuses in law, says Fletcher, is 
motivated by compassion but this is acted out in decisions in the criminal justice 
system through ‘mercy’ with the implication that a ‘superior’ actor is showing 
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mercy to an ‘inferior’ actor. Fletcher sees ‘law’ as applied to the individual beyond 
the narrow interpretation of norm and justification and construes it in ‘…a broad 
sense [that] encompasses the total set of criteria that affects the outcomes of 
particular cases’, that is norms and justifications, excuses and culpability and 
retribution and desert.75 
This is the breadth of responsibility we need to see in the culture-responsibility 
relationship, what we refer to in section 3.2 in turn firstly as the attribution of 
responsibility and secondly punishment. Culture, if superimposed onto Fletcher’s 
three part framework  could find a place in any part of the scheme. However, we 
see in section 3.3 less flexibility to accommodate culture in the traditional 
defences (both justifications and excuses) than Fletcher implies. Therefore 
sentencing decisions too are crucial to understandings of responsibility in the 
context of the culture-responsibility relationship with the degree of responsibility 
determined at sentencing and the juncture at which we may witness Fletcher’s 
‘mercy’. 
The second question ‘what makes an individual responsible?’ is harder to answer 
not least because of the vast number of ideas in academic discourse on the 
subject, although there is a lack of specific engagement between the field of legal 
theory and multiculturalism. Responsibility in a liberal democracy is linked to the 
autonomy of the individual and traditional accounts of responsibility focus on 
agency. These ideas of agency emerged from Enlightenment philosophy, 
particularly the work of Kant, so that ‘…individuals have free will and are able to 
make rational self-interested choices.’76 This is reflected, for example, in the 
                                                        
75 ibid 812. 
76 Ian Dennis, ‘The Critical Condition of Criminal Law’ (1997) 50 (1) Current Legal Problems 
213, 237. 
 76 
Criminal Law Commission’s Seventh Report which states that ‘the notion of 
prevention through the medium of the mind, necessarily assumes mental ability 
adequate to restraint’, a capacity based account of responsibility.77 Tadros says 
that for the purposes of the criminal law we need to consider who can be a 
responsible agent (for example children are not generally held responsible for 
their actions), the ambit of responsibility (for example, we are not generally held 
to account for omissions), causation and ‘attribution-responsibility’. Traditional 
accounts of the attribution of responsibility are based on capacity, choice and 
character and see the nature of responsibility as universal. Tadros, for example, 
builds a theory of responsibility that  argues that ‘…the central ideas that motivate 
character theory are central to criminal responsibility, but these ideas need to be 
carefully refined’ and also suggests that ‘…capacity has a proper place in the 
theory of criminal responsibility.’78 
The traditional approach to understanding responsibility can however be 
challenged. We can see this challenge in two recent (2016) accounts of 
responsibility offered by Farmer and Lacey. These have been chosen because 
they reject the idea of a universal personhood (and therefore should reflect most 
closely the social reality of our multicultural society). They can in turn be 
contrasted with Norrie’s earlier relational account of responsibility and his 
challenge to orthodox subjectivism.  
Farmer does not subscribe to a universal theory of responsibility but argues that 
the policy of the criminal law is concerned with ‘…situating the concept of 
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responsibility in an account of its functions.’79 In other words, responsibility is a 
moveable phenomenon defined according to the aims of the criminal law at 
different times. Perhaps we can read into Farmer’s statement that ‘…the 
individual is embedded in social relations and must attune their conduct to the 
conduct of others in an increasingly complex and interconnected society’ a 
recognition of our multicultural population and the need for law’s understandings 
to accommodate that. Farmer’s theory allows space for the culture-responsibility 
relationship because responsibility is not absolute but driven by the aims of the 
law in different contexts.  For Farmer responsibility cannot be disentangled from 
the practices of holding an individual to account so that responsibility is ‘…a legal 
artefact…linked to the particular nature of civil order in modernity.’80  
For Lacey too criminal responsibility is indeterminate and defined in terms of 
ideas, interests and institutions, so that ‘…the underlying notion of a responsible 
subject is shaped by an interlocking set of conditions that change over time and 
place in tandem with factors such as the human situation, prevailing ideas, 
institutions and the distribution of power.’ 81  This invites us to consider the 
conditions that exist in a multicultural era and how responsibility should be 
construed in the face of cultural diversity because, as Lacey says responsibility 
‘…is grounded in historically and culturally specific understandings’ and we 
should therefore not simply accept Enlightenment understandings of 
responsibility.82  
                                                        
79 Lindsay Farmer, Making the Modern Criminal Law: Criminalisation and Civil Order (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2016)193. 
80 ibid 168.  
81 Nicola Lacey, In Search of Criminal Responsibility: Ideas, Interests and Institutions (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2016) 3.  
82 ibid 6. 
 78 
Lacey begins her analysis of responsibility with ‘ideas’.83 The first idea is capacity, 
both as choice and as fair opportunity. Capacity as choice is subjective and 
relates to intention, knowledge or foresight whilst capacity as fair opportunity is 
objective and relates to negligence or objective recklessness. This latter category 
of capacity is harder to situate in a world of moral pluralism because it fails to 
answer the question of what is fair. But in both cases the ‘…attribution of 
responsibility for specific actions lies in human capacities of cognition- knowledge 
or circumstances, assessment of consequences- and volition- powers of self-
control.’84 Capacity is central to the culture-responsibility relationship because we 
are considering ideas of determination, pre-disposition and an altered moral 
outlook and the effect of these upon choice and behaviour. 
Lacey’s second idea is character whereby the attribution of responsibility is an 
evaluation of character. Here we ‘…condemn not merely the sin but also, and 
fundamentally, the sinner’ because we are resorting to ‘character essentialism’ 
or ‘character determinism’ where identity is fixed and character determines 
conduct. 85  In relying on character responsibility we are questioning the 
defendant’s conduct as evidence of criminal character, asking ‘…does the 
defendant’s conduct qua moral agent display the sort of vice which calls for 
criminal law’s communicative role of expressing moral indignation to be 
invoked?’86 This seems a dangerous approach in assessing the responsibility of 
defendants from other cultures because it is difficult to draw a line between 
making a judgement about an individual’s breach of the criminal law and about a 
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culture that may have informed that breach. If we return to Fletcher’s criticism of 
Anglo-American legal thinking for focusing on an actor’s responsibility generally 
rather than on an actor’s liability for this particular breach of this particular law we 
can see that character responsibility is not a constructive way forward and may 
lead to the possibility of a less just outcome for that actor. From the outset we 
have emphasized the need for the culture-responsibility relationship to concern 
itself with the relationship between culture and responsibility in individual cases. 
Lacey’s understanding of character responsibility is based on wrong or bad 
character at one end of a spectrum or good character where a vicious trait that 
has been displayed is ‘out of character’ at the other. The culture-responsibility 
relationship carefully places its actors in the middle of this spectrum, neither 
inherently good nor bad but whose capacity, either in choice or fair opportunity, 
has possibly been influenced by culture. However, character as broadly 
construed to reflect the influence of culture is relevant to mitigation in sentencing. 
Lacey recognizes the shifting alignment of ideas of responsibility through time 
based on ‘interests’ and so that interpretations of law are shaped by underlying 
power structures. Over time she charts the shift, broadly, from the alignment 
between judgements of responsibility and judgements of bad character in the 
eighteenth century to the realisation of capacity responsibility in the nineteenth 
century to a ‘dual track era’ of capacity (for ‘real crime’) and outcome 
responsibility (for ‘regulatory crime’) in the twentieth century.  She identifies the 
current predominance of capacity responsibility but sees that character (and risk 
and outcome) also hold sway at the prosecution and sentencing stage so that we 
now have a ‘…hybrid pattern of responsibility attribution.’ 87  In addition she 
recognizes that ‘…different conceptions of responsible personhood may be 
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operating at the prosecution, trial and punishment stages- and each contributes 
to the overall construction of the subject of criminal law.’88 Lacey’s analysis of 
responsibility and the culture-responsibility relationship can work well together. 
Ultimately we are searching in this thesis for a forward looking framework that 
can work in practice. If we can understand responsibility as an individual’s 
capacity for agency both in terms of choice and fair opportunity at the guilt stage 
and add to this character evidence in decisions on sentencing we may have a 
just starting point for the development of the culture-responsibility relationship. 
However, we are still accepting in this construction of the responsible person the 
Kantian autonomous agent. Wells and Quick state that ‘…crime is a construct of 
particular legal and social systems, reflecting temporally and geographically 
specific interests, imperatives and arrangements’ and so we must question ‘… 
how responsibility for crime comes to be attributed exclusively to individual 
offenders rather than (also) to the social, legal and political systems which define 
and enforce law.’89 Norrie challenges us, not to move away entirely from this 
ideological individual and not to dispense with notions of agency altogether 
because ‘…the situation calls for a form of judgement that can unite appreciation 
of the social and political environment with individual agency.’90 Like Lacey and 
Farmer, Norrie does not engage with the concept of culture but he does draw on 
ideas of community. He situates himself between Sereny’s assertion that guilt is 
a question for the individual and Giddens’ assertion that it is a question for 
community so that community is relevant to ideas of individual responsibility and 
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guilt.91 He draws on the social psychology of Harre and the dialectics of Bhashkar 
so that ‘…individual identity exists within an overall, totalising context and its 
nature is radically affected thereby.’92 He describes his approach as relational 
and dialectic and this provides the bedrock for his critique of Kantianism. This 
approach fits well with the understanding of culture that we arrived at in section 
2.2. Bhaskar describes his dialectic as the ability ‘…to see things existentially 
constituted and permeated by their relations with others; and to see our ordinary 
notion of identity as an abstraction.’93 Culture too is existential, a group created 
construction that is adopted and adapted by the individual and so we see both in 
Norrie’s critique of Kant and in our understandings of culture the interplay 
between the individual and the greater world around him. In Punishment, 
Responsibility and Justice Norrie asks us to consider ‘what if identity is not 
individual, fixed, and stable but rather located in significant measure beyond the 
individual in the social realm and therefore fluid and changing?’94 In section 2.2 
we do consider this non-monadic character, at least in so far as the identity of the 
individual is informed by culture. The culture-responsibility relationship therefore 
makes us naturally open to Norrie’s socially connected construction of the 
individual.  
Whilst we might embrace Norrie’s resistance to the ‘abstract juridical individual’, 
the ‘autonomous moral agent with abstract will’ informed by the Enlightenment 
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philosophy of punishment, the difficulty with Norrie’s entity relationalism is fitting 
it into the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales and 
Norrie offers no practical guidance.95 We can question, however, whether we are 
recognising in the culture-responsibility relationship the application of Norrie’s 
dialectic because whilst we are calling the individual to account we are insisting 
too upon a reflection on the effect of culture on his behaviour. In making a 
judgment on the defendant with a ‘different’ cultural background is the court not 
considering Norrie’s demand that  
‘…the process of judgment must take account of the broader environment, 
social policy and conditions, because these establish the circumstances 
under which family life occurs and children grow up. It includes the parents 
of the children, the surrounding neighbourhood and ultimately the broader 
society. These are not easy judgements; they are multi-faceted and 
particularistic, recognizing general circumstances in the moment of 
individual agency’?96  
Perhaps in this we are over-simplifying Norrie’s ideas but that which the criminal 
law and criminal justice system may not tolerate in theory can sometimes be 
found to slip into practice. Norrie explains that ‘…the key difference between a 
Kantian individualist view of responsibility and a dialectical-relational point of view 
is that, for the latter, responsibility exists both in and beyond the individual and 
the ‘significant others’ in her community or communities.’97 For now, perhaps we 
can acknowledge the significance of the relational approach to the culture-
responsibility relationship in the attribution of individual responsibility (in both guilt 
and sentencing) whilst simultaneously accepting that in reality and in practice 
significant others and those beyond will not be called to account. 
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There is a third question that is often addressed in understanding responsibility 
and that relates to the interplay between legal responsibility and moral 
responsibility. There has long been debate about the interplay between law and 
morals but it is generally accepted that a guilty verdict is the outcome (other than 
in cases of strict or vicarious liability) for those deemed to be ‘morally responsible’ 
for actions that infringe the criminal law. Law’s authority, says Lloyd, is based on 
a belief in our moral obligation to obey the law and in turn law needs to be 
‘…buttressed by the moral convictions of the community.’98 The obvious question 
arises. What are those moral convictions in a multicultural era? Returning again 
to Norrie, he argues that linking law and morality is problematic because ‘blame’ 
is inadequate and we need to look to a ‘blaming relation’ to counter individualistic 
moral or legal theory. But he acknowledges that there is something important in 
doing individual justice and so, as we know, he advocates a shift from orthodox 
subjectivism to moral contextualism because divorcing the individual from her 
moral community allows us to make no sense of what is good and what is bad. 
Whilst we need to be aware of strong positivist arguments from, for example, Raz 
who sees law simply as social fact, we can accept for the purpose of this thesis 
the correlation between law and morality and in section 2.4 we will examine the 
idea that an altered moral outlook can have an effect on behaviour in the context 
of the culture-responsibility relationship. 
In this section we have arrived at an understanding of responsibility so that we 
are clear about where responsibility can sit within the criminal justice system and 
about what can make an individual legally responsible. We can add this 
understanding of responsibility, widely based so that it can in theory be situated 
in any one of the three parts of Fletcher’s account of the general part of the 
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criminal law and to reflect Lacey’s fluid concept of agency based on capacity but 
with an awareness of the role of character responsibility and of Norrie’s moral 
contextualism, to the conception of culture as a ‘fuzzy, complex whole’ arrived at 
in section 2.2 and take both forward to section 2.4 in establishing the existence 




2.4 Establishing the Existence and the Importance of the Culture-
Responsibility Relationship and Overcoming its Inherent Difficulties 
In Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers seek 
to address two crucial questions, what to criminalise and how to ascribe 
responsibility, calling for a reflection on when ‘cultural information’ can be relevant 
to personal responsibility.99 Lernestedt advocates that we ‘…respect the demand 
for true blameworthiness so that investigation gets profound enough and close 
enough to this particular defendant.’100 This, in essence, is what we are trying to 
achieve with the culture-responsibility relationship, a contemporary and 
embracing understanding of the notion of ‘true blameworthiness’ based on the 
understandings of culture and responsibility arrived at in sections 2.2 and 2.3 
respectively. 
What we are looking for then is a relationship between culture and legal 
responsibility according to which it can be said that culture might affect 
responsibility in individual cases. Establishing this link, in the terms set out in 
section 2.1, validates the call for a revised approach to legal responsibility in the 
criminal law of England and Wales in specifically defined cases in the context of 
multiculturalism.101 As emphasized throughout it is the existence or perceived 
                                                        
99 Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 36) 1.  
100 ibid n26. 
Lernestedt is critical of the Swedish legal system for using ‘our’ (ie Swedish) yardsticks to 
measure the behaviour of defendants from somewhere else. He argues that ‘cultural 
information’ is necessary or ‘has a natural place’ in the rules determining personal 
blameworthiness. 
101 There is a recent argument in contract law in Canada for looking at unconscionability through 
the lens of culture. Instead of looking at the transaction, courts should look at the parties. Lima 
argues that in Harry v Kreutziger [1978] 9BCLR 166, 95 where there was an argument that a 
fisherman had been treated unconscionably in agreeing the price for the sale of a boat the 
evidence for the court should not be ‘someone took advantage of a fisherman’ but ‘someone, 
who is probably a white western male, negotiated with someone of an Aboriginal culture with 
results that are unfair to that person in view of his culture.’ Augusto Lima, ‘When Harry met 
Kreutziger: A Look into Unconscionability Through the Lenses of Culture’ (2008) 28.  
 86 
existence of the relationship, if any, between culture and responsibility that will 
need to be established if the criminal law is to adapt in the face of de facto 
multiculturalism in order to achieve just outcomes. What we are essentially asking 
is whether culture can have an effect on individual agency or upon morality such 
that the attribution of criminal responsibility and punishment should be 
reconsidered.  If we take a paired down view on free will then agency and 
responsibility depend on rational choice. But if we open up the understanding of 
human behaviour to include background, context, emotions, learned behaviour 
and responses then there may be more to it than absolute unfettered free will. If 
we adopt a mono-culturally-centric view of morality then right and wrong are 
clear-cut. But different cultural backgrounds may influence moral standards. In 
section 2.1 we set out the possible ways in which culture might be relevant to 
legal responsibility and carried forward to the culture-responsibility relationship 
cultural determination or pre-disposition that compromises agency or cultural 
influences on moral outlook. The line between determinism and pre-disposition 
is not always clearly drawn.  
Whilst it may not be possible to provide a definitive  answer to the question ‘does 
culture affect responsibility?’ we can conclude that culture can affect 
responsibility (or at least that there is a perception that it can) and that is why the 
culture-responsibility relationship needs to be explored, within the two distinct and 
                                                        
<https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1124922> accessed 25th September 
2018. 
Canadian Tort Law has also seen developments recently in the context of culture with a number 
of court cases in which claimants have argued that something in their religion or culture or both 
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posing a threat to equality and to national and social cohesion.  
Vaughan Black, ‘Cultural Thin Skulls’ (2010) 60 UNBLJ 186. 
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defined parameters set out in section 1.2, and to find its proper place in the 
criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales.  
The relationship between culture and responsibility crops up, directly or indirectly, 
in a surprising number of disciplines and so we need to consider a range of views 
in attempting to answer the question ‘does culture affect responsibility?’ 
Beginning with science, there are recent claims from neuroscience that all human 
behaviour is determined.102 Vincent states that ‘…science and law have been 
locked in a dialogue on the nature of human agency ever since the thirteenth 
century when a mental element was added to the criteria for legal 
responsibility.103 In Vincent’s summary, these developments in neuroscience, 
and behavioural genetics and psychology too, suggest findings that threaten the 
moral foundations of legal responsibility by revealing that determinism is true. 
Relying on a stochastic approach Green and Cohen argue that advances in 
neuroscience show that ‘…free will as we ordinarily understand it, is an illusion’ 
so legal responsibility, which is essentially backwards looking, has no place in a 
‘scientifically informed approach to the regulation of society.’ 104  If that were 
infallibly so then the administration of criminal justice would be a much easier 
affair. No fault liability across all crimes with a focus on deterrence and prevention 
rather than retribution. But there must be caution because we have yet to prove 
                                                        
102 See for example the work of Wegner, who asserts that conscious will is an illusion and that 
we delude ourselves when we think that intentions are causal. Daniel M Wegner, The Illusion of 
Conscious Will (Cambridge, MIT Press 2002). Clearly it is beyond the scope of the thesis to 
attempt to assess the validity of such claims but reference needs to be made to them. The idea 
is that the operation of the mind is linked to the operation of the brain. The brain is a mechanism  
and operates according to the laws of the physical world and not the metaphysical world. 
103 Nicole A Vincent (ed), Neuroscience and Legal Responsibility (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press 2013).  
104 Joshua Green and Jonathan Cohen, ‘For the Law, Neuroscience Changes Nothing and 
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that the will is not metaphysically free and Vincent calls for a more nuanced 
approach, ‘…one that provides the mind sciences with a genuine opportunity to 
enrich the legal understanding of agency and to inform legal responsibility 
practices rather than just attempting to eliminate them.’105  
If we accept that the argument that free will does not exist is currently not fully  
developed we need to return to the idea that culture can affect behaviour. 
Environmental biologists are engaging in discussion around the place of culture 
in human development. Going back to Locke’s tabula rasa,  Pagel argues that 
the human brain is primed for culture but that ‘we are not primed to acquire any 
particular culture.’106 His book, Wired For Culture, is about ‘…how our cultures 
came to occupy our minds, what they demanded of us, how those demands have 
been met, and whether our cultural nature provides useful solutions for living in a 
modern world’.107 
Another scientific approach comes form the world of primatology, a discipline that 
looks at the biology and psychology of primates and finds similarities between 
human and primate behaviour. There is evidence that primates, like humans, 
learn cultural behaviour and so, going back to White’s 1959 definition of culture, 
primates too demonstrate this ‘extra-somatic means of adaptation.’108 A 2010 
study by Horner et al develops a theory of ‘prestige based cultural transmission’ 
concluding that chimpanzees will follow the example of the higher ranking 
                                                        
105 Vincent (n 103).  
106 Pagel (n 37) 5. 
Locke’s tabula rasa is a ‘blank slate’, referred to in his Essay Concerning Human 
Understanding. His idea is that sensory experiences throughout life fill and inform the mind that 
is blank at birth. 
107 ibid 11. 
108 White (n 27). 
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individual, in just the way that humans do.109 This following is innate, the product 
of subconscious choice and when projected onto humans suggests a 
predisposition to follow those of higher social status. Haraway is critical of 
primatology because ‘…the scientific practices and discourses of modern 
primatology participate in the pre-eminent political act in western history: the 
construction of man.’110 Primatology is raised here as one way of approaching 
the effect of culture on behaviour; Haraway’s resistance to the scientific account 
on the grounds that is anti-feminist is raised because the thesis is committed to 
a feminist methodology, to ‘asking the woman question.’111 However, the science 
of primatology can only help us to understand culture and behaviour in the most 
general of terms. 
Cultural determinism is a controversial idea and bringing culture into the realm of 
determinism perhaps follows patterns in criminology where there was a  shift from 
classical criminology based on autonomy and free will to the positivist criminology 
of Lombroso in the nineteenth century. Fox is very critical of any suggestion that 
culture is determinative, questioning how culture, itself only an idea, can affect 
behaviour.112 He uses the word ‘culturology’ to describe  deterministic arguments 
and warns against stereotyping and homogenizing ‘explanations’ of the human 
condition in different societies.113  
Moving away from science to consider determinism in the realm of the social 
sciences, it is helpful to revisit Ortner’s continuum of positions wherein she 
                                                        
109 Victoria Horner, Darby Proctor, Kristin Bonnie, Andrew Whiten & Frans BM de Waal, (2010). 
‘Prestige Affects Cultural Learning in Chimpanzees’ (2010)  5 (5) PLoS ONE 
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110 D Haraway, ‘Primatology is Politics by Any Other Means’ (1984) Proceedings of the Biennial 
Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 489-452, University of Chicago Press, 
Chicago 489-452. 
111 ibid. 
112 Richard G Fox, Lions of the Punjab (University of California Press 1985). 
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recognises that culture can be a hard or a soft determinant of behaviour.114 Ortner 
perhaps comes closest to asking the pertinent question about the relationship 
between culture and responsibility ‘…did my culture, this assemblage of shared 
meanings and standards to which I have become ‘enculturated’, determine or 
influence my behaviour?’115 The ‘soft’ position is that culture has little to do with 
behaviour at the time of the offence or the behaviour in question. It is just called 
upon later to explain, describe or legitimate what happened. Here, we 
‘appropriate after the fact’ to understand and validate what happened and with 
echoes of ‘group membership’ it is not something that we can consider as helpful 
in establishing a culture-responsibility relationship in individual cases.116 At the 
other end of the spectrum is hard determinism and Ortner calls on the structuralist 
work of Levi-Strauss where ‘myths operate in men’s minds without their being 
aware of the fact’ and the ‘habitus’ of Bordieu according to which actors require 
an internal programming that generates behaviour or patterns of behaviour to 
elucidate what is meant.117 Ortner herself takes a ‘middle position’, explaining 
that we begin by acting as individuals but when we recognize that our actions fit 
within a pre-organised schema, we are likely to choose to follow the schema. 
When acting in the cultural schema the path dictated by the schema becomes 
intuitive for the actor. She summarises it in the following paragraph: 
‘With that shift in perception the cultural schema is appropriated and 
further moves appear as the next rational step. In effect the cultural 
schema has been moved by an actor from an external to an internal 
                                                        
114 S Ortner, ‘Patterns of Shared History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of Sherpa Religious 
Institutions’ in Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney (ed), Culture Through Time: Anthropological Approaches 
(Stanford University Press 1990). 
This work was discussed briefly in section 2.2. 
115 ibid 43.  
116 Kay L Levine, ‘Negotiating the Boundaries of Crime and Culture: A Socio-Legal Perspective 
on Cultural Defense Strategies’ (2003) 28 (1) Law & Social Inquiry 39, 43. 
117 Claude Levi-Strauss, The Raw and The Cooked (John and Doreen Weightman (tr), 
Harmondsworth, Penguin 1969) 12. 
Pierre Bordieu, Distinction: A Social Critique of Judgment and Taste (Richard Nice (tr) London, 
Routledge, 1989). 
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position, from an abstract model of deeds done by ancient heroes and 
ritual participants to a personal program for understanding what is 
happening to one right now and for acting upon it.’118 
But the actor can move away from the schema.119 Applying this to the culture-
responsibility relationship, it is a matter of balancing the degree of agency of the 
individual against the degree of control of the cultural schema over the individual. 
If the degree of control of the cultural schema is stronger then, as Levine 
suggests, it is reasonable for the actor to rely on it.120 Ortner’s approach to 
cultural determinism and/or predisposition is credible because it reflects the 
understanding of culture developed here which emphasises the individual’s 
interpretation of shared experiences and recognises the ‘personal program’.  It 
also appears workable and there is potential for its adaptation for courtroom use, 
something that Levine considers in the context of the ‘cultural defence’ and these 
ideas will be returned to in Chapter 5.121 However, it is open to criticism. In section 
2.2 we saw how Appiah and Bhatt are aware of the confinement that ‘deeds done 
by ancient heroes’ can bring to the individual with Bhatt encouraging us to move 
away from identity myths. Ortner’s schema does allow for an individual response 
to what she defines as a historically grounded culture, although Washburn 
pertinently questions what the ability to resist the cultural schema is based upon. 
He asks if we should regard culture as a ‘supra-individual phenomenon’ and if so 
                                                        
118 S Ortner, ‘Patterns of Shared History: Cultural Schemas in the Founding of Sherpa Religious 
Institutions’ in Ohnuki-Tierney (n 114) 89.  
119 ibid 88-90. 
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the question is ‘how cognitively encompassing is it?’ 122  The answer to this 
question must vary from individual to individual. 
It is interesting to contrast Ortner’s cultural schema with Renteln’s ideas on the 
relationship between culture and responsibility. As we know Renteln is a 
supporter of the ‘cultural defence’ and relies on the argument that certain cultural 
practices should be allowed as a defence. She says that four questions need to 
be asked in deciding whether a ‘cultural defence’ should be allowed: 
1. Is the litigant a member of an ethnic group? 
2. Does the group have such a tradition? 
3. Was the litigant influenced by the tradition when he acted? 
4. Is the practice irreparably harmful?123 
In clarifying our understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship in section 
2.1 we confirmed that membership of or belonging to a group is not in itself 
sufficient to establish a relationship between culture and responsibility, and in 
section 2.2 we cast doubt upon the ability of a group to ‘own’ a culture. 
Furthermore, in understanding the socially constructed and fragmented nature of 
the cultural group it is difficult to think in terms of ‘membership’ and ‘group 
traditions’. Renteln’s first two questions are therefore not relevant to the culture-
responsibility relationship. Renteln’s fourth question does not fit within the 
purpose of the criminal law of England and Wales as discussed in section 3.2. As 
we will see, in essence ‘harm’ is the basis for criminalisation and so if a defendant 
is in court, the act of which he is accused is by definition considered ‘harmful’. 
Whether it is  ‘irreparably’ so is very difficult to determine but what, if harmful, is 
not in some way irreparably harmful? Death is irreparably harmful; other actions 
                                                        
122 Daniel Washburn ‘Enculturation and the Degenerative Principle’ (2008) 1 (1) Contemporary 
Issues 49. 
123 Renteln, The Cultural Defense (n 39) 207. The fourth question is not included in her 2004 
book but added in later work. 
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may cause a variety of irreparable harms, both to the victim and others. This just 
leaves the third question in Renteln’s scheme ‘was the litigant influenced by the 
tradition when he acted?’. This is something akin to the question ‘how might 
culture be said to affect responsibility in this individual case?’ but it could also be 
asking the simpler question of how ‘tradition’ affects conduct. In either case, 
guidance as to how the question(s) might be answered remains undeveloped. 
However, Renteln’s ideas are still well regarded and an international conference 
in honour of her work was held at the University of Cagliari in 2016 where the 
‘cultural defence’ was further explored. 124  At that conference she reminds 
delegates that the aim of her 2004 book is ‘…not to open the door to every cultural 
claim but to invite judges and policy makers to become aware of the cultural 
component that a behaviour can have and to remind them that culture is a human 
right to be protected.’125 Again, this is a missed opportunity for considering when 
behaviour might include and be influenced by that cultural component. 
                                                        
124 Details of the conference can be found online at 
 <http://www.clisel.eu/culturaldefense.pdf> accessed 20th September 2018.  
At the conference Ruggiu suggested a 12 point test for when culture should be regarded as a 
defence. The proposed test consists of the following questions: 
1) Is it possible to use the category of culture? 
2) How can the cultural practice be described in detail? 
3) How is the cultural practice related to the broader cultural system? 
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5) Is the practice shared or contested within the group? 
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8) Is the subject sincere? 
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10) Is the practice harmful? 
11) What is the impact of the practice on the culture and value system of the majority? 
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This list does not help us at all in attempting to formulate a framework for the development of 
the culture-responsibility relationship. It is still reliant on concepts of the ‘group’ and ‘cultural 
practices’. The list does not bear legal scrutiny, for example, what does question 8 (‘Is the 
subject sincere?’) mean? 
125 Conference details in note above. 
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We have already been critical of Renteln’s  work for its lack of clarity in both the 
definition and purpose of the ‘cultural defence’. There is some confusion too 
about whether she believes culture pre-disposes an individual to certain 
behaviour or whether culture is determinative. In a Chapter in Criminal Law and 
Cultural Diversity, her most recent work, she states that the ‘cultural defence’ is 
‘…a defence employed by individuals who claim that their cultural background 
predisposed them to commit certain acts’. 126  This departs from her reply to 
Magnarella’s argument that the debate on the freestanding ‘cultural defence’ is 
theoretical/ideological where she conceptualizes it within the practical realm. 
Here she argues that individual behaviour can be influenced to such an extent by 
culture that either the defendant did not believe that his behaviour contravened 
any laws (something she calls the ‘cognitive case’) or the defendant was 
compelled to act in a certain way because of culture (the ‘volitional case’).127 
Renteln argues that both cases should be allowed with a view to ensuring equal 
application of the law to all parties and relies on the work of Dworkin who believes 
that individual justice should focus on the actor as well as the act.128 Renteln’s 
commitment to the ‘cultural defence’ in the cognitive case is problematic for the 
criminal law of England and Wales because it brings us face to face with the 
principle that ignorance of the law is no excuse and that is discussed in section 
3.2. 
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If we take Renteln’s response to Magnarella just to apply to the volitional case 
this is probably one of Renteln’s best argued pieces of work because she looks 
at the whole picture and follows the implications of the ‘cultural defence’ 
throughout the criminal justice system. We need, she argues, a ‘cultural defence’ 
as a partial excuse because mens rea should include considerations of motive in 
establishing guilt. This is based on the idea of enculturation, which should in turn 
be considered in the context of retributivism, proportionality and individualised 
justice. Retributivism and motive are discussed in section 3.2 in the context of 
Norrie’s morally contextual interpretation of retributivism which leads to later 
arguments in this thesis for the place of culture in personal mitigation at the 
sentencing stage. But there is still a lack of clarity in the reference to the 
defendant being ‘compelled’ to act in a certain way and ‘compulsion’ seems to sit 
somewhere between determination and pre-disposition.  
To fully understand these arguments about the effect of culture on behaviour we 
need too to grasp the concept of enculturation. Both Ortner and Renteln rely 
heavily on the idea of enculturation which Herskovits summarises as a process 
of socialization whereby the norms of one’s indigenous culture including its 
salient ideas values and concepts are maintained. 129 Kottak describes 
enculturation as ‘…the process where the culture that is currently established 
teaches an individual the accepted norms and values of the culture or society 
within which the individual lives…enculturation helps mould an individual into an 
acceptable member of society’. 130  Washburn disputes this, arguing that 
individuals are ‘intrinsically idiosyncratic’.131 He bases his arguments on work by 
                                                        
129 Melville Herskovits, Man and His Works: The Science of Cultural Anthropology (New York, 
Alfred A Knopf, 1949) 5. 
130 Conrad Phillip Kottak, Window on Humanity: A Concise Introduction to Anthropology 
(Boston, McGraw Hill 2010).  
131 Washburn (n 122) 1. 
 96 
the neuroscientist Edelman who identifies individual idiosyncrasy from the cellular 
level outwards.132 Once again, it is beyond the scope of this thesis to be able to 
form a view on the credibility or otherwise of findings in neuroscience but for the 
purposes of the culture-responsibility relationship we do need to question 
whether enculturation is still valid as an idea in the social sciences. Richland, in 
criticizing Renteln, says that culture ‘…relies on anachronistic notions of 
enculturation, assimilation, and acculturation whilst simultaneously dismissing 
more recent deconstructionist views of cultural practices as ignoring reality.’133 
There is very little recent academic engagement with the concept of enculturation 
but it is often understood in terms of its difference from acculturation. If we are 
enculturated in our culture of birth then we become acculturated as we move from 
one culture to another. It is at this point that ‘culture conflict’ may emerge, 
something identified by Sellin in 1938. 134  A whole body of work has emerged 
under the broad heading of ‘cross-cultural adaptation theory’ drawing on the 
disciplines of anthropology, sociology and psychology. 135  This is now most 
credible within wider understandings of ‘strain theory’ which focuses on negative 
relationships with others as a cause of crime through the creation of pressures 
on individuals towards delinquency. 136  Criminologists (and now cultural 
criminologists such as Hayward and Young) have contributed to the field in 
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examining the relationship between culture and law breaking. 137  During the 
1930’s the ‘Chicago School’ of sociology developed a symbolic interactionist 
methodology in carrying out ethnographic studies of gangs, particularly of 
immigrants settling in the US. Rock has since explained that meanings and 
motives ‘…are not established and confirmed by the self in isolation. They are a 
social accomplishment...subcultures themselves are taken to be exaggerations, 
accentuations or editings of cultural themes prevalent in the wider society.’138  
Renteln, however, says that sub-cultures should not be allowed a ‘cultural 
defence’ as their worldview ‘…is not radically different from the rest of 
society’s.’139 This is somewhat confusing. 
It is sometimes suggested that ‘acculturation’ is a policy response to a 
multicultural population but this is more accurately a psychological change 
evidenced within the individual when he or she is exposed to a second culture.140 
Even though acculturation cannot properly be defined as a policy response to 
multiculturalism, it may be part of the process of assimilation, which in turn can 
be and has indeed formed such a policy response. Earlier work on acculturation 
theory is now criticized for seeing acculturation as a one-sided process leading 
to a static and, from the point of view of the majority, desirable outcome for 
immigrants.141 More recently Berry has defined acculturation as ‘…the dynamic 
interplay of behaviours and identity representing acculturation ‘strategies’’. 142 
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According to Berry these strategies involve the adoption (or not) of the majority 
culture and the maintenance (or not) of the minority culture.  He identifies four 
possible acculturation outcomes within his acculturation framework: integration, 
assimilation, separation and marginalization. Berry’s work is interesting in the 
context of the culture-responsibility relationship because, as a psychologist, his 
focus is on the individual and he recognises that ’…psychological acculturation 
can occur independently of group level processes and will also be more closely 
linked to individual adaptation’.143  
Yet, if Berry is critical of his predecessors for seeing acculturation as a static 
outcome, his acculturation framework in turn appears to represent four possible 
static outcomes that do not account for shifting or multiple identities. Looking at 
each of these static outcomes in turn, marginalisation (the loss of the minority 
culture but with no compensation from the majority culture) and separation (the 
exclusive maintenance of the minority culture) have never been policy objectives 
in themselves but both are seen as undesirable side effects of  ‘state 
multiculturalism’ or indeed of a multicultural population. In fact, both are now 
blamed for a number of social evils including radicalization and home grown 
terrorism and as identified in the Rotherham Report child sexual exploitation 
because ‘…an unhealthy culture of misplaced political correctness’ led to an 
unwillingness to intervene in the practices of a marginalized group.144 And so 
there is an argument that the degree of acculturation is relevant to the culture-
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responsibility relationship in the extent to which the defendant’s pre-disposition 
or moral outlook is modified. 
Another way culture may be linked to predisposition is through understandings of 
self-control, which can be culturally specific. ‘Loss of control’ in the criminal law 
of England and Wales exists solely as a partial defence to murder and the extent 
to which there is space within that statutory defence to encompass culture is 
examined in section 3.3. However, ‘provocation’ may be relevant in mitigation at 
sentencing and it may be that the courts will have the opportunity to assess the 
effect of culture on a defendant’s ability to exercise self-control at that stage. 
Up until now we have focused on the relationship between culture and 
responsibility in terms of determinism and predisposition. Sometimes it is hard to 
draw a line between the two. Parekh confidently asserts that ‘…while the 
individual’s culture shapes his or her thoughts and disposes them to approach 
the world in certain ways it does not and cannot determine them and deprive 
them of their agency.’145 This seems intuitively right and a safe position from 
which to develop the culture-responsibility relationship. The conclusion must be 
that culture can pre-dispose an individual to certain behaviour. Determinism is 
harder because it ties into notions of agency, free will and choice. Ashworth and 
Horder offer a summary of the philosophical position on determinism stating that 
‘…most philosophers arrive at compromise positions which enable them to 
accept the fundamental proposition that behaviour is not so determined that 
blame is generally unfair and inappropriate and yet to accept that in certain 
circumstances behaviour may be so strongly determined that… the normal 
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presumptions of free- will may be displaced’.146 The difficulty lies in applying this 
philosophical position in the practical realm but in essence it comes down, once 
again, to each and every individual case. 
The importance of individual cases is even more important in matters of morality. 
Hart asks what makes for ‘moral responsibility’ and gives the following answer 
‘…the capacities of understanding, reasoning and control of conduct. The ability 
to understand what conduct legal rules or morality require, to deliberate and 
reach decisions concerning these requirements and to conform to decisions 
when made.’ 147  Moody-Adams is firmly opposed to the idea of exculpation 
through moral ignorance, writing strongly against the ‘inability thesis’ that 
recognises a culturally induced blindness. She argues that the link between 
culture and agency does not exempt humans from responsibility because there 
is no independent causal power that prevents individuals from resisting the 
demands of culture and questioning the moral wrongfulness of actions.148   In 
looking at responsibility, morality and culture Matravers focuses on the 
relationship between enculturation and morality and identifies the critical issue in 
questions of responsibility as ‘..what is involved in grasping (understanding) a 
moral reason?’ There is a difference, he argues between a defendant who has 
the capacity to understand a moral reason and who chooses to reject it and the 
defendant whose ‘…enculturation is such that he lacks the capacity to understand 
that there is a moral issue at all.’149 This latter person would lack a participant 
understanding of morality but Matravers goes on to question why he should be 
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exempt from responsibility on this basis. After all, if he has done some ‘serious 
moral wrong’ (and the state itself is not seriously unjust so that no issue of 
standing arises) then ‘…the significance of culture (usually) does not undermine 
the responsibility of the alleged offender in any general sense because it does 
not (usually) undermine the alleged offender’s ability to grasp and follow 
reason.’150 There is not much space within this for the recognition of an altered 
moral outlook although the use of the word ‘usually’ perhaps allows for cases 
where a defendant may display a genuine inability to grasp and follow reason.  
Despite being unable to offer a black and white conclusion on the ability of culture 
to affect behaviour we have considered the arguments and can confidently assert 
that there is a perception that culture can affect responsibility and that perception 
justifies the place of the culture-responsibility relationship in the theory and 
practice of the criminal law.  Moving away from the need to assess the extent of 
the effect of culture on behaviour we can turn again to Cotterrell who says that 
the ‘cultural defence’ is simply ‘…a demand for differential interpretations of 
law’.151 This is echoed by Rosen who says that culture is relevant even where 
behaviour is not determined or influenced by culture because ‘…the failure to 
take seriously people’s cultural concepts as part of their chosen world, and not 
simply as one imposed upon them, can distort the role of law in their lives every 
bit as much as failing to consider how their choices may be limited.’152 As with 
our understanding of culture we can ask if it is an intellectual cop out not to be 
more definitive about the effect of culture on behaviour and again we can answer 
that it is not firstly because there is simply no empirical evidence to allow us to 
give a categorical answer and secondly because our understanding of 
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responsibility now gives us the parameters within which to consider whether 
culture has an effect in each individual case.  
Moving beyond the individual there are wider socio-legal justifications for bringing 
the idea of culture and its relationship with responsibility into the legal practice of 
decision making in the criminal justice system. We can now consider these 
justifications and  begin to address the problems inherent within the culture-
responsibility relationship. In section 2.1 we identified a number of potential 
difficulties that have emerged around ‘cultural defence’ discourse and that need 
to be addressed in the context of  the culture- responsibility relationship. We can 
group these into four broad categories: 
• Perceptions of an endemic cultural bias in the criminal justice 
system and discrimination. 
• Cultural evidence in the courtroom.  
• Theoretical difficulties around the notion of equality and inequality 
and relativist concerns. 
• Feminist concerns    
Yet the problems in themselves can act as a socio-legal justification for the aim 
here of finding the right and just place for the culture-responsibility relationship in 
the criminal law of England and Wales. The practical difficulty of culture in the 
courtroom is tackled ahead of the theoretical difficulties but before that we need 
to address another problem, not something that is necessarily specific to the 
culture-responsibility relationship but something that is sometimes used, wrongly, 
as a justification for a ‘cultural defence’. That is the perception of an endemic 
cultural bias in the criminal justice system of England and Wales and the wider 
perception of discrimination in the criminal justice system as a whole. 
Endemic Cultural Bias and Discrimination within the Legal System 
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The idea of a relationship between culture and responsibility might assume an a-
cultural legal system but as Loeb points out ‘…legal processes imagined as 
almost neutral are themselves constituted by the cultural particularity of the 
dominant hegemony’. 153  Cotterrell talks of our ‘legal culture’ being ‘…public 
knowledge of and attitudes and behaviour patterns towards the legal system’ and 
whilst we cannot endorse Renteln’s view that we need a ‘cultural defence’ to 
protect minorities against ‘majoritarian bias in the legal system’ we can question 
whether a carefully constructed and applied culture-responsibility relationship 
might contribute to the alleviation of distrust in the criminal justice system 
identified by Lammy and discussed below.154 We have already taken issue with 
Renteln’s ‘purposes’ of a ‘cultural defence’ and cannot support a culture-
responsibility relationship for this reason alone but we can agree that measures 
should be taken to overcome broader perceptions of bias and discrimination in 
the interests of justice. This view is endorsed by Fournier, who sees ‘cultural 
imperialism’ in the judicial process in the ways in which it asserts its perspective 
to be universal and neutral and who challenges the universality of legal claims to 
truth because ‘truth’, as established in the legal system, is complicit in the 
othering of minority people.155 Lawrence takes this a step further in her assertion 
that ‘courtrooms are critical sites in the production of our understanding of culture’ 
and that legal systems paint distorted and questionable views of non-mainstream 
cultures but an equally distorted more flattering picture of the mainstream. The 
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result is ‘racialisation’ with legal systems assigning to others the traits of ignorant 
victims as ‘zealous followers of deviant norms’. 156  This, argues Lawrence, 
amounts to a perpetuation of cultural racism under the guise of cultural 
sensitivity.157 
Magnarella seems to support this, taking the practical point that there is an 
overrepresentation of people of colour in the criminal justice system of the US 
because in part of the ‘…inability of judges and juries from the dominant culture 
to understand the perceptions/actions of people from minority cultures.’158 He 
argues that evidence must not be excluded because the defendant had a state 
of mind that was unacceptable or incomprehensible to the trial judge from the 
dominant culture.159 He has a point and we can see evidence of the convergence 
and lack of convergence of the minds of judge and defendant leading to 
questionable decisions in the criminal law of England and Wales. On the one 
hand, why was Lavinia Woodward, an Oxford undergraduate convicted under 
S20 Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for attacking her boyfriend with a 
breadknife given a 10 month prison sentence, suspended for 18 months, and the 
opportunity to ‘prove herself’ by taking treatment for her eating disorder and 
addiction? The trial judge identified with her intellect and middle class career 
aspirations and found that she was ‘too clever to go to prison’.160 On the other 
hand why was Kiranjit Ahluwahlia convicted of the murder of her abusive husband 
rather than involuntary manslaughter on the grounds of provocation? 161  In 
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addition to recognising the legal arguments that hampered Ahluwahlia’s defence 
because her loss of control was not ‘sudden’,  Phillips argues that Ahluwahlia did 
not conform to the stereotypical image of the Muslim woman and so was 
incomprehensible to the western judge.  Culture for Muslim women, argues 
Phillips, ‘…only becomes available to female defendants when they conform to 
prevailing images of the subservient non-western wife.’162 Lee relies on Bell’s 
‘interest convergence theory’ in the context of the ‘cultural defence’ to argue that 
it is more successful  where ‘…the cultural norms underlying [their] defence are 
either similar to or coalesce with those of the dominant majority’ because cultural 
narratives can be more persuasive when they tap into social norms.163  But there 
are counter arguments to Magnarella’s assertions. Many criminals and criminal 
acts may be incomprehensible to judges and assuming an inability on the part of 
judges to comprehend cultural difference essentialises the white western judge 
in the way that we seek to avoid essentialising ‘the other’ and overlooks the fact 
that the white western judge does not exist in a vacuum but in the real socio-legal 
world.  
There is also the concern that hidden morality is at work in the assessment of 
cases involving culture, as highlighted by Fisher.164 Relying on Dworkin’s theory 
of adjudication he identifies how moral arguments, such as racism, cultural 
pluralism and fairness to women are played out in the ‘culture defence’ debate 
and at how judges look at the ‘internal moral question’ in the individual case rather 
than at the external question of whether the ‘cultural defence’ plays a part in the 
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law.165 This of course may help in explaining the hypothesis here that judicial 
approaches to issues of culture in the courts are ad hoc and inconsistent. 
Ultimately we do want the culture-responsibility relationship to address the 
‘internal moral question’ but within a carefully considered framework. Supporting 
the views of Magnarella above, Fisher concludes that defendants are more likely 
to be able to rely on the ‘cultural defence’ where ‘…the cultural factors reflect the 
morality of the legal system to which he is subject.’166 This goes back to a point 
made in section 1.1 about ‘honour’ in dueling cases. 
But we have to be careful here for, as Fournier points out, ‘…too often culture is 
in the hands of the power elite…and the disempowered are left out of its 
configuration.’167 To support this argument, Fournier cites the  Canadian case of 
R v Lucien 168  in which the judge attributes the absence of the defendant’s 
remorse for rape to a ‘cultural context’ rather than to individual ‘sexual 
misbehavior’. This, says Fournier makes for a transition from biological racism to 
cultural racism (the implication being that men from this particular culture are 
unable to show remorse) so an attempt at a culturally sensitive decision turns out 
to be racist. All of the above is critical of an endemic cultural bias in the legal 
system but we have to consider that many organisations claim to have a unique 
‘culture’, something that it is no doubt possible to be inside of or outside of. Rosen 
recognizes that ‘…legal reasoning, even in its most professionalized versions, 
must therefore tap into the recognizable modes of a culture’s reasoning for at 
least a portion of its legitimacy’ but that equally we cannot hold defendants to a 
standard of behaviour without comprehending, from their perspective, what they 
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were doing.169 In these thoughts Rosen is engaging directly with the ‘cultural 
defence’ but it seems that he is in fact endorsing something much more akin to 
the culture-responsibility relationship. The pertinent issue, in any event, is 
managing the injustice that may arise from a perception cultural bias in the 
criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales and considering 
how the culture-responsibility relationship can play a part in that management.  
For at least 150 years there has been overt recognition of the potential for cultural 
bias in the legal system of England and Wales. The judicial oath is set out in the 
introduction to the Equal Treatment Bench Book and reads ‘I will do right to 
manner of people after the laws and usages of this realm without fear of favour, 
affection or ill will.’170 We can see here a clear theoretical commitment to equal 
treatment within the criminal justice system. The commitment of the Judicial 
College to creating a diverse Judiciary (discussed in section 3.4) displays a 
forward looking understanding of the issues of equality and discrimination in our 
legal system.  However, there are still clear perceptions of cultural bias with a 
natural link to discrimination within the criminal law and the criminal justice system 
and we need to consider these claims, for whilst there is an inevitability in the 
reality of a system having a culture, cultural bias is less benign especially if it 
leads to the more dangerous emergence of discrimination and injustice.  
In 2005 Shute, Hood and Seemungal carried out research into the treatment of 
ethnic minorities in the criminal courts of England and Wales.171 Conducting 1000 
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case observations and interviews, they concluded that there was a perception 
(reinforced through the findings of institutional racism in the McPherson 
Report)172  that ethnic minorities are discriminated against within the criminal 
courts and by other agencies within the criminal justice system. They emphasized 
that this discrimination may be a perception rather than necessarily a fact but 
questioned what needed to be done to increase the confidence of ethnic 
minorities in the criminal courts. These perceptions extend to the probation 
service, where there is a perception that less effort is expended for Asian 
offenders. Research by Hudson and Bramhall looked at pre-sentence reports and 
risk assessments of 144 white males and 54 other males (all Pakistani save 3). 
They concluded that there is ‘…considerable difference in the attribution of 
remorse and acceptance of responsibility…and a difference in scoring of risk 
assessment.’173 Perhaps, more measurably, Asian reports are simply ‘thinner’ 
with a more prevalent use of distancing language. In assessing risk Asians were 
deemed to be more ‘reckless’ and ‘irresponsible’ leading to the authors finding 
that the Pakistani or Asian Muslim is emerging as the ‘criminalised other’.  
In January 2016 David Cameron commissioned an independent review of racial 
bias and BAME representation in the criminal justice system.174 The Lammy 
Review published its findings in September 2017.175 Its purpose is ‘…to make 
recommendations for the ultimate aim of reducing the proportion of BAME 
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offenders in the criminal justice system.’ 176  The review found that BAME 
communities make up 14% of the population but that 25% of those making up the 
prison population are from such communities and 40% of young people in 
custody are from BAME backgrounds. The report makes 35 recommendations 
and calls for ‘…robust systems [to be put] in place to ensure fair treatment in 
every part of the criminal justice system.’177 Obviously the report is concerned 
with race not culture and we must be wary of falling into the trap that it is only 
those of a different race who have a culture, but there are implications for the fair 
treatment of those from other cultures. Many of the recommendations relate to 
the systematic gathering of data on race. With our undefined understanding of 
culture it is more difficult to see how meaningful data on culture can be gathered 
but a nuanced reading on race/cultural statistics must be possible. 
Recommendation 8 asks that ‘…where practical all identifying information should 
be redacted from case information passed to [the Crown Prosecution Service] by 
the police allowing the Crown Prosecution Service to make race-blind decisions.’ 
This may lead to culture-blind  prosecuting decisions. The main issue identified 
is that of trust. For example, BAME defendants are much less likely to plead guilty 
(and thus be eligible for a one third reduction in sentence) because of a lack of 
trust and an ‘us and them’ attitude towards the criminal justice system. The report 
calls for the publication of sentencing remarks at crown court level to increase 
transparency (Recommendation 13) and for ‘…a system of online feedback on 
how judges conduct cases. This information, gathered from different 
perspectives, including court staff, lawyers, juries, victims and defendants could 
be used by the judiciary to support the professional development of judges in the 
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future’ (Recommendation 14). 178  Both of these recommendations would be 
welcome in the context of the culture-responsibility relationship as it would force 
an openness of  judicial reasoning in relation to culture, something that we identify 
as missing in the review of decided cases carried out and discussed in section 
3.3. 
The Lammy Report focuses on ‘over-representation’ of people from BAME 
communities rather than on the more emotive idea of ‘discrimination’ but the 
perceptions of discrimination identified by Shute et al remain. The question is 
whether the culture-responsibility relationship can challenge that perception and 
give those from other cultures some sense of assurance that their apparent 
unequal position is being assessed. It is argued that it can and that there is thus 
a practical reason for the culture-responsibility relationship to be embraced and 
explored as a real issue for criminal justice in the twenty first century. But we must 
be clear that we can only justify its application where there is a true relationship 
between culture and responsibility in individual cases. 
Taking these thoughts on discrimination further, Maguigan claims that there are 
higher conviction rates and longer sentences for ‘outsider defendants’ because  
‘…the present system does not reflect the shared values of a multicultural society 
but instead reinforces the white traditionally male identified values of the 
dominant culture.‘179 Whilst this may be a one dimensional interpretation (there 
are, of course, all sorts of reasons for these higher conviction rates) Maguigan 
supports the view that cultural information is valuable at trial in support of 
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traditionally recognised defences (on the basis that the standards of the dominant 
culture support traditional defences) and at sentencing but is at pains to point out 
that this is only where there is a link between cultural evidence and mens rea, 
where there is, in effect, what we are calling a culture-responsibility 
relationship.180 She accepts the idea of the admissibility of cultural evidence 
where it is relevant to the mens rea of the defendant in the spirit of working to 
multiculturalist reform through ‘…a system that takes a more pluralistic approach 
to the assessment of blame and the imposition of punishment’.181 Is ‘pluralistic’ 
the right word here? In the culture-responsibility relationship we are emphasizing 
the individual defendant and the effect, if any, of culture on that person. Perhaps 
her ideas belong to a time where ‘multiculturalism’ was more clear cut because 
she devises a hierarchy that offers three levels of protection to defendants 
depending on where they were enculturated.182 Whilst this is a brave attempt to 
counteract the inequality of a system where a white, male dominant culture 
prevails with clear cut rules, it is clearly overly simplistic to assume that 
defendants can fit neatly into one of three (or one of any number really) 
categories. She is attempting to address arguments about inequality here but is 
also tackling ‘cultural bias’. Whilst her tiered approach is open to criticism she is 
one of the most perceptive of the writers from the 1990’s in both recognizing and 
advocating the need for a link between culture and mens rea in the context of the 
‘cultural defence’. 
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Recognising then the perception of bias within the criminal justice system of 
England and Wales (arguably a ‘bias’ inevitable in any legal system) and 
perceptions of discrimination backed up by the findings of the Lammy Report, a 
carefully constructed and utilised culture-responsibility relationship has the 
potential to assist the criminal justice system in tackling cultural diversity as well 
as being a tool for justice in the wider sense that those from other cultures feel 
that their standpoint is understood. 
 
Culture in the Courtroom  
Caughey asserts that ‘…what we need to bring to trials is our most sophisticated 
professional understanding of how culture influences human thought.’183 If we 
add to this ‘in individual cases’ we have something akin to the culture-
responsibility relationship rather than the loosely termed ‘cultural defence’. Yet 
culture in the courtroom appears to be problematic, with Woodman recognizing 
both the ‘theoretical and practical difficulties about bringing information about 
culture into the courtroom.’184  
A number of authors emphasize the potential difficulties from different angles. 
Demian argues that culture is a legal fiction in terms of the courtroom ‘…an 
assumption formed through argumentation to achieve the desired outcome in 
court- with the purpose of knowing the intentions of another.’185 Lawrence states 
that ‘…courtrooms are critical sites in the production of our understanding of 
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culture.’ 186  D’Hondt raises concerns ‘…about how minority cultures are 
represented in cultural defence discourse, the collective abnormalisation and 
stereotyping to which they are subjected and the way in which the agency of 
individual members is erased.’187  There is the further argument that raising 
culture shifts the focus of a case onto the merits of a particular culture and away 
from the defendant’s behaviour. Sachar acknowledges that culture can be a 
sword (raised as an advantage) or a shield (as protection from disadvantage) and 
in civil cases supports the latter so long as it is ‘…not a sole or pre-determinative 
factor in the judicial making process.’188 She sees this as being a middle ground 
between cultural blindness (where there is no place for culture) and cultural 
determinism, a ‘culture demystifying approach’ where identity is neither privileged 
nor excused but where litigants can elaborate on ‘sources of the self’.189 This 
approach to civil law can be adopted in the criminal law through the careful 
consideration of the culture-responsibility relationship in individual and limited 
cases.  
On the other hand Renteln argues that cultural evidence should be allowed as a 
‘procedural matter’ in all cases and that judges should always appoint a ‘cultural 
expert’.190 Rosen agrees with the use of experts in ‘cultural cases’ because, as 
seen earlier in this section, judges do use their own cultural assumptions to ‘fill in 
the facts’. 191  Benhabib says that culture presents itself through narratively 
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contested accounts for two reasons, ‘…human actions and relations are formed 
through a double hermeneutic- we identify what we do through an account of 
what we do - words and deeds are equi primordial.’192 Overall there is a sense 
that cultural evidence can be helpful so long as we are aware of the sensitivities 
raised above.  
What is the current legal status of cultural evidence in the courtroom? The law of 
evidence in England and Wales is still governed by common law although there 
are Criminal Procedure Rules and Criminal Practice Directions which set out the 
detail of the admissibility of evidence in the criminal courts. Generally, expert 
evidence may be admitted with the permission of the court where it can assist 
with understanding beyond the knowledge of judge and jury and the expert must 
have relevant expertise, must be impartial and must pass the ‘reliability 
threshold’. The duty of the expert is to provide the court with an objective and 
independent opinion. A 2011 Law Commission Report on Expert Evidence in 
Criminal Proceedings found a laissez faire approach to expert evidence within 
the criminal justice system and called for reliability tests to be stricter. 193  A 
Criminal Evidence (Experts) Bill was introduced in 2011 but not adopted although 
some of the Law Commission recommendations were later incorporated into 
practice through amendments to Criminal Procedure Rules.194 We will see in 
section 3.3 that in R v Sebastian Pinto and Others the expert evidence of an 
anthropologist from Kings College London was dismissed as a ‘cultural 
horoscope’ and in R v Khatun the judge ruled that expert assistance was not 
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required in cultural issues, a ruling upheld by the Court of Appeal.195 The Crown 
Prosecution Service guidance on expert evidence lists 16 areas of expertise. 
‘Forensic Anthropology’ relates to the identification of human remains. There is 
no mention of expertise on culture, multiculturalism or more general 
anthropology.196 The UK Register of Expert Witnesses has only one entry under 
‘multiculturalism’ and that relates to ‘multicultural health’. There are 111 entries 
under the heading of culture with experts on Muslims (2), Pakistani culture (1), 
Islamic culture (2), Indian culture (2), ethnic minority culture (1), Asian culture (1) 
and Arab culture (1).197 The Law Society Gazette directory of expert witnesses 
has no entries for experts in anthropology, culture or multiculturalism.198  
Yet there are a number of anthropologists who have worked as expert witnesses 
in the courts and Holden draws together accounts of their experiences in her 
edited volume Cultural Expertise and Litigation: Patterns, Conflicts and 
Narratives.199 She states that this is based on the ‘cultural defence’ although 
there are ‘less extreme’ examples too of work around family matters, immigration 
and asylum and the evidence of anthropologists has usually been associated with 
customary law and native title. Her definition of ‘cultural expertise’ is helpful. It is 
‘…special knowledge that enables socio-legal scholars, anthropologists or more 
generally speaking, cultural mediators, the so-called ‘cultural brokers’, to locate 
and describe relevant facts in light of the particular background of the claimants, 
litigants or the accused person(s), and in some cases of the victim(s).’200 In March 
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2015 the Society for Applied Anthropology in the USA held a conference on the 
theme of ‘The Anthropologist as Expert Witness: Theory, Practice and Ethics’.201 
The conference explored the idea that there are general differences in 
methodologies between law and anthropology, with law seen as black and white 
and anthropology as much more grey which can be problematic.  
This begs the question as to whether we need ‘expert’ evidence in cases involving 
the culture-responsibility relationship. Lacey asks ‘…is there any reason to think 
that the challenge facing the advocate of extended cultural defenses here is 
analytically or practically different from that faced by anyone interested in how 
criminal law should respond to other situational differences between defendants 
which may bear on their offending behaviour?’202 If we are moving away from 
ideas of degrees of enculturation and situations where a judge might be called 
upon to establish degrees of assimilation there is an argument that the challenges 
of evidence are not unique. But the newness of overt references to culture in the 
courtroom makes it an unknown and as Caughey says, we are looking, 
particularly in the culture-responsibility relationship, for understandings of ‘what 
happened’ through a ‘person centered ethnography’.203 Cotterrell recognizes that 
we are beginning to interpret law in a gendered way (for example with the 
recognition in the new law on loss of control of ‘slow burn’, something that was 
not recognized in the old law of provocation which needed a ‘sudden’ loss of 
control) but calls for a parallel ‘cultural interpretation’ because law is shaped by 
certain cultural assumptions ‘…and in contemporary conditions of considerable 
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(and perhaps only partially mapped) conditions of cultural diversity such a 
position is no longer tenable.’204 There can be no harm therefore in providing a 
framework for the use of cultural evidence in limited and necessary 
circumstances and for encouraging courts to turn to experts where they can assist 
with understandings beyond those of judge and jury. 
Maeder and Yamamoto undertook research to question whether a culturally 
based argument in non-insane automatism cases was beneficial or detrimental 
to defendants. Placing cases before a mock jury the findings were that 
‘…ethnocentrism led to a lower perceived defendant credibility in the cultural 
condition but not in the standard automatism condition.’ 205  Culture may not 
necessarily be, therefore, Sachar’s shield. With thought culture can be 
accommodated in the courtroom and there are a number of reasons why it should 
be. One way of overcoming the recognised difficulties of culture in the courtroom 
would be to follow Renteln’s suggestion that ‘lawyers could study cultural analysis 
in the required legal ethics class in law school.’206 Yet the difficulties identified 
above by Woodman, Demian and D’Hondt can be moderated through the 
exploration of equality, inequality and relativism below. The difficulties may arise 
too because there is not currently in place a specific framework for the treatment 
of cultural evidence and courts have been reactive when faced with culture, rather 
than proactive in preempting the probability of coming face to face with it in a 
multicultural society and considering guidance to deal with it. Alternatively we 
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may be seeing once again a reluctance to engage with culture or even a fear of 
it. 
Equality, Inequality and Relativist Concerns 
The notion of equality is a fundamental tenet of justice and equality in the 
application of the law is protected by the Rule of Law. Perceptions of equality are 
especially important in the light of perceptions of discrimination. Yet there has 
always been great philosophical debate about what ‘equality’ means and how it 
can achieve both formal justice and social justice. There are arguments that a 
‘cultural defence’ undermines formal equality (and that allegation can of course 
be leveled at the culture-responsibility relationship) and that it can give rise to a 
whole host of inegalitarian evils such as individualised justice, legal, moral and 
cultural pluralism (and, stemming from that, relativism) and that it leads to 
essentializing and the erosion of agency of the ‘other’. Sometimes it is hard to 
know where one of these ‘evils’ ends and another begins and so they are 
addressed here under the broad heading of ‘inequality and relativist concerns’ 
but it is argued that the culture-responsibility relationship is less of a threat to 
equality than the ‘cultural defence’ and on some understandings it can indeed 
contribute to achieving equality. 
In 1881 Holmes wrote ‘…the standards of the law are the standards of general 
application. The law takes no account of the infinite varieties of temperament, 
intellect and education which make the internal character of a given act so 
different in different men.’207 In the twenty first century we are seeing a shift so 
that the Rule of Law for example (discussed in section 3.2) should apply equally 
                                                        
207 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Common Law (Boston, Little, Brown and Co 1881). 
 119 
to all ‘…except where objective differences justify differentiation.’208  Waldron 
examines the way in which the law can accommodate difference without 
compromising the basic ethos of legal equality. 209  He draws on the work of 
Dworkin who distinguishes treatment as an equal (the right to be treated with 
equal concern and respect) from equal treatment.210 We strive for a society based 
on equality but the law of England and Wales does not recognize ‘cultural 
equality’. Bringing the culture-responsibility relationship into wider discourse 
around equality will surely aid in our quest for equality. As a contemporary 
dilemma it sits at the centre of the interaction between law and multiculturalism 
and it problematizes a number of other pressing social questions within the wider 
political domain.  
The Equality Act 2010 makes it an offence for one person to discriminate against 
another on the grounds of certain protected characteristics and applies in certain 
areas such as education and the workplace but also to ‘Services and Public 
Functions.’211 Culture is not a protected characteristic. Race, religion and belief 
are and perhaps belief  (‘…any religious or philosophical belief’) could be 
construed as including a cultural belief?212 As we saw in section 2.2 definitions 
and understandings of culture are nebulous and perhaps not suited to the 
legislative framework and we are careful to avoid the claim that ‘…any view of 
culture as clearly delineable wholes is a view from the outside that generates 
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coherence for the purpose of understanding and control’ but is a reductionist 
sociology of culture.213 However, the Equality Act demonstrates once again the 
failure of our law to engage directly with culture.  
There is however, hidden within the Equality Act, a provision that might support, 
very indirectly, some idea of ‘cultural equality’ within the criminal justice system. 
Under S149 (1) a Public Authority must, in the exercise of its functions, have due 
regard to the need to : 
• eliminate discrimination 
• advance equality of opportunity between persons who share a relevant 
protected characteristic and persons who do not share it 
• foster good relations between persons who share a relevant protected 
characteristic and persons who do not share it 
and S149 (6)  states that compliance with the duties in this section may involve 
treating some persons more favourably than others. If a cultural belief is a ‘belief’ 
within S10(2) of the Equality Act could this be binding on the courts and other 
institutions within the criminal justice system? It’s a tenuous claim and in any 
event we need to fit the culture-responsibility relationship into the concept of 
equality whether culture is protected by statute or not. 
In the context of multiculturalism equality has been addressed through the group. 
‘Liberal multiculturalism’ has at its core the values of freedom, democracy and 
equality and identifies the need to move beyond guarantees of non-discrimination 
and tolerance to the provision of ‘accommodation’ for minority groups through 
what Kymlicka terms ‘group differentiated rights.’214 This has led to Barry’s attack 
on multiculturalism and his defence of one status of citizen so that everyone 
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enjoys the same legal and political rights.215 As we seek to disengage from the 
idea of the group in our understanding of culture in section 2.2 it is necessary to 
take a similar position with regard to equality. But Crowder argues that Kymlicka’s 
idea of compensation for undeserved cultural disadvantage through group rights 
in fact establishes individual rights because the group has no moral existence of 
its own.216  We are seeking through the culture-responsibility relationship equality 
of individuals so that each and every person’s actions are contextualized. Renteln 
states that the reason for admitting a ‘cultural defence’ ‘…is to ensure equal 
application of the law to all citizens…actions of defendants should be judged 
against behavioural standards that are reasonable for a person of that culture in 
the context of this culture’. 217  But these things are seen as a threat to 
universalism. 
Universalism stems from natural law principles and in its simplest form 
recognizes that there are certain moral laws that are binding on all human beings 
in all places at all times. Yet for centuries universal truths have been challenged, 
for example by the Reformation in England that saw competing religious claims 
of Catholics and Protestants and by Marxism in the late nineteenth and twentieth 
century when moral values became secondary to economic inequality. In modern 
times Cotterrell defines the universal standards as respect for human dignity and 
the autonomy of others as individuals. 218  Multiculturalism challenges these 
universal understandings further, raising too the fears of pluralism and relativism. 
We need to consider these perceived threats so that we can overcome the 
thought that acknowledgement and acceptance of each of these is an inevitable 
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consequence of the socio-legal recognition of the culture-responsibility 
relationship.  
The culture-responsibility relationship in particular can give rise to fears of legal 
pluralism. In section 1.2 we raised the idea of legal pluralism and made it clear 
that the culture-responsibility relationship is intended to be firmly situated within 
the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales. Woodman 
points out that ‘…English law has historically displayed a readiness to adopt 
bodies of non-state law observed by sections of the population.’219 In fact, our 
common law was established by the Royal Courts and customary law was 
allowed to run alongside it but when it comes to the criminal law it is fairly clear 
that there has only been one legal system and that is state law. Notwithstanding 
this Benhabaib argues that pluralist legal systems can be compatible with 
universal values so long as there is egalitarian reciprocity, voluntary self-
ascription and freedom of exit and association.220 In some ways it could be 
argued that ‘cultural offences’ are a form of legal pluralism, applicable to all but 
directed only at certain groups.221 
Even if we do not endorse legal pluralism we do have to recognize that 
multiculturalism brings with it value pluralism. In 1914 Figgis referred to ‘…the 
hurly burly of competing opinions and strange moralities’ in relation to the rights 
of churches and 100 years later those competing opinions and moralities arise 
from the social reality of multiculturalism.222  We have already argued for those 
‘moralities’ to be considered as relevant to the behaviour of certain defendants 
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where there is a relationship between culture and responsibility and the alarm 
bells of individualised justice may begin to ring.   
There are writers from the 1990’s, when academic discourse around the ‘cultural 
defence’ was rife, who raise a pluralist objection to it and who ask how it can be 
fair to afford members of a minority culture a defence denied to members of the 
dominant culture. 223  But the opportunity to establish a culture-responsibility 
relationship is denied to no-one. If recognition of the culture-responsibility 
relationship strikes up fears of pluralism then it also make us wary that we are 
embracing individualised justice. Black states that ‘…acknowledging that 
something in an accused’s cultural background might justify an acquittal for 
otherwise criminal behavior seems to be a step down the path to individualised 
justice which corrupts the equal protection that should be offered by the criminal 
law. In short it threatens anarchy.’224 However, if we move away from the idea of 
a generally applicable ‘cultural defence’ then such fears can be assuaged 
because we are addressing the culture-responsibility relationship in a nuanced 
way, essentially searching for the link between culture and responsibility in 
individual cases. Black and others overlook this essential link between culture 
and responsibility because any allowances within criminal law (and of course not 
necessarily such that would come even close to acquittal) could never be based 
simply on background but would have to stem from a clear link between that 
background and the behavior in question. Demian supports and makes this point 
neatly in arguing, from an anthropological point of view, that the criminal justice 
system is not interested in what culture is but for law and lawyers culture is a 
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‘revelatory mechanism’225 whereby the intentions of defendants are made known 
because we do not need to ask ‘when is culture relevant?’ but ‘when are 
intentions cultural?’226 Blind justice is thought to equate to equality but in many 
ways we are extending our understanding of responsibility to encompass 
understandings of the individual and his accountability for the particular act in 
question and not just the act of which he is accused in isolation or his 
responsibility generally. This ties into Fletcher’s explanation of accountability 
discussed in section 2.3. 
Lernstedt identifies the need for the criminal law to balance personal 
blameworthiness against individualised justice. To achieve this a criminal trial 
needs to ask two questions 
• Does an action break the law? This is the same for everyone.  
• To what extent is this defendant responsible?  
This is where the culture-responsibility relationship comes in.227   There is a 
balance between finding out everything about the defendant’s background and 
blind justice, but there should be a minimum threshold of information that is 
considered so that the yardsticks used in determining responsibility are put at an 
equal distance from every defendant. 
Parekh suggests that ‘…all justice is individualized justice in the sense that it 
relates to this defendant, not anyone else, and to this action, and not one that 
abstractly or superficially looks like it but is really quite different’. 228  And 
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sentencing is always individualised. But, as Cotterrell argues, even individualised 
justice can have different meanings. The aim of law may be to treat like cases 
alike but ‘…the art of law is to judge reliably which are like cases and which are 
unalike…to do justice is to categorise and to act consistently on the basis of 
categorization.’229 How might culture affect categorization? How ‘unalike’ does 
the multicultural criminal make a case? One suggestion is to assess the ‘cultural 
difference of the accused’ by looking to the law of the country of origin and to 
offer a defence if the conduct is not illegal in that country.230 This seems a much 
more objective approach to individualised justice but what strength must there be 
in the link with the country of origin? And it opens itself to accusations of 
‘othering’. Hallevy’s idea is based upon migrants or refugees who could still claim 
a stronger understanding of the law elsewhere but the difficulty of establishing 
the link would still remain. 
‘Othering’ and essentialising arise from an ‘us’ and ‘them’ mentality and Uberoi 
and Modood argue that ‘essentialism is one of the most important themes in post-
multicultural literature.’231 The tendency to essentialise however goes hand in 
hand with the perception of cultures as bounded groups, a myth that we have 
tried to move away from in our fluid understanding of cultures summarized 
usefully by Benhabib as ‘…constant creations, recreations, negotiations of 
imaginery boundaries between ‘we’ and ‘other’.’232 We are moving away from the 
idea that group traits are relevant because the criminal law is ultimately 
concerned with individual responsibility and not from endorsing the views of 
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Renteln and Valladares that ‘…members of groups do share common 
characteristics…individualised justice based on group traits may be necessary to 
safeguard the rights of individual defendants.’233  
Chui takes a highly philosophical approach, situating her arguments against the 
cultural defence in the realm of the historical management of ‘difference’ and 
seeking to ‘…legitimate cultural imperatives while rejecting the metaphysical 
construction of Asian difference’.234 She warns against the acceptance of the 
‘cultural defence’ (on the basis of exclusion or othering of minorities) and against 
its rejection (on the basis of forced assimilation) introducing instead a hybrid 
position that allows for cultural evidence to be admitted if relevant to the 
defendant’s state of mind. This has the potential to provide ‘individualised justice’ 
(based on ignorance of the law or deeply ingrained cultural values) within ‘…a 
criminal law whose defences are a product of the same culture as the 
defendant’.235 Chui is of course recognising the essential culture-responsibility 
relationship, although her aim is narrower in demanding that the identity of Asian 
American women be individually constructed and not essentialized. Here there is 
subtle reference to the work of Crenshaw and the idea of intersectionality. Chui 
expresses doubt in the workability of her own hybrid position, concerned (along 
with D’Hondt) that raising culture shifts the merits onto the focus of the 
defendant’s culture and not the relationship between the defendant’s actions and 
his state of mind and it is questionable whether the inclusion of cultural evidence 
can ever ‘…allow for uncertainties and unknowns and identities [to] be 
constructed, not essentialised’.236 We have to guard against essentializing and 
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we need to avoid the claim that a ‘cultural’ act is normative within that culture.237 
The culture-responsibility relationship can be effective in this. 
A close reading of Volpp’s work reveals, rather than an endorsement of the 
freestanding ‘cultural defence’, a dismissal of it as a non sequitur. She asserts 
that in American courts any defendant is entitled to raise social context evidence 
and questions why, when attorneys offer cultural explanations, we assume 
‘…immigrants to be the beneficiaries of a special treatment that is tolerated as a 
necessary concomitant of the pluralistic values of multiculturalism’. 238 
Furthermore, her work can be interpreted as being intolerant of the narrative 
surrounding the cultural defence debate because these narratives ‘…reinforce a 
preexisting presumption that misogynist acts are typical of and unique to certain 
immigrant cultures’.239 Notwithstanding her lack of focus on the ‘cultural defence’ 
itself her contribution is valuable in placing the dialogue in the wider context of 
the social construction of ‘the other’, notably the construction of problematic 
behaviour of people of colour as cultural as opposed to the problematic behaviour 
of the white majority as an ‘…isolated instance of aberrant behaviour’.240 She 
calls upon the relationship between nationalism, gender, sexuality and race to 
explain this construction, exploring the idea that the female body is the nations 
symbol of honour and purity, serving as ‘…the boundary marker[s] of the 
nation’.241 In this way the nation can consolidate its identity by projecting beyond 
its own borders the sexual practices or gender behaviours it deems abhorrent. 
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D’Hondt raises concerns about how ‘…minority cultures are represented in 
cultural defence discourse, the collective abnormalisation and stereotyping to 
which they are subjected and the way in which the agency of individual members 
is erased.’242 Today we have much greater awareness of this stereotyping and 
understand why it must be avoided and so the more interesting point is the 
concern about the erosion of agency. D’Hondt however seems preoccupied with 
questions of agency being based on ‘membership’ of a particular cultural group 
(reiterating the concerns of Demian and Renteln that the culture of the legal 
system is invisible) when what we are concerned with in exploring the culture-
responsibility relationship is the question of establishing the influence of culture 
on individual agency and thus attributing responsibility. 
As seen above, Phillips too decries the ‘stereotypical representation of the non- 
western other’ that the ‘cultural defence’ may allow and is highly critical of the fact 
that, outside of feminist circles, principles of gender equality are being used to 
demonise minority cultural groups but she objects to the ‘cultural defence’ on the 
basis that individual agency is eroded.243 She is critical of the way that members 
of minority groups are ‘…represented as driven by their culture and compelled by 
cultural dictate to behave in certain ways’. 244  It is this perception of the 
‘stereotypical other’ (submissive women, coercive parents) lacking in agency that 
contributes to Phillips’s cry for ‘multiculturalism without culture’, whereas 
defensible multiculturalism acknowledges human agency. Foblets and Renteln 
assert that although there is concern that the ‘cultural defence’ is ‘…predicated 
on the notion that cultural factors determine the behaviour of legal actors’ there 
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now seems to be agreement that it is  ‘…based on the idea that culture 
predisposes individuals to act in ways that conform to their cultural upbringing’.245 
So many of these concerns can be assuaged by the shift from the cultural 
defence’ to the culture-responsibility relationship. Similarly, concerns of cultural 
relativism can be alleviated by a focus on the culture-responsibility relationship 
with its commitment to the individual rather than the group.  
As a final thought on this, culture as a way of explanation need not necessarily 
be racially set. For example, there is the idea of a culture of honour in the 
Southern States of the US which emerged in the eighteenth century with the 
arrival of Scots or Irish immigrants and their Celtic cultural values based on Lex 
Talionis. 246 Doucet et al claim that this culture of honour has been passed down 
generations for hundreds of years and competes with claims of higher 
temperatures in offering explanations for raised levels of violence in the Southern 
states.247 
Feminism versus Multiculturalism 
We know that the concept of the ‘cultural defence’ emerged in the 1980’s and 
early literature emanated almost exclusively from writers considered by others or 
self-identifying as feminist so that for a long time commentary on the ‘cultural 
defence’ appeared inextricably linked with the issue of gender equality. The 
feminism versus multiculturalism debate gained momentum during the 1990’s 
and feminist literature of that time displayed firm resistance to the idea of a 
freestanding ‘cultural defence’. However, there were calls for criminal justice 
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systems to ‘…begin to accommodate the seemingly irreconcilable goals of 
feminists and multiculturalists’.248  Okin (although not addressing the ‘cultural 
defence’ directly) was perhaps responsible for opening the broad dialogue on the 
tensions between gender equality and multiculturalism in her 1989 book  Justice 
Gender and the Family. 249  Ten years later, in asking the question Is 
Multiculturalism Bad for Women? and in asserting strongly that ‘…most cultures 
have as one of their principal aims the control of women by men’ it is clear that 
she was subscribing to two feminist hypotheses, neatly summarized by 
Phillips. 250  Firstly, most cultures are ‘suffused with gendered practices and 
ideologies that disadvantage women in comparison to men’.251 Secondly, when 
claims are made on behalf of culture ‘the benefit of those claims often appears to 
be in the interests of more powerful men’.252 Whilst there is some agreement with 
Okin’s perception of the implications of multiculturalism for women (for example, 
Phillips who argues that cultural evidence should be excluded from the courtroom 
on the basis that it ‘reinforces patriarchal power’), Phillips claims that Okin loses 
credibility because of her use of ‘eclectic examples from sensationalist 
newspapers’ in attempting to verify her claims, a point made in section 1.1 in 
relation to Renteln’s work and the ‘cultural defence’ more generally.253 
Similarly, Renteln dismisses Okin’s work as ‘…an attempt to trivialise the cultural 
defence by associating it mainly with female genital cutting and forced 
marriage.’254 Volpp is critical of Okin for relying on a ‘caricature’ of immigrant 
communities and for adopting problematic notions of both feminism and 
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multiculturalism. 255  Okin’s feminism is interpreted by Volpp as ‘colonialist’ 
feminism whereby liberation of women from the ‘east’ is seen as desirable in a 
spirit of colonialism (along with education, The Rule of Law and Christianity). This 
ideology now attracts heavy criticism on the basis that ‘other’ women are 
‘always/already victim’.256 Okin’s multiculturalism is thought by Volpp to resemble 
‘crude cultural relativism’, indefensible in that it assumes a homogenous 
(American) monoculture and overlooking the fact that ‘…valuing difference does 
not destroy our ability to judge among difference.’257 According to Volpp the clash 
between multiculturalism and feminism as constructed by Okin relies on the 
assumption that the western domestic scene is egalitarian and empowering 
whereas minorities are ‘…huddled in the gazebo of group rights preserving the 
orthodoxy of their distinctive cultures in the midst of the great storm of western 
progress’.258 The assumption is made that western liberal values will lead to their 
salvation. Nonetheless, as well as highlighting the clash between multiculturalism 
and feminism, Okin’s claims set the scene for an ongoing polarized debate on 
the extent to which the ‘cultural defence’ should be allowed. 
Rimonte is arguably least tolerant to the ‘cultural defence’, seeing it as a 
mechanism for excusing inexcusable behaviour and as a means of promoting  
‘culturally sponsored violence against women’ but her work can be criticized for 
being single tracked and focusing narrowly on the potential for the ‘cultural 
defence’ to create, in effect, ‘victimless’ crimes through the decriminalization of 
violence against women.259 This is evidenced in her narrow definition of culture 
as ‘…a body of beliefs, ideas and ideals held by an ethnic group about the nature 
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of women and men and their roles and relationships’ (seen in section 2.2) despite 
her acknowledgement of the work of Geertz and other anthropologists in 
recognizing the shaping force of culture more generally.260 
Although recognizing the potential conflict between feminism and 
multiculturalism, at the heart of her arguments Maguigan is more concerned with 
the equality of treatment for minority groups. She rejects a freestanding ‘cultural 
defence’, seeing the debate surrounding  it as theoretical (on the basis that most 
trial judges are never confronted with it although this is something we dispute in 
an era where population movement continues to increase) and as obscuring 
‘…the real practical problems of achieving reform goals that appear to be in 
competition with each other’, that is feminism and multiculturalism.261 
Whilst the above considers the clash between multiculturalism and feminism in 
broad terms with an implication that it is the use of the ‘cultural defence’ by male 
offenders to mitigate acts of violence against women that is objectionable,  it is 
perhaps worth emphasizing that there is a second strand to the ‘cultural defence’ 
and that it is significant in interpreting the acts of female defendants. There has 
long been an argument that the ‘cultural defence’ is only available to women when 
they conform to the stereotype of the non-western subservient wife. Phillips 
analyses the case of Bibi (and Ahluwahlia, as seen above) to substantiate this 
point. 262 Zoora Shah, referred to by the court as an ‘unusual woman’ in her trial 
for the murder of an abusive partner is also illustrative here because Shah did 
not create a good impression in the dock and the construction of her persona by 
prosecuting counsel during her appeal against conviction was damaging. 263 
                                                        
260 ibid. 
261 Maguigan (n 179) 45. 
262 R v Bibi [1980] 1 WLR 1193; R v Kiranjit Ahluwahlia [1992] EWCA Crim 1. 
263 R v Zoora Ghulam Shah [1998] EWCA Crim 1441. 
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Carline construes the label ‘an unusual woman’ as instrumental in the failure of 
Shah’s appeal because there was a ‘contravention of culturally accepted gender 
and racial scripts’ in that description.264 However, it is important to recognize that 
this same stereotyping applies to women of all colour and that there has long 
been a perception that women in the criminal justice system are ‘mad or bad’ 
whilst the wrongdoings of male defendants are socially caused.265 
Phillips raises more broad reaching difficulties with the concept of the ‘cultural 
defence’ but in turn warns against the refusal to acknowledge cultural diversity 
and tries to reconcile the multiculturalism versus feminism conflict in her book 
Multiculturalism Without Culture which is based on the contention that 
‘…multiculturalism can be made compatible with the pursuit of gender equality 
and women’s rights so long as it dispenses with an essentialist understanding of 
culture’.266 This is undoubtedly true and deeper understandings of the social 
reality of twenty fist century multiculturalism and indeed an emphasis on the 
relationship between culture and responsibility should overcome this essentialist 
argument. 
The ‘cultural defence’ has played its part in the twenty five year old dialogue 
surrounding the clash between multiculturalism and feminism. During that time 
ideas have evolved so that our understandings of the implications, both negative 
and positive, of the defence have broadened. In questioning the justifiability of 
the ‘cultural defence’ today we are aware of its potential to generate gender 
inequality yet alert to the need to move outside the strict multiculturalism versus 
                                                        
264 Anne Carline, ‘Zoora Shah: ‘An Unusual Woman’’ (2005) 14 (2) Social and Legal Studies 
14(2) 215, 230.  
She goes so far as to say that the words amount to hate speech, ‘…a speech act that has the 
performative consequence of injuring the recipient’.  
265 Anna Wilczynski, ‘Mad or Bad: Child Killers, Gender and the Courts’ (1997) 37 (3) British 
Journal of Criminology 419.  
266 Phillips (n 243) 8.  
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feminism paradigm. In 2001 Volpp called for a constructive dialogue beyond 
these boundaries and asked us to see and challenge multiple overlapping and 
discrete oppressions. 267 The response of feminists writers to this call has been 
to become almost silent. The clash between multiculturalism and feminism has 
all but disappeared in twenty first century academic literature and whilst interest 
in the ‘cultural defence’ is very much alive debate surrounding it is no longer 
limited to these seemingly irreconcilable viewpoints. It is not possible to know the 
reasons for this. Perhaps Phillips’ ideas on ‘multiculturalism without culture’, 
along with the realization that culture alone is not capable of explaining violence 
against women, have gone some way towards addressing feminist concerns. 
Perhaps there is recognition that feminism is also present in some minority 
groups. Whatever the reasons, the feminist ideas discussed here lead to the 
conclusion that an understanding of feminist theory and an acknowledgement of 
feminist concerns is crucial in successfully formulating a theoretical framework of 
response to the culture-responsibility relationship. 
Parekh identifies 12 practices that most frequently lead to what Benhabib calls 
‘clashes of intercultural evaluation’ and 7 of these have a gendered dimension. 
These are FGM, polygamy, arranged marriage, marriage within prohibited 
degrees of relationship, the withdrawal of Muslim girls from co-educational 
schools, the hajib and finally and broadly the ‘subordinated status of women’.268 
These concerns are still very much alive, awareness of many of them continues 
to grow as just solutions are sought within the legal field. The culture-
responsibility relationship, however, is not a threat to the ongoing search for 
                                                        
267 Volpp (n 255). 
268 Parekh (n 43) 265. 
For completeness the non-gendered areas include Hindu cremation, slaughter rituals, the 
scarring of children and the no-schooling of gypsy and Amish children. The final one is the 
wearing of Sikh turbans, gendered but not considered as harmful to men. 
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justice in these areas, partly because it stands some distance from them but 
mainly because it is designed to be considered in isolation in relation individual 
defendants. Deckha, in looking at whether ‘feminists committed to a theory of 
intersectionality should welcome the introduction of cultural claims into law’ looks 
at the work of Rosemary Coombe who ‘insists that we abandon all inclinations to 
establish one single relationship between law and culture’.269 Coombe asks us to 
‘…imagine culture as a practice of continually emergent differentiation, 
contestation, negotiation and agency and to focus on the scattered power 
relations that shape these actions and the dissent and resistance they 
generate.’270 In the culture-responsibility relationship we are asking the courts to 
apply this ‘differentiation, contestation, negotiation and agency’ to individual 
defendants of all genders to reach a view on whether culture had a effect on 
behaviour. The inherent injustice for women within the ‘cultural defence’ can be 
diminished by the culture-responsibility relationship. 
Concluding this section 2.4 we have established the relationship between culture 
and responsibility and can see that the problems inherent within that relationship 
are double edged- a reason to be wary of it but also a way of giving it a purpose 
beyond that of the pursuit of individual (not individualised) justice. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
The Chapter set out to explore understandings of both culture and responsibility 
and to take these nuanced understandings forward in establishing the existence 
and importance of the culture-responsibility relationship. The aims of the Chapter 
have been achieved. 
We now understand culture to be fluid and complex, derived from the historical 
interpretation and adaptation by a group of a number of possible influential factors 
that an individual may adopt and adapt and that contribute to collective and 
individual identity.  We have moved away from the idea of a static and bounded 
cultural group to focus on the way that culture is uniquely processed in each 
individual case. It is this emphasis on the effect of culture on each individual that 
sits at the heart of the culture-responsibility relationship. Responsibility is now 
understood in terms of agency (capacity in terms of choice and fair opportunity 
and in part character) and the limited place of culture in influencing moral 
responsibility has also been considered. We have looked at a range of possible 
ways in which culture can be said to affect responsibility and in the absence of a 
scientific and definitive answer to the question ‘how does culture affect 
responsibility?’ we have drawn the line somewhere around pre-disposition but it 
must be emphasised that this is not a line that is etched in stone and we must 
always be prepared to defer to evidence of a culture-responsibility relationship in 
individual cases. The problems inherent within the culture-responsibility 
relationship have been examined both to show an awareness of their existence, 
essential particularly for making strong and credible suggestions for a way 
forward in Chapter 5 and to argue that those difficulties are in themselves reasons 
to further the cause of the culture-responsibility relationship. 
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In a broader sense the Chapter has contributed to fulfilling the wider aims of the 
thesis in distancing the culture-responsibility relationship from the ‘cultural 
defence’ and in emphasising the importance of the individual and of the culture-
responsibility relationship at the time of the alleged offence because culture  
should not be used as a tool to explain or legitimate a defendant’s actions after 
the event unless we can see evidence of a genuine relationship at the time of the 
act. Throughout the Chapter a sense that culture is a difficult concept for the 
criminal law begins to emerge and this is something that we need to be mindful 
of throughout the thesis. 
At the start of the Chapter there is a quote from Lloyd who says that it is  ‘beyond 
human power’ to attribute moral responsibility. This may be so but we do have to 
be able to attribute legal responsibility and in undertaking this task in a 
multicultural world we do need the culture-responsibility relationship. Whilst the 
understanding of culture reached in section 2.2 can perhaps be legitimately 
labelled as postmodern Cotterrell states that ‘…contemporary law - explicitly 
constructed, particular and local in scope, and ever changing - might seem the 
quintessentially postmodern form of knowledge and doctrine: not in any sense a 
grand narrative, but the perfect pragmatic embodiment of contingency, 
impermanence, artificiality, transience and disposability; its doctrine continually 
adapted, amended, cancelled, supplemented or reinterpreted to address new 
problems’. 271 The culture-responsibility relationship fits within Cotterrell’s 
postmodern description of the law. The next step is to take this specifically 
nuanced understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship forward to the 
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practical realm and to examine how the criminal law and criminal justice system 










CHAPTER 3  
THE CRIMINAL LAW AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM OF ENGLAND 
AND WALES 
 
‘The stories that we tell to justify one state of legal affairs over another are 
just that, stories.’1 
3.1 Introduction  
In Chapter 2 understandings of both culture and responsibility were enhanced, 
the existence and importance of the relationship (or the perceived relationship) 
between them was established and the problems inherent within the culture-
responsibility relationship were identified. Refined and specific understandings of 
both culture and responsibility and of the relationship between them are therefore 
brought forward to this Chapter. This Chapter has two broad aims. 
Firstly, it seeks to gather evidence to support and advance the hypothesis that 
the culture-responsibility relationship has not been duly considered in theory, 
practice or policy. Matravers states that ‘…any serious reflection on the cultural 
defence* must be embedded in a more general account of criminal justice’ and 
that ‘more general account of criminal justice’ is provided here by situating the 
culture-responsibility relationship within the specific theoretical foundations, 
substantive criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales, one 
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of the three distinct and defined parameters set out at the beginning of the thesis 
to bound a contextually particular analysis of that relationship.2 This first aim is 
achieved by searching for evidence of the presence of and engagement with 
culture in general and the culture-responsibility relationship in particular in the 
substantive criminal law (the law on general defences, legislation creating 
‘cultural offences’, decided cases and sentencing law and decisions) and in the 
criminal justice system (The Police, The Crown Prosecution Service and the 
Judiciary). Sections 3.3 and 3.4 report on the findings from that search. Although 
the review of relevant legislation, decided cases and sentencing decisions where 
there is a cultural dimension carried out for section 3.3 adopts a doctrinal 
approach to legal research more generally, as described in Chapter 1, research 
for the Chapter takes a constructivist approach throughout, a thematic search for 
culture and an assessment of the law’s response (or lack of response) to it. The 
search for the presence of culture in the criminal law and criminal justice system 
reveals minimal engagement between law and culture and consequently it can 
be concluded that the culture-responsibility relationship has not yet found a place 
in practice or policy. Yet the analysis of the foundations of the criminal law set out 
in section 3.2 concludes that there is flexibility within the established principles, 
values and systemic factors that provide the theoretical grounding of our criminal 
law to accommodate that relationship.   
The second aim of the Chapter, therefore, is to move beyond this essentially fact 
finding exercise and to begin to try to understand the reasons for this lack of 
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and Matt Matravers (eds) Criminal Law and Cultural Diversity (Oxford, Oxford University Press 
2014) 89. 






engagement between criminal law and culture, to consider how this apparent 
resistance to culture might be overcome and where and how, in practical terms, 
the culture-responsibility might find a place within our law. In other words, the aim 
is to begin to form an answer to the research question how should the criminal 
law of England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility relationship? The 
recognition and acceptance of culture as a concept  with relevance to law is 
fundamental to establishing the credibility and essential place of the culture-
responsibility relationship in modern thinking about criminal law and to its 
accommodation within the legal system of England and Wales.  The culture-
responsibility relationship matters. It is relevant to contemporary justice. It has 
not been given the attention that this thesis argues that it needs and deserves 
and the current laissez-faire approach is inadequate and problematic. The 
culture-responsibility relationship is not only a reality but a necessary tool for 
achieving justice in the context of twenty first century multiculturalism. The 
general and tentative approach to culture identified in this Chapter needs to be 
followed through with clear, consistent and specific well-reasoned responses to 





3.2 Foundations of the Criminal Law 
With no written criminal code our criminal law is a curious mix. Of course we have 
some specific statutory offences and some common law offences and our 
defences too are a mixture of both. Underpinning all of these things are the 
fundamental principles and values and systemic factors that inevitably shape the 
extent to which our specific laws can adapt at any time. They provide both the 
theoretical grounding and the systemic conditions of possibility for the current 
approach of our criminal law to the culture-responsibility relationship and dictate 
the extent to which the law may be able to demonstrate flexibility in the face of 
argument around the culture of the defence (or indeed the prosecution) which 
may produce a particular way of seeing criminal situations. But to maintain 
credibility these principles and values must resonate with social reality.  At the 
beginning of the twentieth century MacDonnell wrote that ‘…the strength of the 
criminal law is to be found in the general accord between it and the public 
conscience’ and, even then, more than one hundred years ago, he identified a 
disintegration in that harmony.3 Maintaining that harmony is more challenging 
than ever in our multicultural society. At the end of that century in 1997 Dennis 
referred to the ‘critical condition of the criminal law’, critical because of the 
piecemeal approach of judges (an assertion verified, though in the narrow context 
of culture, through the analysis of decided cases and sentencing decisions in 
section 3.3 below) and because of the ‘…growing uncertainty as to the correct 
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Here MacDonnell identifies examples of the criminal law being ‘…in marked discord with 
popular sentiment’, one such example being the infanticide of illegitimate children. MacDonnell’s 
ideas pre-date Hart’s legal positivism whereby standards are set down by the sovereign but 
need moral legitimacy, established by reference to social consensus. H Hart, The Concept of 







philosophical basis for criminal law reform.’4 This section examines the unique 
philosophical foundations of the criminal law of England and Wales, its 
fundamental principles, values and systemic factors, in the context of justice in a 
multicultural era but firstly the purpose of the criminal law needs to be considered. 
Purpose of the Criminal Law 
There is great debate about the criminal laws’ purpose which falls beyond the 
scope of this discussion. However, to understand fully the present argument 
about culture and responsibility and to lay the foundations for the subsequent 
analysis we need to look at some of these alternative ideas, particularly those 
that enlighten our understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship. 
Ashworth and Horder state that ‘…the chief concern of the criminal law is to 
prohibit behaviour that represents serious wrong against an individual or against 
some fundamental social value or institution’ but in many ways Ashworth and 
Horder raise more questions than answers here.5 What is a ‘serious wrong’? 
What are our ‘fundamental social values’? Perhaps overridingly, why should our 
chief concern be the prohibition of certain behaviour? Going back a step, simply 
put, in modern post-industrial times the criminal law has one overriding aim, the 
maintenance of social order.6 To achieve this it needs rules and sanctions for 
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237. Dennis presents a challenge to orthodox subjectivism as the philosophical  basis for the 
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Press 2009) 1. 
6 Wells and Quick identify public order as a recurring theme in the criminal law and identify 
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transgressions of those rules. In establishing those rules and sanctions a just 
system of criminal law focuses on the prevention of harm, the attribution of 
responsibility when harm is caused and punishment. These three ‘purposes’ are 
achieved in turn through the creation of offences, the application of the law to 
arrive at decisions on guilt or innocence and sentencing decisions. Before we 
examine these identified purposes we need to be clear about two things in 
particular that the criminal law should not be concerned with. Firstly, there are 
references throughout the relevant literature to the preservation or protection of 
culture and cultural rights. Renteln, for example, writes of the ‘cultural defence’ 
as a means of protecting cultural rights.7 In the ‘Pitcairn Case’ there was an 
argument against prosecuting those suspected of sexual offences because the 
island’s community, and thus culture, could not survive if a high percentage of 
the able bodied males were found guilty and imprisoned.8 Secondly, the criminal 
law should not be concerned with proactively furthering a policy of 
multiculturalism. As Lernestedt says ‘…the question of how criminal law can 
support multiculturalism is not the right one. It’s about the legitimization of the 
application of the criminal law to individual concrete persons’. 9  The culture-
responsibility relationship is concerned with the just attribution of responsibility 
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Materials (4th edn, Cambridge University Press 2010).  
7 Alison Dundes Renteln, The Culture Defense (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005). 
Renteln devotes a whole chapter to ‘The Right to Culture’ (Chapter 11) although she relates the 
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measures include Article 27 of the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which 
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9 C Lernestedt, ’Criminal Law and Culture’ Chapter 2 in Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 





and, as the second ‘purpose’ of the criminal law identified here, that attribution 
sits between the prevention of harm and punishment. However, as we 
established in section 2.3, ‘responsibility’ as a concept is extended to include the 
degree of responsibility that should attach to a particular defendant, that degree 
being reflected in punishment at the sentencing stage. 
The prevention of harm, or the ‘harm principle’, is widely accepted as the 
backbone of the criminal law, or at least of the decision to create specific criminal 
offences. It is, in Anglo-American legal thinking, the tenet of liberal criminal theory 
under liberalism. Liberalism is 
‘…a secular political morality which, in its currently deontological strains, 
takes individual human beings as the primary units of ethical concern and 
is fundamentally orientated towards safeguarding individuals’ liberty and 
promoting their personal autonomy. It does this without denying the 
socially-situated nature of the self or neglecting the appropriate demands 
of distributive justice. As a public philosophy of government, liberalism is 
committed to equal liberty, non-discrimination, freedom of thought and 
conscience, toleration, pluralism, democratic accountability and the rule of 
law.’10  
The emphasis of liberalism, as we saw in Chapter 2, is on individual autonomy. 
That autonomy is reflected in Mill’s ‘harm principle’ which advocates that ‘…the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a 
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others.’11 This principle 
has been developed by legal theorists over the years and is generally accepted 
as forming the basis of ‘criminalisation theory’. It works because, as Hornle states 
‘…it is the product of a down to earth, secular, functionalist and  consequentialist 
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way of thinking and it rests on a liberal basis which values individuals’ interests 
higher than communitarian ideals or the ideals of value ethics or religion.’12 The 
‘harm principle’ was adopted and adapted in the Wolfenden Committee Report in 
1957 so that the purpose of the criminal law was stated as being: 
 ‘…to preserve public order and decency, to protect the citizen from what 
is offensive or injurious and to provide sufficient safeguards against 
exploitation or corruption of others, particularly those who are especially 
vulnerable because they are young weak in body or mind or inexperienced 
or in a state of special physical, official or economic dependence.’13  
This adaptation seems simple enough, legislatures can legislate to prevent harm, 
but it has implications for legal moralism through the reference to ‘public order 
and decency’ and ‘what is offensive and injurious’. The ‘harm principle’ has 
become complicated too, both as a result of philosophical re-working and the 
social reality of our multicultural world, and two relevant but challenging questions 
emerge. Firstly, what is ‘harm’?  Mill sees harm as ‘hurt, damage, loss and 
injury’14 and that has traditionally been conceptualized within the physical realm 
as evidenced by the Oxford English Dictionary definition of harm as ‘physical 
injury, especially that which is deliberately inflicted.’15 ‘Harm’ today is at times 
given a wider interpretation, with for example, the offence of ‘coercion and control’ 
in S76 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 recognising emotional harm in the context 
of domestic violence. Von Hirsch is among theorists who advocate that ‘harm’ 
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14 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty and Other Essays, (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2008) 69. 
15 Oxford English Dictionary online 
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alone is not enough. We also need ‘wrongdoing’, a ‘dual-element account 
(wrongfulness plus harm).’16 This becomes particularly problematic in the context 
of multiculturalism as both elements become open ended, not only what or who 
defines what is ‘harm’, but what or who defines what is ‘wrongdoing’. Surely harm 
and wrongdoing are morally contingent so that understandings of these concepts 
can never be value neutral. For example, legislation making female genital 
mutilation a criminal offence assumes that it is harmful but there are those in 
academia, medicine and society who justify the practice and disagree with 
commonly held, perhaps majoritarian beliefs around the harm in the practice 
(discussed in 3.3 below). Does that then lead us back to the idea of ‘legal 
moralism’? Duff identifies a ‘modest’ legal moralism whereby there can be 
criminal prohibition of a wrong provided that the wrong is a public wrong requiring 
a collective response because ‘…it is necessary to single out a smaller 
subcategory of public wrongs from the larger category of morally objectionable 
conduct in general.’ 17  Hornle argues that this approach ‘…blurs distinctions 
between rather different collectives; moral communities (which can be religious 
communities) and their norms; civil society and shared public values; the state 
and legal norms’  but it is perhaps the most workable solution in a multicultural 
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society, so long as consensus can be reached on what is ‘harmful’ and what 
makes a ‘public wrong’.18  
Attempting to sidestep these moral dilemmas, Husak perhaps adopts the most 
pragmatic and philosophically simple approach, the ultima ratio principle, which 
advocates that criminal law should only be resorted to when there is no other way 
to deal with the problem. This is because the criminal law is different and ‘…must 
be evaluated by a higher standard of justification because it burdens interests not 
implicated when other modes of social control are employed.’19 But even here  
the question of identifying what is a ‘problem’ (or in other words ‘harm’) and what 
is not remains and the principle was certainly disregarded in the criminalisation 
of forced marriage where successive government reports and interested parties 
supported various alternatives, including immigration restrictions, education and 
the strengthening of civil remedies as the most effective means of prevention.20 
Renteln makes an attempt to consider the harm principle specifically in the 
context of multiculturalism suggesting that individuals should have the right to 
follow cultural traditions unless these ’…cause irreparable physical harm to 
others’ and that ‘…in the absence of any threat of serious harm liberal 
democracies should not interfere with cultural traditions.’21 If defining ‘harm’ is 
difficult what is ‘irreparable’ or ‘serious’ harm, especially outside of the physical 
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19 Douglas Husak, ‘The Criminal Law as Last Resort’ (2004) 24 (2) Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 207, 230. 
20 See discussion in section 3.3 below. 
21 Renteln (n 7) 19. 
Loeb is critical of Renteln for her failure to recognize the consent of victims of harm, questioning 
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domain? Renteln engages with this difficult question in asking how we separate 
acceptable and unconscionable traditions.22 Whilst she is open to both Poulter’s 
human rights framework (if a cultural tradition violates a human right then it should 
not be permitted)23 and Parekh’s ‘dialogue device’, she is critical of the latter. 
Interpreting Parekh’s dialogical approach as the need for ‘…a minority 
spokesman who will engage in dialogue with representatives of the majority about 
cultural practices that offend ‘operative societal values’…[and] explain how the 
tradition is authoritative, central to the way of life of the ethnic minority group and, 
in general, desirable’ and thus based in offence to majoritarian values she 
perhaps misinterprets what Parekh is trying to achieve through dialogue and she 
adheres firmly to her ‘harm principle’, that is the principle of ‘irreparable physical 
harm’ discussed above so that understandings of harm in a multicultural context 
remain undeveloped.24 
This leads to the second question. What or who is the criminal law protecting?25 
Hornle sees the potential objects of protection as being either collective (moral 
values or the legal order, for example) or individual. The Wolfenden Report 
seems to focus on the individual but in the aim of ‘preserving public order and 
decency’ there is cognition of collective harm too. In this thesis the emphasis is 
on the individual as we search for the deepest understanding of the relationship 
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24 Renteln (n 7) 216. Renteln is quoting B Parekh, ‘Minority Practices and Principles of 
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Renteln can be criticized here firstly for her interpretation of Parekh whose ideas around 
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between culture and legal responsibility, for true blameworthiness, in each and 
every unique case. It makes sense therefore to embrace liberalism with its 
emphasis on the individual but in the field of the socio-legal perhaps collective 
harm (or the potential for collateral collective harm if we do not pursue the 
protection of the individual) and individual harm are not necessarily so distinct. 
What we are faced with here is the ongoing communitarian-liberal debate in 
political theory. 26  Communitarian critics of liberal theory, such as Taylor, 
recognize that ‘…liberal theory is committed to an abstract, a-contextual, 
dissociated, ‘atomistic’ conception of self which is both completely unrealistic and 
ethically debased, in being estranged from its social environment and the fabric 
of interpersonal relations woven into and enriching real lives.’27 In other words, 
even if we prioritise the individual we cannot ignore his social, including his 
cultural, context. This deviates from Kant’s classic non- communitarian statement 
where the criminal law should reflect  ‘…the sum of conditions under which the 
choice of one can be united with the choice of another in accordance with a 
universal law of freedom.’28  In the culture-responsibility relationship we can 
never veer too far towards the abstract individual because we are always mindful 
of his cultural context.29 If we agree that we are concerned with prevention of 
harm to the individual, what, pertaining to the individual are we protecting him 
from? There are theorists who believe that we are protecting the rights of the 
individual in preventing harm; there are those that believe that we are protecting 
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an individuals’ ‘quality of life.’30 In essence we are protecting an individuals’ liberty 
so that the individual is ‘…the primary unit of ethical concern’ 31  but as a 
modification to liberal theory perhaps we can contemplate the individual and his 
autonomy (considered in the wider sense of Raz’s autonomy which adds to Kant’s 
intelligent moral agent the social opportunities to ‘live your life according to your 
own lights’) as a whole within his unique social and cultural context and bear in 
the mind the risk of collective harm if we allow harm at the individual level.32  
Applying liberal criminal theory in a multicultural world is never going to be easy 
because, as raised though not fully resolved by Renteln, Poulter, Parekh and 
others, how can the ‘harm principle’ accommodate competing values? There is 
the conflict between criminalising wrongs that infringe liberty and the liberals’ 
‘…existential commitment to pluralism and tolerance in matters of faith thought 
and conscience’ that should preclude criminalisation of, inter alia ‘…unorthodox 
lifestyle choices.’33 Matravers makes a strong statement against criminalisation 
in arguing that ‘…a liberal state in circumstances of pluralism ought not to 
criminalise- or ought otherwise to make space for- (at least some) practices that 
‘belong’ (in some sense or other) to the various cultures and conceptions of the 
good of its citizens.’34 However, Wells and Quick point out that there is a ‘political 
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32 Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon 1986) 369. 
33 P Roberts in Simeseter, Bois-Pedain and Neumann (n 10) 338. 
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impulse’ to ‘pass a law against it’ whenever a social problem appears.35 When it 
comes to multiculturalism we also have to be mindful to differentiate the 
‘…politician’s honest reliance on remote harm arguments and cases where 
‘remote harm’ serves to rationalize proposals which are driven by resentment 
against certain groups.’36 This takes us back to the phenomena of ‘moral panics’ 
and the creation of ‘suspect communities’, a ‘sub-group of the community that is 
singled out for state attention as being ‘problematic’.’37 To be workable we do 
have to try to avoid entering the moral dimension and, like Matravers, Renteln 
argues for maximum accommodation questioning why minorities should have to 
justify their cultural traditions when the dominant culture does not have to.38 Once 
again, it is dialogue that can help us to find a way through these conflicts and in 
Chapter 4 the work of Parekh and political philosophers committed to a dialogical 
approach will be explored further. 
Even outside of the multicultural arena the harm principle has its’ critics, with 
Roberts identifying both its incompleteness and indeterminateness, incomplete 
because it ‘…offers no rationale for criminal prohibitions that are not concerned 
with protecting liberal values’ and indeterminate because’ …it seldom offers 
comprehensive or unequivocal guidance to policy makers, legislators, judges, 
lawyers or other criminal justice practitioners and officials who aspire to principled 
decision making when confronted with difficult choices in their professional 
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lives.’39  It is attacked too for being ‘consequentialist’, a ‘…future oriented view of 
what is blameworthy about a certain act. The notion of harm necessarily has this 
forward looking character.’40 Criminalisation (discussed in the context of ‘cultural 
offences’ in section 3.3) in turn is necessarily forward looking. On the other hand 
the attribution of responsibility is always backward looking. The attribution of 
responsibility is the second ‘purpose’ of the criminal law that we have identified  
and the research question at the heart of this thesis, how should the criminal law 
of England and Wales respond to the relationship between culture and legal-
responsibility?, is central to the quest for just attribution in a multicultural world 
and so is not addressed here . 
The third purpose is punishment. The Criminal Justice Act 2003 S142 lists the 
punishment of offenders, the reduction of crime, the reform and rehabilitation of 
offenders, the protection of the public and reparation as ‘purposes of sentencing’. 
Von Hirsch and Roberts are critical of S142 for its ‘smorgasbord’ approach which 
does not prioritise any one aim over another. 41  Yet retributivism is clearly 
understood to be the dominant ideology in the criminal justice system of England 
and Wales today. This goes back to  Kant’s orthodox subjectivism which 
‘…accords individuals the status of autonomous moral agents who, because they 
have axiomatic freedom of choice, can fairly be held accountable and punishable 
for the rational choice…they make.’42  In other words, moral agents who choose 
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40 ibid 174. 
41 Andrew Von Hirsch and Julian V Roberts, ‘Legislating Sentencing Principles: The Provisions 
of the Criminal Justice Act 2003 Relating to Sentencing Purposes and the Role of Previous 
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to commit crimes are ‘deserving’ of punishment. For Kant the only thing that 
matters is the agent’s ‘act’ and he must receive his ‘just deserts’ for carrying out 
that act and infringing the autonomy of the other.43  This standard model of 
punishment does not seem to allow for individual, including cultural, 
accommodation, not least because it embraces proportionality so that persons 
convicted of comparable offence should receive comparable punishment. But 
retributivism and its emphasis on proportionality can be challenged in a way that 
may allow for culture to influence punishment.  
In Chapter 2 we looked at Norrie’s re-examination of Kant’s classic orthodox 
subjectivism in the context of responsibility but Norrie’s relational challenge 
extends too to retributivism as a basis for punishment. In Law, Ideology and 
Punishment Norrie points out that the revisionist ‘English Hegelianism’ of the late 
nineteenth century that extended into the philosophy of punishment until the 
1930’s, rejected retributivism as practically useless, backward looking and 
cruel.44 This was because it was based on liberalism’s abstract individual. In 
Punishment, Responsibility and Justice Norrie furthers this in stating ‘…if 
punishment remains a valid phenomenon within a relational approach it must be 
reconciled with an understanding of the ways in which others, including 
potentially the punishing agency, are also to blame.’45  He rejects the modern 
revisionist attempts of other twenty first century theorists because ultimately they 
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retreat to Kantian philosophy and the Kantian individual who has autonomy and 
control and is a responsible choosing being.46 Engaging in particular with Moore, 
who sees retributivism as the heart of Anglo-American criminal law, Norrie 
criticizes his ‘emotivist theory of punishment’ based on the blameworthy 
individual, a choosing being and formal legal subject whose actions are judged 
in isolation from the substantive moral context in which she acts.47 Norrie is 
critical too of Duff’s ‘…dialogic and communicative view of punishment which 
embraces the individual and her community’ because although it can be 
described as communitarian it favours the community and relies on the right of 
the community to retribution. 48  Norrie offers instead, in line with his ‘entity 
relational standpoint’ an idea that ‘…links the agent dialectically with the social 
and moral context of her actions.’49 Applying this to retribution Norrie is aware of 
accusations of deconstructionism and that if he is to argue so forcefully against 
retributivism he needs to find an alternative basis for punishment. Norrie’s work 
is well reasoned and compelling, and not simply because it may in time be 
adapted to make room for the culture-responsibility relationship (both in the 
context of guilt and punishment), but because modern socio-legal thinking is 
leading us more and more to question the feasibility of the abstract individual. 
Wilson seems to offer an adaptation to Norrie’s relational approach in recognising 
that ‘…occasionally liberal thinking about criminal justice is prepared to confront 
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this notion of relational responsibility when the moral identity of the subject is 
patently too fragile to sustain the weight of responsibility that retributive justice 
presupposes.’ He looks at the perpetrators of the James Bulger killing, a case 
example used too by Norrie to justify relational responsibility.50  But when is a 
subject ‘too fragile’ to bear that burden? Is a culturally driven defendant or a 
defendant with a culturally different moral outlook sufficiently ‘fragile’? Wilson 
does not really further the relational aspects of this and perhaps his reasons for 
moving away from retributivism are closer to Tonry’s ‘deep disadvantage’ 
mitigation where ‘…judges and juries should have greater leeway to acquit 
defendants on the basis of deep disadvantage and that judges should be 
encouraged to mitigate sentences for that reason when they believe it appropriate 
to do so.’51 Tonry’s focus is really the  question ‘can deserts be just in an unjust 
world?’ Although most of the debate about a ‘social adversity defence’ centres 
on the particularities of sentencing within the US criminal justice system it has 
support in the world of legal philosophy from Hart, who in discussing defences 
states that we ‘…should incorporate as a further excusing condition the pressure 
of gross forms of economic necessity.’52 It also centres largely on economic 
disadvantage though Tonry refers directly to ‘subcultural pressures’ to commit 
offences as part of that ‘deep disadvantage’.53 No one seems to take culture itself 
as a factor of ‘deep disadvantage’ perhaps because there might be implicit in that 
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a hierarchy of cultures, a kind of cultural relativism. Tonry summarises a number 
of ways in which theorists have reconciled ‘deep disadvantage’ with retributively 
based punishment but his own way through is to adopt a limiting retributivist 
position and recognize ‘deep disadvantage’  as a  mitigating factor in sentencing 
so that the offender’s lesser moral culpability is recognised.  If we substitute 
‘culture’ for ‘deep disadvantage’ and borrow Tonry’s ideas on this we may have 
a means of accommodating culture coherently and systematically, where its true 
relationship to responsibility has been established at the guilt/innocence stage, 
within the criminal justice system. 
More broadly, there is other academic opinion that argues against retributivism 
as a justification for punishment. The ‘Justice Without Retribution Network’, for 
example, is a collaboration between the universities of Ghent, Aberdeen and 
Cornell and its most recent conference explored the impact of neurobiological 
determinism on retributive punishment. 54  Ashworth and Horder argue that 
‘…courts have tended to adopt a much looser notion of responsibility at the 
sentencing stage than at the liability stage.’55 This is because the substance of 
the criminal law itself needs to display strict standards whilst ‘… the exculpatory 
force of preceding or surrounding circumstances’ is allowed sometimes in 
sentencing. 56  However, their meaning of responsibility here suggests not 
responsibility in its’ strict sense, as described  in Chapter 2 but responsibility as 
punishment at the sentencing stage. The extent to which culture can be 
considered part of these preceding or surrounding circumstances has yet to be 
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explored by the criminal courts in any depth but, as will be seen in Section 3.3 
below the ad hoc approach of the courts to culture in sentencing has resulted in 
some interesting decisions. Of course, Chapter 2 argued that it should indeed be 
a part of the surrounding circumstances. 
To summarise, we have identified the overriding aim of the criminal law as being 
the maintenance of social order and this is achieved in three ways in the criminal 
justice process, ciminalisation (for the purpose of preventing harm), the criminal 
trial (for the purpose of attributing responsibility) and sentencing following findings 
of guilt (for the purpose of punishment, the form of which may too reflect the 
attribution of responsibility). Each one of these purposes is challenged by the 
existence of culture as definitions of harm, disputed in moral philosophy, become 
ever more complex, retribution as a justification for punishment is questioned and 
most importantly we call for the attribution of responsibility to be reconsidered in 
the context of culture.  
Principles, Values and Systemic Factors 
Our criminal law consists of rules, both in statutory form and at common law and 
a number of hidden but underlying principles. Perhaps the fundamental principle 
or standard in western liberal democracies is the Rule of Law. Much has been 
written around the concept and its application but, originally conceived as limit to 
the power of the sovereign, in essence the idea is that the law must be publicly 





certainty.57  In The Rule of Law Bingham neatly identifies and summarizes eight 
principles of governance including (2) questions of legal rights should be resolved 
by the law and not by the exercise of discretion (3) the law should apply equally 
to all except where objective differences justify differentiation.58  Put simply he 
suggests that we always need generality and certainty but perhaps equality 
becomes a more open concept in the reference to ‘objective differences justifying 
differentiation’ and this is encouraging in the context of culture. The culture-
responsibility relationship challenges the Rule of Law and, more broadly, Raz 
recognizes that one of the theoretical challenges of multiculturalism is ‘…how to 
combine the truth of universalism with the truth in particularism.’ 59  Does 
Bingham’s interpretation of the equality requirement of the Rule of Law with its 
‘objective differences’ proviso encompass this recognition or truth of 
particularism? Raz suggests that, deriving from Aristotle, the universal and 
particular can be complementary rather than antagonistic and in a multicultural 
world we are simply asking for ‘a new moral sensibility’.60 This seems to resonate 
with Kahn’s ideas. He argues that the Rule of Law is ‘socio-legal’, it is not ’…a 
matter of revealed truth nor of natural order. It is a way of organizing a society 
under a set of beliefs that are constitutive of the identity of the community and of 
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its individual members’, including of course the multicultural criminal.61 These 
ideas make way for a Rule of Law that is more flexible than perhaps traditionally 
thought. Sarat and Kearns say that ‘law in theory knows no culture and 
recognizes no identity’ but as we saw in Chapter 2 the link between culture and 
law is inescapable and Cotterrell and Rosen are convincing in their arguments as 
to why this is so.62 As Cotterrell states ‘what was once taken for granted as law’s 
uniform cultural foundation, and so did not need generally to be mentioned in 
legal analysis, has now become explicit and problematic.’63  This is perhaps 
narrower than his assertion that law exists in ‘specific times and places’ and that 
therefore for legal scholarship to be realistic ‘…it must be in touch with law’s 
changing socio-political conditions.’ 64  Nonetheless multiculturalism and the 
ensuing cultural mix must be part of this wider socio-political domain. It’s not 
about legal pluralism or individualised justice but about how culture and its 
relationship with legal responsibility can be accommodated within that law. Norrie 
(in arguing that motive is a more just marker in the attribution of responsibility 
than intention) makes a distinction between equality at the guilt stage and equality 
at the sentencing stage. He acknowledges that individual particularity threatens 
equality under the Rule of Law ‘…but the administration of such equality through 
formal legal categories at the conviction stage is so morally inadequate that it can 
only survive on the basis that individuality is allowed in through the back door of 
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mitigation.’65 It is questionable whether there should be a ‘back door’ in a just 
society and if the sentencing stage is the ‘right’ place to accommodate motive 
then this should be made explicit.66 Renteln argues that the equal application of 
the law requires us to focus on the actor as well as the act and the motive as well 
as the intent.67 
When it comes to generality and certainty Wells and Quick refer back to 
McBarnet’s scepticism about the ability of the Rule of Law to generate ‘objective 
determinations’ of law and argue that although the law’s ideology is grounded in 
the Rule of Law its practice cannot necessarily live up to the ideology because 
‘truth’ is arrived at via ‘the power of cultural assumptions’ which shape the 
interpretation of evidence.68 Therefore ‘…law is storytelling’ and outcomes are 
unpredictable as the law deals with ambiguities, distortions and indeterminacies 
in coming to judgments because the criminal law is based in ‘…historical forces 
external to law itself.’69 In this way we can see some space within the laws 
foundations for movement to accommodate a culture-responsibility relationship 
because today’s multicultural era will become tomorrow’s ‘historical force’.  
It would be wrong to consciously move away from a commitment to generality, 
equality and certainty but perhaps these standards can be achieved with careful 
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and creative thought about how to accommodate the culture-responsibility 
relationship  in contemporary criminal law and criminal justice. Returning to the 
three disparate cases discussed in section 1.1, they demonstrate a particularist 
approach but not a considered approach. In fact, in the ‘Pitcairn Case’ the ‘cultural 
critique’ offered by the media was never given as much space in the legal 
arguments.70 They are simply reactive responses to specific phenomena deemed 
‘cultural’. Somehow there is a feeling that ‘justice’ is missing. Dauvergne writes 
of the new understandings that migration may bring to sovereignty and the rule 
of law in globalizing times 71 which reinforces Fitzpatrick’s view that the ‘…law, 
as the rule of law, has to be ever-responsive and indeterminate, capable of 
extending to the infinite variety which constantly confronts it.’72 
There are a number of other principles and values within the criminal law that 
could be explored here. Norrie refers to these as ‘liberal values’ and 
‘requirements’ and includes broad concepts such as accessibility and fairness in 
his list of what these could encompass. 73  Ashworth and Horder call these 
‘aspirations’.74 This is an attractive label that captures the ultimately non-binding 
nature of these principles and values but perhaps undermines their strength. 
Some are particularly relevant to the culture-responsibility relationship and these 
will be examined in turn. In the House of Lords judgment in Woolmington v DPP 
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in 1935 the ‘golden thread’ of English law, the presumption of innocence, was 
clearly established.75 The Woolmington case itself centered around the mens rea 
of a husband who shot and killed his wife although he had only intended to show 
her a gun which he meant to use to kill himself. The act of killing was not in dispute 
but his state of mind was and Lord Sankey made it clear that it is always for the 
prosecution to prove the guilt of the defendant. This is relevant in criminal trials 
where the culture of the defendant may be relevant to mens rea, in the search for 
Lernestedt’s ‘true blameworthiness’ not least because of the moral panics that 
can be associated with the ‘other’. 
Another principle that needs raising is ignorantia legis neminem excusat, 
ignorance of the law is no excuse, because as we saw in section 2.1 it is 
sometimes argued that a defendant should not be responsible because he does 
not know that his actions contravene the criminal law of England and Wales.  
There is no legislative statement to the effect that ignorance of the law is no 
excuse but it comes from Blackstone and is reiterated in common law. 76  
Ashworth and Horder state that the maxim is too strong and indeed there have 
been cases where ignorance of the law has led to a defence in a cultural 
context.77  In R v Bailey 78  and R v Byfield79  defendants in both cases were 
acquitted on charges of having sexual intercourse with girls under the age of 16 
because it was ‘normal’ for such relations to take place in the cultures from which 
they came and they had not had time to become acculturated. In Alhaji 
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Mohammed v Knott 80  the Court of Appeal revoked a care order (in care 
proceedings following the marriage of a 13 year old Nigerian girl to a 26 year old 
Nigerian man) on the basis that what would be repugnant to an English girl was 
‘entirely natural’ for a Nigerian girl. Rattansi dismisses these instances as 
‘…evidence of a culturally relativist tendency in court judgments in the UK in the 
1960’s and 1970’s’ but states that the tide has turned against ‘…such 
irresponsible cultural relativism.’ 81  Renteln’s ‘cognitive case’ (discussed in 
section 2.4) completely disregards the principle and the defendants sought to rely 
on ignorance of the law in the ‘Pitcairn Case’ where there was a suggestion that 
they did not understand the meaning of ‘sexual offences’ under the 1956 Sexual 
Offences Act and there were arguments as to whether the Act had been 
adequately promulgated on the island.82 Austin states that the principle is ‘an 
assertion without normative force’83 and that makes the way for Husak and Von 
Hirsch to argue that the courts should be allowed to assess ‘…the moral 
legitimacy of the defendant’s belief in ignorance’.84 However, this is qualified so 
that the courts should not make this allowance in cases where the defendant 
knows his conduct is injurious. This raises the idea that knowledge of the criminal 
law is part of the mens rea but Gardner makes a distinction between a defendant 
knowing what the law is and being able to  find out.85 Ashworth, in a later article, 
takes a liberal view in finding the doctrine not only unsustainable but 
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‘preposterous’. 86  There is thus uncertainty about its standing and we have 
reached a stage where clear guidance from the courts would be extremely helpful 
in the ongoing development of the culture-responsibility relationship. There is 
scope here for clarity in the arena of multicultural policy where we can question 
the relationship between knowledge (or deemed knowledge) of the law and 
multicultural rights such as citizenship.  
This brings us to the ongoing conflict between objectivism and subjectivism in 
criminal law. The actus reus of each specific offence is a precondition for criminal 
liability. Generally speaking, other than where causation is in question, it is a 
concept that attracts little controversy. But, to satisfy the demands of a retributivist 
approach to criminal justice, offences need a mens rea to establish fault and in 
turn liability (and to satisfy the correspondence principle the actus reus and the 
mens rea must coincide in time). The criminal law relies on common law 
definitions of states of mind such as intentionally, recklessly, maliciously, willfully, 
fraudulently, dishonestly and knowingly and thus subjectivity enters the law as 
courts try to establish what was in a particular defendant’s mind. (It should be 
noted here that the criminal law of England and Wales does not consider motive 
in establishing the fault element).87 Yet objectivity informs that subjectivity as 
legal standards are laid down, usually at common law, to help the courts 
determine whether or not these states of mind existed at the time of the offence. 
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The test for oblique intention, for example, asks if an outcome was (objectively) 
virtually certain and if the defendant (subjectively) appreciated that and the test 
for recklessness asks if a defendant (subjectively) foresaw a risk but took it 
anyway when to do so was unreasonable (objective) in circumstances known to 
him (subjective).88 This seems to verify what Ashworth and Horder identify as a 
‘loosening and tightening’ in the objective/subjective.89 But they also argue that 
the courts are fearful of subjectivism as they seek not to lower standards, 
something that has perhaps been seen recently in the reworking of the definition 
of dishonesty where the second (subjective) limb of the Ghosh Test was removed 
by the decision in Ivey.90 Wells and Quick argue that ‘…the tribunal is effectively 
constructing the standard against which the defendant is judged: the legal 
process goes on to legitimize that standard as objective and neutral’.91 Broadly, 
a more subjective approach makes more room for culture; a more objective 
approach limits its potential ambit. This is illustrated well in the loss of control 
defence (discussed in detail in section 3.3 below) with S54 (1)(c) of the Coroners 
and Justice Act 2009 providing that where there is a loss of control (a question of 
fact but established subjectively) the defence may be relied upon when ‘…a 
person of the defendant’s sex and age with a normal degree of tolerance and 
self-restraint in the circumstances of the defendant might have acted in the same 
way.’ There is a ‘subjective’ leeway in the words ‘in the circumstances of the 
defendant’. Can the words be stretched to include the defendant’s cultural 
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circumstances? This has not been tested since the new loss of control defence 
became law. 
In looking at the purpose of the criminal law earlier in this section the prevention 
of harm was identified as one of three purposes leading to the overall aim of 
maintaining social order. In practical terms harm is prevented through the 
criminalisation of harmful behaviours. The harm principle thus informs the limits 
of criminalisation. Generally we follow a principle of minimum criminalisation and 
although we saw earlier the emphasis in liberal thinking on individual autonomy 
in decisions around criminalisation, that is balanced against welfare concerns so 
that collective goals are considered too in the criminalisation process. Matravers 
argues that ‘…a liberal state in circumstances of pluralism ought not to 
criminalise- or ought otherwise to leave space for- (at least some) practices that 
‘belong’ (in some sense or other) to the various cultures and conceptions of the 
good of its citizens.’92 Yet we will see in section 3.3, for example the hasty and 
ineffectual criminalisation of forced marriage, despite the well documented 
suggestions from those from within affected communities to tackle the issue 
through alternatives to criminalisation. 
Of the relevant systemic factors to be considered, there is the role of the judge. 
There has long been debate about whether judges make or interpret law. In the 
21st Pilgrim Fathers Lecture Lady Hallet looks back to Sir Francis Bacon who 
ascribed to judges the minimalist role of simply deciding the law (his views were 
in opposition to those of Sir Edward Coke who stated, in Bonham’s case in 1610 
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that judges can override parliament and thus make law). 93  Thus there is 
adherence to ‘declaratory theory’ with the role of the judge confined to the 
interpretation and application of laws rather than their creation.94 In accordance 
with Montesquieu’s doctrine of the separation of powers the judiciary must be 
independent and the role of the judge is to interpret the law fairly and to apply it 
impartially. 95  However, says Freeman, this is a ‘hollow pretence’ because 
‘…judges cannot divorce themselves from the pattern of values which is implicit 
in the society or group to which they belong and no amount of consciously applied 
impartiality or judicial lack of passion will succeed in eliminating the influence of 
factors of this kind.’96  
Webber affirms this in recognising a ‘decline of legal positivism and recognition 
of normative pluralism in judicial decision making’97 but it is questionable as to 
whether such ‘normative pluralism’ exists in reality and indeed whether it reflects 
our multicultural world. Shabani sees instead a ‘normative model of integrative 
adjudication.’98 This means perhaps a move away from the judge who is bound 
by the constitution, legislation and precedent towards decision making based on 
society’s norms. Shabani summarises this as being  ‘…essentially a process of 
social hermeneutics, grounded in the relationship between  moral theories and 
experience in which judges should strive for a synthesis of the contending moral 
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Harold Samuel Stone (tr), Cambridge University Press 1989).  
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considerations.’99 Both Webber and Shabani recognise that this leaves room for 
contention and that judicial outcomes may therefore be ‘provisional’ but the idea 
is that this way forward avoids claims of bias and arbitrariness. Webber asks the 
question ‘…how can one legitimately insist upon common standards? How can 
one establish a normative order, in a society marked by radical disagreement, on 
what those standards should be?’100 He says that judges can merely make an 
‘appropriate response’ because it is not possible to identify ‘…a fully agreed set 
of values from which to deduce all necessary judgments’ and this means that 
there will always be disagreement.101 Is what Webber is suggesting a radical 
rethinking of judicial decision making or  is it what happens anyway, in reality, 
without such practices being acknowledged?. The analysis in section 3.3 below 
suggests the latter. Surprisingly, there has been some guidance on questions of 
culture and race, albeit from the Employment Appeal Tribunal. In Bradford 
Hospitals NHS Trust v W Al-Shabib Judge Reid QC said: 
‘Whilst it may sometimes be legitimate for a tribunal to take into account 
differences in behaviour which reflect racial and cultural differences [there 
must be]…some evidential basis for them, frequently in the form of expert 
evidence. For a tribunal to assume that a particular ethnic group has a 
specific characteristic for example, that they are given to use emotive 
language is fundamentally wrong, even if the assumption is made for 
benign purposes.’102 
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This is constructive in its oblique reference to the unacceptability of essentializing 
and important in legitimising the recognition of racial or cultural differences as an 
explanation for differences in behaviour. In 2013 the President of the Family 
Division gave guidance about how the judge should approach the ‘enormous 
challenges’ of our largely secular and religiously pluralistic society. Munby LJ 
advised that it is not for the judge to weigh one religion against another and that 
all are entitled to equal respect but he qualified this by saying that this is so where 
religions are ‘legally and socially acceptable’ and not ‘immoral or socially 
obnoxious’ or ‘pernicious’. However, he acknowledged that there is no ‘bright line’ 
to demarcate the limits of the reach of the secular law.103 The obvious question 
arises. Why are the judges of the criminal courts not addressing these issues? 
Lacey states that ‘…working out- as a matter of social science as much as legal 
philosophy- the appropriate balance between fairness to individually situated 
defendants and the goals of contemporary criminal law remains one of its most 
urgent challenges.’104  In this section we have looked at the purpose of the 
criminal law and at those principles, values and systemic factors that provide the 
law with its strength and foundations. In addition to the challenging questions that 
the culture-responsibility raises for traditional ideas around the purpose of the 
criminal law, the Rule of Law is pushed to its limits by the culture-responsibility 
relationship and the objective/subjective boundaries are pushed much further 
towards the subjective than perhaps feels comfortable. But with the political will, 
there is space for accommodation. Although we identified the endemic cultural 
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104 Lacey, N. (2014) ‘Community, Culture and Criminalisation’ Chapter 3 in Kymlicka, W., 
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bias of the judiciary in section 2.4 this is not necessarily a barrier to allowing the 
culture-responsibility relationship into the judicial consciousness and as the 
review of the Judiciary in section 3.4 shows the Judicial College seem to be 
ahead of the game in policy terms as evidenced in the provisions of the Equal 
Treatment Bench Book.105 The next step is to thematically search the criminal 
law (section 3.3) and the criminal justice system (section 3.4) for evidence of the 
presence of and engagement with culture in general and the culture-responsibility 
relationship in particular. 
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3.3 The Criminal Law 
In this section traditional defences, cultural offences, decided cases and 
sentencing decisions and sentencing law will be thematically examined as we 
seek to understand how the substantive criminal law has engaged with culture.  
Traditional Defences 
Whilst the theoretical rational for the existence of defences in criminal law is 
disputed, broadly speaking, defences emerge from the denial of responsibility.106 
Traditionally defences have been divided into justifications and excuses but 
Clarkson and Keating recognise an additional category of ‘exemptions’. 107 
Ashworth and Horder adopt the division between the defendant who did not have 
the capacity to choose the course of action taken so that he can deny his 
responsibility for the crime of which he is accused (relying on infancy, insanity, 
automatism) and the defendant with capacity to choose who was a responsible 
moral agent and should be judged ‘…according to the standard of what we ought 
reasonably to expect of a person in that situation.’108 In this latter case defendants 
are accepting responsibility but ‘claiming an excuse on the ground that their 
response to a testing situation lived up to expectations in a normative sense.’109 
Culture therefore could be relevant to excuse where there is an argument that 
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Moore in Chapter 5 ‘Individualising Blame’. Norrie, Punishment, Responsibility, and Justice (n 
44). 
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capacity is reduced by culture or to justification where the defendant has still lived 
up to (perhaps culturally different) ‘normative expectations’. We do need to 
question the basis upon which those expectations are normative because, as 
seen in section 2.4, we need to be able to be answerable to claims of 
individualised justice. As Black points out, ‘…acknowledging that something in an 
accused’s cultural background might justify an acquittal for otherwise criminal 
behaviour seems to be a step down the path to individualised justice which 
corrupts the equal protection that should be offered by the criminal law. In short, 
it threatens anarchy.’ 110 
How far can traditional defences in the criminal law of England and Wales be 
adapted to embrace the defendant who lacks capacity due to his culture or who 
has acted according to a morally different normative expectation? A few writers 
have addressed this question directly. Golding asks how the ‘cultural defence’ fits 
into the standard scheme of justifications and excuses.111 As discussed above, 
broadly, accommodation of the multicultural criminal within the traditional criminal 
law defences lies in the subjectivity or objectivity of each individual  defence. 
Taking loss of control, diminished responsibility and insanity as examples, 
because they are perhaps the most likely defences to interact with the concept of 
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culture we can consider how far they can accommodate the culture-responsibility 
relationship.112 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolished the old defence of provocation and 
replaced it with the defence of loss of control, a partial defence to murder that 
reduces a murder conviction to one of voluntary manslaughter. There must now 
be a subjective loss of control caused by a ‘qualifying trigger’ and a requirement 
that ‘…a person of the defendant’s age and sex with a normal degree of tolerance 
and self-restraint and in the circumstances of the defendant might have reacted 
in the same way’.113 In the law on loss of control it is possible to see some 
evidence of direct engagement with culture. In fact, Dick argues that provocation 
was originally a ‘cultural defence’, based on cultural norms about women as 
property and ‘honourable’ reactions to adultery.114  S 55(6) of the Act excludes a 
‘considered desire for revenge’ as a qualifying trigger. The Law Commission 
Report that led to the reform of the law expressly considered honour killings and 
in paragraph 5.25 stated that such killings were ‘likely’ to include a strong motive 
for revenge. 115  Furthermore, in 2009 the Ministry of Justice published its 
response to the reform proposals and in paragraph 56 stated that ‘Honour Killing 
cases will not satisfy the requirement that circumstances were of an extremely 
grave character and caused a justifiable sense of being wronged’. 116  It is 
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114 Caroline Dick, ‘A Tale of Two Cultures: Intimate Femicide, Cultural Defences, and the Law of 
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encouraging that both the Law Commission and The Ministry of Justice gave 
thought to these cultural issues.  
Dogan questions whether the 2009 Act is flawed in assuming that all ‘honour’ 
killings are based on a desire for revenge and identifies three different types of 
‘honour’ killing with only the third, labelled as ‘cultural’, being qualitatively different 
from other kinds of murder.117 As will be seen below, courts in England and Wales 
are generally reluctant to accept cultural evidence in murder cases and it seems 
that ‘honour’ is not raised by the defence but rather by the prosecution. However, 
Phillips looks at four cases involving ‘honour’ killing and finds that culture was 
relevant to provocation in one case when it was introduced as a defence at re-
trial and the Court of Appeal found that victim’s illicit affair ‘…would be deeply 
offensive to someone with your background and religious beliefs.’118 The new 
loss of control defence has not been tested in the context of a culturally motivated 
murder or more specifically an ‘honour’ killing.119 Whilst the 2009 Act is clear that 
sexual infidelity is excluded as a qualifying trigger for the purpose of establishing 
loss of control the Court of Appeal took a grey line in allowing appeals from men 
convicted of the murder of unfaithful wives who had had not been able to rely on 
the loss of control defence at trial.120 Now where sexual infidelity is ‘…integral to 
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and forms part of the essential part of the context in which to make a just 
evaluation whether a qualifying trigger properly falls within the ambit of 
subsection 55 (3) and (4) the prohibition does not operate to exclude it’.121 This 
judicial widening of what counts as the qualifying trigger may in time have 
implications for ‘honour’ killing cases. 
More generally it is interesting to trace the development of provocation in case 
law. Prior to 1957 provocation was a common law defence, a ‘concession to 
human frailty’ but based on the objective reasonable man.122 In R v Lesbini the 
court ruled that no account should be taken of an anti-Semitic slur which provoked 
the defendant but would not provoke an ordinary man who was not Jewish.123  
Section 3 of the Homicide Act 1957 required two elements for a defendant to rely 
on the defence of provocation. Subjectively, the court had to be satisfied that he 
had been provoked into losing self-control. Objectively, the court needed to 
evaluate whether the provocation was enough to make a reasonable man do as 
he did taking into account everything said and done and the effect it would have 
on a reasonable man.  Lord Diplock defined a reasonable man in DPP v Camplin 
as ‘…an ordinary person of either sex, not exceptionally excitable or pugnacious, 
but possessed of such powers of self-control as everyone is entitled to expect 
that his fellow citizens will exercise in society as it is today.’124 The Privy Council 
decision in the 1997 case of Luc Thiet Thuan v R reaffirmed this objective 
standard but qualified it in allowing the personal characteristics of age and sex to 
be taken into account in assessing the ‘reasonable man’.125 This case is directly 
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relevant to the culture-responsibility relationship because the defendant was a 
Chinese man who claimed, unsuccessfully, that his girlfriend’s mocking his 
sexual ability was more insulting to a man from his culture making his loss of 
temper reasonable. The departure from this objective standard in R v Morgan 
Smith which ‘…involved a significant relaxation of the uniform, objective standard 
adopted by Parliament [in S3 Homicide Act 1957]’ in stating that the defence of 
provocation should be interpreted with ‘…sufficient sensitivity to individual 
difference to individual defendants’  was judged as erroneous in AG for Jersey v 
Holley and the latter case placed objectivity  firmly back in the legal framework.126  
If the legislature intended an objective test in S54(1) (c) of the 2009 Act and the 
courts are committed to developing that objectivity is there room for the culture-
responsibility relationship within the traditional defence of loss of control? Do the 
words ‘in the circumstances of the defendant’ allow for an element of subjectivity? 
The Clinton decision might suggest so with the black and white prohibition on 
sexual infidelity as a qualifying trigger in S55(6)(c) being given a grey 
interpretation but the analysis of decided cases in section 3.3 suggests 
differently.  Gardner is insightful here for he recognized in the Smith decision the 
implications for ‘todays cosmopolitan social conditions’ where ‘…an increasingly 
mobile populace creates an increasingly fragmented social and cultural space 
with a corresponding fragmentation of standards that are expected of people and 
regarded as proper.’127  Gardner identifies ‘enough pluralistic space’128  in the 
                                                        
126 R v Smith (Morgan) [2001] 1 AC 146. 
AG for Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23 [22] (Lord Nicholls). 
 
127 John Gardner, Offences and Defences  (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2007) Chapter 8 
‘Provocation and Pluralism’. 





defence of provocation even though he was writing after the Holley decision. The 
decision in R v Shabir Hussain, however, is anomalous in that Hussain was able 
to rely on the defence of provocation at re-trial after running over his sister in law 
whilst she was waiting for her partner on the grounds, as stated by Phillips above, 
that the affair was offensive to someone of his ‘background and beliefs’. 129 
Perhaps the absence of the word ‘culture’ is significant.  
Diminished responsibility is also a partial defence to murder. The defendant must 
be suffering from an abnormality of mental functioning caused by a recognized 
medical condition and that recognized medical condition must be listed in the 
latest American Psychiatric Association’s Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of 
Mental Disorders (‘DSM’).130 Diminished responsibility was raised as a defence 
in two ‘honour’ killing cases in 2014. In R v Ahmed al-Khahib the defendant 
claimed that the djinn (a demonic spirit in Islamic folklore) had commanded him 
to bury his wife and in R v Jahangir Nazir the defendant sought to rely on severe 
depression as a recognized medical condition in establishing diminished 
responsibility. The defence was rejected in both cases.131  
                                                        
129 R v Shabir Hussain [1997] EWCA Crim 24 Hussain was convicted of the murder of his sister 
in law in 1995, a crime he denied. He appealed against conviction on the grounds of false 
identification and introduced the defence of provocation at retrial. The judge at retrial 
acknowledged that the sister in law’s affair ‘…would be deeply offensive to someone with your 
background and your religious beliefs’ and stated that ‘…something blew up in your head that 
caused you a complete and sudden loss of self-control’. His original life sentence was reduced to 
6 ½ years. 
130 S2 Homicide Act 1957 as amended by Coroners and Justice Act 2009. 
This is the latest edition-American Psychiatric Association (2013) Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual of Mental Disorders (5th ed.) Arlington, VA: American Psychiatric Publishing.  
131 R v Mohammed al- Khahib Manchester Crown Court 2014 
R v Jahangir Nazir Manchester Crown Court 2014 
Diminished responsibility was also rejected as a defence in an earlier ‘honour’ killing case and 
although the defendant went on to appeal against conviction this was on the basis of a wrongful 





At first there seem to be fewer cultural implications for the defence of insanity. 
The law on insanity in England and Wales still comes from The 1843 M’Naghten 
Rules. The defence requires that the defendant is suffering from a defect of 
reason caused by a disease of the mind. Unlike the defence of diminished 
responsibility it does not rely on medical reference tools. The insanity defence 
has always worked on common sense understandings of what ‘insane’ may look 
like. In a 2013 paper the Law Commission proposed an alternative to insanity ‘not 
criminally responsible by reason of a recognised medical condition’. 132 
Interestingly (and in contrast to their earlier recommendation on reform to the law 
on diminished responsibility) they specified that ‘recognised medical condition’ is 
a term of art to be interpreted by the court and not related to diagnostic materials. 
This is because it is (and always has been) a question of mens rea with insanity 
needing a complete lack of capacity to be successfully pleaded. 
Davis argues for recognition of ‘cultural insanity’ where a defendant may not be 
insane within legal definitions but insanity should be available as a proxy for a 
‘cultural defence’ simply because a defendant lacks mens rea. 133  This is 
controversial, akin to Renteln’s ‘volitional case’ where the defendant was 
compelled to act according to culture.  More helpful however is Davis’s knowledge 
of the  DSM and how this has adapted to take account of cultural influences in 
mental health.134  Extending these developments to law she argues that the DSM 
could provide courts with helpful guidelines for contextualizing cultural issues in 
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psychiatric diagnoses. In fact DSM V includes cultural criteria for the diagnosis of 
mental disorders (although it carries a warning about its use in forensic settings)  
and reflects the American Psychiatric Association’s effort to improve treatment of 
cultural issues in diagnosis. It now recognizes ‘cultural concepts of distress’.135 
Prior to this DSM IV recognized ‘culture bound syndrome’ 136  and Parzen 
comments that claiming this would be likely to lead to insanity at the time of the 
act and therefore a defence.137  
We can see that culture has gained a foothold in the consciousness of law makers 
and there is theoretical scope within these traditional defences to accommodate 
culture but as the next sections show there seems to be an embedded reluctance 
to admit culture to the practice and policy of  the criminal law.
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Theories of criminalisation and the limits of the criminal law relate back to 
questions raised earlier in this chapter firstly about the purpose of the criminal 
law and secondly about the laws’ principles and values. We need to review the 
recent creation of ‘cultural offences’  in order to achieve a full understanding of 
the approach of the criminal law to responsibility and culture. As seen above the 
‘harm principle’ forms the basis for decisions to criminalise behaviour as 
legislatures decide what amounts to harm and arguably wrongdoing but Ashworth 
and Horder remind us that ‘…the frontiers of criminal liability are not given but are 
historically and politically contingent’.1 In other words, notions of harm are fluid 
and the criminal law responds accordingly. This is of course evident where ‘harm’ 
takes on a cultural or multicultural dimension. Early legislative approaches to 
different cultures were based on a ‘rule and exemption’ approach, for example 
the Criminal Justice Act 1988 prohibits the carrying of knives and other dangerous 
weapons but exempts knives carried for ‘religious purposes’.2 These exemptions 
are grounded in the idea of group rights. More recently we have seen the creation 
of ‘cultural offences’ a phenomenon that contributes to what Duff has identified 
as a ‘crisis of criminalisation’ where behaviour outside the normative values of 
the majority is made criminal and where we need to assess the value judgments 
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behind criminalisation.3 Van Broeck is one of the few writers to focus on the idea 
of the ‘cultural offence’.4 His suggested definition is  
‘…an act by a member of a minority culture which is considered an offence 
by the legal system of the dominant culture. That same act is nevertheless, 
within the cultural group of the offender, condoned, accepted as normal 
behaviour and approved or even endorsed and promoted in the given 
situation.’5  
Van Broeck is looking to establish a ‘cultural offence’ in individual cases, firstly 
by asking if the defendant was subjectively motivated by culture, secondly 
through objectifying this by asking if members of the defendant’s cultural group 
agree and thirdly by comparing the defendant’s culture with the dominant culture 
to reach a decision on whether a ‘cultural offence’ has been committed. Perhaps 
it is a testament to our beginning to think in a different way but Van Broeck’s 
definition can no longer be workable. Yes, the focus of Van Broeck’s ‘cultural 
offence’ is on the individual but we have moved away from the idea of an offender 
belonging to a ‘minority culture’ (although there is a whole criminological literature 
on deviance within different cultures and sub-cultures, beyond the scope of this 
thesis) and beyond the understanding of cultures, minority and dominant, as 
bounded. 
In recent years two high profile ‘cultural offences’ have emerged in legislation. 
Female circumcision, now more commonly referred to as Female Genital 
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Mutilation (FGM), could historically have been dealt with using the catch all tools 
of the criminal law, notably the Offences Against the Person Act, or managed as 
a safeguarding issue under the Children Act 1989.  It  was made a specific 
criminal offence by the Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985.6 The later 
Female Genital Mutilation Act 2003 made the offence more serious in increasing 
the maximum sentence from 5 to 14 years as the rhetoric surrounding the offence 
changed with the move from ‘circumcision’ to ‘mutilation’, something Bibbings 
recognizes as ‘value loaded’  because the latter word conveys a disgust not 
inherent in ‘circumcision’. 7  Recent research from Equality Now and City 
University reports that 103,000 women who had undergone FGM  were living in 
England and Wales in 2011, with the implication that their own daughters 
(144,000 girls born to these mothers between 1996 and 2011) are in turn at risk 
of being subjected to FGM.8 FGM has recently received prominence following the 
‘Girl Summit’ which took place in the UK in June 2014 and where there were 
consensus resolutions on forced marriage and FGM.9 For many years there was 
only one prosecution in England and Wales for offences relating to FGM and the 
defendant, Dr Dhanuson Dharmasena was acquitted on 4th February 2015, 
leading to support groups questioning why the law is ineffective.10 New provisions 
(with support of the Royal College of Nursing and the British Medical Association) 
                                                        
6 Prohibition of Female Circumcision Act 1985. Section 1 made it an offence (a) to excise, 
infibulate or otherwise mutilate the whole or any part of the labia majora or labia minora or 
clitoris of another person; or (b) to aid, abet, counsel or procure the performance by another 
person of any of those acts on that other person’s own body. The Act has now been replaced by 
the 2003 Female Genital Mutilation Act. 
7 L Bibbings, ‘Female Circumcision: Mutilation or Modification’ in Jo Bridgeman and Susan 
Millns (eds) Law and Body Politics: Regulating the Female Body (Dartmouth 1995) 151. 
8 <https://www.city.ac.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0004/282388/FGM-statistics-final-report-21-07-
15-released-text.pdf> accessed 18th June 2018. 
9 This was part of the 2014 Foreign and Commonwealth Office Human Rights and Democracy 
Report which related largely to the 800 year anniversary of the signing of the Magna Carta and 
aimed to show that the principles embodied there, equality before the law and the accountability 
that comes from that, are still alive today. 





have now been added to strengthen the 2003 Act. The law now provides for extra 
territorial liability, lifelong victim anonymity and parent/guardian liability for failure 
to protect a child from FGM.11  A case against a Bristol father accused of allowing 
his 6 year old daughter to undergo FGM collapsed in February 2018 after the 
Crown Court judge ordered the jury to acquit because of a lack of evidence. 12 
The 2003 Act was further amended in 2015 by the addition of the availability of 
an FGM Protection Order. National Statistics from the Family Court state that 
since July 2015 233 applications for FGM Protection Orders were made with 220 
orders being granted and for the period January to March 2018 15 applications 
for orders were made.13 Perhaps it is too soon to conclude that the civil system 
provides more effective protection for girls (and thus prevents more harm) than 
the criminal justice system. Whilst the numbers of FGM Protection Orders issued 
is encouraging, the caution of the criminal justice system in proactively engaging 
with FGM prosecutions is arguably echoed in the civil system. The ruling of the  
                                                        
11 The new law is found in sections 70-75 of the Serious Crime Act 2015 and came into force 3rd 
May 2015. The background to the passing of the new law is as follows- 
• House of Commons Home Affairs Committee. Female Genital Mutilation: The Case for 
National Action Plan- Second Report of 2014-15 Session 3rd July 2014 
<https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201415/cmselect/cmhaff/201/201.pdf> accessed 1st 
September 2018. 
• Government Response published 9 December 2014 CM8979 
<https://www.parliament.uk/documents/commons-committees/home-affairs/Govt-Response-
FGM-abuse-unchecked.pdf> accessed 1st September 2018. 
• Follow up Report 14 March 2015 
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/home-
affairs-committee/inquiries/parliament-2010/female-genital-mutilation-follow-up/> 
accessed 1st September 2018. 
12 12 Reported in the Guardian (23rd February 2018) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/society/2018/feb/23/uk-fgm-trial-father-failed-case-intolerable-
pressure> accessed 18th June 2018. 
13 Ministry of Justice, Family Court Statistics Quarterly, England and  
Wales, January to March 2018 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data







judge in  London Borough of Barnet v MFABCD (by their Guardian) as to whether 
or not child A (who was living with foster parents under an interim care order) had 
undergone FGM was based on three days of evidence from, among others, 2 
social  workers, pediatricians with expertise in FGM, psychologists, school 
workers and a child protection officer. The ruling ran to 19 pages and the judge 
finally decided at paragraph 139 that A had undergone a procedure to her 
genitalia, likely to be Type IV FGM but that ‘…there is no evidence to suggest 
that A is at risk of suffering a further procedure of FGM.’ 14  FGM is high on the 
political agenda with a further Select Committee Report published in September 
2016 and a governmental response published in December 2016 in which the 
government reinforced its commitment to eradicate FGM.15 The law, both criminal 
and civil needs to live up to the political rhetoric. 
If the dominant political and legal discourse tells us that FGM lies somewhere on 
a scale from distasteful to abhorrent we may be reluctant to entertain alternative 
social constructions surrounding it. Bibbings asks whether FGM is mutilation or 
modification and argues that it is no ‘worse’ than other forms of cosmetic surgery, 
which western women may appear to have autonomy in choosing. However, she 
questions that autonomy as being compromised as a result of false 
consciousness.16 She is of course overlooking the issue of ‘whose autonomy?’ 
bearing in mind that FGM is often a procedure chosen by women for their infant 
daughters. American cultural anthropologist Schweder uses the word ‘alteration’ 
rather than mutilation and presents findings from a number of ethnographic 
                                                        
14 London Borough of Barnet v MFABCD (by their Guardian) 2016 WL 07840583 [140]. 
15 Female Genital Mutilation: Abuse Unchecked (CMND 9375) The Government Response to 
the Ninth Report From the Home Affairs Select Committee Session 2016-17 HC 390. 
16 L  Bibbings, ‘Female Circumcision: Modification or Mutilation’ in Jo Bridgeman and Susan 





studies that view FGM as a positive coming of age experience in the 
psychological, spiritual, social and physical sense. He counteracts both the 
feminist objection to FGM (pointing out that ritual ‘alteration’ is also carried out on 
males) and the allegations of patriarchy (on the basis that FGM is usually upheld 
within the matriarchy). He claims that health risks have been exaggerated and 
are empirically unsubstantiated and that there are no grounds for imposing 
Western aesthetic norms on communities.17 But like Bibbings he gives little time 
to the issue of the autonomy of the young. Few Western multiculturalists are 
swayed by these arguments, for example Parekh whose firm and unequivocal 
rejection of female circumcision also displays his commitment to universalism 
rather than cultural relativism.18  
Despite the availability of a court order preventing the marriage of those at risk of 
being forced to marry under the Forced Marriage (Civil Protection) Act 2007 the 
conservative government made the decision to criminalise forced marriage in 
June 2012. Sections 120 (which creates the offence of breaching a forced 
marriage protection order (FMPO)) and 121 (which creates the offence of forcing 
someone to marry) of the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 
came into force on 16th June 2014. On 10th June 2015 the first (and only) 
conviction for the offence of forcing someone to marry under S121 was secured.19 
Statistics released on 16thth March 2018 revealed that during 2017 the Forced 
Marriage Protection Unit gave advice or support in 1196 cases (a decrease of 
                                                        
17 Schweder, R. ‘What About FGM? And Why Understanding Culture Matters in the First Place’ 
Chapter 11 in Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal 
Democracies eds Schweder, R., Minow, M. and Markus, H. (New York, Russel Sage 
Foundation 2002). 
18 Bhikhu Parekh, Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 2000) 50. 
19 The unreported case was heard at Cardiff Crown Court and received widespread media 





19% on 2016 figures of 1428 although that does not necessarily reflect a 
decrease in the prevalence of forced marriage).20 Between January and March 
2018 there were 58 applications for forced marriage protection orders with 55 
granted.21 On 3rd May 2016 MP for Bradford West Naz Shah put  a written 
question to the Attorney General asking how many prosecutions there were for 
forced marriage in 2014 and 2015.22 The Attorney General’s written answer of 
10th May 2016 is reproduced in full below.23 Despite the initial figures indicating 
45 or 46 prosecutions annually for offences ‘associated with forced marriage’ the 
statement does not give the number of convictions. A recently published protocol 
between the CPS and NCCP24 on ‘honour’ based violence/abuse and forced 
marriage gives prosecution figures for 2015/16 and shows that there were 90 
cases referred from the police to the CPS and ‘flagged’ with 53 prosecuted, 32 of 
those successfully (60.4%). This compares with 5 prosecutions under S121 
(perhaps more truthfully stated the prosecution of 5 defendants in 2 cases) which 
were unsuccessful due to the victims withdrawing support. These are interesting 
                                                        
20Foreign & Commonwealth Office, Forced Marriage Unit Statistics 2017 (16 March 2018)  
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/730155/2017_FMU_statistics_FINAL.pdf> 
accessed 1st September 2018. 
21Ministry of Justice, Family Court Statistics Quarterly, England and Wales, January to March 
2018 (28 June 2018) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/720100/FCSQ_January_to_March_2018.pdf> accessed 1st September 2018. 
 
22 Parliamentary written question number 36316 
<https://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-
statements/written-question/Commons/2016-05-03/36316/> 
accessed 1st September 2018. 
23 The Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) collects information to show the number of defendants 
prosecuted for offences relating to forced marriages identified by way of a monitoring flag 
applied to the case record.  The flag is applied where any offence of threatening behaviour, 
violence or abuse has been carried out in the context of a forced marriage. During the financial 
year 2014-15 the CPS prosecuted 45 defendants in England and 46 defendants nationally 
(England and Wales) for offences associated with forced marriage. 
24 (14th December 2016) <https://news.npcc.police.uk/releases/crown-prosecution-service-and-






numbers. A long line of governmental reports considering the forced marriage 
issue documents both the shift in the situating of forced marriage from the 
violence against women paradigm (under early labour government responses) to 
the cultural paradigm (under the later coalition government) and the shift from the 
belief that criminalisation would not be helpful (in 2000, 2005, 2008) through to 
criminalizing breaches of the FMPO (2011) to the announcement on 8th June 
2012 that ‘…there were strong arguments both for and against the creation of a 
new offence, however, listening carefully to all views we have decided to make 
forcing someone to marry a criminal offence.’25 Had the government listened 
carefully to ‘all views’? Support for this criminalisation was by no means universal 
with independent research by Gill casting doubt on the validity of the claim in the 
government’s 2011 eConsultation that 54% of those consulted were in favour of 
the offence of forcing someone to marry.26 Does the failure of S121 add weight 
to the argument that creating and attempting to prosecute ‘cultural offences’ just 
does not work? Those most affected by forced marriage had a different view 
which points strongly to the fact that we need dialogue. 
Honour Based Violence (HBV) is not a crime in its own right but prosecuted under 
the general provisions of the criminal law, notably murder for ‘honour’ killings and 
the Offences Against the Person Act 1861 for offences that do not lead to killing. 
It is arguable that the new law on coercion and control could be used to prosecute 
HBV cases where the ‘violence’ is less obviously physical and more 
                                                        
25 These documents are: 
Downing Street Press Release (8th June 2012) 
<https://news/forced-marriage-to-become-criminal-offence> accessed online 1st May 2018. 
26 Aisha K Gill, ‘Forced Marriage Legislation Survey: Report Findings, University of 





psychological or emotional.27 Despite the lack of a specific offence of committing 
HBV there is a government commitment to ending ‘so called HBV’ or ‘honour 
based abuse’. 28  In 2017 MP Nusrat Ghani introduced a private members bill in 
the House of Commons, the Crime (Aggravated Murder of and Violence Against 
Women) Bill 2017. After the First Reading (31st January 2017) the Second 
Reading was set for 24th March 2017 but the Bill was withdrawn. The concept of 
aggravated murder was always going to be problematic but the Bill was far 
reaching in its ideas including the prosecution for aggravated murder and 
aggravated domestic violence in cases involving ‘honour’ and the power to bring 
prosecutions where alleged crimes have taken place outside the jurisdiction 
(consistent with recent forced marriage and FGM legislation). 29  The Welsh 
Assembly have taken a broader approach to the problem of HBV with the passing 
of the Violence Against Women Domestic Abuse and Sexual Violence (Wales) 
Act 2015 on 10th March 2015 which requires the production of local and national 
strategies for tackling gender based violence, domestic abuse and sexual 
violence. In notes to the Act ‘honour based violence’ is specifically listed as a 
form of gender based violence.30 Interestingly this legislation is ahead of its 
                                                        
27 S76 Serious Crime Act 2015 which states that a person is guilty of an offence if he repeatedly 
or continuously engages in coercive or controlling behaviour towards another who is personally 
connected and he knows or ought to know that that behaviour will have a serious effect on the 
other. Coercive or controlling behaviour is not defined in the statute but the government 
published guidelines as to what constitutes coercive control in September 2012 
Home Office, Statutory Guidance Framework: Controlling or Coercive Behaviour in an Intimate 
or Family Relationship (5 December 2015) 
<<https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/statutory-guidance-framework-controlling-or-
coercive-behaviour-in-an-intimate-or-family-relationship> accessed 28th September 2018. 
28 HM Government, Ending Violence Against Women and Girls (VAWG) Strategy 2016-2020 
(March 2016) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/522166/VAWG_Strategy_FINAL_PUBLICATION_MASTER_vRB.PDF> accessed 1st 
September 2018. 
29<https://services.parliament.uk/bills/201617/crimeaggravatedmurderofandviolenceagainstwom
en.html> accessed 1st September 2018.  
  
30 Note 43 ‘…an example of gender based violence…is a type of so-called honour based 





counterpart at Westminster where the Preventing and Combatting Violence 
Against Women and Domestic Violence (Ratification of Convention) Act, whose 
purpose is to allow ratification of the Istanbul Convention, received royal assent 
on 27th April 2017.31 The long awaited draft Domestic Violence and Abuse Bill is 
expected in the autumn of 2018.32 
It is interesting that HBV, as a separate and specific crime, lies outside of the 
legislation. Whilst the framing of the response to HBV within the violence against 
women paradigm is sometimes questioned (men are victims and women are 
perpetrators too) we need to be wary of placing ‘harmful’ traditions and practices 
within the cultural context and of seeing such practices as  culturally sanctioned 
aberrations from the norm. Roy, Ng and Larsi highlight the misperception that 
harmful practices are linked to certain cultures and Dustin and Phillips argue that 
just because something is statistically more prevalent in one group than another 
it does not make it a ‘cultural practice’.33  Begikhani, Gill and Hague document a 
recent change in social attitudes and policy responses to HBV, significant in the 
re-labelling of ‘honour’ as ‘dishonour’ (degrading to perpetrators rather than 
victims) but more so in the reconceptualisation of HBV as a community based 
                                                        
perception that they have caused disgrace or dishonor to the family or community where the 
perceived disgrace or dishonor arises from values beliefs or customs relating to gender or 
sexual orientation.’ 
31 The Act was introduced in response to the Istanbul Convention, a Council of Europe 
Convention and obligations under international law to combat violence against women. This has 
now been ratified by 32 of the original 46 EU signatories to the Convention. 
32 A consultation on the Bill was launched on 8th March 2018 and closed on 31st May 2018. The 
results of that consultation are awaited 
<https://consult.justice.gov.uk/homeoffice-moj/domestic-abuse-
consultation/>https://consult.justice.gov.uk/homeoffice-moj/domestic-abuse-consultation/ 
Accessed 1st August 2018. 
33 Sumanta Roy, P Ng and Ikamara Larsi, (2011) ‘The Missing Link: A Joined Up Approach to 
Addressing Harmful Practices in London’ (2011) End Violence Against Women 
<www.endviolenceagainstwomen.org.uk> accessed 1st August 2018.  
Moira Dustin and Anne Phillips, ‘Whose Agenda is it? Abuses of Women and Abuses of Culture 






and interpersonal form of violence. However, they continue to situate HBV within 
the violence against women framework, as HBV aimed at men is still gendered 
as it is motivated by perceived transgression of male/female relationships and 
women involved in perpetrating HBV (usually as accomplices) ‘…subscribe 
powerfully to the socio-cultural norms and traditions that discriminate against 
them.’34 The patterns in the cases involving ‘honour’ killings reviewed in section 
3.3 certainly support this view. It is arguably more just to move HBV away from a 
cultural framework to avoid the perception that it is related to the non-western for 
as Bordieu recognised 30 years ago ‘honour’ ‘…emerges from a constellation of 
interpersonal exchanges.’35 Therefore ‘honour’, a bit like culture, does not have 
one definition but differs country to country, community to community and family 
to family which is why ‘…each unique social and cultural context should be 
evaluated to determine how and why specific ‘honour’-based practices have 
arisen.’36 This is perhaps why the Crime (Aggravated Murder of and Violence 
Against Women) Bill 2017 could never gain a footing as a realistic legislative goal. 
Relating these specific practices to theories of criminalisation, in 1789 Bentham 
advised us not to punish ’…where it must be inefficacious, where it cannot act so 
as to prevent the mischief’. 37  In the cases of FGM and forced marriage 
criminalisation has not eradicated the mischief and the perpetrators are not being 
punished, perhaps because as Ashworth and Horder argue ‘…the main 
determinants of criminalisation continue to be political opportunism and power, 
                                                        
34 Nazand Begikhani, Aisha Gill, Gill Hague with Kawthar Ibrahim, Honour Based Violence: 
Experiences and Counter Strategies in Iraqi Kurdistan and the UK Kurdish Diaspora (Farnham, 
Routledge 2016).  
35 Bordieu (1977)  
36 Nazand Begikhani, Aisha Gill, Gill Hague with Kawthar Ibrahim (n 170). 
37 Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to Principles of Morals and Legislation (Kitchener, Ontario, 





both linked to the prevailing political culture of the country.’ 38  There is an 
argument that perhaps follows Husak’s ultima ratio principle, that alternatives to 
criminalisation should be exhausted, for example, civil remedies. Civil remedies 
came first in the case of forced marriage. In the case of FGM the civil remedy 
came after the criminal one. In both cases the civil remedy has a greater impact 
on ‘efficaciousness’. As Sager says ‘…epistemic concerns and the principle of 
equal liberty require that we be slow to judge the unfamiliar and that we take a 
hard look at our own factual beliefs and normative judgments’ before we 
condemn the beliefs or practices of others.’39 This ties in with Lernestedt’s caution 
against the use of forward looking objective rules to try to change things when 
we simply need to take a defendant as he is.40  
 
Decided Cases  
Fisher states that ‘much…judicial energy continues to be expended over the role 
of culture in the law.’ 41  A review of the cases analysed here does not support 
that view, at least in the criminal law, either in terms of the quantity of cases 
considering culture or the quality of the engagement between the criminal courts 
and the concept of culture. We will see in Chapter 4 how our multicultural 
population has changed and grown, particularly since the beginning of the twenty 
first century, with a commensurate increase in the number of defendants from 
                                                        
38 Ashworth and Horder (n 5) 39. 
39 L Sager, Chapter 8 in Richard A Shweder, Martha Minow and Hazel Rose Markus (eds) 
Engaging Cultural Differences: The Multicultural Challenge in Liberal Democracies (New York, 
Russell Sage Foundation 2002) 173. 
40 C Lernestedt, ‘Criminal Law and Culture’ Chapter 2 in Kymlicka, Lernestedt and Matravers (n 
2) 19. 
We need to be mindful of the question of whether ‘cultural offences’ are ethically sound in 
principle. 
41 James Fisher,  ‘The Role of Morality in Cultural Defence Cases: Insights from a Dworkian 





different cultural backgrounds, yet it seems that the criminal courts have 
addressed the issue of culture in few cases since 2000. A lecture by Lady Hallet 
entitled ‘Being a Judge in the Modern World’, which drew on the inaugural 
academic programme of the Judicial College in 2013-14, identified several 
challenges for modern judges. None related to culture, cultural diversity or 
multiculturalism.42 
Renteln undertakes a review of cases involving cultural conflict across different 
jurisdictions (though largely in the US) which, she claims, is successful in 
illustrating ‘…the ubiquity and extraordinary variety of disputes involving diverse 
cultural traditions’.43 Renteln is critical of her own methodology, claiming that her 
conclusions provide an overview rather than scientific findings. This review, it is 
hoped, adopts a more scientific approach. As explained in Chapter 1 a search 
was made for cases decided under the general criminal law (excluding the 
‘cultural offences’ of forced marriage and FGM) in the criminal courts of England 
and Wales at Crown Court level or above since 2000 in which culture was raised 
at any point. The search was limited in time to tie in with understandings of twenty 
first century multiculturalism in the United Kingdom and to keep the focus on the 
‘current approach’ of the criminal law and criminal justice system. The cases 
selected therefore exclude some notable earlier cases discussed elsewhere in 
the thesis.44 It also excludes summary cases tried at Magistrates Court level 
                                                        
42 21st Pilgrim Fathers Lecture 3rd November 2014 printed in Plymouth Law and Criminal Justice 
Review 2015. 
These included (i) increased judicial review claims as a result of devolution, European Union 
Law and the Human Rights Act 1998 (ii) the modern judge as case manager (iii) leadership and 
management outside the courtroom (iv) modern technology (v) communication and relations 
with the public and (vi) extra curricula judicial comment following the abolition of the Kilmuir 
Rules by Lord Mackay in 1987. 
43 Alison Dundes Renteln, The Culture Defense (Oxford, Oxford University Press 2005) 6. 
These cases are listed at note 35. 





which would not normally be reported. A search was made on the Westlaw 
database using the search term ‘culture’. Many hundreds of cases were found 
because of the multiple meanings of ‘culture’, including mainly the ‘culture’ of 
different organisations, ‘cultural rights’ and ‘culture’ in the context of the arts 
world. Those hundreds of cases were reviewed and most rejected so that 23 
cases remained. These were added to after finding media reports of 9 ‘honour’ 
killing cases following a general search for criminal cases involving ‘culture’.  
There may of course be other cases but the list is believed to be comprehensive. 
The backgrounds to and outcomes of these 32 cases are set out in the Annex A.  
Whilst there are a number of ways in which the cases could be ordered Part 1 of 
the Annex A begins by listing the 9 of the 32 cases that did not go on to appeal, 
coincidentally all ‘honour’ killing cases reported in the media.  There is obviously 
more judicial comment available in the 23 cases that went on to appeal, and these 
follow in the list in order of seriousness of offence from the most to the least 
serious. Beyond this categorisation it is difficult to know how to utilise most 
effectively the information within the case reports to ascertain the approaches of 
the courts to culture. A starting point is the quantitative breakdown of the 32 cases 
into type and number of offence which simply shows the spread of offences 
involving a cultural element:  
                                                        
R v Bailey [1964] CLR 671  
Rv Byfied [1967] CLR 378 
R v Shabir Hussain [1997] EWCA Crim 2876  
Luc Thiet Thuan v R [1997] AC 131 
R v Bibi [1980] 1 WLR 1193 
R v Kiranjit Ahluwahlia [1992] 4 All ER 889 
R v Zoora Gulum Shah [1998] EWCA Crim 1441 






Table (1) Type and Number of Offence in Crown Court Trials 
 
Murder    17 
Attempted Murder     1 
Rape/ Sexual Assault     6 
Offences under 
Offences Against the 
Person Act 1861 
    
    1 
Fraud     2 
Dangerous Driving     1 
Drug related offences     2 
Harassment     1 
Child Cruelty     1 
 
However, as the aim of this part of section 3.3 is to achieve a deep understanding 
of the approach of the courts to culture (together with a doctrinal analysis of how 
the criminal law itself engages with culture) we need to look far beyond the 
quantitative to build a more complete picture.45 Here it was decided to search for 
various themes within the criminal trial process. Building a picture of the gender 
of both defendants and victims within these cases involving culture is useful 
because it is within the feminism/multiculturalism paradigm that the ‘cultural 
defence’ (and perhaps now the culture-responsibility relationship) meets its 
strongest opposition. It is also helpful to identify the proportion of guilty and not 
guilty pleas and the engagement of both the prosecution and defence with culture 
in framing those pleas. Analaysing judicial engagement with culture is of course 
essential and finally a deeper understanding of the grounds of appeal in the 23 
cases that went on to appeal is sought. There is an attempt to separate issues of 
substantive law and procedure (discussed here) and sentencing (discussed in 
                                                        





the next part of this section). Full case references are given in the Annex A so 
the cases are referred to by name only in this section 3.3. 
Firstly, looking at the gender of the defendants, both of the fraud cases involve 
female defendants. Of the more serious crimes only in R v Khatun do we find a 
female defendant acting alone (in the murder of her husband) for in the murder 
cases of R v Athwal and Athwal, R v Ahmed and R v Naz and the child cruelty 
case of R v Sebastian Pinto and Others the female defendants are charged jointly 
with male family members.46 Therefore we find female defendants in a total of 7 
cases (3 acting alone and 4 acting jointly) and male defendants in a total of 29 
cases (25 acting alone and 4 acting jointly). The percentage of female and male 
defendants across our 32 cases is thus 19% and 81% respectively and if we 
leave aside the number of cases where there are joint male/female defendants 
(4) the percentage of female defendants decreases to 12%. On both calculations 
there appears to be a far lower percentage of female defendants in cases 
involving ‘culture’ than the percentage of women throughout the criminal justice 
system more generally, shown by government statistics to be 27%.47 When it 
comes to the gender of victims, the number of cases involving female victims far 
outweighs the number of cases involving male victims. If we consider the 5 cases 
involving fraud, dangerous driving and drugs as ‘victimless’ crimes, of the 
remaining 27 cases 22 involve female victims and 5 involve male victims meaning 
                                                        
46 This ties in with the findings of Begikhani, Gill and Hague that women involved in ‘honour 
crimes’ are usually accomplices to men. 
Begikhani, Gill and Hague (n 34). 
47 These statistics come from Ministry of Justice, Statistics on Women and the Criminal Justice 
System 2015, A Ministry of Justice Publication under S15 Criminal Justice Act 1991’ (24th 
November 2016). 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data






that 92.5% of victims in cases involving culture are female. Again, this is a far 
higher percentage than that across the criminal justice system more generally 
where government statistics show an equal divide between male and female 
victims. 48  Whilst we are considering the  gender of defendants/victims in a 
relatively small number of cases here and so must be wary of theoretical 
generalization, the cases analysed are the only cases available on the 
established selection criteria and so the quantitative findings are in some ways 
definitive. These findings bring the feminist concerns about making allowances 
for culture (raised in section 2.4) straight back to mind because these numbers 
do indicate a high prevalence of male defendants and female victims in cases 
involving culture.  
Moving on to guilty and not guilty pleas, of the 32 cases analysed here 31 (97%) 
of cases involved not guilty pleas meaning a guilty plea rate of 3%.49 Generally 
in the Crown Court the guilty plea rate is 67%.50 Whilst provocation (all relevant 
cases were heard before the introduction of the loss of control defence in the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009) and diminished responsibility were raised in 7 
                                                        
48 ibid. 
The above publication relies on the British Crime Survey 2015 and makes the following 
statement in its Executive Summary, p10. ‘According to the Crime Survey of England and 
Wales, there was no statistically significant difference in the proportion of women and men that 
were victims of crime in 2015/16. Women were less likely than men to think that the CJS is fair 
and more likely to believe that crime is rising. Women were more likely to have been subject to 
abuse as children, particularly sexual assault. They were less likely to be victims of violent crime 
in general, but much more likely to be victims of sexual assault or domestic violence–and 
female homicide victims were far more likely than their male equivalents to have a current or 
former partner be the principal suspect for their death.’ 
49 The case involving a guilty plea was R v Ashtiaq Ashgar, called a ‘white’ honour killing case 
by the media because the victim was a white girl, a girlfriend of the defendant who threatened to 
reveal her relationship with the defendant to his family.  
50 67% is the latest figure from the Ministry of Justice, Criminal Court Statistics for the Period 
January to March 2017 (29th June 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data






cases (4 and 3 of the murder cases respectively, discussed below), traditional 
defences were not raised in the remaining 25 cases (other than in R v Goren 
where the defendant raised self-defence, a plea that was not accepted because 
the attack was pre-meditated and made in revenge). We know that a ‘cultural 
defence’ as such could not be raised, so what exactly were the defendants basing 
their not guilty pleas on? Culture itself was raised by the defence in relation to 
guilt in several of the cases. For example ‘westernisation’, ‘shame’, ‘promiscuity’ 
and ‘sexual jealousy’ were each raised as ‘reasons’ for the killing in the murder 
cases and cultural background was raised not just as mitigation in sentencing but 
as an influencing factor in relation to guilt in 2 of the 4 marital rape cases. In The 
Queen on the Application of Mohammed v Nursing Midwifery Council the 
defendant claimed that in the Yoruba culture the wife must obey her husband in 
all things which is why she had committed fraud and in R v Zaynab Hamza, R v 
Sabina Ahmed, two women claimed that although they were not sisters it was 
‘normal’ in their culture to refer to one another as sisters and so they had not 
been dishonest for the purposes of S1 Fraud Act.  
‘Honour’, on the other hand, was not raised by the defence in a single case. Of 
the 17 murder cases in this analysis 14 involved an ‘honour killing’. ‘Honour’ was 
also relevant in the attempted murder case (R v Khan (Adeel)), and in the S18 
Offences Against the Person Act case (R v Goren). This means that in 16 (50%) 
of the cases ‘honour’ was presented as a factor in the crimes committed but, and 
this is significant, it was raised by the prosecution as a driving force for  the 
defendants committing the crimes that they did. In R v Mohammed Mujibar 
Rahman, R V Mamnoor Rahman and R v Chomir Ali prosecuting counsel said 





accused…to murder Arash to vindicate the family’s honour’.51 In R v Yones the 
prosecution said that the victim ‘…was murdered because she loved the wrong 
person, in her family’s eyes. It was an ‘honour killing’ to protect the perceived 
status of the family and to mark their disapproval’.52 ‘Honour’ and the emotions 
associated with it might then be said to be inherently indefensible, a weapon for 
the prosecution in proving guilt rather than for the defence in maintaining 
innocence. Therefore, if the culture-responsibility relationship is to be fairly 
considered, it is important to separate notions of ‘honour’ from notions of culture. 
We explored the resistance to the ‘cultural defence’ earlier in this thesis but if 
there is a perception that culture and ‘honour’ are one and the same then 
resistance to the culture-responsibility relationship is likely to be difficult to 
overcome. Despite the not guilty pleas the defendants in all 32 cases were found 
guilty of the crimes with which they were charged, a 100% conviction rate which 
only confirms the resistance of the courts to allow culture as any form of 
defence.53 
That said, we do see evidence of trial judges acknowledging (though not 
necessarily engaging with) culture in a number of cases. In R v Mohammed 
Rahman, R v Mamnoor Rahman, R v Chomir Ali the trial judge identified a 
‘cultural divide’ between Bangladeshi born parents and British born children and 
in R v Ahmed the trial judge said ‘…a desire that [the victim] understood the 
                                                        
51 R v Mohammed Mujibar Rahman, Manmoor Rahman and Chomir Ali Oxford Crown Court 4th 
November 2005.  
52 R v Yones [2007] EWHC 1306 (QB). 
53 Latest figures form the Crown Prosecution Service show an overall conviction rate of 80% at 
Crown Court level. Prosecution Service Key Performance Measures 2017-2018. 
Excel spreadsheet available online 
67% is the latest figure from the Ministry of Justice, Criminal Court Statistics for the Period 
January to March 2017 (29th June 2017) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data





cultural heritage from which she came is perfectly understandable, but an 
expectation that she lived in a sealed cultural environment, separate from the 
culture of the country in which she lived was unrealistic, destructive and cruel.’54 
In R v Gurmeet Ubhi Singh the cultural dimension was played down. The 
defendant’s inability to accept his daughter’s western lifestyle was explained by 
his being an ‘old fashioned’ father who thought his children should do what he 
wanted. Unfortunately, the judges do not go on to explore the relationship 
between these observations and the law. 
In the cases where provocation and diminished responsibility were raised as 
defences to murder the trial judges seemed to engage more readily. In R v Faqir 
Mohammed the defence asked the jury to take account of the defendant’s 
‘strongly held religious and cultural beliefs’ ( that sex outside marriage is a sin) 
and to weigh these against evidence from his children that he was a violent man 
in deciding whether he had been provoked. The jury found that he had lost his 
temper (leading to him killing his daughter after finding her in her bedroom with 
her boyfriend) but had not lost control and the defence of provocation was not 
allowed. In Re Sze-Hua Tai the defence asked that provocation be considered in 
the light of his cultural background because an assault on a man by his wife in 
China was considered a great insult (his wife had prodded him with a plank and 
thrown tea in his face). His defence of provocation was rejected. In Re Naz the 
victim was murdered by her brother after he learnt of her pregnancy which he 
claims caused a ‘sudden and temporary loss of control’ because of his religious 
beliefs. His defence failed with the trial judge saying that the case was ‘…a horrific 
                                                        
54 R v Ahmed  
Chester Crown Court  3rd August 2012. 





example of outdated and misplaced family pride’. In all cases the jury was unable 
to make the connection between cultural background or beliefs and loss of 
control. A similar outcome was apparent in each of the 3 cases where the 
defendant pleaded diminished responsibility.  The claim that the djinn (a demonic 
spirit in Islamic folklore) had commanded the defendant to bury his wife in R v 
Ahmed Al-Khahib did not convince the jury that the defendant was suffering from 
an ‘abnormality of mental functioning’ and the defendant’s severe depression in 
R v Jahangir Nazir was not severe enough to be a recognized medical condition 
because of his ‘mental agility’ after the killing. In R v Nazir the defendant pleaded 
diminished responsibility on the basis that his sister was resisting an arranged 
marriage but once again the plea was rejected. This means that although we see 
room, at a theoretical level, for culture within the traditional defences (identified 
earlier in this Section 3.3), those defences cannot be said, in practice, to be 
opening up to embrace culture. 
In a limited number of cases trial judges have engaged with culture in the 
procedural realm. In R v Khatun the defendant claimed that she had stabbed (and 
killed) her husband due to ‘cultural tensions’ but the trial judge excluded expert 
evidence on cultural issues because he found that such assistance was not 
required. Similarly, in R v Sebastian Pinto and Others the trial judge dismissed 
the evidence of a ‘cultural profiling expert’ (as seen in section 1.1) on the basis 
that it looked like a ‘cultural horoscope’. Conversely, in Crawford v CPS, where 
the defendant was found guilty of harassing his former wife, the court engaged 
with culture in a unique way in taking culture into account in its findings on 
credibility and this, claimed the defendant, amounted to subconscious 





Moving on to appeals, 23 out of 32 cases were appealed. Of the 23 cases 
appealed, 9 were appeals against conviction, 11 were appeals against sentence 
and 3 were appeals against both conviction and sentence. Of the total of 12 
appeals against conviction 6 engaged directly with culture. We referred  in 
Chapter 1 to the ‘Pitcairn Case’ and the issues of culture set before the Privy 
Council.55 In R v Khatun appeal was made on 3 grounds, the third being that the 
‘trial judge was wrong to exclude expert evidence as to K’s cultural background…’ 
but the Court of Appeal found that the trial judge was entitled to find that no expert 
evidence was required and the appeal was dismissed. The Court of Appeal did 
engage with culture in relation to conviction  in the Pinto case  acknowledging 
that two of the defendants did hold the deluded belief that the victim was 
possessed but the Court did not go as far as allowing that deluded belief to 
influence guilt (although as will be seen below their sentences were reduced).  In 
The Queen on the Application of Mohammed v Nursing Midwifery Council the 
appellant appealed on the basis that the court had not placed sufficient weight on 
the influence of the Yoruba culture in reaching their decision. The case of 
Crawford v CPS elicited some interesting comments on appeal. The High Court 
accepted the appellant’s submission that the Crown Court had been wrong to 
refer to his culture because it meant ‘…that a person of the appellant’s culture 
would have a less ready understanding of what amounted to harassment than a 
white person. This was condescending, unjustified and unfair and assumed that 
the culture of the defendant pre-disposed him to act in certain ways.’ Here we 
see implicit reference to essentializing and agency and this is ruled ‘unfair’. The 
                                                        






decisiveness in this is helpful but there seemed to be a missed opportunity for a 
deeper judicial exploration of the issues involved.  
The one appeal linking culture to the traditional defence of provocation, Re Sze-
Hua Tai, created the perfect scenario for the appeal court to explore the 
relationship between cultural background and provocation but the Court of 
Appeal said that whilst the defendant’s cultural background ‘…mitigated the 
criminality of the conduct a little’ the minimum term of 12 years should remain as 
mitigating circumstances had been properly addressed at trial.56 This seems like 
a wasted opportunity. A summary of other cases is set out in the note below.57 
For the sake of completeness, the appeals in all 6 of these other cases were 
dismissed too meaning that in our group of 12 cases there was not one successful 
appeal against conviction. 
The findings of this case analysis of Crown Court decisions can be summarized 
in the following 10 points:  
                                                        
56 Here the defendant appealed under Paragraph 3 Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 
2003 for a review of the minimum term of his sentence on the basis that his defence of 
provocation should have been considered in the light of his cultural background.   
57 Below is a summary of  those cases where there was an appeal against conviction but where 
no connection with culture was acknowledged in the appeals.  In R v Faqir Mohammed the 
defendant appealed on a point of law-that the test for provocation applied during trial (that in 
Smith (Morgan)) was wrong and that the later test in Holley should have been applied (an 
interesting appeal as surely the Smith (Morgan) test with its subjective bent would have been 
more favourable towards this defendant). The Court of Appeal found that the jury would have 
reached the same verdict in any event and dismissed the appeal. In both R v Taylor and R v 
Andrews the arguments before the Court of Appeal centered more around the Rastafarian 
religion and the use of cannabis as a defence in the former case and the prohibition on its use 
as a breach of Article 9 of the European Convention on Human Rights  in the latter case. In R v 
Nazir the appeal revolved around the direction given by the trial judge to the jury on ‘joint 
enterprise’ and in R v Mahmod the appeal was based on fresh evidence from the defendant’s 
sister. Finally in R v Goren the Court of Appeal would only look at the issue of severity of 





• The culture-responsibility relationship is a gendered dilemma with a higher 
than average number of male defendants and a higher than average 
number of female victims. 
• Female defendants rarely act alone in cases involving culture (here in one 
case, 3%) 
• There is a very low guilty plea rate (3% compared with the average of 67% 
at Crown Court level). 
• There is a very high conviction rate (100% compared with an average of 
80% at Crown Court level). 
• ‘Honour’ is a factor in 50% of cases but is never raised by the defence.58 
• Culture is not recognized in the context of the traditional defences of 
provocation and diminished responsibility. 
• Judges acknowledge culture but do not allow it to influence their directions 
to the jury and do not allow it as evidence in deciding guilt. 
• There is a high appeal rate 72%. 
• 100% of appeals against conviction are dismissed. 
• The appeal courts only engaged with culture in 6 cases (50%) 
Tentative conclusions about the engagement between culture and legal 
responsibility in the criminal courts will be drawn in section 3.5 when the analysis 
of sentencing decisions, sentencing policy and the response of the  criminal 
justice system to issues of culture is complete. 
Sentencing 
The 9 cases not appealed all involved ‘honour’ killings and there are no 
sentencing remarks available for these cases.59 Of the remaining 23 cases a total 
                                                        
58 As stated earlier the 9 cases not appealed all involved ‘honour’ killings. If  conclusions are 
possible from such a small number of cases it may be suggested that the culture-responsibility 
relationship is self-limiting- in heinous crimes such as these the defendants did not dare to 
appeal their sentences, all mandatory life sentences for murder but ranging from the 
recommendation that life be served in R v Rahan Arshad where the defendant killed his wife 
and 3 children (and claimed his wife had killed the children) to a minimum term of 14 years in 
where the defendant was 16 at the time of the murder in R v Manmoor Rahman. 
59 All of the comments here relate to the total of 14 cases involving appeals against sentence 
because unfortunately sentencing remarks were not published for any of these 9 cases that were 





of 14 appeals against sentence were heard. The appeals were dismissed (or 
leave to appeal not granted) in 10 of those 14 cases. Looking firstly at the 4  cases 
where the sentence was changed, in only one case was there an increase in 
sentence (Re AG Ref (No. 66 of 2010)). This deserves comment  because the 
trial judge had indicated that the defendant, who came from an ‘African culture’, 
had been influenced by his culture in raping his wife. The Attorney General’s 
reference was allowed on the basis that the sentence was unduly lenient and the 
Court of Appeal said that cultural background should be irrelevant in sentencing 
‘…particularly for a defendant who had lived in the UK for some years and knew 
his actions were unacceptable.’ There is oblique reference to acculturation (as 
there was in Re AG Ref (No 1 of 2011) which followed shortly afterwards) and 
the sentence was increased from 7 to 11 years. In fact, the Court of Appeal seems 
to have shown most resistance to cultural factors being taken into account in 
mitigation in the 4 appeals in marital rape cases with the firm statement that ‘… 
no man, whatever his background race or creed has the right to rape his wife.’(R 
v MA). This is definitive and therefore helpful. 
                                                        
following question: ‘What criteria do you use for deciding whether or not to publish judgments, 
rulings and sentencing remarks on your website and Twitter?’ The reply is as follows:  
Publication of judgments, rulings or sentencing remarks is undertaken by the Judicial 
Communications Office on behalf of the judiciary.  These are published on the Judiciary 
website, and highlighted through Twitter, if the nature of the media or legal profile of a 
case suggests it would be helpful. The majority of cases are publicised because of the 
actual or predicted level of media interest.  In some instances, however, the Lord Chief 
Justice or another senior judge might flag a case as one that gives specific guidance on 
legal issues such as sentencing.  Publication of sentencing remarks from Crown Court 
cases is again generally governed by the level of media interest, but will also depend on 
them being available to us:  it is important to note that not all judges have full written script 
of the remarks they make at the time the sentence is handed down. 
It seems extraordinary, given the level of the media interest in the 9 ‘honour’ killing cases 
reviewed here, that sentencing remarks were not published in any one of them. We do not know 





In 3 cases sentences were reduced. In R v Cooper (Justin Shane) Cooper 
appealed against a custodial sentence of 9 months following a dangerous driving 
conviction on the grounds that he was a member of a devout religious community 
and prison would cause him ‘greater upset than normal’ and that he may be 
excluded from his community upon release from prison. His appeal was 
dismissed on the basis that  ‘many people from different backgrounds, whether 
they be religious, cultural or ethnic would have particular difficulty coping with 
imprisonment and the court would have considerable difficulty distinguishing 
between members of different groups on that basis.’60 Although the appellant’s 
custodial sentence was not reduced his driving ban was reduced from 2 to 3 
years. 
We have already considered the case of R v Sebastian Pinto and Others which 
involved charges of child cruelty based on kindoki. Two of those convicted raised 
successful appeals against sentence with the Court of Appeal finding that a 
maximum sentence should be passed only in ‘truly exceptional cases’. Here it 
was held that the appellants  were not acting maliciously and inflicting harm 
gratuitously but in the deluded belief that the child was possessed by spirits and 
whilst this did not provide mitigation it was possible ‘to conceive of worse cases 
involving prolonged cruelty.’ Their sentences were reduced to 8 years.  
The sentence was reduced too in R v Goren with the Court of Appeal saying that 
a revenge attack of the kind carried out here should always attract a long 
sentence but that 7 years was too severe and therefore this was reduced to 5 
                                                        
60 Mr Justice Roderick Evans, Recorder of Cardiff, Sitting as judge of CACD.  EWCA [2003] 





years. Although counsel for the appellant argued that the victim’s beliefs were a 
‘moral outrage’ in the defendant’s community the Court of Appeal stated that the 
sole question before them was one of severity of sentence. In each of these 3 
cases there is a manifest reluctance to really begin to engage with the cultural 
issues at stake and to consider their effect on responsibility. Yet somehow there 
is a ‘reason’ for reducing the sentences. If there is a sense that outcomes are just 
there is a concern that they are arrived at circuitously. There is a sense that 
culture is evaded. 
We can see further reluctance to engage with culture in the appeals against 
sentence that were dismissed. The appeal courts did not engage with culture at 
all in 4 of the cases even though 2 of these involved high profile ‘honour’ killings.61 
In Re Siva Kumar the trial judge identified the defendant’s cultural background as 
the only mitigating factor in sentencing, noting that the family had come from Sri 
Lanka to escape civil war. On appeal these mitigating factors were accepted on 
the basis that the appellant would find his time in custody harder to bear because 
of cultural and linguistic unfamiliarity with those around him (although the 
appropriate minimum term of 17 years remained). This is in marked contrast to 
the remarks in R v Cooper (Justin Shane). In R v Sze Hua Tai, where cultural 
background was raised in the context of provocation the appeal court ruled that 
‘..it mitigated the criminality of the conduct a little’ (although the minimum term of 
12 years was to remain as mitigating circumstances had been properly 
                                                        
61 For the sake of completeness these are R v Yones, where the term of 14 years for the 
‘honour’ killing of the appellants daughter set by the trial judge was agreed, Re Naz where the 
term of 17 years imposed on the victim’s mother for her ‘honour’ killing was agreed, R v A 
where the appeal against a 14 year sentence  for marital rape with a recommendation that the 
defendant serve 8 years was dismissed  and R v Zaynab Hamza and Sabina Ahmed where 





addressed at trial). And so we see 2 cases here (Re Siva Kumar and Re Sze Hua 
Tai) where culture is recognised by the appeal courts as a mitigating factor yet 
the appeals against sentence are dismissed. Outcomes and reasoning are in 
direct contrast with the 3 cases (above ( R v Cooper (Justin Shane), R v 
Sebastian Pinto and Others and  R v Goren) where appeals are allowed and 
sentences reduced but whilst culture is clearly present it is not acknowledged as 
relevant to the sentencing appeals.  
The Court of Appeal did consider culture a little more closely in R v Khan (Adeel) 
but made it clear that it was only doing so because the appellant had been 17 
when convicted of attempted murder and the question was whether he had been 
put under ‘substantial or tangible pressure’ from an older person but ‘a vague 
appeal to cultural pressure’ could not assist even a child and so the 15 year 
sentence was to stand. The final case to be considered is R v Jamal Muhammed 
Ul Nasir, particularly interesting because it was the culture of the young victims 
of sexual assault by Ul Nasir that was an ‘aggravating factor’ justifying his 
sentence of 7 years.62   
How then can we summarise the findings from this analysis of appeals against 
sentence involving culture? 
• 10 out of 14 appeals against sentence dismissed (71%). 
• Appeal courts engaged with or recognized culture at some level in 10 out 
of 14 cases. 
                                                        
62 Ul Nasir was refused leave to appeal by a court of 6 judges after a single judge had 
previously refused leave. The victim’s father was concerned about future marriage prospects for 
his daughters and the harm to the victims was aggravated by the impact of the crime on the 
girls and their  families within their community. The Court of Appeal was not explicit in how its 





• 3 cases where appeal against sentence was successful and cultural 
reasons acknowledged but other reasons for reduction given. 
• 2 cases where cultural background recognized as mitigation. 
• Long sentences not reduced on appeal for marital rape and oblique 
reference to acculturation. 
Again, conclusions will be considered in section 3.5. Whilst sentencing is by its 
very nature approached on a case by case basis we do see unacceptable 
idiosyncrasies here, a lack of consistency in the treatment of culture in sentencing 
decisions. Recalling that the understanding of responsibility arrived at in section 
2.3 includes not just the attribution of responsibility at the guilt stage but the 
degree of responsibility deemed just in the disposition of those found guilty,  clear 
guidance on the effect of culture on ‘responsibility’ at the sentencing stage is 
essential. 
It would be helpful here to assess the extent to which current sentencing laws 
provide adequate guidance on issues of culture.63 The introduction of Sentencing 
Guidelines has been considered in many countries but it is only the jurisdictions 
of the US and England and Wales that have adopted formal guidelines. The 
Sentencing Guidance Council was established in 2003 (the Sentencing Council 
since 2010) with guidelines being introduced by the Coroners and Justice Act 
                                                        
63 Sentencing law generally is considered to be in need of reform in England and Wales. In July 
2017 the Law Commission published its draft Sentencing Code and a period of public 
consultation ended on 26th January 2018. The Law Commission Final Report was published in 
the summer of 2018 and a draft bill is now in Parliament. Law Commission, Draft Sentencing Bill 
<http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukdpb/2017/sentencing-bill/contents> 
accessed 5th October 2017. 
On 26th  July 2017, David Ormerod, the Law Commissioner running the reform project, 
explained in The Independent that the code is an attempt to consolidate the law on sentencing 
that currently runs to 1300 pages and is ‘overwhelmingly complex’ in one document. 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/home-news/law-commission-sentencing-law-
consultation-simplified-streamlined-courts-judges-delays-errors-a7861896.html> 
 The code does not seek to replace the individual published Sentencing Guidelines but to set 
out the general principles of sentencing law. Ormerod explains that in the year to 30th 
September 2016 1.2 million offenders were sentenced and there were 4241 appeals against 





2009 and now, under S125 of that Act every court must follow any sentencing 
guidelines that are in force.64 According to Ashworth and Roberts, sentencing 
guidelines in England and Wales have produced no attention from scholars but 
Padfield has engaged, arguing that there is little sense of what the guidelines are 
meant to achieve and little idea of how judges actually sentence.65 In general, 
individual guidelines give a starting point for sentence and then there are specific 
aggravating or mitigating factors that need to be taken into account in increasing 
or reducing the sentence from that starting point. In addition there is the possibility 
of a defendant raising personal mitigation although there is no entitlement to it.66 
(It is important to note the distinction between mitigating factors in relation to 
specific offences and personal mitigation although more recent guidelines tend 
to include one list for ‘factors reducing seriousness or relating to personal 
mitigation.’). The guidelines are intended to be developed over time and in 
relation to specific offences but they do appear  to be being implemented slowly. 
There are now 33 sets of ‘definitive guidelines’ currently in publication and there 
                                                        
64 According to Ashworth and Roberts the purpose of the guidelines is to reduce disparity in 
sentences and to accurately project prison numbers. Prior to 2009 there was much discretion in 
sentencing. The Alverston Memorandum of 1901 set out a ‘Memorandum of Normal 
Punishments’ and later on in the twentieth Century it was the job of the Court of Appeal to give 
guideline judgments on sentencing in the context of suitable cases. The Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 created a Sentencing Advisory Panel to provide advice to the Court of Appeal but this 
depended on a suitable case coming before the Court of Appeal and the Court did not need to 
heed the advice of the Panel. In 2003 the Sentencing Guidelines Council was established, a 
body that could issues guidelines after receiving advice from the Sentencing Advisory Panel 
and then in 2010 the Sentencing Council replaced that body. It is the job of the Sentencing 
Council to produce guidelines on a piecemeal basis on different offences over time. Andrew 
Ashworth and Julian Roberts, Sentencing Guidelines: Exploring the English Model (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press 2013). 
65 ibid, 
N Padfield, ‘Exploring the Success of Sentencing Guidelines’ in Ashworth and Roberts 200. 
However, the Judicial College website is informative on the purposes of sentencing.  
Judicial College, The Crown Court Compendium Part II: Sentencing (June 2018)  
<https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/06/crown-court-compendium-pt2-
sentencing-june-2018.pdf> accessed 1st September 2018. 
66 S166(1) Criminal Justice Act 2003 which makes provision for the person passing sentence to 






is a claim that  ‘…sentencing in this jurisdiction [has] entered a new era’.67 It is of 
course necessary for us to question whether sentencing is fit for a multicultural 
era. 
In 2004 the (then) Sentencing Guidance Council produced guidelines on 
‘Overarching Principles: Seriousness’. These are still in force and intended to be 
used where no offence specific guidelines have been published. There are 22 
aggravating factors (and 4 statutory mitigating factors but a separate list of 12 
factors that may affect personal mitigation) and these include:68  
• The offence was racially or religiously aggravated 
• The offence involved hostility towards a minority group 
• The offence deliberately targeted vulnerable victims 
Again, we can question whether there is oblique inclusion of culture here. As seen 
above in R v Jamla Muhammed Raheem Ul Nasir the Court of Appeal held that 
the shame of the victim was relevant in considering increasing a custodial 
sentence.69 Commenting on this Gill and Harrison identify a backlash for example 
                                                        
67 In 2018 6 sets of guidelines were published relating to child cruelty, manslaughter, 
intimidatory offences, terrorism, bladed articles and offensive weapons and domestic abuse. In 
2017 there were 2 in relation to Reduction in Sentence for Guilty Plea and Sentencing Children 
and Young People. In 2016 these were relating to robbery, dangerous dog offences and the 
imposition of community and custodial sentences. 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/?type=publications&s=&cat=definitive-
guideline&topic=&year=on> accessed 20th January 2017 
Ashworth and Roberts (n 198) 5. 
68 <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf> 
accessed 2nd May 2018. 
The 4 mitigating factors are a greater degree of provocation than usually expected, mental 
illness or disability, youth or age and playing a minor role in the offence. 
These overarching principles were of the first to be published by the (then) Sentencing 
Guidance Council in December 2004.https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/web_seriousness_guideline.pdf 
69  Regina v Jamal Muhammed Raheem UL Nasir [2015] Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL  







from the NSPCC (‘British Justice should operate on a level playing field and 
children need to be protected irrespective of cultural differences’) and from Philip 
Davies MP who points out that it is unacceptable to say that sexually abusing 
Asian girls is more serious than sexually abusing white girls.70  Gill and Harrison 
say that it raises the question of how courts should deal with cases where cultural 
religious or ethnic factors are not as easily identified as relevant. In relation to the 
culture-responsibility relationship it would be illogical to argue that we should be 
considering the culture of the defendant but not the victim. If responsibility is to 
be diminished or understood in the context of its relationship to culture then 
should not the effect of crimes also be understood in the cultural context? That 
way too the culture-responsibility relationship cannot be seen merely as an easy 
route to leniency- it becomes a two way process. This of course has implications 
for equality. 
In June 2018 the Sentencing Council opened a consultation on new ‘General 
Guidelines’ to be used where there are no offence specific guidelines in force.71 
Draft guidelines were produced and the balance of aggravating factors (23) and 
mitigating factors (17) remains similar to that in the 2004 ‘Overarching Principles’ 
                                                        
70 A Gill and K Harrison, (2017) ‘Ethnic and Religious Origin as an Aggravating Factor in 
Sentencing Sexual Offences’ (2017) Journal of Sexual Aggression 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/13552600.2016.1267271> 
accessed 30th September 2018. 
Comments of Philip Davis reported in The Times (18th September 2018) 
 ‘Molesting Asian girls deserves a longer sentence’ 
<https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/molesting-asian-girls-deserves-a-longer-sentence-
6g3kt6bp025> accessed 1st October 2018. 
71 The consultation closed on 11th September 2018. It is the aim of the Sentencing Council to 
update all guidelines by 2020. The Council has identified certain serious or high volume 
offences for which there are no guidelines in force and these new General Guidelines are 
intended to cover those offences. 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/offences/item/general-guideline-sentencing-offences-for-






but mitigating factors now include both ‘factors reducing seriousness or reflecting 
personal mitigation’ and the list given is said to be ‘not exhaustive’. There are two 
previously unseen mitigating factors that are noteworthy. Firstly, ‘activity 
previously legitimate.’ Explanatory notes say that this could be due to a change 
in the offenders circumstances or a change in regulations. The obvious question 
is ‘previously legitimate where and when?’ And of course ‘legitimate’ is not the 
same word as ‘legal’. Secondly, ‘limited awareness or understanding of the 
offence’. Explanatory notes say that this could include the offender not 
understanding the ‘significance’ of the offence. There is no obvious connection 
with culture in these two mitigating factors but could they apply to an offender 
who views his actions as ‘culturally legitimate’ or whose altered moral viewpoint 
leads him not to understand the significance of his offence? 
Three new sets of guidelines came into effect in 2016 and two in 2017 although 
2018 has seen some momentum with the introduction of 6 sets of guidelines, the 
latest being Definitive Guidelines on Child Cruelty, due to come into effect on 1st 
January 2019.72 This guideline is particularly significant as it includes a distinct 
and specific set of guidelines for the offence of failure to protect a girl from FGM. 
It is practice for the Sentencing Council to hold an open consultation prior to the 
drafting and publication of new guidelines and in the case of the child cruelty 
consultation although no specific questions were asked on FGM ‘most 
respondents’ were supportive of the introduction of guidelines for this offence.73 
                                                        
72 Definitive Guidelines on Child Cruelty (September 2018) 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/item/child-cruelty-definitive-guidelines>  
accessed 19th September 2018 
73 There were a total of 43 respondents but no specific number given for ‘most’ and only the 
barristers who responded (3) commented that there is no need for guidelines on FGM because 





One respondent stressed the need to take cultural background into account but 
the Sentencing Council felt this could be covered by the low culpability provisions. 
The new FGM guidelines do not include direct reference to culture but one of the 
factors ‘reducing seriousness or reflecting personal mitigation’ is that the offender 
is ‘particularly isolated with limited access to support.’74 That sounds very much 
like another back door route to ‘culture’. 
These new FGM guidelines are not alone in overlooking culture.  Not surprisingly 
there is no direct reference anywhere to culture within the provisions of the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 or within the remaining 32 published guidelines, 
although  once again perhaps we can tenuously establish indirect reference.  
Murder, sexual offences and domestic violence are those offences most closely 
related to the culture-responsibility relationship and sentencing guidelines show 
no consistency in their engagement with culture. Guidelines on the Determination 
of Minimum Term in Relation to Mandatory Life Sentence are set out in Schedule 
21 of the Criminal Justice Act 2003. Factors that may increase the seriousness 
of the offence may resonate in cases where there is a cultural element. For 
example, 
• V is vulnerable due to age.  
• Mental or physical suffering, including sexual maltreatment, 
humiliation or degradation inflicted on V before death. 
• Abuse of position of trust or power. 
• Established evidence of community impact. 
                                                        
74 Definitive Guidelines on Child Cruelty (September 2018) p18 
<https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/item/child-cruelty-definitive-guidelines>  
accessed 19th September 2018 






• Racially or religiously aggravated. 75 
Updated guidelines in relation to domestic abuse were published in February 
2018 and came into force on 24th May 2018.76  They provide a definition of 
domestic abuse as ‘presently used by the Government’ and point out that the 
Government definition includes so-called ‘honour based abuse’, FGM and forced 
marriage. Paragraph 5 of the guidelines states that ‘…care should be taken to 
avoid stereotypical assumptions regarding domestic abuse. Irrespective of 
gender, domestic abuse occurs amongst people of all ethnicities, sexualities, 
ages, disabilities, religion or beliefs, immigration status or socio–economic 
backgrounds. Domestic abuse can occur between family members as well as 
between intimate partners.’ This comes close to culture, including some of those 
elements that we identify as being part of culture in section 2.2 of this thesis 
(ethnicity, religion, belief)  yet the previous guidelines on domestic abuse referred 
to  the victim’s particular vulnerability for ‘…cultural, religious, language, financial 
or other reasons’ as an aggravating factor  whereas the new guidelines refer 
simply to the victim’s ‘particular vulnerability.’ 77 This was the only direct reference 
to culture in the (then) 27 published sentencing guidelines, albeit the culture of 
the victim, and it is has disappeared. 78 Recognising ‘honour’ based abuse, FGM 
and forced marriage as being within the government definition of domestic abuse 
                                                        
75 As defined in S28 Crime and Disorder Act 1998. 
76 <https://www.sentencingcouncil.org.uk/publications/item/overarching-principles-domestic-
abuse-definitive-guideline/> accessed 3rd May 2018. 
77 Paragraph 3.7 Previous Domestic Violence Guidelines. 
78 A search for ‘culture’ on the Sentencing Council website returned one result and that related 
to the culture of the criminal justice system. As a general criticism of the Sentencing Council the 
guidelines on manslaughter deal only with voluntary manslaughter and still refer to the law of 
provocation under the Homicide Act 1957. However, new guidelines on manslaughter are due 
to come into effect in October 2018. These deal separately with unlawful act manslaughter, 
gross negligence manslaughter, loss of control and diminished responsibility. In the last case 
‘belief that the killing was an act of mercy’ is listed as a mitigating factor. This relates back to 





but furthering the recognition of those crimes within the context of sentencing 
seems like a wasted opportunity. Obviously we now know that FGM guidelines 
are included in the child cruelty guidelines but the question has to be asked, is 
this another case of ‘hiding’ culture away? 
Looking at the balance between aggravating and mitigating factors, further  
analysis of the 33 published Sentencing Guidelines reinforces Cooper’s views 
that there is an overemphasis on aggravating factors and seriousness and harm. 
Guidelines on mandatory life sentence for  murder, sexual offences and domestic 
abuse, those most relevant to the culture-responsibility relationship, show a lack 
of balance between aggravating and mitigating factors- 
Table (2) Aggravating and Mitigating Factors in Sentencing 







Murder  20  8  
Domestic 
Abuse 
9 2  
Sexual 
Offences 
16 5  
 
Cooper argues that the Sentencing Council is too victim focused and that 
guidelines should give much greater attention to personal mitigation as it is ‘…one 
of the most important elements of a just and fair disposition.’79 He is critical of the 
                                                        





Sentencing Council (and of the Court of Appeal which is responsible for guidance 
on sentencing where no specific guidelines exist) for emphasizing seriousness 
and harm rather than personal mitigation. He recognises a tension between the 
directive in Section 125 (1)(a) of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 (that the court 
must follow sentencing guidelines) and the Court of Appeal guidance in case law 
that sentencing decisions should be made ‘in the interests of justice’. Cooper 
relies on research from the Prison Reform Trust that gathers empirical evidence 
and finds a correlation between personal mitigation and lighter sentences and 
argues that ‘…the importance of personal mitigation goes beyond that of the 
direct impact of sentencing on the defendant. 80 In diminishing the role of personal 
mitigation to such an extent it is not only the offender who may be punished 
inappropriately but it is also society as a whole that will suffer’.81 Despite Cooper’s 
pleas and further research by Lovegrove who analysed the findings of the Victoria 
Law Foundation in Australia which identified 45 personal mitigating factors as 
reducing culpability in cases heard between 2004-2006 Cooper argues that the 
Sentencing Guidelines marginalize personal mitigation. 82  The Sentencing 
Council state that their aim is ‘public confidence’ but Cooper argues that ‘…the 
Sentencing Council appear to have decided that the public expect punitive 
responses to offending, ones based on culpability and harm. The real  
expectation is one of a pursuit of fairness and justice and this must include a 
                                                        
80 Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough, ‘Mitigation: The Role of Personal Factors in Sentencing’, 
Prison Reform Trust 
<http://www.prisonreformtrust.org.uk/uploads/documents/FINALFINALmitigation%20-
%20small.pdf> accessed 1st October 2018 
81 J Cooper, ‘Nothing Personal’ Chapter 10 in Ashworth and Roberts (n 198) 159. 
For example, personal mitigation might reveal that a non-custodial sentence is better for 
rehabilitation. Pre-sentence reports, claims Cooper, are ‘harm-centric’ and do not focus on 
rehabilitation and reform. Personal mitigation in cases involving culture could arguably led to a 
deeper understandings of the motives of others and provide the opportunity for mutual cross-
cultural education. 
82 Austin Lovegrove, ‘Proportionality Theory, Personal Mitigation and the People’s Sense of 





central role for personal mitigation.’83 Public attitudes towards sentencing are 
important and well researched. Roberts et al carried out a large scale empirical 
study to assess public attitudes to sentencing and concluded that ‘…it is 
important to ensure that there is an appropriate relationship between public 
opinion and sentencing practice.’84 That research showed that the public have 
high levels of support for personal mitigation but that there is judicial reluctance 
to consider it. Cooper recommends that the Sentencing Council produce a 
definitive list of factors that could be used in personal mitigation and the argument 
here is that ‘cultural factors’ should be included on that list. 
Bakalis and Sage argue that religion is a useful example to explore mitigation 
especially in the context of Articles 9 and 14 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR).85 The Prison Reform Trust highlights the need for more 
consideration of how and to what extent religion should be taken into account at 
the sentencing stage ‘…without this, sentencing outcomes are likely to vary 
between judges and thus to threaten the principles of fairness which we expect 
from our criminal justice system.’ 86 It concluded that judges are reluctant to take 
religion into account in sentencing but that they do need to comply with Articles 
9 and 14 of the ECHR. However, it did identify three types of personal mitigation 
recognised by judges in relation to religion: 
                                                        
83 J Cooper, ‘Nothing Personal’ Chapter 10 in Ashworth and Roberts (n 198) 164. 
84 Julian Roberts, Mike Hough Jessica Jacobsen and Nick Moon,  ‘Public Attitudes to 
Sentencing Purposes and Sentencing Factors: An Empirical Analysis’ (2009) 11 Criminal Law 
Review 771.  
85 Chara Bakalis and Peter Edge ‘Taking Due Account of Religion in Sentencing’ (2009) 29 (3) 
Legal Studies 421. 






• Previous good character can relate to culpability and membership 
of a religious group may be evidence of good character. 
• A defendant is less likely to offend in future.  
• A defendant may have a problem with specific type of punishment, 
for example, coping with a custodial sentence as seen in Re Siva 
Kumar. 
More recently sentencing remarks in the case of R v Darren Osbourne, better 
known as the ‘Finsbury Park Mosque Case’, confirmed that there should be no 
defence or even mitigation in cases of ‘murder done for the purposes of 
advancing a political, religious, racial or ideological cause’ even if radicalization 
is claimed.87 Osbourne was convicted of murder and attempted murder with a 
recommendation that he serve 43 years.  
Generally there is a cry for policy makers and the Sentencing Council to make 
clear what mitigating factors can be taken into account in personal mitigation. The 
findings of this chapter add weight to that collective cry. On the basis that the 14 
cases discussed in this section that resulted in appeal against sentence involve 
some cultural element it must be argued that due consideration of culture in our 
trial courts is essential. Lord Lane comments that sentencing is ‘…trying to 
reconcile a number of irreconcilable facts.’88 To this should be added the plea 
that culture needs to be considered in the context of sentencing so that 
magistrates and judges might have clear guidance on the relationship between 
culture and both aggravating and mitigating circumstances and of course in 
                                                        
87 Reported 2nd February 2018 and sentencing remarks issued by Mrs Justice Cheema Grubb. 
R v Darren Osborne <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-content/uploads/2018/02/r-v-osborne-
sentencing-remarks.pdf> 
accessed 10th March 2018. 
88 Lord Lane speaking extrajudicially in House of Lords Debate (HL Debates Vol 486, col 1295) 
quoted in Andrew Ashworth Sentencing and Criminal Justice (Cambridge, Cambridge University 





relation to personal mitigation.  We are beginning to see a slow contextual 





3.4 The Criminal Justice System 
This section seeks to examine the engagement between the institutions of the 
criminal justice system and culture. The journey of offenders in the criminal justice 
system is followed in turn through the stages of investigation (the Police) 
prosecution (the Crown Prosecution Service)  and trial (the Judiciary). 
The Police 
The criminal justice system begins with the investigation of crime. Suspects may 
be arrested and held in custody prior to being charged. There are strict and 
detailed rules on detention and custody now set out in the 2015 National Police 
Chief’s Council (NPCC) College of Policing Document on Detention and 
Custody.89 There is a section on ‘Equality and Individual Needs’ and paragraph 
5 deals with Religious and Cultural Needs. This document was updated in August 
2015. The previous (2012) document stated that ‘…it is not permissible to treat a 
person less favourably because of their faith, belief or culture. The specific needs 
of a person are best determined by effective and respectful questioning…Religion 
culture or nationality should never be assumed.’ 90  The current version has 
deleted this first sentence, perhaps because culture is not a characteristic 
protected by law under the Equality Act 2010 whereas, broadly, the ‘faith and 
                                                        
 89 College of Policing, College Releases New Guidance for Custody Officers and Staff 
<http://www.college.police.uk/News/archive/August%202015/Pages/new_guidance_for_custody
_officers_and_staff.aspx> accessed 19th August 2018. 
90 College of Policing, Detention and Custody, Equality and Individual Needs 
<https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/detention-and-custody-2/detainee-care/equality-






belief’ are covered by religion. A former long list of ‘additional needs’ has also 
been significantly shortened to include just copies of religious texts, advice to 
Muslim detainees on the direction of Mecca (eg, a compass or mark applied to 
the eastern cell wall of one or more cells) and halal, kosher, vegetarian and vegan 
meal alternatives.91 We can see therefore a diminution in the emphasis on culture 
in the 3 year period from 2012 to 2015. 
As well as guidance for custody the College of Policing have recently produced 
guidance on FGM (March 2015) and on Forced Marriage and HBV (June 2014).92 
                                                        
91 ibid 
The previous document included a long and detailed list of requirements including the following: 
 
Custody managers should consider providing a separate room for use as a prayer room, or for 
detainees to receive official visitors such as local faith leaders. Arrangements should be made 
for providing: 
copies of the Koran, the Bible and the Torah (Islam requires that copies of the Koran be 
kept neat and wrapped securely away from contamination) 
advice to Islamic detainees on the direction of Mecca (eg, a compass or mark applied to 
the eastern cell wall of one or more cells) 
halal, kosher, vegetarian and vegan meal alternatives. 
Note: someone who is vegetarian on ethical grounds should have this belief respected 
in the same way as if they were vegetarian on religious grounds. 
 
Religious considerations: 
Custody staff should facilitate any reasonable requests wherever possible in respect of religious 
considerations, particularly: 
facilitating times of prayer, including the requirement of some faiths that various parts of 
the body are washed prior to doing so  
asking the person for their prayer times and informing them when they are due 
reading religious texts 
food and drink (food type and timing with regard to fasting) 
visits from local faith leaders 
prayer times.  
Due respect should be given to all religious artefacts retained in custody offices for the use of 
detainees. 
Prayer times. Members of the Islamic faith are required to pray five times daily, at times which 
vary according to the season.  Custody officers should ensure that enquiries are made (eg, with 
local faith leaders) to establish those times in advance, so that interviews and meal times may 
be organised around them. 
92  College of Policing, Major investigation and public protection, Female genital mutilation 
(March 2015) <https://www.app.college.police.uk/app-content/major-investigation-and-public-
protection/female-genital-mutilation/> 
College of Policing, Major Investigation and Public Protection, Forced Marriage and Honour 






Forced marriage is now to be treated by the Police as a form of HBV. In December 
2015 HM Inspector of Constabulary reported on the response of the Police to 
HBV, broadly defined to include forced marriage and FGM.93 The inspectors 
found a  ‘mixed picture’ stating that the police service have ‘…some way to go 
before the public can be fully content that HBV is properly understood by the 
police and that potential and actual victims are effectively protected.’ Part of the 
problem is that there is ‘no strong evidence base on what works in policing to 
prevent harm and to protect victims.’94 A victim engagement project, undertaken 
as part of the report, identified ‘honour’ as a critical fact  because ‘…while HBV 
has features in common with domestic abuse and gender based violence …it is 
the aggravating factor of perceived ‘honour’ that shapes the context of abuse.’95 
The report made a total of  14 recommendations to the Home Office, the NPCC, 
chief constables and the College of Policing, the overall aim being to eradicate 
‘honour’ based abuse, forced marriage and FGM but made it clear that ‘…due 
respect must always be given to lawful cultural traditions and  sensitivities but  
these should not be barriers behind which desperate people are imprisoned.’96 
The challenge, once again, is balancing these competing demands. The time 
frame for the implementation of these recommendations was March, June or 
December 2016. It is not clear whether these have been successfully 
implemented. The Metropolitan Police have produced a number of online fact 
                                                        
accessed 18th September 2018. 
A recent change in reference from ‘honour’ to ‘dishonour’ in relevant literature is a positive step 
but the label HBV is used here to reflect policy and practice. 
93 ‘The Depths of Dishonour: Hidden Voices and Shameful Crimes’ 
<https://www.justiceinspectorates.gov.uk/hmicfrs/wp-content/uploads/the-depths-of-
dishonour.pdf>  
Accessed 1st October 2018. 
94 ibid [5.9]. 
95 ibid 14. 





sheets in relation to various crimes including HBV.97 These are accessible and 
informative and perhaps satisfy Recommendation 4 which requires awareness 
raising. The NCCP national strategy for eradicating HBV, forced marriage and 
FGM pre-dated the HMIC Report.98 
In 2015 Mulvihill et al carried out research on the experiences of victims of HBV 
reporting to the police.99 This is based on a framework of interactional justice, a 
concept that measures a victim’s feelings of being respected and informed, which 
in turn are related to feelings of self-worth and belonging.100 Researchers found 
that empathy and validation are critical in the first contact with police. 20 in the 
research sample of 36 participants were happy with their initial encounter but only 
9 out of 36 were happy with  the reporting experience overall. 
With regard to FGM The Metropolitan Police have also set up ‘Project Azure’, a 
response to FGM advocating a coordinated drive to eradicate FGM through 
prevention, protection, partnership and prosecution yet there is ongoing criticism 
of the Metropolitan Police for not securing a successful FGM prosecution and in 
                                                        
97 <https://safe.met.police.uk/crimes_of_honour/get_the_facts.html> 
accessed 5th October 2018. 
98 Commander Mak Chishty, Honour Based Abuse, Forced Marriage and Female Genital 
Mutilation, NPCC (December 2018) 
<https://www.npcc.police.uk/Publication/Final%20NPCC%20HBA%20strategy%202015%20201
8December%202015.pdf> accessed 5th October 2018. 
99 N Mulvihill, G Gangoli, A Gill and M Hester, ‘The Experience of Interactional Justice for 
Victims of ‘Honour’-Based Violence and Abuse Reporting to the Police in England and Wales’, 
(2018) Police and Society 
<https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/10439463.2018.1427745> accessed 20th 
September 2018. 
100 These in turn relate to interpersonal justice and informational justice, based on the 
framework of interpersonal justice developed by Laxminarayan et al and referred to in Murphy, 
K & Barkworth J, ‘Victim Willingness to Report Crime to Police: Does 
Procedural Justice or Outcome Matter Most? (2014) 9 (2) Victims and Offenders 178, 182-184.  
The focus of interactional justice is thus different from distributive justice, which is concerned 





particular for not knowing where in their jurisdiction that FGM takes place.101 The 
Police have taken other initiatives to tackle ‘cultural crime’. Project Violet is the 
response of the Metropolitan Police to witchcraft or ‘faith based child abuse’. 
There is also a National Action Plan to tackle abuse linked to faith or belief which 
identifies the main challenge as working with communities and faith leaders and 
raising awareness and encouraging reporting.102 However, there seemed to be 
momentum around faith based abuse  back in 2012, perhaps as a result of the 
Victoria Climbie, case and these earlier initiatives do not seem to have been 
updated.  
Although the Forced Marriage Unit, set up in 2012, is a joint initiative between the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Home Office the Police are 
committed to the eradication of forced marriage.103 Individual forces seem to 
have adopted protocols on forced marriage and taken measures to make 
reporting as easy as possible.104  There is criticism that the Police have been too 
timid in tackling forced marriage leading to media comments such as ‘..the 
answer to tackling [forced marriage] lies in forcefully entering ghettoized, 
backward communities.’105 Perhaps this seems shocking but there is a need to 
                                                        
101 <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/crime/met-police-fgm-32-years-no-conviction-
where-happen-female-genital-mutilation-a7616536.html> 
accessed 5th August 2018. 
102The National Working Group on Child Abuse Linked to Faith or Belief,  
 National Action Plan to Tackle Child Abuse Linked to Faith or Belief (14th August 2012) 
<https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data
/file/175437/Action_Plan_-_Abuse_linked_to_Faith_or_Belief.pdf> accessed 5th August 2018. 
103 <https://safe.met.police.uk/crimes_of_honour/consequences_and_the_law.html> 
accessed 5th October 2018. 
104 For example, Greater Manchester Police have set up various ‘Advice Centres’ including one 
on HBV  that includes forced marriage. 
Greater Manchester Police, Forced Marriage, 
<http://www.gmp.police.uk/live/Nhoodv3.nsf/section.html?readform&s=F9AE08C3D47F28C380
258091004C6F8B> accessed 5th October 2018. 





avoid accusations of the kind of misplaced political correctness that, it is argued, 
led to the Rotherham scandal and the failure to protect victims of abuse. 
Crown Prosecution Service (CPS) 
‘Cultural crime’ is placed within the CPS’s violence against women and girls 
strategy which in turn lies within the human rights framework recommended by 
the United Kingdom’s strategic priority for the CPS and one of nine identified 
mission critical projects. A CPS pilot launched in July 2007 whose purpose is to 
identify and monitor forced marriage and honour crimes and to inform 
development of national guidance and training for prosecutors and this flagging 
system has continued so that forced marriage and Honour Based Violence 
crimes are identified as a separate category.106 There is also CPS guidance on 
forced marriage and Honour Based Violence with revised guidance being 
published on 28th June 2018.107 In its Tenth Annual Report on Violence Against 
Women and Girls figures show that there were 200 HBV flagged cases in 
2016/17. 108  There are 136 ‘charged’ cases and from these there are 90 
convictions and 81 unsuccessful outcomes.  The statistics do not make for easy 
interpretation, possibly because some incidents are charged in a number of 
                                                        
<https://www.independent.co.uk/voices/forced-marriage-happens-in-the-uk-because-police-are-
scared-of-being-labelled-racist-a6998296.html> 
accessed 5th October 2018. 
This comment comes form Yasmin Choudhury who was taken to Pakistan at the age of 7 and 
witnessed the forced marriage of a 17 year old girl. The interesting question is whether her 
views carry more validity because of her own cultural background.   
106 (June 2014) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/honour-based-violence-and-forced-
marriage> accessed 5th October 2018. 
107 Revised Guidelines (28th June 2018) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/honour-based-
violence-and-forced-marriage> accessed 5th October 2018.  
108 (November 2017) <https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/cps-






different ways. Looking specifically at forced marriage there were 56 referrals to 
the CPS (90 in 2015/16) with 44 prosecutions and 32 convictions giving a 
conviction rate of 72.7%. We know that there has only been one successful 
prosecution for the offence of forcing someone to marry under S121 of the Anti-
Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act 2014 and so these convictions must be 
for other offences relevant to forced marriage though ‘flagged’. The figures are 
thus misleading but looking behind them does not disguise the fact that S121 of 
the Anti-Social Behaviour Crime and Policing Act is inefficacious. When it comes 
to FGM clearly there are no figures to report with the CPS acknowledging that 
mandatory reporting obligations on health professionals under the Serious Crime 
Act has not increased the number of prosecutions although it has led to an 
increase in safeguarding measures through the family courts and the issue of 
FGMPO’s. 
The CPS came under attack recently for not prosecuting ‘honour’ crimes for fear 
of causing unrest in Asian communities but retaliated with an explanation of its 
approach to charging. 109 ‘The CPS makes charging decisions in every instance 
without sway to political correctness or any other outside influence. Our role is to 
examine the evidence, decide whether it is sufficient to present to a jury, and then 
prosecute if it is in the public interest to do so’.110 There seems to be a huge 
willingness on the part of the CPS (and the Police) to work towards eradicating 
these crimes and towards combatting violence against women and girls more 
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accessed 20th January 2017. 
110The Telegraph (11th November 2016) 
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generally but as argued in section 3.3 the emphasis on ‘cultural crime’ within the 
legislative arena cannot be considered the best way forward. In the 2016/17 
Report the director of the CPS called for further training for prosecutors in 
2017/18 on ‘harmful practices’. 
The Judiciary 
In February 2010 the Advisory Panel on Judicial Diversity reported to the Lord 
Chancellor and made 53 recommendations for achieving a diverse judiciary. The 
Judicial Diversity Taskforce was set up with a view to ensuring implementation of 
the recommendations and this has now been replaced by the Judicial Diversity 
Forum. The Judicial Appointments Commission was set up in April 2006 under 
the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 with a view to ensuring a fair and transparent 
process for selecting candidates for judicial office. Part of its remit is  ‘…to have 
regard to the need to encourage diversity in the range of persons available for 
judicial selection.’111 To assist in this the Crime and Courts Act 2013 has a tipping 
point provision that allows cultural diversity to be taken into account for the 
purposes of increasing judicial diversity when two applicants are in all other ways 
of equal merit. The judiciary is becoming more diverse. Focusing on ethnic 
diversity Judicial Diversity Statistics for 2018 show that 7% of court judges and 
11% of tribunal judges are of BME origin.112 In the case of court judges this 
percentage is only slightly below that of the working age general population.113 
There are now over 100 members of the  ‘Diversity and Community Relations 
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Judiciary’ (DCRJ) whose remit is to dispel myths surrounding the judiciary and to 
act as a link between the courts and local communities on a voluntary basis so 
that there is increased public confidence in the legal system and so that outdated 
perceptions of the judiciary are challenged. This DCRJ network was originally set 
up to work with BME communities but it works now with all under-represented 
groups.114  
However, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between a diverse judiciary 
and diversity of views. The recent ‘fracking case’ which has led to calls for judicial 
review on account of the severity of the sentences passed is significant for the 
comment of the judge Robert Altham who felt unable to suspend the sentences 
because the offenders had no hope of rehabilitation as ‘…each of them remains 
motivated by an unswerving conviction that they are right.’ 115  There is an 
argument for ensuring that this newly diverse judiciary is adequately trained in 
diversity issues.  
Since the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 the Lord Chief Justice has 
responsibility for training the judiciary in England and Wales. The Judicial College 
was set up in 2011 with a view to undertaking this training.116 The most recent 
                                                        
114 Information obtained from Courts and Tribunal judiciary, Diversity and Community Relations 
Judiciary <https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/you-and-the-judiciary/judiciary-within-the-
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115 Reported in Independent (2nd October 2018) 
<https://www.independent.co.uk/environment/fracking-protest-cuadrilla-preston-lancashire-
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116 The previous director of training at the Judicial College was John Phillips. In a talk to judges 
from overseas given at the Supreme Court in May 2016 he explained that his job is to meet the 
training needs of judges. A ‘Learning Needs Analysis’ was carried out with 300 members of the 
judiciary of England and Wales (from a total of some 33,000 including 26,000 lay magistrates) 
and this showed a need for training to be individual and to focus on ‘judgecraft’ (rather than 





strategy document  of the Judicial College outlines the vision, objectives and 
overriding principles of the College.117 The Vision is to be a ‘world leader in 
judicial education and training.’ 118  The governing principles set out what is 
included in judicial training.119 As well substantive law, evidence and procedure 
and the acquisition and improvement of judicial skills, training aims to cover ‘…the 
social context within which judging occurs’. ‘Social context’ is stated to include 
diversity and equality and the need to relate to and communicate with all manner 
of people from a variety of backgrounds with different needs capacities and 
expectations.120  
However, an analysis of the Judicial College Prospectus for 2018-19 shows that 
there is no reference whatsoever to culture and very little reference to equality 
and diversity.121 A review of judicial education and training in other countries 
prepared for the Judicial Studies Board in 2006 found that all the jurisdictions 
analysed offered training in ‘social context’ but this amounted to simply 
understanding the potential for discrimination. 122  The 2018/19 Prospectus 
includes seminars on leadership and management and separate ones on case 
management. There is a general seminar for District Judges that includes ‘issues 
of bias and diversity’ and a general seminar for  Deputy District Judges that 
                                                        
117Judicial College, Strategy of the Judicial College 2018-2020 <https://www.judiciary.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2017/12/judicial-college-strategy-2018-2020.pdf> accessed 18th September 
2018. 
This has not been significantly updated since the previous 2015-17 strategy document other 
than references to increased digitalization, withdrawal from the European Union and continuing 
austerity. 
118 ibid Paragraph 11. 
119 ibid Paragraph 13. 
120 ibid Paragraph 14. 
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2019.pdf> accessed 5th October 2018. 
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includes content on domestic violence. There is one for judges on Sentencing 
which includes updates on new guidelines and on sentencing law and promises 
to look at ‘…sensitive and often difficult areas such as domestic violence, 
sentences involving defendants who are carers, defendants who are young, 
defendants who may have been trafficked and defendants with mental heath 
problems.’ There is a gap crying out to be filled with ‘defendants with different 
cultural backgrounds.’ Those trafficked might of course have different 
backgrounds but they are singled out here because of the trauma of that 
trafficking. 
The latest Equal Treatment Bench Book (ETBB) was published on 28th February 
2018. It is a living document that is constantly updated, the latest amendments 
being made in August 2018. The aim is ‘…to increase awareness and 
understanding of the different circumstances of people appearing in courts and 
tribunals.’123 It is a manual for good procedural practice at all levels in the criminal 
justice system  and is, in contrast to other areas of the criminal justice system 
that we have examined, enlightened. It contains new sections on litigants in 
person, refugees, modern slavery, multicultural communication and 
Islamaphobia and anti-Semitism. If judges adhered to the guidelines in this 
comprehensive document culture in the courtroom could become much less 
problematic. This is one of the few documents reviewed in this thesis that 
demonstrates a real understanding of culture, that is not afraid to count culture 
as among the tangible influences that make up our socially diverse world. Of 
course, it is only setting out requirements relating to culture in the procedural 
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realm and has no bearing on substantive law. Therefore whilst it does not impact 
directly upon the culture-responsibility relationship it is of great value as an 
illustrative example of how the criminal justice process can interact with culture. 
A well as outlining what the approach of the judiciary should be to equality (raised 
in section 2.4) the ETBB recognises the endemic cultural bias in the legal system 
that we raised in section 2.4 stating that ‘…people perceive the words and 
behaviour of others in terms of the cultural conventions with which they are most 
familiar’ so that judges need an  ‘…awareness of where a person is coming from 
in terms of background, culture, and special needs and of the impact of  those on 
participation in the process.’ However, paragraph 28 of Chapter 1 lists those at a 
particular disadvantage in the legal process and whilst those from ethnic minority 
communities are included there is no mention of culture or cultural background 
and so there is some inconsistency around the inclusion of culture. The ETBB 
warns too against stereotyping with the words in paragraph 33 that stereotypes 
are ‘simplistic mental shortcuts’ and ‘often grossly inaccurate’ and ‘ignorance of 
the culture’s beliefs and the disadvantage of others encourages prejudice’ 
(paragraph 32). Most encouragingly of all the ETBB promotes intercultural 
communication so that judges in England and Wales have an understanding of, 
for example, the East Asian habit of ‘saving face’ and the South Asian narrative 
style of taking a long time to get to the point. We have seen how remorse, the 
most cited mitigating factor in sentencing, is culturally loaded and misconstrued 
as lacking in this context.124 
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 If the judiciary/judicial appointments committee see the need for diversity to be 
commensurate with the general population then it recognizes the de facto 
multicultural population. If the Judicial College issues guidance for judges on 
equal treatment of, inter alia, those from different cultural backgrounds in court 
then it too recognizes that there will be litigants in court with different cultural 
backgrounds.  In the appeal of Shakeela Naz against sentence following 
conviction for the ‘honour’ killing of her daughter Rukhsana, counsel for the 
appellant referred to The Equal Treatment Bench Book, and warned against 
ethnocentric assumptions and the danger that a court might  deploy ‘…their  own 
assumptions to evaluate the behaviour of those whose cultural conventions are  
different to their own’.125 The next step is the development of procedural rules to 
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The first aim of the Chapter was to gather evidence to support and advance the 
hypothesis that the culture-responsibility relationship has not been considered in 
practice or policy. The aim was achieved by searching thematically for the 
presence of culture and evidence of engagement with culture in both the 
substantive criminal law and the criminal justice system. Overall, there is a 
notable absence of reference to culture and minimal engagement between 
culture and the criminal law and the criminal justice system of England and 
Wales. It logically follows therefore that the culture-responsibility relationship  has 
not been considered in the context of the practice and policy of the criminal law 
and criminal justice system of England and Wales.  
Looking beyond this general conclusion we can see evidence of the following 
patterns: 
• The criminal law has engaged most fully with culture in the creation of 
criminal offences, specifically the offences of FGM and forced marriage. 
Legislation creates a forward looking responsibility through criminalising 
harmful practices. It can therefore be said to widen the ambit of 
responsibility which is why these offences are relevant to the culture-
responsibility relationship.  Such laws are of universal application but they 
are clearly not directed at all members of society. Their implementation 
can challenge generally accepted understandings of the purpose of the 
criminal law and of criminalisation theory. Criminal legislation aimed at 
preventing and eliminating the perceived harm in FGM and forced 
marriage is ineffective. 
• There is generally a much greater reluctance for the law to engage with 
culture in the realm of personal responsibility at the stage of establishing 
guilt. There is some scope within the loss of control defence to allow 
culture to be included in a subjective understanding of a litigant ‘in the 
circumstances of the defendant.’ Although the courts have not had the 
opportunity to explore this since the loss of control defence replaced the 
defence of provocation, in 3 of the cases reviewed the defence raised 
culture in the context of provocation and the courts did not respond. 





in a limited number of cases but do not allow it to influence their directions 
to the jury or to consider it as evidence in appeals against conviction.  
• There is a lack of clarity about the procedure for admitting evidence 
relating to culture in the courts. This has resulted in courts dismissing 
culture and where evidence has been adduced of group practices the 
courts have not attempted to relate this to the individual defendant. 
• At Crown Court level culture is more likely to be relied on by the 
prosecution than the defence. However, there is a lower than average 
guilty plea rate and a higher than average conviction rate which could 
suggest that defendants believe in their innocence without necessarily 
having any grounds in law for so doing. 
• ‘Honour’ is never raised by the defence. It is construed very negatively by 
both the prosecution and by the judiciary. 
• Judges do allow cultural evidence in mitigation at the sentencing stage 
and in appeals against sentence in a limited number of cases but there is 
no clear guidance from the Court of Appeal or from the Sentencing Council 
on this. 
• Decisions on both guilt and sentencing are inconsistent and show a lack 
of clear reasoning. 
• The interaction between culture and the criminal law in practice does seem 
to have implications for gender equality as we see a higher number of male 
defendants and a higher number of female victims in criminal cases 
involving culture than across criminal cases more generally. 
• There is naturally a focus within the Police and the CPS on prosecuting 
HBV, FGM and forced marriage all of which are situated in the violence 
against women and girls framework and a strong commitment within both 
organisations to working together to bring about the eradication of these 
‘harmful practices’. However, the number of successful prosecutions does 
not reflect the commitment to combatting ‘cultural crime’. In recent years 
the Police appear to have pulled back from considering culture in meeting 
the needs of offenders.  
• There is notable reference to culture in policy documents relating to the 
Judiciary, particularly from the Judicial College. There is a commitment to  
creating a diverse Judiciary and to training the Judiciary in awareness of 
cultural difference. Whilst we can see greater diversity in the Judiciary this 
does not seem to be translating into a willingness to engage with culture 
in the courtroom.  
The second aim of the Chapter was twofold, to begin to try to understand reasons 
for this absence of reference to culture and the lack of engagement between 
culture and the criminal law and to begin to answer the research question how 
should the criminal law of England and Wales respond to the culture-
responsibility relationship? The evidence gathered from research for this Chapter 





even due to an immanent fear of culture. Furthermore, where there might be a 
willingness by the courts to consider culture as being in some ways relevant in a 
particular case  there seems to be a tendency to admit culture ‘through the back 
door’ and so it is not openly acknowledged as being influential or being significant 
in any way in understanding a defendant’s behaviour.  
We can suggest reasons for this. As we saw in section 2.1 culture is not a 
protected characteristic for the purposes of the Equality Act 2010 and so whilst 
we are becoming used to seeing reference to the 9 groups now protected by 
equality legislation we are perhaps not comfortable with the unfamiliar, with the 
idea of culture. The current protected characteristics are comprehensible 
because they are either visible, self- identified or professed, objectively 
determined or a matter of record. Despite a shift in understandings of some of 
these characteristics in recent years, for example gender is now seen as a fluid  
social construction rather than simply as a binary that is biologically determined, 
society is or is becoming open to the need for equality for those possessing these 
characteristics. We can therefore ascribe them reasonably confidently to actors 
within the legal system. Culture is more nebulous. As we saw in section 2.2, it is 
an intangible complex whole with a myriad of meanings and we have brought 
forward an understanding of it that insists upon it being conceptualized as a 
construction unique to every individual, formed in each case through the  
acquisition, adoption or adaptation of that which the group has created, 
something that Bordieu would call an ‘embodied culture’.126 D’Hondt argues that 
culture is much more visible than other forms of social fragmentation but in the 
context of twenty first century multiculturalism culture is hard to identify, and it is 
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therefore less comprehensible, perhaps less suitable for a policy legislative 
framework or for inclusion in a legal system.127 Matravers states that it appears 
that ’…the notion of culture is simply not robust enough to do the analytic and 
ethical work which much of the cultural defence literature sets for it.’128  Moreover 
we are fearful of something that traditionally we have seen as belonging to ‘the 
other’ and in addition, political correctness disables us from attributing to others 
something that we do not fully understand. These are themes that will be returned 
to in Chapter 4 when we explore multicultural policy in the United Kingdom in the 
twenty-first century and search once again for evidence to support and advance 
the hypothesis that the culture-responsibility relationship has not been 
considered in policy and seek an explanation for that omission. 
When it comes to beginning to answer the research question, as seen in section 
3.2, we know that there is flexibility within the foundations of our criminal law to 
accommodate the culture-responsibility relationship. We can take two 
approaches here. We can look firstly to the patterns extracted from the evidence 
gathered in sections 3.3. and 3.4 to establish the reality of current practice which 
will give us an indication of the natural limits of the law at this moment, ‘the 
general accord between [the law] and public conscience’ that we identified in 
section 3.2 as being necessary for the law’s inherent credibility.129 We can use 
these patterns as a starting point and will carry them forward to Chapter 5. 
Secondly, we can ask ‘how far should these boundaries be pushed?’ The word 
                                                        
127 S D’Hondt,  ‘The Cultural Defence as Courtroom Drama: The Enactment of Identity, 
Sameness and Difference in Criminal Trial Discourse’ Law and Social Enquiry (2010) 35 (1) 67-
98. 
128 M Matravers, ‘Responsibility, Morality and Culture’ Chapter 5 in Kymlicka Lernestedt and 
Matravers (n 2) 50. 
129 John MacDonell, ‘The Foundations of Criminal Law’ (1912) 13 (1) Journal of the Society of 






‘should’ is deliberately chosen here because the outer limits of these boundaries 
should not be imposed through the cultural lens of the dominant majority but 
should be arrived at through meaningful dialogue as will be explained in detail in 
Chapter 4. And so turning back to the research question how should the criminal 
law of England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility relationship?, 
drawing on the findings of this Chapter and on the conclusions from section 2.4 
we can suggest the following starting point: 
• It is not possible to say with any certainty that culture can or cannot 
determine behaviour but there is a general perception that culture can, in 
the broadest of terms, ‘influence’ behaviour. We cannot therefore currently 
see space for culture as a justification or excuse, either as a standalone 
‘cultural defence’ or within the traditional defences because the law’s 
boundaries are not currently receptive to that idea. It is safest therefore, 
for now, to place culture at the sentencing stage in personal mitigation, 
where a pre-disposition or altered moral outlook may be construed as a 
motive in influencing behaviour. Although the criminal law does not 
recognize motive within the structure of actus reus and mens rea it has at 
times been recognized as mitigation in sentencing. Culture therefore 
seems to fit most naturally at the stage of personal mitigation in 
sentencing.  
• Sentencing laws need to reflect clearly the admissibility of culture as a 
factor in personal mitigation in individual cases where it is established that 
culture has had an influence on behaviour. 
• There need to be clear procedural rules within the law of evidence on how 
evidence of the effect of culture on behaviour should be introduced and 
considered in the courtroom. 
• The Judiciary (and prosecution and defence lawyers) need specific 
training that goes beyond the stated aim in the ETBB of ‘increasing 
awareness and understanding of the different circumstances of people 
appearing in courts and tribunals’ on how to deal with cultural evidence in 
court.  
• Honour should be excluded as a factor that is relevant to personal 
mitigation and it seems to be inherently indefensible. 
• Courts should always consider the gendered implications of allowing 
culture as a factor in personal mitigation. 
Each of these points will be developed further in Chapter 5. The analysis in 
Chapter 3 has thrown light upon a number of further issues that need elucidation 





the starting point suggested here and these too will be returned to in Chapter 5. 
The suggestion here of situating the culture-responsibility relationship at the 
sentencing stage fits with Norrie’s ‘looser notion’ of responsibility at this stage 
and is supported by the evidence gathered here from the criminal law and criminal 
justice system of England and Wales. However, the above suggestion is not 
prescriptive and dialogue may in time reveal a better place for the culture-
responsibility relationship. As we saw at the beginning of the Chapter Cornell 
asserts that ‘ …the stories that we tell to justify one state of legal affairs over 
another are just that, stories.’130 It is sometimes important and just for culture to 
find its place in such stories. 
                                                        










CHAPTER 4  
MULTICULTURALISM IN THE UNITED KINGDOM  
 
‘There is much to be grateful for and proud of in the legal traditions of the 
United Kingdom. But it is important to ask whether the law is doing all it can 




It is stated in Chapter 1 that the research question how should the criminal law of 
England and Wales respond to the relationship between culture and legal 
responsibility? needs to  be addressed within two well-defined parameters. The 
second of these parameters is multiculturalism, as it exists uniquely and 
specifically within the socio-political system of the United Kingdom today. In 
Chapter 3 the emergence of culture as a constituent part of (and indeed 
constitutive of) the criminal law as a result of the social reality of multiculturalism 
and its relationship to the criminal justice system was examined in the context of 
the challenges that it brings to settled notions of individual legal responsibility. 
Demian states that ‘…culture as a form of evidence seems to have appeared on 
the legal horizon in the last twenty years because of the politicization of culture 
as a descriptor of difference-as-authenticity.’2 Although she goes on to argue that 
culture is a ‘legal fiction’ and that multiculturalism is a ‘red herring’, because it is 
not culture itself that is revelatory but the effect that culture has on ‘intentions’, it 
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remains that were it not for the social reality of multiculturalism, the effect of 
culture on legal responsibility would not have emerged as a pressing and 
contemporary issue for justice in the criminal law of England and Wales. In an 
age of increasing awareness of the co-existence of different cultures we are 
called to question whether the standards, purposes, limitations and allowances 
of a criminal law fit for a mono cultural society are similarly fit for a multicultural 
one and in section 3.2 we established that the foundations of our criminal law are 
perhaps more able than we had previously thought to accommodate the 
potentially altered cultural situation of individuals comprising a multicultural 
criminal population within the criminal justice system of England and Wales. We 
are therefore considering how best to accommodate the culture-responsibility 
relationship, whose existence and importance we established in Chapter 2, within 
the legal system, and recognising that the criminal law and criminal justice system 
are situated within the wider domain of a multicultural reality . However, as we 
found in Chapter 3, we see in the criminal law and the criminal justice system 
itself a reluctance to engage with culture in general and an inconsistent approach 
to the culture-responsibility relationship in particular and so we need to examine 
whether recourse to multicultural policy and philosophy can help in answering the 
question how should the criminal law of England and Wales respond to the 
relationship between culture and legal responsibility? 
 
The first broad aim of this Chapter is to generate a deeper understanding of the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ within the specific socio-political context of the United 
Kingdom and to establish that, as a society, we have not fully considered the 
implications of contemporary multiculturalism for law and justice and perhaps 





least the criminal law. The second and narrower aim is to further the hypothesis 
that the culture-responsibility relationship, sitting as it does within the social reality 
of a multicultural society, remains a largely unexplored concern that, in the 
interests of justice, needs to be addressed with some urgency. This follows on 
from the conclusion reached in Chapter 3 that there has been an absence of 
consistent and coherent engagement between the culture-responsibility 
relationship and the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and 
Wales at both a practical and policy level and that there is stark evidence that the 
criminal law and the institutions of the criminal justice system continue to provide 
evasive solutions to skim the surface of how the fundamental issues involving 
culture should be addressed. The qualitative content analysis of the United 
Kingdom’s policy on multiculturalism (as identified in Annex B) carried out and 
summarized in this Chapter further develops the hypothesis. It may also help us 
to understand why multiculturalism in the United Kingdom is largely understood 
in terms of race relations rather than cultural difference. We identified in Chapter 
3 a seeming reluctance of the courts to engage with or to recognise culture and 
this lack of recognition of culture may extend too to multicultural policy. Race is 
much more comprehensible than culture and Panayi identifies an ‘…iron girder 
of racism and xenophobia’ throughout the history of immigration into the United 
Kingdom. This can be seen especially towards the Irish in the nineteenth century, 
the Germans during the First World War, West Indians during the 1950s, Asians 
from the 1960’s to 1980’s, asylum seekers in the 1990s and currently Muslims 
where ‘…hostility towards outsiders, which usually focuses on one particular 
group at one particular time, remains constant’.3 Justice and hostility are arguably 
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mutually exclusive concepts and so we must be constantly aware of this ‘othering’ 
and suspicion in seeking just solutions. 
 
The first aim of this chapter seems simple enough- to explore and seek further 
understanding of the term multiculturalism in the socio-political context of the 
United Kingdom today. Yet things are much more complex. This is largely 
because ‘multiculturalism’ is, like culture, multifaceted and dynamic and difficult 
to define and as Rattansi says, an ‘…acceptable definition of multiculturalism is 
notoriously elusive’.4 It is a word that has multiple interpretations. Firstly, it is a 
descriptive label. As Howarth and Andreouli state, in its simplest form 
multiculturalism is a ‘demographic condition’.5 This understanding of the term is 
sometimes referred to as ‘soft multiculturalism’ and will be explored in section 4.2 
where we consider multiculturalism as social reality.6 Secondly it is a policy. To 
further complicate things there are two possible interpretations of multiculturalism 
as policy. The first is where cultural minorities are thought of as distinct 
communities and where public policy encourages this distinctiveness and 
multiculturalism is promoted. This is sometimes referred to as ‘state 
multiculturalism’, a policy standpoint that is often criticized for being grounded in 
the group and leading to segregation.  The second and broader interpretation is 
where policy is adopted to regulate or to respond to the ‘demographic condition’ 
of multiculturalism, although that policy may not necessarily be promoting 
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multiculturalism or ‘state multiculturalism’ (as understood in the first 
interpretation). This is what Parekh refers to as ‘a normative response to that 
fact’, that is, the fact of diversity and policy that may be promoting an alternative 
response to state multiculturalism, such as assimilation or integration.7 Modood 
provides a useful definition of multiculturalism in this second context as ‘…the 
recognition of group difference within the public sphere of laws, policies, 
democratic discourses and the terms of a shared citizenship and national 
identity’.8 These interpretations of ‘multicultural policy’ are used interchangeably 
by politicians, policy makers and academics, but it is the second wider meaning 
that is adopted in this chapter so that reference to ‘multicultural policy’ means all 
or any policy seeking to regulate the social reality of a culturally diverse populace. 
This is examined in section 4.3. Thirdly and finally, multiculturalism is a 
philosophy. In the Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy Song defines 
multiculturalism as ‘…a body of thought in political philosophy about the proper 
way to respond to cultural and religious diversity’.9 This body of thought is huge 
and will be explored in section 4.4 where political philosophy is called upon to 
enhance understandings of what multicultural justice looks like in the context of 
the culture-responsibility relationship. Section 4.4 engages with multicultural 
philosophy, in particular with dialogical theory, in the search for an understanding 
of justice grounded in multicultural thought within which suggestions for the 
ongoing development of the culture-responsibility relationship can be 
theoretically explored. 
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Despite the challenges and complex interpretations of the term multiculturalism, 
it is essential to embrace it. Whether we are considering multiculturalism as social 
reality, policy or philosophy the culture-responsibility relationship is relevant 
across each of  these multiple understandings. Despite the evolution of society 
in the United Kingdom into that of a multicultural one in the wake of population 
movement throughout history but especially since the middle of the twentieth 
century, the criminal law of England and Wales and multiculturalism (whether as 
social reality, philosophy or policy) have largely remained as bounded fields, their 
borders barely touching let alone interacting. Our multicultural society has 
changed in and around the criminal justice system and the criminal law so that 
the culture-responsibility relationship has been overlooked in policy, perhaps not 
even recognized as a point of possible tension in the first place, or even worse, 
consciously disregarded as just too difficult. 
 
This Chapter will continue by exploring the social reality of multiculturalism in 
section 4.2 and by examining multicultural policy in section 4.3. Throughout the 
analysis of the criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales in 
the context of the culture-responsibility relationship in Chapter 3 we began to 
identify a sense of uncertainty about ‘culture’ and concluded that there was a 
widespread reluctance to engage openly with it.  This theme will be developed 
throughout this Chapter where we identify another reluctance to engage, this time 
between multicultural policy, the law generally and legal responsibility in 
particular. 
 






What then does multiculturalism look like in the United Kingdom today? To 
understand the nature of our multicultural society, perhaps different from that in 
postcolonial societies or in colonized states with an indigenous population, we 
need to understand a little about the history of migration to and from the United 
Kingdom. This will  help us to form a picture of our unique multicultural makeup 
so that the suggested framework for the way forward for the culture-responsibility 
relationship within the criminal law can be responsive to and specific to the locale. 
The law too needs to be understood in the context of historical fact. As Cotterrell 
points out  ‘…law only exists in specific times and places…most of the important 
theoretical questions about law are not at all timeless but very timely- they are 
issues about the way law is shaped, works and develops in specific historical 
contexts’.10  
 
The History of Multiculturalism in the United Kingdom 
Kymlicka and Banting correctly state that ‘…immigration is an enduring feature of 
Western societies; there have always been powerful forces that push and pull 
people across international borders.’11 Panayi tell us that between 1800 and  
2010 9 million people had moved to the United Kingdom.12 Numbers of migrants 
peaked in 2015 with an annual net migration figure of 332,000.13 So it is only in 
relatively recent years that the United Kingdom has had to cope with such large 
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numbers of migrants.14 Migration Watch UK state that ‘…the massive increase in 
the level of migration since the late 1990’s is utterly unprecedented in the 
country’s history dwarfing the scale of anything that went before’.15 We need to 
understand the approach of the United Kingdom to these population movements 
in order to fully comprehend our multicultural society. We need to be able to offer 
a critique of accounts of and successive government responses to 
multiculturalism that do not appear to grasp the complete picture. For example 
Parekh asks us to rethink the national story but is criticized by Panayi for 
beginning it only in 1945 and seeing it only from an Asian perspective.16 This 
knowledge, which reinforces an interdisciplinary methodology, is also essential 
to give us the context within which to further a meaningful socio-legal analysis of 
the culture-responsibility relationship. It also further serves to reinforce the 
closeness between this wider realm of multiculturalism as social reality, as 
philosophy and as policy and the specific and narrow research question that this 
thesis seeks to address. 
 
The United Kingdom is considered, at face value, to have a long tradition of 
toleration. The Toleration Act of 1689, passed only some 150 years after the 1534 
Act of Supremacy, was the final Act of Parliament of the Reformation. It gave 
freedom of worship to non-conformist Protestants, with Locke famously 
commenting ‘I esteem that toleration be the chief characteristic mark of the true 
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church’.17 Yet, some have questioned whether the 1689 Act really was a sign of 
toleration or a political move to unite conformist and non-conformist Protestants 
together against Catholics. There are other historical examples of surface 
toleration and accommodation hiding a more sinister political agenda.   The Jew 
Bill of 1753 (later the Jewish Naturalisation Act) gave Jews the right to 
naturalisation upon application to Parliament, yet underlying this apparently 
liberal and accommodating concession was the recognition of the economic 
value of a small population of wealthy Jewish merchants in whose favour the Act 
was addressed. In any event the law was repealed in 1754 due to widespread 
opposition to its provisions. Rabin argues, supporting the theme that ‘suspect 
communities’ have been socially constructed throughout history, that the 
existence of ‘threatening’ outside groups in the eighteenth century was necessary 
in order to strengthen Anglican identity. ‘The debate over the Jewish Bill suggests 
that the formation of a British identity in this period was dependent to some 
degree on the maintenance of a complex of negative stereotypes of religious 
error that embodied Jews, Muslims, Catholics…’18 In this way the 1753 Act and 
its repeal hid a deeper problem still relevant today and that is the floundering by 
the successive governments in matters of addressing other cultures or minorities 
and in attempting to define ideas of ‘Britishness’. Yet these Acts of Parliament 
were an important part in the spread of liberal ideas following the Enlightenment 
and the democratic structures of Britain as a liberal democracy established during 
these years continue to play a central role in the process of migration. These 
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formative years arguably saw the beginnings of British multiculturalism as a policy 
with the rights of Jews being recognized tentatively from the end of eighteenth 
century following the Enlightenment and they undoubtedly paved the way for 
Jews to campaign for full civil rights, the Jewish Association for the Removal of 
Civil and Religious Disabilities being formed with this as an agenda.19 The story 
is similar with Catholic Emancipation where a campaign for equal rights for 
Catholics led by pressure groups resulted in the 1829 Catholic Relief Act and that 
movement again set the scene for subsequent groups to seek equal rights. 
Panayi says that the Catholic Relief Act 1829 is the most significant legislation 
passed in favour of a minority group in the last 200 years on the basis that it 
recognised the concept of ‘equal rights’.20 Yet, nowhere in this early discourse on 
equal rights is there a corresponding exploration of equal responsibility. 
 
At the end of the eighteenth century there were no restrictions on aliens entering 
the country but in 1793 the Alien Act was passed obliging aliens to register when 
coming into the country and giving the Home Secretary the power to deport 
‘suspicious aliens’. Perhaps this is an early example of the government using 
immigration as a tool to regulate ‘outsiders’ and any practices seen as 
undesirable. Such a practice has been seen in recent years in the amendment of 
Rule 277 of the Immigration Rules in 2008 which raised the age for marriage 
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visas from 18 to 21 with the motivation of deterring forced marriage prior to the 
criminalisation of forced marriage in 2014.21 
 
Mass migration to the United Kingdom began in 1841 with the influx of Irish 
fleeing the famines of the 1840s. This was in fact ‘internal migration’ as Ireland 
was at that time part of the United Kingdom. However, until the beginning of the 
twentieth century the United Kingdom took a laissez-faire approach to entry on 
immigration, its borders largely unregulated and open to all. This ended with the 
passing of the Alien’s Act 1905 in response to the ‘Jewish Question’, which arose 
from a perception of ‘Jewish criminality’ and degenerating housing within the 
community of Jewish Eastern European immigrants who had begun to settle in 
the East End of London from the 1880’s onwards. The immigrants were perceived 
to be engaging in the large scale trafficking of girls for prostitution.22 The Act 
imposed restrictions on the entry of ‘undesirable’ immigrants and allowed for the 
expulsion of those already here and again defined as ‘undesirable’. 23 Knepper 
identifies this as an early episode of racial criminalisation in the criminal justice 
system.24  
 
                                                        
21 The Supreme Court later ruled that the amendment to Rule 277 was not compatible with Art 8 
(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights because it prevented parties in genuine 
marriages from living together and was therefore disproportionate as a means of dealing with 
the social evil of forced marriage (R Quila and another) v Secretary of State for Home 
Department [2011] UKSC 45). Migration Watch UK, ‘A Summary History of Immigration to 
Britain’ (Briefing Paper 6.1)<https://www.migrationwatchuk.org/briefing-paper/48> accessed 1st 
October 2018. 
22 Documented by Paul Knepper, ‘British Jews and the Racialization of Crime’ (2007) 47 (1) 
British Journal of Criminology 61. 
23 ‘Undesirable’ was defined as:  
i needing support financially 
ii being a lunatic or idiot 
iii sentenced in a foreign country for a crime (not a political crime) 
iv already subject to an expulsion order. 
24 Knepper (n 22) Seen more recently through the creation of the offences of Forced Marriage 





Historians consider that the 1905 Act was largely unworkable as it required a 
whole scale bureaucratic infrastructure to enforce it that simply did not exist.25 
Pellow presents a table of immigrant traffic and inspection from 1906 to 1913 that 
shows that 7594 aliens were refused entry and an additional 2866 expulsion 
orders were made during these years.26 This is out of a total of some 3.5 million 
who arrived on ‘immigrant ships’ during the same time period. The approach of 
government agencies to this Act demonstrates that policy was not about the 
settlement of immigrants following arrival in the United Kingdom but about 
controlling immigration because ‘…politically it has nearly always been an 
emotive issue, where liberal ideas of welcoming strangers have conflicted with a 
variety of fears about letting them in unrestricted’.27 Yet, despite the overtones of 
the Act, Sacks sees the treatment of the newly arrived ‘suspect community’ as 
an example of successful integration effected by the long established and socially 
accepted British Jewish community who took the initiative in forming charitable 
committees to help the new immigrants to settle and to see the ‘error’ of their 
ways when contravening the norms of established British society.28 Where was 
the United Kingdom government in the settlement of these new immigrants? It 
was the existing immigrant communities and the voluntary sector that was taking 
on the burden of settlement and nowhere was there any official statement of 
expectation of them on arrival. Again, we see evidence of recurring themes in 
policy in this early social reality of multiculturalism. 
 
                                                        
25 The National Archives keep records of expulsion orders under S3 (1) A of the Act for some 
years but these are not available digitally.  
26 Jill Pellow, ‘Communication: The Home Office and the Aliens Act 1905’ (1989) 32 (2) The 
Historical Journal 369. 
27 ibid 378. 
28 Jonathan Sacks, The Home We Build Together: Recreating Society (London, Continuum 





Despite mass population movement as a result of the upheaval of two world wars 
the next fifty years were broadly characterized by a non-interventionist strategy 
regarding immigration.29  One exception to this was the blatantly xenophobic 
legislation aimed at German people during and following the First World War.30 
The Aliens Restriction Act 1914 perhaps gives us the first evidence of the 
interaction between the criminal law and the responsibilities of aliens in relation 
to it. The power of the Home Secretary to expel aliens in the event of a criminal 
conviction in a foreign country was extended to allow expulsion for crimes 
committed after arrival in the United Kingdom. This included all crimes punishable 
by imprisonment including summary offences.31   
 
Following the Second World War the government intervened in immigration 
matters again with the passing of the Polish Resettlement Act 1947 (under which 
200,000 Polish immigrants arrived in five waves to supply labour in the post war 
years) and the British Nationality Act 1948 (under which immigrants from former 
colonies came to the United Kingdom in the 1950’s and 1960’s, although Crowder 
argues that the 1948 Act was put in place to allow white people from the 
Dominions to travel to and from the United Kingdom freely).32 The latter created 
                                                        
29 For example, the resettlement of 250,000 Belgian refugees in 1914 following the outbreak of 
World War 1 (organised and administered by Non-Governmental Organisations) and the 
resettlement of 4000 Basque children in 1937 as a result of the Spanish Civil War (organised by 
voluntary organisations). 
30 For example the Aliens Restriction Act 1914 which required all foreign nationals to register 
with local police. The Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919 extended the emergency war 
time powers in the 1914 Act but the motivation was understood to be the desire to safeguard 
jobs for indigenous white people. Remarkably this 1919 Act was renewed annually until 1971 
when it was repealed by The Immigration Act of that year. 
31 S 3 (1) (d) Aliens Restriction (Amendment) Act 1919  
The Secretary of State can make an expulsion order if  
‘…it is certified to him by any court (including a court of summary jurisdiction) that the alien has 
been convicted by that court of any felony or misdemeanor or other offence for which the court 
has power to impose imprisonment without the option of a fine… and that the court recommend 
that an expulsion order should be made in his case either in addition to or in lieu of this 
sentence’. 





a ‘Citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies’ for those born or naturalised in 
the United Kingdom or Colonies and allowed citizens of the Colonies the 
unrestricted right to reside in the United Kingdom.  
 
As an aside here, the legislation relied on the complex notion of citizenship. The 
idea of citizenship (and this is almost exclusively construed as ‘British citizenship’ 
rather than citizenship of the United Kingdom or England and/or Wales) is 
complex due to its historical evolution from the idea of the subject (post 1066) 
who owed allegiance to the sovereign. The concept of citizenship was recognized 
by Blackstone on the basis of the principle of jus soli, a natural born subject being 
born within the dominion of the crown. 33  In his Citizenship Review of 2007 
Goldsmith gives the example of the 1948 British Nationality Act, which creates 
the idea of Commonwealth Citizenship based on the British Nationality Status of 
Aliens Act 1914 which states that ‘…any person born within His Majesty’s 
Dominions and Allegiances was a natural born British subject’.34 The Act also 
relies on the principle of jus soli, extended to included British subjects throughout 
the Empire. 
 
Returning to the 1948 British Nationality Act, underlying the apparent legislative 
welcome the political message was less warm. A Privy Council memo to the 
Foreign Office in respect of the 492 skilled workers from Jamaica arriving on SS 
Empire Windrush in June 1948 (their arrival being seen as a symbol of the 
success of the 1948 Act in drawing ‘…immigrants of good stock’ to help rebuild a 
                                                        
33 Blackstone’s Commentaries, 4Bl Comm 24 (1753). 
34 Lord Goldsmith QC, ‘Citizenship: Our Common Bond’ (The Goldsmith Report 2008) 
<http://image.guardian.co.uk/sys-files/Politics/documents/2008/03/11/citizenship-report-full.pdf> 





country devastated by war) recommended that ‘…no special effort be made to 
help these people …otherwise it might encourage a further influx’.35 There was 
definitely a political assumption of an assimilationist approach to the ‘dark 
stranger’ although as Winder goes on to point out, the government did not provide 
any political leadership for these immigrants, perhaps a missed opportunity in 
terms of providing a structured way forward and of considering notions of rights 
and responsibilities. 36  A report at the time included the following ‘…a large 
coloured community as a noticeable feature of our social life would weaken …the 
concept of Englishness or Britishness to which people of British stock throughout 
the Commonwealth are attached.’ 37 
 
When the numbers of Colonial immigrants began to increase significantly by the 
beginning of the 1960’s this political message was reinforced and controls were 
successively introduced in the Commonwealth Immigration Acts of 1962 (under 
which, for example, proof that the immigrant had a job had to be shown) and 1968 
(which introduced the requirement for the immigrant to have a ‘substantial 
connection with the United Kingdom’). By 1972 the distinction between 
Commonwealth and non-Commonwealth immigrants had been abolished and the 
scene was set for an attitude of suspicion and hostility towards all immigrants. 
This control in immigration was accompanied by a strong race relations agenda, 
with race relations being a central policy issue from the 1960’s until the 1980’s. 
This remained the case following what were termed the ‘black race riots’ of the 
                                                        
35 Identified in Robert Winder, Bloody Foreigners: The Story of Immigration to Britain (London, 
Little Brown 2004). 
36 Comes the Dark Stranger is the title of a book by Patterson. H Patterson, Comes the Dark 
Stranger (London, Harper 1963). 
37 Royal Commission on Population 1944-1949 <http//:nationalarchive.go.uk/details/r/C13392> 





1980’s, with more anti- discrimination legislation being introduced following the 
Scarman Report and with an integration policy aimed at immigrants and families 
who had been in the United Kingdom for some time, not at the new flow of 
immigrants.38 
 
In addition to this Colonial immigration following World War Two there have been 
large numbers of refugees who began to arrive in waves immediately after 1945 
when 91,151 displaced persons settled in the United Kingdom and, once again, 
provided labour.39 The impact of European Union law on the free movement of 
persons is also hugely significant with the Migration Observatory at the University 
of Oxford noting a huge increase in net migration to the United Kingdom following 
the accession of the A8 countries to the European Union in May 2004.40 Their 
total net migration figures for the period 2004-2012 are estimated at 423,000, 
                                                        
38 For example Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 with its focus on fair policing and the 
establishment of the Police Complaints Authority in 1985. 
The Scarman Report was commissioned by the UK Government following the Brixton Riots in 
1981. Its terms of reference were to ‘inquire urgently into the serious disorder in Brixton on 10-
12 April 1981 and to report with the power to make recommendations’. It concluded that urgent 
action was needed to prevent racial disadvantage ‘…becoming an endemic, ineradicable 
disease threatening the very survival of our society’. It recommended recruiting more ethnic 
minorities to the police force and more community engagement between the police and racial 
minorities. 
Integration: Mapping the Field 
Report of a Project carried out by the University of Oxford Centre for Migration and Policy 
Research and Refugee Studies Centre contracted by the Home Office 
Immigration Research and Statistics Service (IRSS). Stephen Castles, Maja Korac, Ellie Vasta, 
Steven Vertovec, ‘Integration: Mapping the Field’ (December 2002)  
<http://forcedmigrationguide.pbworks.com/w/page/7447907/Integration%3A%20Mapping%20th
e%20Field> accessed 1st October2018 
39 Panayi (n 3) 44. Figure of 91151 taken from p41.For example 30,000 from Iranian revolution 
of 1979, 15,000 from Vietnam as a result of Vietnamese War, 3000 from dictatorship of general 
Pinochet in Chile and 15,000 Kurds estimated numbers since 1800. (Irish 2.2million). 
40 European Parliament and Council Directive 2004/38/EC of 29 April 2004 on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of 
the Member States amending Regulation (EEC) No 1612/68 and repealing Directives 
64/221/EEC, 68/360/EEC, 72/194/EEC, 73/148/EEC, 75/34/EEC, 75/35/EEC, 90/364/EEC, 
90/365/EEC and 93/96/EEC. 






although this figure is challenged by the Office for National Statistics as being 
underestimated by 346,000.41 
Multiculturalism as Social Reality Today 
As for the social reality of multiculturalism today, Howarth and Andreouli call for 
the adoption of a social psychological approach to assess the successes or 
failures of multiculturalism ‘on the ground…otherwise academic and political 
discussions are in danger of being disconnected from real life experiences and 
actual intergroup relations’ and multiculturalism is either seen in political terms as 
a failed project or in academic discussion where the focus is on institutional 
frameworks that advance cultural equality (as, for example in Kymlicka and 
Banting’s work).42 In this way they are able to examine ‘…the lived realities of 
cultural diversity and the tensions that are associated with it’.43 They envisage 
research where intergroup interactions in everyday life are empirically studied 
alongside macro-level theorisation of multicultural justice and citizenship.  
 
Using Berry’s acculturation framework and data from the UK Household 
Longitudinal Study and as part of the ESRC funded Understanding Society 
Project Nandi and Platt seek to analyse the degree of acculturation among 
                                                        
41 Figures from University of Oxford. ‘The Migration Observatory’ 
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migration-flows-a8-and-other-eu-migrants-
and-uk> accessed 12th February 2015. 
In their ‘Quality of Long-Term International Migration Estimates from 2001-2011’ report 
published on 10th April 2014, the ONS has revised the total net migration estimates for 2001-
2011; this suggests that the total net migration between 2001 and 2011 was underestimated by 
346,000 net migrants. Office for National Statistics, ‘Quality of Long-Term International 




report.pdf> accessed 12th February 2015.  
42 Howarth, and Andreouli (n 5) 1.  





minorities (and the majority) in their 2013 paper. 44 Their conclusions are based 
on data from 28,000 randomly selected households and 4,000 households 
selected to provide an ‘ethnic minority boost sample’. They conclude that across 
all groups the most common acculturation outcome is integration with British 
identity being stronger in cases where there are second generation immigrants. 
(Marginalisation is strongest among the Caribbean group, who feel most isolated 
from the dominant society and, as time has passed since their migration, make 
less investment in creating alternative identities). It is interesting to note a link 
between actual acculturation outcomes (as measured by Nandi and Platt) and 
the desired outcomes (now integration) of multicultural policy.  
 
In 2000 and 2010 the Multicultural Policy Index maintained by Kymlicka and 
Banting at Queen’s University Canada, with the aim of monitoring the evolution 
of multicultural policies in 21 western democracies by measuring the presence or 
absence of multicultural policies in those countries, categorised the United 
Kingdom’s multiculturalism as ‘moderate’ with a score of 5.5 (it had been 2.5 in 
1980) pointing out that multiculturalism is typically recognized as a demographic 
fact but policy discourse relies more on the terms cohesion and integration than 
                                                        
44 Berry’s acculturation framework is discussed in detail in section 2.4 and broadly identifies four 
possible acculturation outcomes. 
The UK Household Longitudinal Study (UKHLS) is a major research study designed to provide 
new evidence about people in the UK, focusing on their lives, experiences, behaviours and 
beliefs and how people in the same household relate to each other.  The Study was 
commissioned by the Economic and Social Research Council and is led by the Institute for 
Social and Economic Research (ISER).  The National Centre for Social Research conducts the 
fieldwork for the survey. The study started in 2009 and follows 100,000 individuals in 
40,000 households each year.   
Alita Nandi and  Lucinda Platt, ‘Britishness and Identity Assimilation Among the UKs Minority 
and Majority Ethnic Groups’ (2013) Working Paper Series no 2013-08 
<https://www.iser.essex.ac.uk/research/publications/working-papers/iser/2014-01.pdf> 





on multiculturalism.45 The index has taken measurements in 1980, 2000 and 
2010 and their ‘Index for Immigrant Minorities’ is intended to track the extent of 
this multicultural shift over the past three decades, by examining the adoption of 
eight multicultural policies.46 There is no definition of a ‘multicultural policy’ and 
so the measurement is controversial and, by the author’s admission ‘perhaps 
arbitrary at the edges’.47 Rattansi is critical of Kymlicka and Banting’s work on the 
basis that their list of policies is contentious and that the list gives only a brief 
indication of the responses of nation states to ethnic minorities.48 It is indeed a 
crude measurement but it is useful in giving some indication of just how 
multicultural our society is.  
 
In 2004 Joppke identified a seismic shift from a language of multiculturalism to 
one of civic integration. 49  David Cameron identified the failure of state 
multiculturalism in a speech at a security conference in Munich on 5th February 
2011 criticising ‘state multiculturalism’ as encouraging some to live separate lives 
and linking it to radicalisation and the causes of terrorism. 50 He called for a 
                                                        
45 The MPI is a ‘…scholarly research project that monitors the evolution of multicultural policies 
in 21 Western democracies… the project provides an index at three points in time, 1980, 2000 
and 2010 for three types of minorities.  
<www.queens.ca/mcp> 
accessed 1st October 2018.    
46 ibid. These are: 
• constitutional, legislative or parliamentary affirmation of multiculturalism; 
• the adoption of multiculturalism in school curriculum; 
• the inclusion of ethnic representation/sensitivity in the mandate of public media or 
media licensing; 
• exemptions from dress-codes, Sunday-closing legislation etc; 
• allowing dual citizenship; 
• the funding of ethnic group organizations to support cultural activities; 
• the funding of bilingual education or mother-tongue instruction; 
• affirmative action for disadvantaged immigrant groups. 
47 Will Kymlicka and Keith Banting, ‘Is there Really A Retreat From Multiculturalism Policies? 
New Evidence From the MCP Index’ (2013) 11 (5) Comparative European Politics 577. 
48 Rattansi (n 4) 17.  
49 Christian Jopkke, ‘The Retreat of Multiculturalism in the Liberal State: Theory and Policy’ 
(2004) 55 (2) British Journal of Sociology 237. 
50 BBC News, ‘State Multiculturalism has Failed, Says David Cameron’ (5th February 2011) 





stronger national identity, a ‘shared national identity’, stating ‘…we need a lot less 
of the passive tolerance of recent years and much more active liberalism’.51 He 
warned Muslim groups that if they failed to endorse women’s rights or to promote 
integration they would lose their funding.  
 
Certainly it cannot be argued that multiculturalism as social reality does not exist. 
But the reality is it that it is more than ever tied up in the public mind with 
radicalisation and terrorism within Muslim populations and the popular media in 
particular depicts it as a threatening reality. ‘Multiculturalism has of late generated 
alarmist critiques in connection with its perceived support for a new tribalism and 
an associated threat to equality and democracy or at least to national and social 
cohesion’ 52  There is a sense of moral panic, Muslims being the ‘suspect 
community’ of our times and what Modood has identified as Islamaphobia.53 In 
the past, when faced with such anxieties, Western states have often adopted 
exclusionary and/or assimilationist policies towards immigrants. States denied 
entry or naturalization to those immigrants who were perceived as unable or 
unwilling to assimilate, and anyone seeking citizenship was expected and 
sometimes even required to renounce or hide their earlier ethnic identities. Yet 
since the 1960s, a different approach has emerged in some Western countries, 
in which assimilation is renounced as a goal, and integration is seen as 
compatible with maintaining and publicly expressing an ethnic identity. People 
                                                        
51 Content of speech available at: Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Office, 10 Downing Street, 
‘PM's Speech at Munich Security Conference’ (5 February 2011)  
 <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/pms-speech-at-munich-security-conference>  
accessed 10th October 2018. 
52 Vaughan Black, ‘Cultural Thin Skulls’ (2010) 60 UNBLJ 186, 190. 
53 Tariq Modood, ‘Islamaphobia: A Form of Cultural Racism’ (2018) Submission to All Party 
Parliamentary Group on British Muslims in response to call for evidence on working definition of 
Islamaphobia<http://www.academia.edu/36775691/Islamophobia_A_Form_of_Cultural_Racism





can participate in society through membership in immigrant ethnic communities, 
which are seen as legitimate social and political actors that are worthy of support 
and consultation. As Fischl and Johnson point out, being Muslim was not an issue 
until after 9/11. There were no questions on religion on the census form until 
2001. The Muslim Council of Britain was not formed until 1997. But by the 
summer of 2005 task force groups had been created with the aim of looking at 
the place of Muslims in society and in the same breath at what could be done to 
combat violent extremism. 54  ‘CONTEST’, the government’s anti-terrorism 
strategy was the result.  
 
If the social reality of multiculturalism can lead to the perceived victimisation of 
certain groups then the white working class can sometimes be perceived as 
victims of our multicultural society. Putnam’s theory of social capital, ‘…the 
connections among individuals- social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them’ involves bonding (cohesion amongst 
defined communities) and bridging (overlapping networks between different 
communities bringing together people who are unalike). It recognizes that 
bonding capital can have a dark side as it excludes ‘others’ but the concept of  
‘shared values’ becomes important in context of bridging capital, which suffers 
where there is too much cultural difference, with ethnic diversity contributing to a 
decline in trust.55 
                                                        
54 For example The Working Group on Tackling Extremism and Radicalisation. Home Office, 
‘Counter-terrorism strategy (CONTEST)’ (26 Mar 2013) 
<https://www.gov.uk/government/collections/contest> accessed 16th March 2018. 
55 Robert Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New 
York, Simon and Schuster 2000). 
Cavanagh claims that Robert Putnam had considerable influence over the policy makers in 
Communities and Local Government from 2007 onwards and as a result social cohesion and 
integration became confused. 
Jill Rutter, ‘Back to Basics: Towards A Successful and Cost-Effective Integration Policy’ 






Rattansi says Putnam’s theory has severe conceptual, methodological and 
empirical limitations and that the transfer of his thesis to the United Kingdom is 
especially problematic because Putnam ignores ‘cultural capital’ which allows 
upper classes to build exclusive networks and advantages.56 Putnam’s emphasis 
is on the quantity not quality of relationships. He takes a broad historical sweep 
ignoring locales. He also ignores important social changes, for example he 
assesses political participation through formal political organisations rather than 
through alternative politics. Peter Hall looks at a different picture in Britain. 57 He 
finds little intergenerational difference in rates of participation and hence little 
evidence of a decline in social capital. Hall’s analysis reveals a large gap in trust 
between middle and working classes in Britain whereas Putnam’s work is based 
on an overall decline in civic trust. He has little to say about large differences in 
civic trust exhibited by privileged and marginalized groups. In December 2009 
John Denham MP berated the middle classes for not understanding the impact 
of immigration on poorer workers. The middle class could benefit from ‘cultural 
enrichment’ but the working class experience pressure on jobs and housing. In 
2004 Goodhart took Denham’s recognition of the resentment of the white working 
class further and drew the conclusion that immigration and growing diversity were 
undermining the kind of common culture, trust and solidarity that had earlier 
allowed a culture of sharing to develop, his basic assumption being that citizens 
are likely to be supportive of welfare benefits only to those who seem similar to 
themselves in values and lifestyle. 58  The more different the culture of their 
                                                        
<https://www.ippr.org/files/images/media/files/publication/2013/03/back-to-basics-
integration_Mar2013_10525.pdf?noredirect=1> accessed 1st October 2018, 38. 
56 Rattansi (n 4) 100.   
57 Peter A Hall, ‘Social Capital in Britain’ (1999) 28 British Journal of Political Science  417. 





neighbours and the less the sense of shared history, struggles and a collective 
contribution to the welfare state, the less strong the feelings of empathy, 
sympathy and solidarity that the white indigenous population feel. A 2006 study 
of London’s changing East End highlights this.59 It paints a picture of acute 
hostility where the white working class population is seething with anger at the 
new culture and practice of entitlement according to need rather than contribution 
to local and national wealth. But the study has been criticized for a lack of 
contextual information, for homogenizing the white working class (which 
consisted of Irish, Polish, Greek, etc.) and treating the poorest as synonymous 
with the whole. Minorities are unified in other misleading ways- the local dynamics 
cannot be encapsulated in an account that simply pits whites against 
Bangladeshis. Multiculturalism is the social reality of the United Kingdom in the 
twenty first century. However, the social reality of multiculturalism is uneasy. 
Successive governments have failed to put in place strong policy guidance 
reacting instead to perceptions of threats. Ashcroft and Benn say that the current 
approach to multiculturalism is one of ‘rebalancing’.60 
 
Certainly in terms of the criminal law generally and the culture-responsibility 
relationship in particular this re-balancing is a welcome development. Throughout 
this exploration of multiculturalism as social reality we can see a number of 
themes. They can be broken down into eight themes and listed as follows: 
 
• Multicultural policy is, and has historically been, elusive and there is a lack 
of consistency and of clarity in both purpose and terminology and in 
particular a lack of engagement with  the criminal law.  
                                                        
59 Gavron G Dench and K Young, The New East End: Kinship. Race and Conflict (Profile Books 
2006). 
60 Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir ‘Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain; Policy, Law and 





• There is and has been an emphasis on immigration control rather than 
post immigration settlement. The British Nationality Act 1948 missed the 
opportunity to consider the rights and responsibilities of immigrants and 
this omission has been successively followed throughout the history of 
immigration policy. 
• Favell states that the historic approach to multiculturalism in the United 
Kingdom has been one of race relations through social cohesion.61 
• Where it is possible to find policy on post immigrant/migration settlement 
this has largely been directed at regulating ‘undesirable practices’ 
following immigration. 
• Throughout history beginning with responses to Jewish Immigrants in the 
1800’s it is possible to identify the emergence of ‘suspect communities’ 
made up of certain groups of immigrants. Legal responses to such groups 
may have the potential to result in unjust laws. 
• There is an emphasis in policy (and in academic literature) on rights rather 
than responsibility. This absence of reference to responsibility includes of 
course criminal responsibility and therefore it is not surprising that if 
criminal responsibility generally is not in the multicultural discourse then 
the culture-responsibility relationship must too be forgotten or excluded. 
• The matter of post immigration settlement is largely delegated to local 
communities with central government distancing itself from involvement.  
• Policy and academic literature focus on the immigrant and immigrant 
communities. This does not encompass the whole picture of our 
contemporary multicultural society consisting now of migrants and 
refugees too. As Ashcroft states multiculturalism in the United Kingdom 
‘…seems primarily to be viewed in terms of the non-white immigration 
sparked by decolonization.’62 
 
Bearing these overarching themes in mind it is easy to see how the culture-
responsibility relationship has indeed been overlooked in multicultural policy. 
Ashcroft recognizes that ‘…a recurring feature of the different debates over 
multiculturalism is…a challenge by a minority to implicit or explicit norms or 
practices of a majority.’ 63  The culture-responsibility relationship encapsulates 
such challenges which arise from minority claims that the neutrality of the state 
is illusory, something that we are familiar with through perceptions of the  endemic 
                                                        
61 A Favell, ‘Multicultural Race Relations in Britain: Problems of Interpretation and Explanation’ 
in Christian Jopkke, Challenge to the Nation State: Immigration in Western Europe and the 
United States (Oxford Scholarship Online 2003). 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com/view/10.1093/0198292295.001.0001/acprof-
9780198292296-chapter-10> accessed 1st October 2018. 
62 Richard T Ashcroft and Mark Bevir, ‘Multiculturalism in Contemporary Britain: Policy, Law and 
Theory’ (2017) 21 (1) Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 1, 14.  





cultural bias in the criminal justice system explored in section 2.4. Ashcroft 
recognizes too that the ‘…domestic legal issues raised by multiculturalism in the 
UK are legion and there is really no aspect of domestic law that has been 
untouched’ but we are yet to see evidence of the criminal law responding to such 
issues, at least in the realm of responsibility.64 
 
                                                        






4.3 Multiculturalism as Policy 
The focus of this section is a review and analysis of historic and contemporary 
multicultural policy in the United Kingdom. The historical approach is required 
because demographic multiculturalism within the unique socio-political context of 
the United Kingdom has been identified in the introduction to this thesis as one 
of the two parameters within which the culture-responsibility relationship should 
be analysed and situated. It is therefore necessary to examine the evolution of 
the contemporary multicultural population and the historical policy response to 
that evolution to enable us to understand why we are where we are today and to 
distinguish this jurisdiction from others where there has perhaps been a different 
trajectory in the formation of the multicultural makeup. Contemporary multicultural 
policy needs to be examined because the aim of the thesis is to undertake a 
socio-legal and interdisciplinary analysis of the culture-responsibility relationship 
and an understanding of relevant policy will provide the social and political 
context underlying the way forward for this relationship in the criminal law of 
England and Wales. Again, Cotterrell is helpful here in arguing the case for a 
socio-legal approach that makes ‘…the study of law a great conversation that 
draws on the whole range of types of knowledge necessary to make that 
conversation an informed one’.65  
 
The assertion in the introduction to this thesis that the United Kingdom has not 
adopted a ‘policy of multiculturalism’ is perhaps a misleading and oversimplified 
statement that needs re-examining. It implies that ‘a policy of multiculturalism’ is 
a one dimensional and straightforward thing, a question of agreement at the 
                                                        





highest level that we embrace and commit to what is, de facto, a ‘multicultural’ 
world. It further implies that the United Kingdom government and its predecessors 
have failed to give any consideration to the issues raised by multiculturalism. 
Although this thesis is critical of successive governments and other agencies 
(particularly those within the criminal justice system) for their failure to engage in 
a meaningful way with, as appropriate, multiculturalism or culture and in turn with 
the culture-responsibility relationship, the latter a problem that has arisen from 
the demographic condition of multiculturalism, it is not fair to suggest that there 
have been no attempts to consider certain aspects of multiculturalism. In fact as 
the section on the history of multiculturalism above shows successive United 
Kingdom governments have been managing population movement, and the 
consequent multicultural circumstances, for centuries. It is certainly possible to 
identify trends in multicultural policy (perhaps subtly different from the trends 
identified in reality in section 4.2) notably race relations, Parekh’s Britishness 
defined as a ‘…plural identity that celebrates difference as a community of 
communities’, social cohesion and more recently the affirming of shared values 
and integration.66 However, as Howarth and Andreouli point out, we now need to 
recognize the current intensity of multiculturalism due to globalization.67 
 
In this light, the existing approach to dispensing with the issues that compete in 
the sphere where cultural diversity and the criminal law of England and Wales 
meet, which involves a semblance of accommodation and equality, can be seen 
as an inadequate response to contemporary social reality and this failure to 
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engage on a deep level with what cultural diversity means for the future of the 
criminal law of England and Wales at both a theoretical and a practical level and 
to consider suggestions for the way forward is a missed opportunity in the quest 
for justice and for a law that should be evolving to be fit for purpose in a 
multicultural era. 68  
 
It is necessary to define what is meant by ‘policy’. This is limited to that found in 
the documents that have been identified and listed in Annex B to this thesis (part 
1 lists relevant government documents and, part 2 EU sources and  part 3 those 
from other relevant organisations and sources) and to that necessarily inferred 
from historical analysis where policy is not made explicit. In fact it is difficult to 
find definitive statements of multicultural policy in relation to any period and most 
of what we know, certainly until the 1960’s, seems to come from retrospective 
academic analysis and commentary. A Hansard search for the terms 
‘multicultural’ and ‘multiculturalism’ between 1st January 1800 and 31st October 
2018 reveals 226 references with the first not appearing until 1985 and with a 
peak in 2007/8. Most of these references are in relation to immigration, terrorism 
and, latterly, Brexit. 
 
A deductive approach is applied to the analysis of  ‘policy’ with a view to 
establishing that law (and especially the concept of responsibility) and policy have 
largely failed to interact. It is difficult to categorise the research method chosen 
to analyse these policy documents. It could be argued that the analysis is nothing 
more than an extended Literature Review but, as explained in section 1.4 it is 
                                                        





more ‘thematic’ in searching for references to engagement between law 
(particularly the criminal law and responsibility) and policy. The approach taken 
could fall within a strict definition of Content Analysis, ‘…a research technique for 
the objective, systematic and quantitative description of the manifest content of 
communication’.69 Content Analysis is considered a quantitative method of social 
research with an emphasis on measurement and the transparency of rules used 
in the analysis. The key qualities of Content Analysis are being objective and 
systematic, the technique involved here including those characteristics. However, 
the method chosen does not look at manifest content, such as would be the case 
with the mass media texts typically analysed using this method, but with latent 
content as an underlying theme is sought and identified. Perhaps the approach 
better fits what Bryman refers to as ‘qualitative content analysis’.  
 
The method is therefore described as qualitative and it can be subject to a 
deductive or an inductive approach, although Finfgeld-Connett warns of a threat 
to validity with a deductive approach (taken here as stated above) because of the 
possibility of verifying the obvious and overlooking that which runs counter to the 
hypothesis. 70  Writers on the method envisage a sample of the relevant 
documents being examined but here no sample was selected because as 
complete a body of documents as it has been possible to find has been analysed.  
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However, as will be seen, there is little to be found within policy documents, both 
historic and contemporary, to assist in answering the research question how 
should the criminal law of England and Wales respond to the relationship 
between culture and legal responsibility?  This finding advances the hypothesis 
that the criminal law of England and Wales has failed to engage meaningfully 
with the social reality of our multicultural world and that the pathway through the 
competing demands of multicultural accommodation and the preservation of the 
existing social order under the Rule of Law is not clearly marked. The current 
focus of multicultural policy in the United Kingdom (immigration and the 
prevention of violent extremism) targets Muslim groups and seems to exclude all 
other Conditions for Integration where the purpose of integration is stated to be 
‘long term action to counter extremism’.71 Yet multicultural policy should be about 
far more than this and it should certainly be providing guidance for those involved 
at all levels of the criminal justice system. Policy on immigration and terrorism is 
still much clearer than policy on multiculturalism and post-immigration settlement 
with the aim of the UK Border Agency being, inter alia, to strengthen the country’s 
borders.72  
 
The introduction to this chapter sets out the alternative understandings of the 
term ‘multiculturalism’. According to the understanding adopted here, 
multicultural policy may adopt a number of different responses to a multicultural 
population. The terms traditionally associated with multicultural policy include 
acculturation, assimilation, segregation (or separation), marginalisation and 
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integration but more recently new terms such as ‘interculturalism’ and 
‘omniculturalism’ have emerged in academic and policy dialogue. Here we will 
look at understandings of assimilation and integration. The terms immigrant and 
migrant are used interchangeably because the sources drawn on reflect the focus 
of their times, immigration or migration, but understandings of these concepts 
apply equally to both immigrant and migrant. Before looking at specific policies 
over time we can understand the most common policy responses under the 
umbrella of multiculturalism. 
 
We examined Berry’s acculturation framework in Chapter 2 in establishing the 
relationship between culture and responsibility but focused there on acculturation 
as a process of acquiring a second culture, a psychological change within the 
individual.73 Although it is hard to see acculturation as a policy response to the 
social reality of multiculturalism the outcomes of acculturation identified by Berry, 
integration, assimilation, separation and marginalisation, may be seen as policy 
responses.  As will be seen below, assimilation (involving the loss of the minority 
culture and the adoption of the majority culture) was an implied multicultural policy 
in the United Kingdom in the twentieth century (implied because it appears that 
there is no evidence of it being explicitly stated). Assimilation is the desired 
outcome of a society where members are culturally indistinguishable. As a policy 
assimilation can be criticized for being based on the idea of a homogenous 
society prior to immigration; it also assumes the interconnectedness of different 
dimensions of assimilation (although the idea of ‘segmented assimilation’, usually 
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applied to second generation immigrants may overcome this). 74  If a strong 
assimilationist stance is adopted, there can be no allowance within the criminal 
law for the culture-legal responsibility relationship. However, we saw evidence in 
section 3.2, from case law in England and Wales, of leniency during sentencing 
on the basis that immigrants are becoming assimilated and this evidence comes 
from a period when policy was based on implied assimilation.75 Some academic 
writers too argue for allowances to be made dependent upon the degree of 
assimilation that the defendant has experienced. For example, Ma advocates the 
right for defendants to rely on a ‘cultural defence’ for a limited time following 
immigration as individuals become used to local laws.76 She suggests a period 
of five years but Van Broeck is rightly critical of this hard and fast rule that bears 
no relation to the actual degree of assimilation of the individual concerned and 
hence no fit assessment of responsibility and appears to be an arbitrary time 
period.77 Before looking at multicultural policy in specific periods of history it is 
helpful to consider the meaning of ‘integration’. 
 
Integration 
Whilst integration may be at the heart of today’s multicultural policy (as discussed 
below), until recently there seems to be unwillingness in policy documents to 
define it. The Casey Review reversed this tendency with a definition in 2016 of 
                                                        
74 Segmented assimilation theory is explained by Alejandro Portes and Min Zhou, ‘The New 
Second Generation: Segmented Assimilation and Its Variants Among Post 1965 Immigrant 
Youth’ (1993) Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 530, 74-98.  
75 For example in the cases of R v Bailey [1961] 66 Cr App Rpt 828 and R v Byfield [1967] Crim 
LR 378 the courts imposed lenient sentences against men who had sexual intercourse with girls 
under the age of 16 on the basis that this was acceptable in their home countries and they had 
not yet been assimilated in the United Kingdom and were unaware of the law here. 
76 Veronica Ma, (1995) ‘Culture Defence: Limited Admissibility for New immigrants’ (1995) 3 
San Diego Justice Journal 462.  
77 Jeroen Van Broeck, ‘Cultural Defence and Culturally Motivated Crimes (Cultural Offences)’ 






integration as ‘…the extent to which people from all backgrounds can get on with 
each other in enjoying and respecting the benefits the United Kingdom has to 
offer.’ But this, like multiculturalism, is still construed as having two distinct 
meanings with academics seeing it as a process that migrants are involved in 
following their arrival in the United Kingdom and policy makers seeing it as an 
end goal and Cavanagh’s definition, ’…integration may be seen as a person or 
group of people possessing the opportunities and skills needed to ensure social 
inclusion and long term well-being. It is both a process and an outcome’, is 
therefore more encompassing.78 It is seen as relating to equality and ‘…the 
elimination of unacceptable degrees of inequality and segregation’.79 Of course 
the question for this thesis is how the criminal law will need to develop to play its 
part in a successful integration policy. A Migration Policy Institute paper of 2012 
refers to integration as a ‘dazzling’ and ‘treacherous’ concept but it is understood 
as a two-way process based on mutual rights and corresponding obligations of 
immigrants and the host society that provides for full participation of the 
immigrant.80 ‘This implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host 
society to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way 
that the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural 
and civic life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms 
and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, 
without having to relinquish their own identity’. 81  For some, there are still 
overtones of assimilation ‘…in particular a concern that the key focus of interest 
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79 ibid.  
80 Shamit Saggar and Will Somerville, ‘Building a British Model of Integration in an Era of 
Immigration: Policy Lessons for Government’ Migration Policy Institute, Washington (2012).  
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is whether migrants will become culturally similar to the rest of the population and 
the normative judgment that they ought to do so’.82 
 
A detailed paper from IRSS Home Office Mapping the Field reports on a survey 
of British research on immigration and refugees undertaken between 1996 and 
2001. The aim of the report is stated as being ‘…to better inform government 
policy development’.83 A conceptual survey of the integration of immigrants and 
refugees found that whilst these groups were treated differently, there is no 
consensus on what integration means or on how it can be measured. However, 
it states that integration must be recognized as a two way process ‘…of adaption, 
involving change in values, norms and behaviour for both newcomers and 
members of existing society’ because if it is merely one way then there are 
connotations of assimilation.84 This seems to recognize the need for existing 
norms (and arguably laws?) to change too. Although the report recognizes that 
integration is complex and therefore cannot be studied from the perspective of a 
single discipline it does not list law among the 9 disciplines identified as covering 
integration.85  This reinforces the view that law and hence responsibility and 
multiculturalism are disconnected. Again, there is a focus on rights ‘…above all 
integration in a democracy presupposes the acquisition of legal and political 
                                                        
82 Report of The Migration Observatory University of Oxford-COMPAS (Centre on Migration 
Policy and Society) Policy Primer on Integration Sarah Spencer March 2011 p4. The Migration 
Observatory produces policy primers. A new primer was due in June 2012 but this does not 
appear to have been published. 
83 Stephen Castles, Maja Korac, Ellie Vasta, Steven Vertovec, ‘Integration: Mapping the Field’ 
(December 2002)  
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84 ibid 116. 
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rights by the new members of society so that they can become equal partners’.86 
Interestingly there is reference to agency in the statement ‘…developing the 
human agency needed to function effectively in a new environment requires the 
individual and collective initiative of the newcomer’ so perhaps in recognising 
agency we can see  an oblique recognition of individual responsibility? 
 
Taking this point on integration and responsibility further, in his model of refugee 
integration Kuhlman includes legal integration. Yet whilst the IRSS report lists 
possible ‘indicators of legal integration’ these are the right to reside, the right to 
participate in the labour market, the right to access social services and the 
acquisition of citizenship. Where are the reciprocal duties or responsibilities? The 
Report refers to Glover’s 2001 work on areas of government policy intervention 
relevant to immigration and refugee law and states that Glover claims that there 
is ‘legal flexibility to accommodate cultural/religious customs (including changes 
to the law to accommodate specific practices)’.87 Unfortunately this is not taken 
further. 
 
Gans identifies ‘bumpy integration’ where the migrant is integrated in one domain 
but not necessarily all. Other models of integration are based on identity and 
acknowledge change over time. For example Harrell-Bond and Voutira recognize 
three stages of integration for refugees, physical segregation, liminality and 
reincorporation.88 What is absent from both policy documents and academic 
literature (apart from the work of Ma and Van Broeck referred to above) is an 
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account of what integration looks like in the context of the culture-responsibility 
relationship. This may be because the implementation of integration policies (or 
at least strategies), such as they are, fall largely on local government or on the 
voluntary and community sector and there can be conflict between central and 
local government with the strong view from local authorities that central 
government should not dictate policy where local differences require flexibility.89 
 
Interculturalism is a relatively new idea, interestingly promoted by Cantle, who in 
2001 was the author of the Home Office Report on Community Cohesion.90 
Cantle introduces interculturalism as a replacement for multiculturalism. It seeks  
‘…to provide a new paradigm for thinking about race and diversity. 
Multiculturalism may have had some success in the past but it has simply 
not adapted to the new age of globalisation and super diversity. 
Interculturalism is about changing mindsets by creating new opportunities 
across cultures to support intercultural activity and it’s about thinking, 
planning and acting interculturally. Perhaps, more importantly still, it is 
about envisioning the world as we want it to be, rather than determined by 
our separate past histories.’91 
 
It is noteworthy that the term does not yet appear in policy dialogue, despite 
Cantle’s high profile (or former high profile) in the policy world. To some extent 
the dialogical approach of contemporary political philosophers examined in 
Chapter 4 of this thesis fits with Cantle’s framework of interculturalism. It is 
encouraging that Cantle is advocating a proactive approach, such as that taken 
here in searching for a just framework and interculturalism is an idea that we can 
                                                        
89 Identified by The Migration Observatory Report. The Migration Observatory’ 
<http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migration-flows-a8-and-other-eu-migrants-
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90 A Report of the Independent Review Team Home Office Report 
(The Cantle Report 2001) 
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take forward to Chapter 5.92 The relevant question here of course is how do 
integration and the culture-responsibility relationship interact? If integration is 
both a process and an outcome the culture-responsibility relationship can be part 
of the process of integration through its place in clearly defining rights and 
responsibilities for migrants and part of the outcome as those with a cultural 
background different from that of the majority become clear about how their cases 
will be treated in the criminal justice system. 
 
Multicultural Policy Pre 1960 
As seen in discussing historical social reality, whilst it is possible to get a clear 
picture of the nature of late nineteenth and twentieth century immigration in the 
United Kingdom and government attempts to control the numbers of immigrants, 
it is much more difficult to find clear policy statements on what the response to 
the resultant new multicultural society should be. It is reasonable to conclude that 
throughout the period discussed above there was a preoccupation with 
immigration and a lack of application to the aftermath of immigration. Academic 
writers seem to identify an early assumption of laissez faire certainly until the 
1960’s but there appears to be no documentary evidence of this attitude. 
Kymlicka and Banting point out that ‘…each new wave of immigrants is often 
perceived as a source of anxiety and insecurity by native-born residents of the 
host society who worry about the extent to which immigrants are able or willing 
to integrate and about the social impact of religious and cultural differences’.93 
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Perhaps one of the ways successive governments have demonstrated of dealing 
with this fear has been to adopt (consciously or otherwise) an assimilationist 
policy. A 2007 Institute of Race Relations Briefing Paper states that 
‘…assimilation was the expectation when ‘New Commonwealth’ immigrants 
came to help to rebuild the war-torn country.’94 Again, no source is cited for this 
conclusion although some academics recognise that policy makers and 
researcher used both the terms assimilation and integration for the settlement of 
new commonwealth immigrants.95 Multicultural policy becomes a little more easy 
to find from 1960 onwards and we can see the development of this firstly from 
1960-1997 and then during the Labour governments from 1997-2010, the 
Coalition government for 2010-2015 and the current Conservative government.  
 
Multicultural Policy 1960-1997 
Perhaps the first clear policy statement comes following the racial tension of the 
1960’s. A policy of integration can be identified, defined by the then Home 
Secretary Roy Jenkins in a 1967 speech as ‘…cultural diversity, coupled to equal 
opportunities, in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance’ and ‘…not a flattening 
process of uniformity’.96  This is generally considered to be an affirmation of 
integration, identifiable in four main strategies (and seen by many as still being at 
the heart of integration policy today) 
• Protection against discrimination and violence- this relies on a heavy race 
relations agenda with Race Relations Acts being passed in 1965, 1968 
and 1972. The emphasis was on ‘good race relations’, peaceful 
coexistence through toleration, diversity and pluralism.97 
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• The collection of data. 
• Controls on immigration. 
• Legal duties to promote good community relations. 
 
 
Multiculturalism was not really part of the political dialogue and policy, such as it 
was, relied heavily on a race relations agenda. Tiryakian identifies a 
‘paradigmatic shift’ in how modern states approached multicultural policy in the 
years from the mid 1960’s as they dealt with demographic change and 
considered what that meant.98 This shift was towards ‘acknowledging, accepting, 
welcoming and accommodating the presence of others’. So how have successive 
governments responded in the way of multicultural policies since the end of the 
1960’s?  
 
It has been difficult to find evidence of multicultural policy emanating from 
successive governments from 1970 to 1997. 99  Tiryakian says that from the 
1970’s multiculturalism was ‘…a way of reconciling a certain pragmatism about 
living together- in practice rather than theory- with a striking traditional belief in 
the role of community, neighbourhood initiatives, cooperatives.’ 100  This was 
never enshrined in doctrine, policy or national ideology but it moved the United 
Kingdom towards a vision of society ‘based on group identity and defined on 
ethnic/racial lines’. Such policy as there was tended to be localized and evident 
within major cities as funding was made available for various BAME groups.101 
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Multicultural Policy 1997-2010 
It was during this era of Labour governments that interest in multicultural policy 
seemed to be at its peak. The Parekh Report, commissioned in 1998 was 
published in 2000. 102 This is a forward looking and aspirational document rather 
than a backward looking one that summarises former policy. There is a section 
that deals with criminal justice but the focus is on racism and diversity. 103 
Although there is no attempt within the report to engage with legal principles and 
theory the report points to evidence of the fact that ‘…there is a perception in 
Asian, black and Irish communities that the criminal justice system is not just’.104 
This is based on data that shows ‘that black and Irish people are differentially 
treated at all stages of the criminal justice system’.105 The Report does not give 
further detail of why this might be so and neither does it suggest any follow up 
recommendations. 
 
This was an era during which the European Union began to have influence on 
domestic multicultural policy and although, in the light of Brexit, it is not important 
to explore this in any depth, the strong EU led commitment to integration needs 
to be recognized for relevance to the direction that multicultural policy in the 
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United Kingdom has taken. Through the Treaty of Amsterdam, the European 
Union had, and currently still has, an ever increasing power on national 
immigration policies (although the Treaty of Lisbon makes it clear that integration 
is subject to the subsidiarity principle). It is claimed that this is a policy of legal 
rights based on a non-discriminatory paradigm.106 Since the Treaty of Amsterdam 
the European union has been seeking a coordinated policy on integration. The 
Migratory Policy Group has produced a series of Handbooks on Integration on 
behalf of the European Union.107 The Justice and Home Affairs Council have 
produced a list of 11 Common Basic Principles for Integration.108 However, as 
with domestic policy there is a general absence of interaction with law and the list 
of policy variables for shaping a societal model (in the search for more adequate 
models of multiculturalism) does not include a legal dimension.109  
 
Broadly, Labour governments from 1997-2010 show three distinct phases and 
attitudes towards multiculturalism. The first is a celebratory attitude towards 
Britain’s ethnic diversity;110 the second, a move towards community cohesion 
(which shifted the focus from group identity to promoting interaction between 
groups) following disturbances in northern towns and the Cantle Report which 
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• Employment  
• Policing 
• Allowance of Islamic Practices and Symbols Taken From above document 
110 Evidenced for example in the celebration of ‘Cool Britannia’, a period of pride in the unique 





identified a society of polarization and fractured lives but still advocated the idea 
of community cohesion and the need for secure borders following 9/11; and the 
third a reaction to the 7/7 bombings in 2005 and the government announcing a 
major review of multiculturalism with an emphasis on counter terrorism and the 
PVE (Prevention of Violent Extremism) Initiatives.111 There are claims that the 
Labour administration from 1997-2010 undertook a clear response to the doctrine 
of multiculturalism in the form of ‘…state support and funding for minority groups 
to preserve their culture…’112 However, the Migratory Policy Institute states that 
this was a misunderstanding as ‘there never was a clear doctrine or programming 
on multiculturalism in the United Kingdom’.113 A Downing Street speech by Tony 
Blair in December 2006 is interpreted as being against the ideology of 
multiculturalism and in part led to media talk of a ‘backlash’ against 
multiculturalism. Whilst Blair referred in that speech to the need for ‘allegiance to 
the Rule of Law’ he also stated ‘If you come here lawfully we welcome you. If you 
are permitted to stay here permanently you become an equal member of our 
community and become one of us. The right to be different. The duty to integrate. 
That is what being British means’.114  
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The Department for Communities and Local Government was set up in 2006 and 
the main focus of the Department were the Independent Commission on 
Integration and Cohesion, the Migration Impacts Forum and the Migration 
Impacts Fund115. The Independent Commission on Integration and Cohesion 
made their final report in 2007 (Our Shared Future) and made 57 
recommendations that were responded to in the 2008 Government Report (The 
Government’s Response to the Commission on Integration and Cohesion).116 
This 2007 report was key in the development of policy because it attempted to 
set out a new definition of integration and community cohesion and recognized 
for the first time that integration was key to cohesion. It clearly set out 3 
foundations 
• People from different backgrounds having similar life opportunities. 
• People knowing their rights and responsibilities. 
• People trusting one another and trusting local institutions to act fairly. 
 
It further identified three key ways of people living together 
• A shared future vision and sense of belonging.  
• A focus on what new and existing communities have in common alongside 
a recognition of the value of diversity. 
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The 2008 report responded by making several recommendations.117 Relevant 
here are (2) that central government should set out a clear policy on integration 
and cohesion, (17) that there should be a new body to manage the integration of 
new migrants independent of government but sponsored by DCLG (38) DCLG 
should clearly set out what their strategy is in funding intercultural dialogue.118 
However, subsequent reports are critical of the Labour government for 
consistently failing to take measures to implement the recommendations made. 
If integration was considered to mean people knowing their rights and 
responsibilities, what was done to bring this worthy objective into practice? 
 
The Goldsmith Review followed this.119 This is arguably the most significant 
government report in terms of the culture-responsibility relationship (and the 
criminal law more generally) as it does at least introduce the notion of legal 
responsibility. In the Executive Summary which looks at the ‘Legal Rights and 
Responsibilities of Citizens’ it is pointed out that there is a right of protection 
coupled with a duty of allegiance. This duty of allegiance includes ‘the duty to 
obey the law when in the United Kingdom and liability for certain offences in the 
United Kingdom even if committed abroad’. But it is acknowledged that the 
previous report (the 2008 Department for Community and Local Government 
Report) ‘…observes that the history of legislation on citizenship and nationality 
has led to a complex scheme lacking in overall coherence or any clear and self-
contained statement of the rights and responsibilities of citizens’.120 At point 27 
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the Goldsmith Report states that there has never been any attempt to make a 
statement on the rights and responsibilities of citizens. However, Goldsmith says 
that this would be overly legalistic and the only suggestion is for a narrative 
statement that would not be justiciable. Clearly, citizens are expected to obey the 
law and although there is no overarching statutory duty in English law to obey the 
law, all who receive its protection are under a duty to do so and upon prosecution 
will attract punishment if they do not. And protection is stated to amount to 
defences and mitigation (point 46). The implied duty to obey the law is not drawn 
tightly by reference to citizenship and this is extended to those acquiring 
citizenship under the British Nationality Act 1981. 121  However, a blurring of 
citizenship is noted (point 14) and this arises in terms of loyalty as the courts have 
suggested that non-citizens too may be subject to the duty of allegiance. In R v 
Tchorzewski Lord Campbell said ‘…those who find asylum here must ever bear 
in mind that while they have the protection of the law of England they are bound 
to obey that law’.122 With the social reality of multiculturalism as it is today we 
need to look beyond notions of citizens to those of immigrants, migrants and 
refugees. Some international instruments also say that certain classes of migrant 
must obey the law for example, the Convention Relating to the Status of 
Refugees 1951 Article 2. 
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The Goldsmith Report was followed by The Governance of Britain, a Green Paper 
whose aims were to forge a new relationship between government and the citizen 
and to begin the journey towards a new constitutional settlement, with an 
emphasis on enhancing the rights and responsibilities of citizens.123 It was ‘…the 
first step in a national conversation’.124  This paper was different from other 
government initiatives because it was the first to emphasize the need for 
widespread consultation. It was not on multiculturalism specifically but introduced 
the possibility of a ‘British Statement of Values’ and a ‘British Bill of Rights’ and 
followed on from Gordon Brown’s speech at the Labour Party Conference in the 
Autumn of 2006: 
‘We the British people must be far more explicit about the common ground 
on which we stand, the shared values which bring us together, the habits 
of citizenship around which we can and must unite. Expect all who are in 
our country to play by our rules’.  
 
The focus on ‘Britishness’ is ascribed to a number of factors including the threat 
of home grown terrorism and the impact of multiculturalism on society. It is 
arguable that the Green Paper did not really engage with the social reality of 
multiculturalism with its emphasis on citizenship at a time when net migration to 
the United Kingdom was at its peak but it did lead ultimately to the Constitutional 
Reform and Governance Act 2010.  
 
Interestingly migrants rather than citizens were the focus of the next government 
papers. The 2008 Managing the Impacts of Migration; A Cross Government 
Report was updated in June 2009 with Managing the Impacts of Migration: 
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Improvements and Innovations.125 In the foreword to the latter document it states 
‘…equally where migrants choose not to play by the rules we will work with the 
police to come down hard on those who commit crimes and remove those who 
cause most harm in our communities…making newcomers earn their 
citizenship…by obeying the law.’ 126 There is a separate section on crime and 
policing which refers to Immigration Crime Partnerships across England and 
Wales (between UKBA and ACPO) and to the establishment of Immigration 
Crime Teams.  
 
In the 2008 paper Face to Face a framework is suggested for the way in which 
the government will support stronger dialogue between people of different faiths. 
This followed on from a multifaith event held at Parliament on 3rd January 2000, 
‘a shared act of reflection and commitment’, hosted by the government and 
assisted by the Inter-faith Network for the UK and was based on a three month 
public consultation with 185 responses. One question in this consultation asked 
‘Tell us about issues which limit the ability to bridge and link’. The response was 
gender issues and conventions about men and women in public which of course 
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In 2010 the Coalition government began with a focus on integration. In a revised 
PREVENT strategy (Home Office 2011) it was stated that ‘…we will do more than 
any government before us to promote integration’.127 Against this rhetoric there 
was dialogue, particularly in the media, about a ‘retreat’ from multiculturalism, 
although Phillips identifies this retreat as beginning from 1990’s onwards as 
‘…multiculturalism became the scapegoat for an extraordinary array of political 
and social evils’. 128  But, although Phillips argues that we have a ‘robust’ 
multiculturalism arrived at through ‘multicultural drift’ rather than a conscious 
philosophy or indeed policy (a viewpoint that supports the theme running 
throughout this chapter that multicultural policy is elusive) it is a retreat from 
multiculturalism that forms the political context for her book Multiculturalism 
Without Culture. Song argues that there is only a backlash in relation to immigrant 
multiculturalism, a political backlash based on fear of the ‘other’ but as that is the 
widely held perception of the nature of our multiculturalism she would in effect 
seem to recognize the backlash.129 With this in mind the government (through the 
Department for Communities and Local Government) published a report in 
February 2012 Creating the Conditions for Integration stating that ‘ …it is only 
common sense to support integration’130 Yet, there is still difficulty about what 
‘integration’ means within the document and there are some interesting 
anomalies in the Report. Confusingly, there is reference to abandoning 
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multiculturalism and adopting ’a more assimilationist approach’, which in turn 
does seem to suggest a retreat from state multiculturalism and invites the 
question ‘what did the Coalition government’s version of integration actually look 
like’? Despite the separate PREVENT strategy, the 2012 report states that 
integration is ‘central to long term action to counter extremism’, emphasizing 
again the focus on security. The Report recognizes that integration challenges 
have traditionally been met through legal rights and obligations around equality, 
discrimination and hate crime but it calls for ‘changes in society’, not just law and 
states that this is a not a job for government but for collective action. The Report 
envisages that collective action will come about if the government ‘…create(s) 
the conditions for civic leadership on integration’ because integration comes from 
every day activities and the government should only intervene ‘exceptionally’ but 
the government agreed to  take some steps including 
• The Big Lunch 
• Superact and Making Music Event – a national community music making 
day held on 9th September 2012 (and repeated 10th-12th July 2015 funded 
by DCLG) 
• Reform to Immigration and Settlement Rules. 
 
The conclusion to the report was that the government’s role in achieving an 
integrated society should be strongly shaped by localism and the ‘Big Society’.131 
The 2016 Casey Review sums this up dismissively as the era of ‘saris, samosas 
and steel-drums’ and not surprisingly Cavanagh identifies that ‘…currently the 
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government is struggling with a dilemma - universal values or distinctive 
values’132 
 
By the end of their term of office the Coalition government was struggling within 
an atmosphere of negativity surrounding the term ‘multiculturalism’ (as used in 
the first interpretation in the introduction to this chapter) yet an acknowledgment 
that a culturally diverse population is an essential feature of contemporary 
society. As Cantle states ‘…multicultural policies are toxic but multicultural 
societies are the future’.133  There was a general sense that the policy and 
practice of integration was lacking direction. This was evidenced in a number of 
independent reports. The Migration Policy Institute stated that ‘…few countries 
make systematic efforts to integrate immigrants and refugees into their social and 
political fabric and fewer still can claim success…’ and a Migration Observatory 
Policy Primer observes ‘…a lack of consensus on the objectives of policy 
intervention and some suspicion of government intentions has meant that the 
term integration is contested and not used consistently at national or local level… 
This has been a contributory factor in a lack of coherence on policy, including a 
lack of clarity on the demarcation between policy relating to migrants and to 
British born ethnic minorities.’ The Migration Observatory summarises integration 
as a minimalist strategy where ‘…the various strands of immigrant integration 
indicate a policy shift away from multiculturalism but not a regression to the 
acculturation and assimilationist frameworks publicly adopted by some European 
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countries in recent years’.134 Although the report states that we have a tradition 
of migration and a tradition of tolerance, this view does not seem to accord with 
the statement within the document itself that integration is being seen as ‘central 
to long term action to counter extremism’.135 The paper also states that ‘…we will 
robustly challenge behaviours and views which run counter to our shared values 
such as democracy, Rule of Law, equality of opportunity and treatment…’136 
 
The strategy is minimalist because in the past integration challenges have been 
met with legal rights and obligations around equality, discrimination and hate 
crime but now, claims the report, we need changes in society, not just law and 
this is a not a job for government but for collective action. It claims that the 
Government intends to ‘create the conditions for civic leadership on integration’ 
and sets out how this is to be achieved.137 The emphasis lies on the premise that 
integration comes from every day activities, so that the government needs to 
intervene only ‘exceptionally’. The report has its critics. Despite the robust 
government emphasis on integration as a policy for the way forward the Migratory 
Policy Institute still claims, in its executive summary that ‘… the United Kingdom 
has not developed a formal integration programme’ and identifies an ‘uncertain 
way forward’ in terms of multicultural policies.138 Cavanagh criticizes the 2012 
                                                        
134 The Migration Observatory, University of Oxford 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migration-flows-a8-and-other-eu-migrants-
and-uk (accessed 12th February 2018) 18. 
135 ibid introduction. 
136 ibid 5. 
137 It states that  
• we should speak honestly about the issues and create space for response 
• give people power, knowledge and control which enables them to come together locally 
as an integrated community. 
138 Based at University of Sussex and part of the Transatlantic Council of Migration. Shamit 
Saggar and Will Somerville, ‘Building a British Model of Integration in an Era of Immigration: 
Policy Lessons for Government’ Migration Policy Institute, Washington (2012) 1. 
The Migration Observatory’ <http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/briefings/migration-





report for its many omissions.139  She agrees that integration can happen in 
practice without government intervention but claims that there is a role for policy. 
The state has clear obligations towards migrants and migrants in turn have 
responsibilities towards society but they state ‘…these responsibilities are clear 
in current policy: learn the language and obey the law’. Learning the language 
may be clear, but where is ‘obey the law stated’? Under the Coalition government 
there was also an organisational issue within government as responsibility for 
migrants was shared among various departments.140 However, there was some 
specific reference to the law in a limited context such as the Ministerial Group on 
Gypsies and Traveller’s Progress report April 2012 which outlined 26 
commitments across government including ‘improving access to the criminal 
justice system’ through the National Offender Management, the Shpresa 
Programme which reported on impact of migration and on working with Albanian 
nationals to help them understand their rights and responsibilities in the United 
Kingdom and the IRSS report ‘Mapping the Field’ reports on research done by 
Stevens on law and policy towards Roma in the UK.141  In that latter report under 
the heading ‘Justice and the Legal System’ it states ‘…the justice and legal 
system appears to be under-represented in legal research.’142 
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Cantle is very critical of successive governments for the failure to coordinate 
integration programmes, for the emphasis on a system based on group rights and 
social initiatives and for policy confused with anti-terrorism measures. By 2012 
he was calling for a review of multiculturalism. ‘There is a timely and obvious 
need to develop a progressive rethinking on multiculturalism. For many reasons, 
not all of which are fair, the multicultural brand has become toxic and enjoys little 
by way of popular nor political support.’ However it is not just about rebranding. 
Multicultural policies were developed in the 1960’s and while arguably 
appropriate for that time have failed to adapt to the current period of globalization 
and superdiversity.  
 
Integration, under the Coalition government was still difficult, with a sense that 
there was a lack of conceptual clarity about integration and a common 
understanding about the role of government in promoting it and clearly there was 
no interaction between integration and law. The Casey Review, discussed below, 
states that the Coalition government had promised a stronger integration strategy 
but PREVENT was too controversial to deliver and ‘…attempts to promote 
integration had not fulfilled their stated aim.’143  
 
Multicultural Policy 2015-Present Day 
The present Conservative government therefore inherited something of a 
minefield on multicultural policy. On 8th May 2015, a day after the General 
Election, a Policy Paper was issued stating  ‘…we want to achieve more 
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integrated communities.’ In reality this was just a list of projects funded between 
funded projects 2010 to 2015 under the Coalition government and the statement 
that integration is a local issue and requires a local response  because local 
communities should identify the issues that affect their areas and shape their own 
responses.144 Whist Cameron, as leader of the Coalition, had renounced state 
multiculturalism in 2011 the current Conservative government has not clearly set 
out its policy on multiculturalism. Policy is now under the umbrella of the Ministry 
for Housing, Communities and Local Government whose focus seems to be 
housing. However, a Hansard search shows 34 references to multiculturalism in 
Parliamentary debate between 1st July 2015 and 31st October 2018. Whilst, once 
again, the content of such debates is linked mainly to terrorism, immigration and 
Brexit, there have been debates on ‘Public Life: Values’ and ‘National Life: 
Shared Values and Public Policy Priority’.145  In the latter Lord Blencathra states 
that ‘…we must not in the name of discredited multiculturalism sacrifice our 
western liberal democracy’ and Lord Bilimoria states that ‘…in encouraging 
multiculturalism we did not encourage integration enough.’  
 
Policy in the early years of the Conservative government seems to echo that of 
the Coalition with a search on the Department for Communities and Local 
Government website on 15th January 2016 showing up to date news as ‘Your 
Guide to Planning a Street Party.’146 However, due to concerns about terrorism, 
immigration and the economy, in July 2015 the new government commissioned 
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Dame Louise Casey to undertake a review of integration and opportunity in the 
countries most isolated and deprived areas and the Casey Review was published 
on 5th December 2016.147 The terms of the Review were to consider how well we 
all get on and how well we do compared to one another. The review team met 
with 800 people and considered written submissions from another 200 and 
‘…none said that there was not a problem.’ Paragraph 1.8 of the Review states 
that ‘…creating a just fair society where everyone can get on is a cornerstone of 
Britain’s values.’ The Review is a mine of information and gives a strong sense 
of guidance for the way forward. In it we see encouraging evidence of 
engagement with law although the terms ‘culture’ and ‘multiculturalism’ seem to 
have all but disappeared from its language. 
 
Whilst the Review envisages an ongoing national conversation about the steps 
that everyone can take to increase integration and opportunity it also makes 
some initial recommendations. These are set out in paragraph 1.75 and include 
the need ‘…to improve the integration of communities in Britain and establish a 
set of values around which people from all different backgrounds can unite. This 
is envisaged through (and numbers 4, 5, 6 and 12 from a list of 12 are quoted 
here)  
• (4) attaching more weight to British values laws and history in our 
schools. 
• (5) considering what additional support or advice should be provided 
to immigrants to help them get off to the best start in understanding 
their rights and obligations and our expectations for integration 
• (6) …consider the introduction of an integration oath 
• (12)…consider an oath for holders of public office enshrining respect 
for the Rule of Law and equality. 
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The Review states that ‘…numerous reports of community cohesion and 
integration had been produced in the preceding 15 years but the 
recommendations they had made were difficult to see in action.’148 Part of that is 
because ‘integration’ is ‘…a nebulous concept which resists a single definition or 
description.’149  
 
‘British Values’ have been an important theme under Labour, Coalition and 
current Conservative governments. The current government, in its Counter 
Extremism strategy, recognizes the combination of the following as integral to a 
successful and cohesive nation- democracy, the Rule of Law, individual liberty, 
equality, freedom of speech and mutual respect, tolerance and understanding of 
different faiths and beliefs. Integration too, requires these common values’…but 
these need to strike the right balance between the benefits of diversity and those 
of unity or cohesion.’150 We can see in the culture-responsibility relationship the 
need to strike this very same balance. The Review recognizes that ‘…respect for 
the law has featured as a popular attribute in a variety of surveys on values and 
Britishness, including a 2015 ComRes Poll in which it was ranked second ‘most 
important’ British value.’151 However, there is no further discussion of what this 
means or of how respect for the law should be enshrined in wider multicultural 
policy. The Review goes on to look in detail at religion, education and inequality 
but there is no mention of ‘respect for the law’ other than in relation to ‘Religious 
Codes’ which looks at arbitration by non-state agencies and the call for 
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government and law enforcement agencies to take action against practices 
incompatible with ‘UK’ law in this dimension.152 
 
Following on from the initial recommendations of the Review outlined above, 
there are 12 broad recommendations for moving forward. These include a call on 
central government for a programme to improve community cohesion with local 
authorities to pick up on a breakdown of integration at the earliest stage and as 
we saw in paragraph 1.75(4) the promotion of ‘British’ laws, history and values 
within the core curriculum in all schools to ‘…build integration, tolerance, 
citizenship and resilience in our schools.’153 
 
In the Review, Casey is critical of past failures ‘…to implement practical actions 
with sufficient consistency, persistence of force to keep pace with the rate of 
change in communities.’154 This echoes the findings of an All Party Parliamentary 
Group Report following an enquiry into the integration of immigrants and 
published in August 2016 which commented on the ‘hitherto remarkably non-
interventionist’ role of government and called for a pro-active and comprehensive 
government strategy.155 Casey does not blame any particular administration but 
identifies a failure of will to take practical action and the approach to cohesion 
over time as ‘wrong’ with ‘…a long standing failure to manage the settlement of 
migrants a particular concern’ although she does note that cohesion policy has 
been squeezed out since 2010 ‘…with the [Coalition] government only willing to 
act exceptionally over the issue falling well below its stated ambition of ‘to do 
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more than any government before to promote integration.’’ 156  The previous 
reports (many of which we have reviewed here), she says make ‘sorry reading’ 
because ‘…the vast majority-if not all- of the findings, recommendations and 
concerns could be or are echoed in this Report.’157 A year after publication of the 
Review there was no evidence of the current government having acted upon the 
implementation of Casey’s recommendations with Casey herself criticizing the 
government for its failure to act and citing a preoccupation with Brexit as the 
reason.158 
 
However in March 2018 the government published its Green Paper ‘Building 
Stronger More Integrated Communities’ inviting views on its vision for ‘…building 
stronger integrated communities where people-whatever their background- live, 
work, learn and socialize together based on shared rights, responsibilities and 
opportunities.’ The consultation was open from 14th March to 5th June and the 
outcome is currently awaited. The key government proposals include the 
consideration ‘…of providing information to prospective migrants before they 
arrive in the United Kingdom to give them a clear expectation about our life in 
modern Britain including our laws, norms and standards.’159 And perhaps finally 
we find something that refers, obliquely at least to the culture-responsibility 
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relationship in the statement on page 56 that ‘…the links many immigrant 
communities have to their countries of origin can present challenges to 
integration where social or cultural norms overseas alter from British values and 
influence the way that people behave here…we need to better understand these 
international influences and their impact on integration.’ 
 
We can therefore conclude that integration is still the dominant way of thinking 
about multicultural policy and perhaps we have the clearest government 
statement on multicultural policy for a long time. A review of multiculturalism as 
philosophy may help us to understand how the culture-responsibility relationship 










4.4 Multicultural Philosophy 
Raz says that multiculturalism is a relatively new word, and that the Oxford 
English Dictionary traces it to the 1950’s and 1960’s.160 If Song is correct in her 
assertion that multiculturalism as philosophy is ‘a body of thought in political 
philosophy about the proper way to respond to cultural and religious diversity’ 
there is a huge amount of thought on what that response should look like.161 
Multicultural philosophy seeks to offer a way through the imbalances in society 
that arise from ‘difference’ and, like state multiculturalism, promotes the 
recognition of difference through the ‘politics of difference’. Bhandar asserts that 
multiculturalism derives from Hegel’s political philosophy of recognition.162 This 
in turn draws on the work of Fichte.163  According to Hegel, the relationship 
between the self and others is the fundamental defining characteristic of human 
awareness and activity. Multiculturalism is therefore associated with ‘identity 
politics’, the ‘politics of difference’ or ‘the politics of recognition’, seeing oneself 
through the perspective of others. The term the ‘politics of recognition’ was 
introduced by Taylor in 1992 who argues that recognition constitutes a vital 
human need and that misrecognition is a violation. 164  Citizens are therefore 
engaged in a ‘struggle for recognition’ and adequate recognition can only be 
achieved within ‘...an institutionalised order of rights.’165 These early ideas on 
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recognition have been refined and Benhabib says that to be a ‘self’ is to insert 
oneself into ‘webs of interlocution’ because ‘…our agency consists in our capacity 
to weave out of those narratives our individual life stories which make sense for 
us as unique selves.’166  The intersubjective constitution of the self therefore 
comes from dialogic moral practices but she distinguishes identity politics (with 
its belief that we can and should do justice to certain claims by allowing the group 
to define the content as well as the boundaries of its own identity) from the politics 
of recognition which can ‘…initiate critical dialogue and reflection in public life 
about the nature of the collectivity itself.’167 The challenge in the context of culture 
and legal responsibility is to work out how the culture-responsibility relationship 
can fit into the established order, how best that relationship can do justice to 
recognition and how it can avoid misrecognition. The aim of this section is to 
situate the culture-responsibility relationship in the discourse on multicultural 
justice. 
 
If the emphasis in policy has been on rights (and not responsibility) then 
traditionally the emphasis in philosophy has been on groups (and not individuals). 
The question for this thesis is how multicultural philosophy can help us 
understand what is at stake in the wider realm as we seek to find an answer to 
the research question. Interaction between multicultural philosophy and the 
culture-responsibility relationship is neatly summed up by Levine who states that 
‘…in a culturally diverse society, there is an inherent conflict between the unity 
required to govern, the need to honour diverse traditions and practices of cultural 
                                                        
166 Seyla Benhabib, The Claims of Culture (Princeton, Princeton University Press 2002) 15.  





groups, and the recognition accorded to autonomous individual actors’. 168 In 
section 2.4 we identified a number of recurring themes within this attempt to 
balance governance, culture and individuals but we have been consistent in 
making the importance of the group subsidiary in the context of the culture-
responsibility relationship.169 We have acknowledged the historical interpretation 
and adaptation of influential factors by a group in creating a ‘culture’ that is in turn 
adopted and adapted by the individual but the culture-responsibility relationship 
pertains solely to the individual. However, we can see that multicultural 
philosophy as well as multicultural policy has traditionally centered around the 
group. If we go back to the understandings of multicultural policy set out in section 
4.1 we recall ‘state’ multiculturalism’ as a situation where the cultural minorities 
are, or are thought of, as distinct communities and where multiculturalism 
encourages this distinctiveness. Within this therefore there is the recognition of 
the ‘group’ and the ensuing fear of cultural relativism as one group is placed 
higher in the group hierarchy than another. There is the fear of pluralism. There 
is the fear too of essentializing, as individuals are overlooked as autonomous 
agents and ascribed the perceived characteristics of the group. These are issues 
that we reviewed in the context of the culture-responsibility relationship in section 
2.4 where such fears, broadly labelled as threats to equality, were assuaged. 
 
Dworkin says that every plausible political theory has the same ultimate value, 
equality. So the debate is not about accepting equality but about how to interpret 
it and multiculturalism raises several issues for equality. Taylor wrote in 1992 of 
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the switch from the equality of sameness to the equality of difference. Liberal 
egalitarian multiculturalism is based on the liberal values of autonomy and 
equality and recognizes that culture is valuable to people because it enables 
individual autonomy and self- respect and, because members of minority groups 
are disadvantaged in terms of access to their own cultures, they are entitled to 
special protections. The opposition to this idea is that religious and cultural 
minorities should bear responsibility for their own beliefs and practices because 
religion and culture may shape ones willingness to seize an opportunity but they 
do not affect whether one has such an opportunity. Barry argues that justice 
should be concerned with ensuring a reasonable range of equal opportunities for 
the individual. Raz places limits on toleration towards groups so that cultural 
communities should not be allowed the right to repress their own members, the 
option to leave one’s group must be viable and publicly recognized and all groups 
must allow their members ‘…access to adequate opportunities for self-expression 
and participation in the life of the country in the widest sense.170 
 
Modood, however, emphasises the importance of the group and advocates 
‘strategic essentialism’. This means accepting empirically that groups do exist 
and that group identity should be normatively accepted if it is important to the 
bearers and therefore groups should be politically accommodated. Multicultural 
strategy, says Modood, should include a new ‘we’ because anti-essentialism 
alone is not enough to undermine or negate a policy of (state) multiculturalism.171  
Kymlicka’s work on multiculturalism comes from the premise that all minority 
groups suffer disadvantage. This is especially true of national and ethnic 
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indigenous groups.172 There should therefore be state intervention to sustain 
minority cultures and advance the rights of the group in the form of ‘group 
differentiated rights’ but ‘…liberals can only endorse minority rights in so far as 
they are consistent with respect for the freedom and autonomy of individuals.’173 
In this preservation of autonomy Kymlicka is true to liberal values and it allows 
him to claim that ‘…in all liberal democracies, one of the major mechanisms for 
accommodating cultural difference is the protection of the civil and political rights 
of individuals.’174 However, there is an argument that the group has no moral 
existence of its own and so group rights are in fact individual rights. Shachar 
(2001) refers to nomoi communities who are not sufficiently protected by the 
individual rights offered by liberal democracies and so special group rights are 
needed because ‘…once we acknowledge the constitutive relationships that exist 
between state institutions and majority cultural norms, we must prioritise 
substantive justice among the various cultural groups in order to achieve some 
balance of equilibrium; procedural justice merely reinforces pre-existing 
imbalances and dominant cultural norms.’175 We argued in section 2.4 against 
Renteln’s call for the ‘cultural defence’ to be a mechanism for redressing such 
state/individual imbalance and here there are also individual/nomoi conflicts 
where individual justice for, for example, women, may be compromised at the 
expense of group rights. This is, says Sachar, ‘…the paradox of multicultural 
vulnerability’ whereby it is not possible to simultaneously protect the rights of the 
group against the state without harming the rights of individuals against the 
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group.176 The multiculturalist approach, however, is pluralism and based on the 
rights of group against state and not individual against state. 
 
There have been arguments that link the social reality of multiculturalism with the 
political philosophy of communitarianism, in turn the philosophy behind the policy 
of community cohesion. We have considered communitarianism in the context of 
Cotterrell’s work and its closeness to culture but it is a much more politicised 
concept than culture, not least because of the theoretical ability of the community 
to create its own laws because ‘…laws roots are in a social group conceived as 
a united entity whose values, beliefs, common interests, allegiances or tradition 
provide its foundation.’177  Communitarianism emerged in the 1990’s as a ‘third 
way’ perspective between the politics of the left and the right but is criticized as 
the concept of ‘community’ is nebulous and Rattansi asks ‘when does a social 
group constitute a community?’178 Communitarianism can also be linked with the 
problem of essentialism in the way that culture can as it is easy to make the 
assumption that communities are homogenous and strongly bonded. However, 
in communitarianism a greater degree of agency is implicit, a sense of a more 
meaningful choice for the individual about whether to belong to a certain 
community or not.  
 
But we know from the understanding of culture arrived at in section 2.2 that we 
can no longer consider groups as bounded and static. The politics of recognition 
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is also criticized because the theory does not distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate struggles for recognition, it only recognizes single sites of oppression 
and it does not look at struggles within the group. We know too that the culture-
responsibility relationship is concerned with the individual and the quest for true 
blameworthiness and therefore we have to look to philosophy that moves away 
from the idea of the group. In essence, we cannot deny the existence of the 
group, both as a reality, although its boundaries are uncertain, and as a 
theoretical concept in the allocation of rights in a multicultural world. It is important 
too for its interaction with the individual.  Kukathas argues that there are no group 
rights, only individual rights. In granting group rights the state is overstepping the 
mark so states should not pursue ‘cultural integration’ or ‘cultural engineering’ but 
a ‘politics of indifference.’179 The disadvantage of this is that groups who do not 
value toleration and freedom of association (including the right to exit a group) 
will practice internal discrimination. The ‘benign neglect’ approach permits abuse 
of vulnerable members within the group. This of course is the fear that lies behind 
the multiculturalism/feminism paradigm discussed in section 2.4. Barry is 
concerned with ‘…views that support the politicization of group identities, where 
the basis is of the common identity is claimed to be cultural.’180 He is against both 
multiculturalism and communitarianism because they ‘…reward the groups that 
can most effectively mobilise to make demands on the polity.’181 Benhabib argues 
that in response to the ‘strange multiplicity of our times’ we have rushed into the 
premature normativisation of group identity which has resulted in hasty policy 
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recommendations.182 We have already considered Benhabib’s criticism of the 
reification of the group which she argues is based on a faulty epistemology and 
she defends social constructivism as a comprehensive explanation of social 
difference but insists that all analyses of culture must begin by distinguishing the 
standpoint of the social observer from that of the social agent.183 She rightly asks 
the question ‘…why should the individual’s search for an authentic selfhood be 
subordinated to the struggles of collectives unless we have some ontological or 
hierarchical ordering of the groups to which the individual belongs, so that one 
group, more than other groups, can be said to portray a more authentic 
expression of one’s individuality?’184 She therefore recommends a ‘…deliberate 
democratic model that permits maximum cultural contestation within the public 
sphere, in and through the institutions and associations of civil society.’185 
 
Looking beyond the politics of recognition Modood and Uberoi recognise that 
there is an ‘…intuition that different types of cultural minorities deserve better 
treatment than they actually get.’186  In some senses the culture-responsibility 
relationship does not belong in this discourse of supremacy battles between 
state, group and individual but in the wider discourse on rights, responsibilities 
and  justice. Parekh’s Rethinking Multiculturalism is seen as a philosophical 
justification for intercultural dialogue, a new direction in addressing injustice. 
Parekh rejects monism, which sees cultures as ‘…a national 
organic…unchanging integrated wholes’, an understanding that coincides with 
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the understanding of culture we reached in section 2.2187 He accepts the liberal 
view of cultures as linked to individual autonomy but recognizes that individuals 
need something to exercise that autonomy with and that is the beliefs and norms 
of their cultures. This resonates with Ortner’s scheme, analysed in section 2.4, 
for assessing the effect of culture on behaviour. However, Parekh points out that 
cultures have no coordinating authority, are complex and unsystemised, are 
internally varied and ‘…speak in several voices.’188 They have ‘no essence’189 
and are ‘…never settled, static and free of ambiguity.’190 So whilst each culture is 
a world of ideas it is not closed to other worlds and cultures can learn from one 
another and cultural diversity should not be viewed as a problem but as a pre-
requisite for the intercultural learning that leads to ‘…a richer view of reality.’191 
Parekh therefore advocates intercultural dialogue for four reasons, personal, 
communal, societal and universal. The culture-responsibility relationship should 
be situated at the societal level where ‘operative public values’, usually the values 
of the majority, can reflect too the values of the minority.  
 
Parekh is not alone in calling for dialogue in the search for justice. Hidden within 
the multicultural philosophy of a number of writers there are calls for dialogue. 
Chui asks us to ‘include people with different backgrounds in the reformulation of 
legal rules.’ 192  Barry advocates ‘…a principled dialogue on the interrelated 
problems of equality and culture’.193 And Cotterrell asks ‘…what are the demands 
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of the immigrant population on our law?’194 The culture-responsibility relationship 
may not be a demand as such but it seems not only logical but just too to ask the 
‘immigrant population’ how should the criminal law of England and Wales 
respond to the culture-responsibility relationship? Habermas says that, in order 
to achieve context sensitive laws, we need to fully include the affected groups in 
the process of decision making.195 Young takes this a stage further by suggesting 
that (formerly) oppressed groups should have a veto over questions that 
particularly affect them.196 In dialogue we need to be wary of ‘cultural bias’ or 
what Mikhail calls, in his review of Cotterrell, a ‘failure to confront the enduring 
reality of cultural hegemony’ saying that Cotterrell’s aspiration of dialogue is 
unrealistic.197 But we have to try. Von Jhering sees law as a kind of impartial 
mediator between the competing interests in society so that law’s real 
requirement is to ‘…relate the legal process to the developing needs of existing 
society.’198 The use of the word ‘developing’ is significant because it recognises 
the fluid nature of the law. 
 
Returning to Parekh’s rejection of monism, there must be implicit within this an 
acceptance of pluralism. We have been wary of legal pluralism throughout this 
thesis reiterating the need to situate the culture-responsibility relationship inside 
and not outside the criminal law. But we have recognised value or moral pluralism 
as an inevitable reality of a multicultural society. This reality has led Parekh to 
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seek a way through the conflict between ‘…locally valid norms pitched against 
other locally valid norms’ and a return to ‘…ethical norms which are true and 
therefore universal’ and he confronts this with ‘social and ethical pluralism’.199 
This involves the establishment of operative public values (OPVs) arrived at 
through dialogue. The ‘…OPVs of a society are the public moral and political rules 
that bind a particular group of people into a common society. Without such OPVs 
the different and often conflicting components of a society could not exist as a 
cohesive body… OPVs constitute and embody a shared form of public life.’200 
These OPVs are the way to negotiate multicultural inclusion because the 
dialogue that creates them must take place across liberal and non-liberal 
cultures. 
 
At the moment the culture-responsibility relationship is not an OPV but the 
framing of it arrived at in section 5.3 is a reflection the perception reached in the 
course of this thesis of how far the foundations of the law can be manipulated at 
this particular time. It is therefore a social and ethical reflection of the reality of 
the theory and practice of our criminal law. However, dialogue around the 
renewed understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship and its 
suggested ambit can lead to it being regarded as an OPV as well as a law. 
 
Shabani et al call for dialogue in the specific realm of the law, as a means of 
beginning to balance the competing claims of solidarity and accommodation. 
Even in a post recognition era there can be struggles over recognition, something 
Tully identifies as ‘…struggles over the intersubjective norms under which the 
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members of any system of government recognise each other as members and 
coordinate their actions.’201 These are ‘norms of mutual recognition’ and there 
may be times when individuals or groups might experience a prevailing norm as 
unbearable.202  This is because the norms are handed down by law makers and 
seen as definitive and final and Tully argues that dialogue ‘…among those in the 
field who are subject to the contested norm of mutual recognition’ is the way 
forward in what has been called the ‘dialogical turn’. 203  Norms of mutual 
recognition might be seen as being akin to Parekh’s OPVs but there is an initial 
implication that not all are invited to participate in Tully’s dialogue and in 
establishing the norms. Tully later corrects this by warning against the elevation 
of dialogue as a solution to all recognition problems and acknowledging the 
importance of the presence of theorists, courts and policy makers within the 
dialogue as a non-sovereign counterbalance.204 The dialogical turn is said to 
satisfy the claims of justice in calling into question a top-down monological 
approach to law making and embracing instead an interactive approach. 
Habermas says that ‘…only those norms can claim to be valid that meet or could 
meet with the approval of all affected in their capacity as participants in a practical 
discourse.’205 This resonates with the Rule of Law and the need for laws to have 
the moral authority of the population to which they apply. This might work with 
legislation but it does call into question the action that judges should take on a 
day to day basis if we accept that the declaratory theory of the law (discussed in 
section 3.2) is not always adhered to in practice. To address this we need to 
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return to Shabani’s ‘normative model of integrative adjudication’ which 
recognises that values are not always fully agreed.206 However, dialogue could 
establish general norms of recognition that, once established, judges could call 
upon. In any event Tully recognises that norms of mutual recognition are not 
definitive and absolute and that there is space within them for contestation or 
‘reasonable disagreement’. 
 
McCarthy agrees broadly with Tully but extends the dialogical turn to matters 
beyond recognition and to a ‘multilogue’ which is perhaps a better description of 
the envisaged process. He wisely cautions that there is an empirical question 
over whether democratic dialogue will be successful. This is a useful practical 
point because although we place emphasis in Chapter 5 on the power of dialogue 
to validate the culture-responsibility relationship in the first instance and to further 
its development in the second the logistics of ‘how’ need to be resolved. He warns 
too that dialogue can be elitist.  
 
If the post-multicultural critique is concerned with the essentialist way in which 
cultures are understood then one of the strengths of multicultural philosophy is 
the engagement of its proponents in the public sphere so that the link between 
theory and practice is established. Uberoi and Modood say that multiculturalism 
has become a debate about the public sphere and define the public sphere as 
‘… a political space distinct from both state and economy which emerged as an 
aspect of the development of the modern state and specifically of the liberal 
state.’ 207  Section 5.4 brings together unresolved questions that have arisen 
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throughout this thesis that could benefit from space in the public sphere. The 
framework for the culture-responsibility relationship is just a starting point raising 
in some ways more questions than it answers and Parekh’s ‘intercultural 
dialogue’ can begin to formulate answers to those questions because ‘…there is 
a market place of ideas in which the good ones are expected to drive out the bad 
ones.’208 
 
We referred in section 1.2 to a Critical Legal Studies interpretation of the ad hoc 
approach of the criminal courts to questions of culture and responsibility. We can 
return to this theory in the context of multicultural justice. The Critical Legal 
Studies movement emerged in American law schools in the 1970’s from the 
premise that liberal thought is underwritten by a number of contradictions, most 
notably the difference between rules and standards and the conflict between 
intentionalism and determinism. The law’s power to make social change is 
hampered by its commitment to such liberal values especially universalism. 
These ideas lead to unjust social hierarchies such as the domination of men over 
women, rich over poor and white over non-white. Law appears neutral but it 
masks existing patterns of power and control. We have seen throughout this 
thesis a shift over time in some of the claims underpinning the Critical Legal 
Studies movement, particularly those around identity politics where an 
awareness of the structural injustice beneath the surface of the law in a number 
of dimensions can be recognised and addressed through multicultural justice in 
general and the culture-responsibility relationship in particular. Both 
Mookherjee’s border tracing and Parekh’s intercultural dialogue can be helpful in 






their recognition of sights of oppression and the oppression of majoritarian laws 
and so are useful devices in warding off claims of injustice. One claim of the 
Critical Legal Studies movement is that legal culture can be mystifying to those 
standing outside it. In section 2.4 we recognised the perception of cultural bias in 
the courtroom and suggested that the culture-responsibility relationship, in 
genuinely constructed and individual cases, might be helpful in overcoming such 
perceptions. We have been consistent in promoting the importance of the culture-
responsibility relationship in the search for individual justice and we can pre-empt 
the critical Critical Legal Studies interpretation of liberalism’s autonomous 
individual, ‘…the liberal and romantic idea of each individual being the author of 
his life and responsibility for what he makes of it’, because we have taken account 
of Parekh’s remark that social contract tradition is based on ‘…the half-truth of 
the atomistic or individualistic ontological reduction of the concrete human 
being.’209 We have reconstructed our individual to be a concrete being whose 
well being is of the highest value.210  
 
Morrison says that philosophy seeks to ‘…maintain the delicate balance between 
humanity and the cosmos.’ 211  This must be especially true of multicultural 
philosophy. Raz says that multiculturalism is a new way of seeing an old truth 
and warns against ‘…the dangers of each one of us understanding the universal 
in terms of him or herself, a danger which is particularly great when the other is 
an alien in our country, when we are at home and he is not.’212 Multiculturalism 
therefore aims to give us a ‘heightened awareness’ and the culture-responsibility 
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relationship can be seen as an example of that heightened awareness, a 
mechanism by which the standpoint of others in our country can be recognized 
and comprehended.213 Jahanbegloo says that we need mediation of our moral 
and human duties but that our focus needs to be’…not so much on the intentions 
or motives and inner lives of individuals as on the structures of social relations.’214 
Perhaps this can be seen as being in conflict with our insistence on the primacy 
of the individual for the purposes of the culture-responsibility relationship but it 
resonates with Norrie’s moral contextualism in the attribution of legal 
responsibility. It does not seem possible at the moment to push the limits of the 
suggested framework in section 5.3 as far as to consider the structures of social 
relations  but this meeting of legal and multicultural philosophy adds weight to the 
call for ideology around the construction of the individual to be carried forward to 
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The broad aim of this Chapter was to generate a deeper understanding of the 
term ‘multiculturalism’ within the specific socio-political context of the United 
Kingdom in the twenty first century. This aim was achieved in two ways, firstly by 
researching the history of migration in relation to the United Kingdom, particularly 
population movements since 1900, to arrive at a clear understanding of the social 
reality of multiculturalism today and secondly by carrying out an analysis of both 
historical and contemporary multicultural policy. We now have a clear picture of 
multiculturalism as social reality and multiculturalism as policy. We see a diverse 
population brought together through centuries of migration, particularly 
immigration between 1950 and 2000 and fluid migration form 2000 onwards. We 
see an elusive and weak policy, not of state multiculturalism, but of integration. 
This is characterised by the distance of central government, race relations, 
immigration control and latterly anti-terrorism measures and the implications of 
Brexit. Policy, such as it is, displays a  lack of concern with post immigration 
settlement, and references to rights, responsibilities, British values and the Rule 
of Law are not followed up with explorations of meaning or meaningful attempts 
at developing policy in these areas further. 
 
In the course of pursuing that first aim we also set out to explore and establish 
the idea that as a society we have not fully considered the implications of 
multiculturalism for law and justice and that the perception of law and 
multiculturalism as bounded fields is not unfounded. In particular we have found 
that the culture-responsibility relationship and multicultural policy have not 
interacted. This lack of engagement between these spheres furthers the 





concern, not just in the criminal law and criminal justice system but in the wider 
realm of multiculturalism.  
 
Throughout this Chapter we have been questioning how recourse to multicultural 
policy can help in answering the research question how should the criminal law 
of England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility relationship? The 
wide world of policy can seem far removed from the seemingly small world of the 
culture-responsibility relationship and yet they are intrinsically linked in a number 
of ways. In section 2.4 we asserted that the culture-responsibility relationship has 
a socio-legal justification beyond that of the pursuit of individual justice and the 
recognition of the culture-responsibility relationship can be justified too in terms 
of its ability to provide a tangible legal response to and realization of multicultural 
policy whilst multicultural policy can in turn provide elucidation for the essence 
and ongoing development of the culture-responsibility relationship. We have seen 
calls in multicultural policy for allegiance to the Rule of Law, we have seen calls 
for citizens and immigrants to know their ‘rights and responsibilities’ and to obey 
the law. But what has been done to move these calls into the practical realm? 
The culture-responsibility relationship can, in a narrow way, answer those calls. 
It can be both the basis of a right and a responsibility. Looking back to section 
2.4 and the nuanced understanding of the relationship we arrived at there we can 
see that it affirms the responsibility of the individual to obey the law and it creates 
the legal right of the individual to have cultural evidence taken into account in 
court in limited and defined tightly circumstances. If we take integration as the 
basis of current multicultural policy and pick up on the recent reference in 





responsibility relationship can be seen as reinforcing that respect whilst at the 
same time encompassing the tolerance that our society is renowned for. 
 
We have questioned too how recourse to multicultural philosophy can help in 
answering the research question. The politics of recognition give the culture-
responsibility relationship a political purpose and give clarity to the conflict 
between individual  and group. Whilst we have been clear throughout this thesis  
that justice in itself is an adequate justification for the existence of the culture-
responsibility relationship, seeing it as a means by which ‘the other’ can be 
recognised adds weight to its importance.  
 
At the end of Chapter 3 we saw the reluctance, perhaps even the fear, of the 
criminal law and criminal justice system to engage with culture. Moving this to the 
next level we can see from the analyses in this Chapter the reluctance of 
multicultural policy to engage with law, particularly the criminal law. It is no 
wonder then that the culture-responsibility relationship is under-explored in 
multicultural policy and yet in Chapter 2 we established its importance for 
contemporary justice in a multicultural society. If multiculturalism (as policy) 
evades law and law in turn evades culture, yet culture is the basis of 
multiculturalism (as social reality) then the circle does not quite meet up and there 
is a sense that justice cannot be achieved. In section 4.4 we turned to 
multicultural philosophy in the hope of finding the answer to a just way forward 
for the culture-responsibility relationship. Some of the issues have been explored 
in earlier parts of the thesis, particularly in section 2.4 where the problems 
inherent in the culture-responsibility relationship were also seen as a socio-legal 





comes from dialogical theory and we can identify and take forward to Chapter 5 
suggestions for further dialogue. 
 
Whilst the broad aim of the Chapter has been achieved some tangible progress 
has been made towards answering the question how should the criminal law of 
England and Wales respond to the culture-responsibility relationship? The 
current government rhetoric does seem more committed to engagement between 
law and multicultural policy and we need to harness this interest and take forward 
to the framework in Chapter 5 thought about how legal responsibilities generally 
and the culture-responsibility relationship in particular can be incorporated into 
the wider multicultural picture as well as into the practice of our criminal law. 
Whilst there seems to be agreement that ‘state multiculturalism’ has failed, 
multiculturalism in terms of a demographic description is still very much a social 
reality and the development of multicultural policy, pending the response to the 
Green Paper consultation, is looking encouraging. Baroness Mobarik recently 
said in the House of Lords ‘…for a long time, diversity or multiculturalism were 
celebrated and encouraged on this island… it is deeply disappointing to think that 
multiculturalism was simply a failed experiment… it was not multiculturalism per 
se which was at fault but the way that we went about promoting it…just because 
we got multiculturalism wrong, we must not be reactive, go to the other extreme 
and impose assimilation.’215 The culture-responsibility relationship can sit well 
within a framework of integration and its recognition can be seen as a positive 
step toward a coherent multicultural policy that engages with law and justice and 
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that balances respect for the Rule of Law with the recognition of individual 
difference. Chui recognized this almost twenty five years ago when she saw three 
possible responses to the ‘cultural defence’, affirmation (which corresponds most 
closely with exclusion), opposition (which corresponds most closely with coercive 
assimilation) or an intermediate position in which cultural evidence is used to 
show the defendant’s state of mind.216 We need to take forward to Chapter 5 the 
argument that the culture-responsibility relationship is integral to the criminal law 
in a multicultural era and that it needs to be considered in the context of 
multicultural policy because currently the criminal law is not doing’…all that it can 
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The Way Forward and Conclusions 
‘The challenge then is to take minds and hearts formed over the long millenia of 
living in local troops and equip them with ideas and institutions that will allow us 
to live together as the global tribe that we have become.’1 
 
5.1 Summary of Arguments 
In this thesis we have undertaken a socio-legal and interdisciplinary analysis of 
the relationship between culture and legal responsibility focusing on the individual 
(not the group) and responsibility (not rights) within the parameters of (i) the 
foundations, practice and policy of the criminal law and criminal justice system of 
England and Wales; and (ii) understandings of multiculturalism within the socio-
political system of the United Kingdom in the twenty first century. Throughout that 
analysis we have been mindful of justice as we have searched for an answer to 
the question how should the criminal law of England and Wales respond to the 
culture-responsibility relationship? The result of the analysis is a renewed and 
specifically nuanced understanding of the culture-responsibility relationship 
whose importance for contemporary justice has been established. In general, we 
have advanced the hypothesis that the criminal law and criminal justice system 
of England and Wales manifest the absence of a consistent and coherent 
engagement with both culture and the culture-responsibility relationship and we 
have tentatively offered some thoughts on that lack of engagement. We have also 
identified a lack of engagement between the criminal law and multicultural policy. 
                                                        






We have suggested that if multicultural policy evades law and law in turn evades 
culture (even though culture is the basis for multiculturalism) then the circle is not 
complete. 
 
The broad aims of the thesis have thus been achieved and the purpose of this 
Chapter is firstly to take the knowledge gained forward and into the practical 
realm through the construction of a framework that suggests a way for the 
criminal law and criminal justice system of England and Wales to engage 
meaningfully with the culture-responsibility relationship (section 5.3) and 
secondly to identify those matters that are important for justice in a contemporary 
multicultural society and that need further consideration at a theoretical, practical 
or policy level under the two broad headings of criminal law and multicultural 
policy (section 5.4). 
 
One of the most important things to come from the thesis is the distinction 
between the culture-responsibility relationship and the ‘cultural defence’. This is 
much more than a matter of semantics. However, the body of literature that has 
built up over the last 25-30 years surrounding the ‘cultural defence’ has been 
invaluable in allowing us to construct the understanding of the culture-
responsibility relationship which we have reached here and is a wealthy source 
for its ongoing development. The word ‘defence’ is used too loosely in discourse 
and does not bear the scrutiny of legal analysis as its meaning is situated on a 
spectrum from acquittal to mitigation in sentencing without any relationship 
between culture and responsibility necessarily being established. The culture-
responsibility relationship is a much stronger legal concept and something that is 





from the idea of a ‘defence’  but through its thoroughly considered interpretations 
of both ‘culture’ and ‘responsibility’. We have given both culture and responsibility 
fluid understandings with culture conceptualised as a fuzzy complex whole 
derived from the historical interpretation and adaptation by a group of a number 
of possible influential factors that an individual may adopt. Responsibility is 
attributed to liberalism’s autonomous individual whose capacity (as choice and 
fair opportunity) must be considered but whose character, at least at the stage of 
establishing guilt or innocence, must not be seen as either innately good or bad 
because in a multicultural context this runs the risk of essentialising. In 
considering responsibility we are aware of interests, ideas and influences outside 
of the individual that may have a bearing on his responsibility. These broadly 
‘relational accounts’ of responsibility are particularly important in the context of 
culture but perhaps currently less workable in the practical realm. Our 
understanding of responsibility also broadens its meaning to be relevant to both 
decisions of guilt or innocence and to the degree of responsibility attributed at the 
sentencing stage.  The culture-responsibility thus gains a sense of purpose from 
finding a place within the criminal justice system.  
 
A second overriding matter of importance to be established by this thesis is the 
clear need for the culture-responsibility relationship to be included in the criminal 
law and criminal justice system of England and Wales. The general symbiosis 
between law and culture identified in section 2.4 fortifies this argument along with 
the findings reported in Chapter 3. The aim of that Chapter was to gather 
evidence to support the hypothesis that the culture-responsibility relationship has 
not been duly considered in theory, practice and policy and to reflect on the lack 





patterns were identified and detail is given in section 3.5. These include, most 
notably,  
• a greater engagement between criminal law and culture in the realm of the 
‘cultural offence’ than that of the culture-responsibility relationship. 
• a greater engagement  between criminal law and culture at the sentencing 
stage than at the guilt stage. 
• a lack of clarity about the treatment of ‘cultural evidence’ in court.   
• an inconsistency in decisions on both guilt and sentencing. 
• a general uncertainty about and reluctance to engage openly with culture. 
• gendered implications in the treatment of culture in the courtroom. 
• statistics on conviction rates and appeal rates in cases involving culture 
that that are at odds with the statistics in cases that do not involve culture.  
 
We examined the foundations of the criminal law to consider whether there is any 
immanent structural or theoretical barrier to the accommodation of the culture- 
responsibility relationship and found that, with political will, there is space within 
the existing system. We have found multicultural policy to be elusive and have 
noted the failure of successive governments to follow through on seemingly 
empty policy statements. Whilst we can now identify integration as a policy aim, 
the focus of the current government is on immigration rather than post 
immigration settlement and on regulating undesirable practices. Central 
government has abdicated responsibility for multicultural policy, relying on local 
communities to provide integration strategies. Multicultural Policy emphasises the 
immigrant rather than the migrant and is embedded in race relations. Most of all 
the focus is on the prevention of terrorism. The emphasis is on rights rather than 
responsibilities and groups rather than individuals. There is no engagement 
between multicultural policy and the criminal law in general and therefore it is no 
surprise to find that the culture-responsibility relationship has not been 
considered at a policy level. There is evidence in the rhetoric of commitment to 





once again, not followed through and there is no active exploration at policy level 
about what these things actually mean. We concluded in section 4.5 that the 
culture-responsibility relationship is capable of uniting policy and practice as it 
can sit within a integration framework as both the basis of a right and a 
responsibility, answering the call for a two way process in which immigrants are 
‘socially included’ and enjoy equal treatment.  A surprising finding is the bridge 
that multicultural philosophy can provide between the practice of the criminal law 
(in the form of the culture-responsibility relationship) and multicultural policy 
because in section 4.4 we gain understanding into the complex relationship 
between individual group and state and whilst we are concerned with the 
individual we can see how his autonomy, his sense of self, is informed by those 
outside of himself. The next section includes further thoughts on culture, 







5.2 Reflections on Culture, Multiculturalism and Justice 
The thesis did not set out to adopt a postmodern approach to either culture or the 
culture-responsibility relationship but the understanding of culture that we arrived 
at in Chapter 2 has a distinctly postmodern aura. Postmodern jurisprudence is 
attacked for its interpretivist approach to concepts perhaps previously considered 
definitive and objectively understood. We have seen in our own analysis of both 
culture and responsibility a reluctance to be prescriptive and to favour instead a 
fluid interpretation of these concepts. Another concept that can be subjected to 
the postmodern critique is that of justice. Feldman argues that we understand 
justice as both a value and ‘an inexhaustible drive’, the former informed by 
philosophical hermeneutics and the latter by deconstruction.2 Throughout this 
search for an answer to the question, how should the criminal law of England and 
Wales respond to the relationship between culture and legal responsibility?, 
justice has been ephemerally present and even though we have not attempted 
define it, we know innately that it is a value to which we must aspire. Like culture, 
justice is socially understood and yet we do not seek to undermine its value 
because it is not in some ways tangible. Feldman argues that ‘…we are open to 
the meaning of justice, not because our souls transcend culture but rather 
because we participate in our communal traditions and culture.’ 3  Justice is 
therefore understood from within our own cultural standpoint. Perhaps that is why 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice has been so enduring, because he asks us to find a 
just place for ourselves from behind the veil of ignorance where we are 
supposedly, among other things, a-cultural. We need the culture-responsibility 
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relationship to feel ‘just’ and have seen throughout this thesis the complex 
challenges in balancing competing interests in the search for justice. We said at 
the outset that we wanted to avoid what Norrie refers to as an anti-nomial 
approach. The multiple binaries that we have confronted (male/female, 
insider/outsider, white/non-white ,individual/group, rights/responsibilities, 
agency/determinism, guilt/sentencing, equality/inequality) have made this a 
challenge but have not undermined the search for a just  answer  to the question 
at the heart of the thesis as the culture-responsibility relationship has been 
considered in the widest possible sense throughout and the suggested 
framework for a way forward is grounded in theory, practice and  policy.  
 
In the realm of justice multiculturalism is challenged by the intersection of culture 
and equality. Phillips writes, in Multiculturalism without Culture, of a normative 
commitment to equality but also of support for multiculturalism and women’s 
rights, achieved through dispensing with an essentialist understanding of culture 
so that individuals from minority groups are left with agency.4 And at times we 
see the absence of culture in multiculturalism because culture is somehow 
inherently problematic. Perhaps that is why, in Chapter 3, we became aware of a 
fear of culture within the courtroom, or at least of an uncertainty or reluctance 
about how to engage with it. Culture, it seems, is only allowed into the practice of 
the criminal law through the ‘back door’. This might be because it is perceived as 
belonging to the other and something that others belong to. These thoughts raise 
questions about the plausibility of culture as a concept in the realm of justice. But 
culture is intrinsically present in law as we saw in the three disparate cases 
                                                        





outlined in section 1.1. It is as stated in section 2.2, what makes us uniquely 
human and as Matravers points out, humans ‘…reflect on their culture, criticize 
and revise it, add to it elements derived from others, even replace it with another, 
but they cannot transcend or operate outside the realm of culture altogether.’5 
And therefore the law, to be truly just, needs to embrace it. 
 
Fuller states that law is ‘...the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the 
governance of rules’ but questions who is making these rules because for the 
rules to stick there must be ‘an internal morality of the law.’6  Fuller recognises in 
this ‘hundreds of thousands’ of systems of law as clubs and associations the 
world over make their rules which bind their members. But the ‘internal morality’ 
of state law is necessary too, with morality being given the meaning of 
‘acceptability’. Magnarella says that the criminal law embodies the morality of the 
politically dominant but again why should this be so if we live in a multicultural 
world and if we recognise the need for dialogue?7 We need dialogue to allow us 
to decide upon what is ‘acceptable’. Parekh sees multiculturalism as a movement 
for justice rather than an uncritical celebration of all norms and the culture-
responsibility relationship can play its part in that movement. Teubner says that 
law has lost its identity in postmodern times, that it ‘…has surrendered to new 
Gods: it is seen as a servant of economics, of utility, while we demand that it 
should be a moral phenomenon.’8 Multiculturalism needs to be one of those gods. 
Raz say that multiculturalism can be a ‘…normative precept motivated by concern 
                                                        
5 Matt Matravers ‘Responsibility Morality and Culture’ in Will Kymlicka, Claes Lernestedt and 
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for the dignity and well-being of all human beings’ and a well-considered culture-
responsibility relationship can also been viewed in this positive light.9  
  
                                                        





5.3 A Suggested Framework for the Culture-Responsibility Relationship 
Matravers states that ‘…the moment at which the criminal law of a liberal state is 
brought to bear on a person with a different cultural background from the majority-
seemingly in response to actions that implicate that background-can create a 
certain anxiety in liberals.’10 It is hoped that the analysis in the thesis and the 
ensuing framework can go some way towards alleviating that anxiety. There are 
a number of themes that have been identified throughout this thesis that are 
insufficiently developed to be included in a practically based framework at this 
stage. These are taken forward to section 5.4 as subjects for further research 
and/or dialogue. The framework reflects the findings made throughout this thesis.  
It reflects the current limits of the law as established in this thesis and is therefore 
not radical but sensitive to the need to resonate with the political will and aware 
of alienating its ability to be reasonably considered or of inducing fear. It adheres, 
broadly, to the tenets of liberalism. It recognises the need for strict standards 
through criminal norms and the limits of the orthodox criminal law but balances 
these against extended perceptions of agency and moral responsibility in the 
wake of multiculturalism. It attempts to reflect the delicate balance between the 
need for equality and the need to accommodate the individual from a different 
cultural background. It is, in the spirit of dialogue, a starting point.  
 
The framework is divided into (i) general recommendations; (ii) recommendations 
relating to practice and policy; and (iii) recommendations relating to substantive 
law.  
 
                                                        







• The concept of the ‘cultural defence’ should be disregarded in discourse 
about the relationship between culture and legal responsibility and its 
place taken by the culture-responsibility relationship. 
 
Practice and Policy 
• Cultural evidence should be admitted to the courtroom. Renteln still argues 
that cultural evidence should be allowed in all cases as a ‘procedural 
matter’ so that the judge should always consult an expert, that is an 
anthropologist.11 This may not be necessary but the Judiciary need to 
have clear guidance on when to consider culture. This could be whenever 
a need to establish a relationship between culture and legal responsibility 
arises. Cultural evidence should not be treated any differently from other 
evidence but should fall within the ambit of the Criminal Procedural Rules 
and experts on cultural evidence should be subject to the same standards 
on reliability as other experts.  
• We identified significant reference to culture in policy documents relating 
to the Judiciary and a commitment to training the Judiciary in the 
awareness of cultural difference. This commitment should be acted upon 
so that the Judiciary is better equipped to deal with culture in both the 
realm of procedure and the substantive law.  
• The Sentencing Council should make clear what mitigating factors can be 
taken into account in personal mitigation. Sentencing Guidelines should 
therefore be amended to include specific guidance on where culture might 
be relevant as a mitigating factor (and arguably as an aggravating factor). 
• Sentencing Remarks should be published in all cases at Crown Court level 
and above involving a cultural dimension so that we can begin to 




• There should be no further criminalisation of cultural practices. ‘Cultural 
Offences’ can challenge the limits of the criminal law and criminalisation 
theory and legislation aimed at preventing the harm in forced marriage and 
FGM has not proved effective. 
• There should be no distinct stand-alone ‘cultural defence’.  
• The Judiciary should embrace the opportunity to consider the defence of  
loss of control in the context of culture. Subjective understandings of a 
litigant ‘in the circumstances of the defendant’ should be explored if the 
situation calls for the court to consider whether there is, in any individual 
case, a relationship between culture and legal responsibility.  
• Capacity may be considered as bearing upon responsibility in findings of 
guilt or innocence. It is vital that this should only be considered where the 
                                                        





defence raise the issue of capacity as relevant to a relationship between 
culture and legal responsibility. Character should not be considered at the 
stage of establishing guilt or innocence. 
• Ortner’s ‘middle position’ in the cultural schema of determinism could be 
adopted as an initial test for establishing the culture-responsibility 
relationship in individual cases. The question that we cited in section 2.4 
‘…did my culture, this assemblage of shared meanings and standards to 
which I have become enculturated determine or influence my behaviour?’ 
could be put forward and tested as a model direction to juries in cases 
where culture and responsibility meet.   
• Both the capacity and the character of an individual should be relevant in 
personal mitigation in sentencing. 
 
 
Lernestedt says that ‘…my guess (or at least wish) is that in time what we now 
label ‘cultural’ evidence in criminal law will be seen as a part of that coherent 
whole’, that is the general law on personal responsibility.12 This framework is 
perhaps the first step towards such a goal. It is by no means a perfect solution. 
In applying this framework in practice it is clear that, for now, the sentencing 
process will bear the burden of accommodating the culture-responsibility 
relationship. This recognises Fletcher’s ‘mercy’ and whilst something about this 
way forward feels perhaps a little disingenuous, in the final analysis for now at 
least it may be that ‘…justice is to be done not through adherence to the Rule of 
Law but through the sentencer’s discretion.’13  Waldron says that ‘…allowing 
cultural norms to change the terms of the criminal law in certain circumstances 
for specific defendants from specific communities, would lead to unacceptable 
contradictions, concerns about retroactive application, and mass confusion 
among the public as to what constitutes criminal behaviour.’14 But this is not what 
the culture-responsibility relationship sets out to do. It is not cultural norms that 
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are changing the law from the outside but consensus arrived at, in the now, 
through a culture-responsibility relationship grounded in the existing reality of 
policy and practice of the criminal law and criminal justice system and, in the 
future, through dialogue about the ongoing development of this framework. It is 
not for ‘specific defendants from specific communities’ but for everyone- when 
and where a relationship between culture and legal responsibility is established. 
It does not pose the threat of mass confusion but rather seeks to bring 
consistency to existing confusion. In time the culture-responsibility relationship 
can become normalised within the criminal law and at that point we may be able 
to adopt a more common sense and manifest approach but until it is established 







5.4 Matters to Take Forward 
The framework for the culture-responsibility relationship suggested in section 5.3 
is a starting point. It includes ten ways in which the criminal law can move forward 
in a practical way to meet the needs of defendants from any background where 
culture might be thought to have an effect on responsibility.  It is intended to 
reflect the limits of the law as they stand today. However, a number of other 
matters have arisen in the course of the analysis undertaken in this thesis. They 
are not recommended for inclusion in the framework because they do not pertain 
directly to the development of the culture-responsibility relationship, because they 
cannot be contained by it or because they involve a significant shift in thinking 
about the values underpinning the criminal law. They are nevertheless important 
for the ongoing and just development of the culture-responsibility relationship or 
for justice generally in a multicultural world. We do not want to forgot them and 
this list can be seen as a working agenda of ‘matters for further discussion’. 
Following the distinct parameters within which this research has been carried out 
these are divided into matters of the criminal law and matters of multicultural 
policy. 
Criminal Law 
• Norrie’s argument that motive is more central to human agency than 
intention should be revisited. Much of Renteln’s work, being non-
jurisdiction specifc, is also focused on motive. 
• Norrie’s moral contextualism should be revisited in terms firstly of defining 
who is responsible for acts that contravene the law and secondly in relying 
on retribution as the basis for punishment. As Norrie says ‘…there is 
growing uncertainty as to the correct philosophical basis for criminal law 
concepts and the growing challenge to orthodox subjectivism as the 
dominant approach to criminal responsibility.’15 
• ‘Cultural offences’ need to be revisited. The concept of harm and the 
question of what or who the criminal law is protecting needs to be 
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reconsidered in the context of a multicultural population. It seems to defeat 
the purpose of legislation creating the offences of forced marriage and 
FGM to allow culture in personal mitigation but if rehabilitation or reform is 
a better punishment outcome than retribution (for example, education 
and/or reform goals might be a more appropriate basis for punishment in 
these cases) then perhaps it could be used in  mitigation to drive a more 
appropriate sentence. The low prosecution rates in cases of forced 
marriage and FGM needs to be addressed. 
• The concept of ‘honour’ needs to be revisited. The inherent reluctance of 
the criminal law to include it in decisions both on guilt and in sentencing 
needs to be clarified. 
• Further research into outcomes in cases in the criminal justice system 
involving a cultural dimension needs to be carried out. This picks up the 
findings of the Lammy Report and the perception of an endemic cultural 
bias in the legal system.  
Multicultural Policy 
In section 4.2 we identified a number of perceptions surrounding multicultural 
policy that were subsequently borne out in the analysis of multicultural policy 
undertaken in section 4.3. The culture-responsibility relationship can be seen as 
a positive mechanism for redressing, in part, some of these negative perceptions. 
We need to be mindful of elevating the purpose of the culture-responsibility 
relationship to the level of policy because we must remember that it is, in 
essence, simply a mechanism for establishing true blameworthiness at the 
individual level but in situating it within these perceptions it can be taken forward 
for discussion and dialogue in the wider realm. The themes are as follows:- 
• A clear statement of current multicultural policy would be enormously 
beneficial. Generally we need much more transparency in these 
matters. 
• Consideration should be given to what is meant by the Rights and 
Responsibilities of Citizens’ and to phrases such as the ‘need to obey 
the law’ and ‘adherence’ to the Rule of Law in the context of the 
multicultural citizen and the culture-responsibility relationship. 
• ‘Multicultural policy’ should focus on settlement after arrival in the 
United Kingdom. The ability of the culture-responsibility to assist in that 
settlement should be considered.   
• There has been opposition to ‘multiculturalist policy’. This can be 
because it has in general been seen to be  created by policy elites 
rather than by popular demand. Therefore ‘…ordinary people have 





lives more difficult in times that are difficult already.’16 Dialogue is a 
way to circumvent this perception. There have been strong arguments 
for dialogue both from academia (Tully, for example) and policy 
(Cantle’s intercultural dialogue and Parekh’s focus on dialogue bridges 
the two domains. 
• If the development of the law and legal theory depends on empirical 
socio-legal research to keep it grounded then empirical legal research 
and dialogue can perhaps be combined. 
• A broad dialogue/research about the concept of culture in the legal 
domain would be hugely helpful in enhancing understanding of culture 
and understanding the law’s reluctance to engage fully with it. This 
could extend to debate around the possibility of culture being a 
protected characteristic for the purposes of the Equality Act. 
 
All of these matters- law, culture, multiculturalism, the culture-responsibility 
relationship- need to be taken forward and considered as a joined up whole, with 
a concrete framework such as that suggested here as a starting point from which 
meaningful dialogue and further research can begin. As Rosen says ‘…legal 
scholars often approach the patterns of social and cultural life either as 
intrinsically interesting but not directly germane to the course of actual legal 
decision making or in need of being distinct from law.’17 This can no longer be so 
because ’…it is by moving back and forth across the analytic line that separates 
law from culture that we can perhaps best see how problems raised in each 
domain find their response not within their own confines alone but within the ambit 
of both- how the determination of facts depends upon the concepts by which mind 
and act are categorised in ordinary discourse or how the conceptual framework 
of legitimate authority is shaped by its judicial articulation.’18 
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 5.5 Conclusion 
Rosen says that law must seek to ‘…maintain the cosmos’, especially in times of 
contested social change.19 Norrie says that ‘…law should be comprehended 
neither in its positivity nor as a metaphysical correlate but as a social 
phenomenon comprehended within sociological theory.’20 It is a tall order to call 
upon a social phenomenon to maintain the cosmos, yet we know that law has 
this capability because it is underwritten by the political will and bolstered by the 
times in which it finds itself. The criminal law now needs to respond adequately 
to multicultural times. If  ‘…the stories that we tell to justify one legal state of 
affairs over another are just that, stories’, it is hoped that culture has established 
its place in such story telling.21 It is acknowledged that judgements are made on 
the basis of story-telling and that the  ‘…adjudicators judge the plausibility of  a 
story according to certain structural relations among symbols in the story.’ 22 
Culture is such a symbol. 
In legal theory there is almost unanimous agreement that we need resonance or 
at least not dissonance ‘between the substantive norms of criminal law and 
prevailing social norms.’23  How do we establish what those prevailing social 
norms are in a multicultural society?  We talk to people. Ultimately, as Appiah 
says, we need to ‘…live together as the global tribe that we have become’ and 
we need to reflect seriously upon the role of the criminal law in enabling us to do 
so. As Latour says ‘…there is no doubt that the war of the worlds is taking place; 
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unity and multiplicity cannot be achieved unless they are progressively pieced 
together by delicate negotiations. Nobody can constitute the unity of the world for 
anybody else...by generously offering to let others in, on condition they leave at 
the door all that is dear to them: their gods, their souls, their objects, their times 



















                                                        







Decided Cases Involving a Cultural Dimension 2000-2018 
 
Part 1-Cases Not Appealed 
 
1. R v Mohammed Rahman, R v Manmoor Rahman, R v Miyibar Rahman 
Oxford Crown Court 
4th November 2005 
 
 
3 defendants found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. 
Mohammed to serve minimum of 20 years 
Miyibar to serve minimum of 16 years 
Manmoor to serve minimum of 14 years 
 
2. R V Rahan Arshad 
Manchester Crown Court 
13th March 2007 
Defendant found guilty of murder of wife and three children and sentenced to life 
imprisonment with recommendation he serve life. 
 
3. R V Athwal and Athwal 
Central Criminal Court  
26th July 2007 
 
Defendants found guilty of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment 
Bachan Athwal (mother in law) to serve 20 years 
Sukhdave Athwal (husband) to serve 27 years 
 
 
4. R v Gurmeet Ubhi Singh 
Leicester Crown Court 
February 2011 
BACKGROUND: Arash Ghorbani Zarin (19) was killed by Mohammed Raman (19) and Manmoor 
Raman (16) on the orders of their father Mohammed because he had been having a relationship 
with their sister. The relationship brought tension to the family where there was a ‘…cultural 
divide between the Bangladeshi born father and the British born children’. Gross, J. 
Prosecuting counsel said ‘… their relationship brought shame and dishonor on the family. That 
drove the accused, headed by the head of the family to murder Arash to vindicate the family’s 
honour. It is inconceivable that a murder of this kind would be organized by his 15 and 18 year 
old sons on their own’ 
BACKGROUND: Uzma Rahan and her three children were killed by Arshad Rahan in July 2006 
because he was jealous about his wife’s affair. 
He pleaded provocation and claimed that his wife had murdered the children. 
 
 
BACKGROUND: Surjit Kaur Athwal was killed in India in 1998. The killing was arranged by 
her mother in law Bachan Kaur Athwal and husband Sukhdave Athwal.  





Defendant found guilty of murder of daughter and sentenced to life imprisonment 
to serve 15 years 
 
5. R v Ashtiaq Ashgar 
 Sheffield Crown Court 
 December 2012 
 
Defendant found guilty of murder of girlfriend and sentenced to life imprisonment 
to serve 17 ½ years. 
 
 
6. R v Ahmed 
Chester Crown Court 
3rd August 2012 
 
Defendants Iftikhar Ahmed (father) and Fazana Ahmed (mother) found guilty of 
murder and given a life sentence, both to serve minimum of 25 years. 
 
7. R v Mohammed Inayat 
Birmingham Crown Court  
30th October 2013 
Defendant found guilty of murder of wife and guilty of arson but not guilty of 




8. R v Ahmed al-Khahib 
Manchester Crown Court 
2014 
 
BACKGROUND: Gurmeet Singh Ubhi murdered his daughter Amrit because he could not accept 
her western lifestyle. He was sentenced to life imprisonment with a recommendation that he 
serve 15 years. 
Singh’s second wife (who he had attacked with a chisel, a crime he had served a prison sentence 
for) said that the murder of Amrit was not about her being ‘westernised’ but that ‘…it has to do 
with being an old fashioned father who thought his children should do what he thought. It is not 
really a cultural thing’. 
 
BACKGROUND: Shafelia Ahmed was killed by her parents Iftikhar and Fazana Ahmed in 1998 for 
bringing shame on the family. They were not prosecuted until 2012 when another daughter 
staged a robbery at the family home so that she could report the killing to the police. 
‘A desire that she understood the cultural heritage from which she came is perfectly 
understandable, but an expectation that she lived in a sealed cultural environment separate from 
the culture of the country in which she lived was unrealistic, destructive and cruel’. Evans J.   
 
 
BACKGROUND: Mohammed Inayat set fire to the family home because he did not want his 
daughter to fly to Dubai to marry. His wife died in the fire but his daughter did not. He was charged 
with the murder of his wife, the attempted murder of his daughter and with arson with intent to 
endanger life. 
 





Defendant found guilty of murder and given a life sentence to serve minimum of 
20 years. 
 
9. R v Jahangir Nazir 
Manchester Crown Court 
March 2014 




Part 2- Cases Appealed 
 
10. R v Faqir Mohammed 
[2005] EWCA Crim 1 880 
 
Trial-cultural beliefs were raised in the context of provocation. 
Appeal-Defendant appealed on a point of law, that the test for provocation applied 
during trial (Smith (Morgan)) should have been that under the later decision in 
Holley. The CA found that the jury would have reached the same verdict under 




11. Rv Sze-Hau Tai 
[2006] EWHC 1724 (QB)  
 
  
He claimed that the djinn (demonic spirit in Islamic folklore) had commanded him to bury his wife 
and a defence of diminished responsibility was rejected 
 
 
BACKGROUND: Jahangir Nazar killed his wife Farkhanda Younis and was tried at Manchester 
Crown Court in March 2014. She was ‘westernised’ and ‘promiscuous’ and he was jealous and 
controlling. 
Defence of diminished responsibility caused by severe depression. This was not accepted because 
of his ‘mental agility’ after the killing. 
 
BACKGROUND: Mohammed killed his daughter after finding her with her boyfriend in her 
bedroom. He raised the defence of provocation at trial and the jury was asked to take account of 
his depression and his ‘strongly held religious and cultural beliefs’, ie that sex outside marriage is 
a sin, and to weigh those things against the evidence from his children that he was a violent man 
in deciding whether he had been provoked. Provocation was not allowed as he had lost his temper 
rather than lost control and he was convicted of murder on 18th February 2002 at Manchester 






Trial-cultural background was not raised in the context of provocation. 
Appeal-cultural background raised in the context of provocation and QBD ruled 
that it ‘mitigated the criminality pf the conduct a little’. Held that the minimum term 
of 12 years remain as mitigating circumstances had been properly addressed at 
trial. 
 
12. Re Siva Kumar (Setting of Minimum Term) 
[2007] EWHC 1322 (QB) 
 
 
Trial-cultural background identified as the only mitigating factor in sentencing 
Appeal- The mitigating factors were accepted on appeal on the basis that K would 
find his time in custody harder to bear because of linguistic and cultural 
unfamiliarity with those around him. 
 
 
13. R v Yones 
[2007] EWHC 1306 (QB) 
 
 
Trial- Cultural background not discussed although ‘honour killing’ recognised. 
Appeal-Term of 14 years set by trial judge agreed. 
 
14. R v Nazir 
[2009] EWCA CRIM 213 
BACKGROUND: D killed his wife by striking her three times over head with plank. He raised the 
defence of provocation and asked that the provocation be considered in the light of his cultural 
background because an assault on a man by his wife in China was deemed to be a great insult (his 
wife had prodded him with a plank and thrown tea in his face).The jury rejected the defence of 
provocation. He was found guilty of murder and sentenced to life to serve 12 years. 
He appealed under Para 3 of Schedule 22 to Criminal Justice Act 2003  for a review of the minimum 
term of his sentence on the basis that his defence of provocation (his wife had prodded him with 
a plank and thrown a cup of tea in his face) should be considered in the light of his cultural 
background. 
BACKGROUND: Kumar was part of a gang that took a vulnerable youth hostage to extract 
money from him. The gang beat him to death before stripping him and setting his body alight. 
Kumar was convicted of murder and sentenced to life, to serve 17 years. The trial judge 
identified K’s cultural background as the only mitigating factor, noting that his family had come 
to England to escape civil war in Sri Lanka. 
Proceedings in QB were to set minimum term. 
BACKGROUND: Yeshu Yones was murdered by her father Abdullah Yones. He pleaded guilty 
and was sentenced to life imprisonment. At trial the prosecution recognized the murder as an 
honour killing with prosecutor Nazir Azal stating that the victim ’… was murdered because she 
loved the wrong person, in her family’s eyes. It was an ‘honour killing’ to protect the perceived 
status of the family and to mark their disapproval.’ Yones was convicted of murder to serve 14 
years. 
Proceeding in QB were to set the minimum term. 
 
BACKGROUND: Samaira Nazir was killed by her brother Azhar Nazir (who actively participated 
in a joint enterprise to kill he because he claimed he was protecting the honour of the family) 
and by her cousin Imran Mohammed. Her family did not approve of the caste of her boyfriend 






Trial- Culture was raised in the context of the killing. 
Appeal-This was against conviction on three grounds including the judges 
direction on joint enterprise and the anonymity of witnesses. Appeal dismissed. 
 
 
15. R v Mahmod (Babkir) 





16. R v Khatun 
[2010] EWCA CRIM 138 
 
 
Trial- The judge did acknowledge that cultural background may provide innocent 
explanation for lies. 
Appeal- Counsel argued that expert evidence was admissible because the expert 
could help the jury understand why K had lied, evidence could explain why K 
gave a no comment interview when arrested, a fact that led to a standard inverse 
inference direction and evidence could explain why she made no initial reference 
to  sexual abuse. However the trial judge was entitled to find that no expert 
assistance was required as assessment for the lies and omissions did not require 
expert evidence. Appeal dismissed. 
convicted of murder and given a life sentence to serve 20 years and Mohammed a life sentence 
to serve 10 years. 
BACKGROUND: Mahmod was convicted of the murder of his daughter Banaz. He did not 
actually kill her but arranged her killing. He was sentenced to life, to serve 20 year. His brother 
Ari Mahmod Babakir Aga was convicted of murder and sentenced to life to serve 23 years. 
Mohammed Marid Hama was also convicted of murder and sentenced to life to serve 17 years. 
Mahmod appealed against conviction on the basis of fresh evidence from the victim’s sister. At 
trial he held that he did not distinguish between his sons and daughters and that he believed 
in human rights and women’s rights. Leave to appeal refused 
BACKGROUND: K convicted of murder of husband and sentenced to life to serve 17 years. Her 
defence was that the stabbing of her husband (it was her second arranged marriage) arose 
from cultural tensions. Various witnesses from K’s background had given evidence but the trial 
judge excluded expert assistance on cultural issues, particularly on why she had initially lied to 
the police. She appealed on 3 grounds. 
Ground 3-The trial judge ‘was wrong to exclude expert evidence as to K’s cultural background 
which could explain why she had initially lied to police and failed to say that she had been 
physically and sexually abused by her husband 
HELD: Appeal dismissed. The trial judge was entitled to find that no expert assistance was 
required. 
REMARKS: There was no issue as to the expertise of Miss Patel, an expert in the culture from 
which the appellant came. 
Counsel argued that expert evidence was admissible because  
1. The expert could help the jury understand why K had lied (and the trial judge did 
acknowledge that cultural background may provide an innocent explanation for lies) 
2. Evidence could explain why K gave a no comment interview when arrested a fact 
which ked to a standard adverse inference direction 
3. Evidence could explain why K made no initial reference to sexual abuse 












17. Re Naz 
[2011] EWHC 2850 (QB) 
Trial-Culture was not raised in mitigation (though religious beliefs were raised in 
the context of provocation). 
Appeal- Culture was allowed to be taken into account on appeal ‘…on the 
grounds that while the cultural background of the defendants could not excuse a 
killing such as this, it mitigated the criminality of the defendants a little.’ (Lord 
Bingham LCJ) Appeal allowed and recommended minimum period for both 
Shazad Naz and Shakeela Naz be reduced to 14 years. 
 
18. R v Khan (Adeel) 
[2015] EWCA Crim 1816 
 
 
Trial-Background of defendant was taken into account but not the pressures of 
cultural issues. 
Appeal- Although the motivation for a revenge attack of this kind by an adult could 
never be used in mitigation ‘…the position may be less clear cut with a child or 
young person, just as it is when sentencing judges are dealing with young or 
vulnerable offenders who have been put under tangible and substantial pressure 
into committing any crime by identified family members or older friends. Here 
there was no evidence of such pressure. ‘A vague appeal to cultural pressure 
cannot assist anymore than it would, for example, were a 17 year old to beat up 
someone in a revenge attack for a perceived insult to his girlfriend and then said 
BACKGROUND: Shazad Ali Naz was convicted (along with his mother Shakeela Naz although his 
younger brother Iftikhar was acquitted)  of the murder of his sister Rukhsana in 1999. The family 
claimed that this was an ‘honour killing’. At trial he pleaded provocation on the grounds that news 
of his sisters pregnancy caused a sudden and temporary loss of control on account of his religious 
beliefs. The judge asked the jury to consider whether a reasonable and sober person of her 
brother’s age religion and sex would have acted as he did. They decide not and he was convicted 
of murder and sentenced to life imprisonment to serve a minimum term of 17 years. At trial 
Tucker J said that the case was a horrific example of outdated and misplaced family pride but 
there was no mention of cultural reasons in his plea in mitigation. He appealed against sentence 
under the Criminal Justice Act 2003. 
 
BACKGROUND: Khan (17) was convicted of the attempted murder of Ismail Khan (15). He had 
attacked him with a hammer because Ismail Khan was in a relationship with Khan’s younger sister. 
The court considered this a planned revenge attack. Khan was sentenced to 15 years detention in 
a young offenders institution. He appealed against his sentence on the grounds that he was only 
17 when he committed the offence and that although the trial judge had recited Khan’s 
background he failed to appreciate that there were ‘…cultural issues in play which  
must have imposed subtle pressure on the appellant to do something’. The prosecution had 





his response was the normal way of dealing with such matters in his family or 






19. Re AG Ref (No. 66 of 2010) 
(Also known as R v NW) 
[2011] EWCA CRIM 97 
 
 
Trial-Cultural background was raised in the context of sentence and the trial judge 
made oblique reference to the effect of assimilation. 
Appeal-There was concern about the judges observations on cultural influence 
and the defendant’s cultural background should be irrelevant to the sentencing 
decision. It was not a feature that could be said to justify any reduction in the 
sentence particularly for a defendant who had lived in the UK for some years and 
knew his actions were unacceptable. Sentence increased from 7 to 11 years. 
 
20. Re AG Ref (No 1 of 2011) 
(Also known as R v A) 




Appeal-The cultural background of an offender of Pakistani origin who had raped 
his wife on numerous occasions was of no relevance for the purposes of 
mitigation. Cultural background was not a feature that justified or could begin to 
be said to justify any reduction in sentence. The defendant had in any event lived 
in the UK for some years and therefore the issue of cultural background had no 
relevance. (Lord Judge LCJ) Appeal dismissed. 
 
21. R v MA 




Appeal- Counsel for the appellant submitted that the learned judge ‘could have 
treated [him] slightly differently from a man who had been brought up in the UK. 
The Court of Appeal rejected that submission out of hand. ‘no man, whatever his 
background, creed or colour has the right to rape his wife.’ (Paragraph 20 Official 
Transcript) 
BACKGROUND: N was convicted of marital rape in the year following marital breakdown. The trial 
judge indicated that N, who came from an African culture where marital rape might be condoned, had 
been influenced by his cultural background. Reference to The AG was allowed on the basis that the 
sentence was unduly lenient 
BACKGROUND: A convicted of marital rape and sentenced to 9 years in prison. Appealed on basis that 
cultural background was of relevance in mitigation 
BACKGROUND: Marital rape. A sentence of 8 years was given on the basis that the defendant was 








22. R v A 






23. Christian and Others v The Queen 
[2006] UKPC 47 
 
 





Appeal- Was the culture of the victim relevant in sentencing? 
 
25. R v Sebastian Pinto and Others 
[2006] EWCA CRIM 749 
 
Trial- 
Appeal- Applicants 2 and 3 appealed against sentence. Applicant 1 appealed 





26. R v Goren 
[2001] EWCA CRIM 307 
 
BACKGROUND: A convicted of marital rape and sentenced to 14 years to serve a minimum of 8 years 
on the grounds of ‘dangerousness’ and public protection 
He appealed against sentence on the ground that the starting point for sentence was too high as he 
had not been brought up in the UK and his offending was based on a cultural belief that he had a right 
to rape his wife rather than on a disregard of UK behavioral norms. Counsel submitted that the trial 
judge ‘could have treated [him] slightly differently from a man who had been brought up in the UK’ 
HELD: The finding of ‘dangerousness’ was met. This was a campaign of rape’. Appeal dismissed. 
REMARKS: ‘No man, whatever his background race or creed has the right to rape his wife’ 
BACKGROUND: Leave to appeal against 7 year custodial sentence 
BACKGROUND:  
BACKGROUND: Mehmet Goren was convicted of wounding with intent to cause grievous bodily harm 
under S18 OAPA 1861. He was sentenced to 7 years in prison.  His daughter was in a relationship with 
a Turkish political refugee and had left home to live with him and they were planning to marry, with 
Goren’s consent, when the daughter was 16. After a meeting with others from the Turkish community 
Goren stabbed the man in the neck with a hatchet. The trial judge said that the attack had been 
premeditated and made in revenge. Goren raised the issue of self defence but this was not accepted. 







Appeal-Provocation was raised at appeal and in mitigation severe treatment in 
Turkey where the appellant was tortured and imprisoned for his political beliefs. 
Defence counsel argued that the victim’s political beliefs were a ‘moral outrage’ 
in the defendant’s community. The Court of Appeal affirmed that the sole question 
for them was one of severity of sentence. It was held that although tis was clearly 
a revenge attack the sentence of 7 years was too long and it was reduced to 5 
years.  
 
27.Crawford v CPS 
[2008] EWHC148(admin) 
Trial- 
Appeal-The High Court accepted the submission that the Crown Court had been 
wrong to refer to the appellants culture. ‘…it may be a generous interpretation to 
take into account the appellant’s ‘culture’ but the Crown Court did so , meaning 
that a person of the appellants culture would have a less ready understanding of 
what amounted to harassment than a white person. This was condescending, 
unjustified and unfair and assumed that the culture of the appellant predisposed 
him to act in certain ways.’ 
 
27. The Queen on the Application of Mohammed v Nursing Midwifery 
Council 




Appeal -The Nursing Midwifery Council had placed sufficient weight on the 
cultural influence and personal mitigation is less relevant in this type of case than 
in criminal cases where the purpose of the sanction is punishment. 
 
 
28. R v Zaynab Hamza, R v Sabina Ahmed 





BACKGROUND: The appellant was a midwife who had been struck off after being found guilty of money 
laundering even though she claimed she had no knowledge of the fraud. Her evidence to the Nursing 
Midwifery Council was that in the Yoruba culture a wife should obey her husband in all things. The 
council had stated ‘Although the panel are sympathetic to cultural influences these should not override 
the law of the land or a professional person’s code of conduct’. She appealed against the decision on 
the basis that although the panel had listened to and accepted the mitigation re the Yoruba culture 
they had not placed sufficient weight on it.  
BACKGROUND: Two women claimed they were sisters and that they had resided together in order to 
be able to exercise a right to buy social housing. They were charged with 8 counts of fraud under S1 
Fraud Act 2006, pleaded guilty and were each sentenced to 20 months in prison. They appealed against 
sentence on the basis that although they were not in fact sisters it was normal in their culture to refer 
to one another as sisters. There had been detailed consideration of mitigation at sentence but  culture 






29. R v Taylor (Paul Simon) 





30. R v Andrews (Reuben Philip) 
[2004] EWCA CRIM 947 
Trial- 
Appeal-Appeal dismissed. There was no incompatibility between S170 and 
Article 9. 
 
31. R v Cooper (Justin Shane) 
[2003] EWCA 2259 
Trial- 
Appeal- Appeal against custodial sentence dismissed on the basis that ‘…many 
people from different backgrounds, whether they be religious, cultural or ethnic, 
would have particular difficulty coping with imprisonment, and the court would 
have considerable difficulty distinguishing between members of different groups 
on that basis.’ 








BACKGROUND: Taylor was convicted of possession of cannabis under Misuse of Drugs Act 1971. The 
question was whether the use of cannabis for religious purposes provided a defence. 
 
 
BACKGROUND: Andrews imported cannabis which he used, as a Rastafarian, as a result of his religious 
beliefs and was convicted for drug trafficking under S 170 (2) Customs and Excise Management Act 
1979 and sentenced to…  He argued that S170(2) of the 1979 Act was incompatible with his rights under 
the Human Rights Act 1998 (and Article 9 ECHR) 
 
BACKGROUND: Cooper was convicted of dangerous driving following a car accident and sentenced to 
9 months in prison and given a three year driving disqualification. He appealed against the custodial 
sentence on the grounds that he was a member of a devout religious community, the Plymouth 
Brethren, and that he was likely to be excluded from the community as a result of imprisonment. He 
claimed that the trial judge had not taken account of mitigating factors, particularly religious 









ANNEX B  
Multiculturalism 
 
Documents and Sources Reviewed for Thematic Content Analysis of Policy on 
Multiculturalism 
(All sources accessed 1st October 2018) 
 
 
Part 1 Government or Government Initiated Policy Documents 
  
2000 The Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain 
Commission on the Future of Multi-Ethnic Britain set up by Runnymede in 
January 1998 
(The Parekh Report) 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/29/32.html 
 
2001 Community Pride Not Prejudice: Making Diversity Work in Bradford 
The Bradford District Race Review Panel 




2001 One Oldham, One Future: Independent Panel Report 
(David Ritchie) 
Cohesion Institute (no longer available online)  
 
2001 Integration: Mapping the Field 
Report of a Project carried out by the University of Oxford Centre for Migration 
and Policy Research and Refugee Studies Centre contracted by the Home Office 




2001 Community Cohesion 
A Report of the Independent Review Team Home Office Report 




2002 Secure Borders, Safe Haven: Integration with Diversity in Modern 
Britain  Immigration White Paper (Home Office 2002) Led to Nationality, 














2005 Improving Opportunity, Strengthening Society Strategy: The 






2005 Integration Matters: A National Strategy for Refugee Integration 




2006 The Duty to Integrate: Shared British Values 




2007-2008 Citizenship Survey 
Department for Communities and Local Government. Race, Cohesion and Faith 
Research Unit, National Centre for Social Research. (2008). Citizenship Survey, 
2007-2008. [data collection]. 6th Edition. UK Data Service. SN: 5739, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.5255/UKDA-SN-5739-1. 
 
2007 Our Shared Future  




2007 The Governance of Britain 
Ministry of Justice Cm 7170 July 2007 




2007 The Governance of Britain 
Green Paper 07/72 26th October 2007 
House of Commons Library 
 










2008 The Government’s Response to the Commission on Cohesion and 
Integration 




2008 Face to Face and Side by Side: A Framework for Partnership in Our 
Multicultural Society 




2008 Managing the Impacts of Migration: A Cross Government Approach 




2010 Attitudes, Values and Perceptions: Muslims and the General 
Population in 2007-2008 




2010 How Fair is Britain?  






2012 Building Safe Active Communities: Strong Foundations by Local 
People 




2012 Creating the Conditions for Integration 




2015 Living with Difference: Community Diversity and the Common Good 
Baroness Elizabeth Butler-Sloss 




2015 Community Integration 
Department for Communities and Local Government 








2015 Social Integration Commission 
Kingdom United? Thirteen Steps to Tackle Social Segregation 
Matthew Taylor 
http://socialintegrationcommission.org.uk/images/sic_kingdomunited.pdf 








2018 Integrated Communities Strategy 
Ministry of Housing Communities and Local Government 




2018 National Conversation on Immigration 





Part 2 European Union Policy Documents 
 
Horizon 2020 
Research Programme of European Union, successor to Microcon Framework 
Programmes 
 
Migratory Policy Group (see Part 3 below) 
Handbook on Integration for Policy Makers and Practitioners 




Justice and Home Affairs Council 
2618th Council Meeting  
Press release 14615/04 Brussels 19th November 2009 
 













European Union Observatory on Democracy - Robert Shuman Centre of the 
European Union Institute Florence (EUDO) 
Launched January 2009. Keeps country profiles. Handbook for the UK ‘Access 





Part 3 Other Documents and Sources of Policy 
 
Migration Policy Group (MPG) 
Independent non profit think tank founded 1995 and based in Brussels with focus 
on migration, anti-discrimination and integration 
Keeps Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX) 148 policy indicators on migrant 
integration based on public laws, policy and research.  
http://www.migpolgroup.com/ 
 
The Migration Observatory University of Oxford (MO) 
Based at the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS) at the University 
of Oxford, the Migration Observatory provides impartial, independent, 
authoritative, evidence-based analysis of data on migration and migrants in the 
UK, to inform media, public and policy debates, and to generate high quality 
research on international migration and public policy issues. The Observatory’s 
analysis involves experts from a wide range of disciplines and departments at the 
University of Oxford. 
http://www.migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/ 
 
Migration Watch UK (MWUK) 
Independent and non-political think tank formed in 2008 and chaired by Lord 
Green of Deddinton.  
http://www.migrationwatchuk.org/about-us 
 
Migration Policy Institute (MP Institute) 
Independent non partisan non profit think tank dedicated to the analysis of the 
movement of people world wide. Founded in 2001 and based in Washington. 
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/ 
 
Multicultural Policy Index (MP index) 
Research project monitoring the evolution of multicultural policies in 21 Western 





Sussex Centre for Migration Research 
University of Sussex 
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